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Legal Status of Integration Treaties and the
Enforcement of Treaty Obligations: A Look
at the COMESA Process
P.

KENNETH KIPLAGAT*

I. INTRODUCTION

Integration treaties are international treaties that bring together
different countries as equals. Such integration treaties necessarily
impact the domestic jurisdictions of the Member States and interfere
with their sovereignty. It is important, therefore, that those States be
equipped to handle the interference caused by this impact through
legislative and judicial developments adopted by the Member States.
The key theme of this paper is the role of law in the management
and consolidation of regional integration in developing countries. It
examines the general attitudes of developing countries towards treaties, in general, and the resulting domestic legislation, in particular.
To do this, Section II discusses State relations as a function of treaty
law. Section III explores the observance of treaties by developing countries. Section IV describes the specific impact of integration treaties on
domestic jurisdiction. Section V analyzes the impact of treaty law on
domestic law. Section VI describes the methods through which developing countries have harmonized their domestic law to comply with the
treaties. Section VII concludes the article.
II.

STATE RELATIONS As A FUNCTION OF TREATY LAW

Interaction between states is made possible by the existence of
international law which is primarily1 the product of customary inter-

* J.S.D. Candidate, Yale Law School; LL.M. Yale Law School, 1992; LL.B. University of Nairobi; Lecturer, University of Nairobi.
1. Article 38(1) of the STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE is
traditionally taken as the archetypal proclamation of the sources of international law
and mandates the International Court to apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
The above is the traditional view, but it is no longer accepted by some scholars who
are persuaded that international law is a constitutive process of authoritative pre-
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national law and treaty' law. In participating in this interaction,
States exercise the highest measure of their sovereignty. The Permanent Court of International Justice determined that though "any convention creating an obligation. . places a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of the state ... the right of entering into
international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty."3 To
the extent that participation in treaty-making presupposes the exercise
of recognized sovereign authority, a criteria to evaluate such participation is imperative. This criteria has evolved and discarded most of its
obsolete traits.4 Two such traits, that only "christian"5 or "civilized"6
States could claim the right to be bona fide subjects7 of international
scriptions of fundamental community policy. See, Myres S. McDougal & Harold D.
Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53
AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959). See infra notes 30-32; and W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY
AND REVISION 555 (1971).
Prof. Reisman in his contribution to this area of study states that:
[t]he root problem of enumerated sources such as are found in article 38
is that of priorities. In point of fact, the problem of priorities is artificial, since authoritative international policy does not present itself for
application with a convenient label affixed, specifying its sources. International prescription is an ongoing process. The purport of a convention
cannot be grasped without consideration of prior and subsequent customary developments, their consonance with general principles, and the
response of quasi-authoritative doctrine.
2. The International Law Commission provisional draft on the law of treaties
defined a "treaty" as:
any international agreement in written form, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever
its particular designation (treaty, convention, protocol, covenant, charter,
statute, act, declaration, concordat, exchange of notes, agreed minute,
memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi or any other appellation),
concluded between two or more States or other subjects of international
law and governed by international law.
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 161, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1962/Add. 1 (1962).
3. S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. et al v. Germany), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25.
4. See generally David Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 1 (1986) (providing a historical analysis).
5. B.V.A. ROLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN EXPANDED WORLD 21 (1960).
This divine imploration in the overall context of European imperialism of the time
was used as:
the justification of, or the legal title to, the domination of non-Christian
peoples. The quality of Christian Nation conferred the legal title to the
domination of the 'barbarian' 'heathen' world. The biblical 'Go and instruct all peoples' the 'compelle intrare,' was the justification of subjection and domination. It provided that inner certainty and self-confidence
are essential for a ruling position.
6. Id. at 27. Whereas the criteria of "civilization" may have been intended to
embody a shared cultural and social facsimile, the whole notion was sufficiently
nebulous to permit a Japanese diplomat, following his country's admission to the
"civilized" world, to quip, in not very whimsical savour: "We show ourselves at least
your equals in scientific butchery and at once we are admitted to your council tables
as civilized men."
7. As opposed to "objects" of international law, which comprised all "heathen"
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law, survived until the nineteenth century. A measure of objectivity'
has now been ingrained into the process with the adoption of a new set
of standards9 for the determination of statehood and, consequently,
participation in international state relations.
As international customary law has failed to keep pace with the
growing sophistication of international interactions, treaties have progressively assumed dominance as sources of international law.'0 An
attendant corollary to this new prestige has been the naturing,
through consent and often times through subtle duress, of a higher
degree of fidelity to treaties." Without diminishing the economic efficiency that treaties have precipitated in international relations, it is
legitimate to conclude that the previously self-styled "civilized" states
spotted an opportunity to conveniently perpetuate their privileged
position in treaties 2 and to this extent have influenced other states to
assign the same measure of fidelity to treaties. This perception has
influenced the attitude of developing countries towards treaties.

and "uncivilized" States, it would of course, be a contradiction of terms to label such
entities as States using the same criteria.
8. BIERLY JAMES LESLIE, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1958) (Objectivity in this sense does not relate to the material and substantive
evaluation of the subject, but rather reflects a move to a non-whimsical evaluative
criteria).
9. The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States is widely
acknowledged as having coalesced competing criteria into a definite set of rules and
provides at Article 1 that:
The State as a person of international law should possess the following
qualifications:
(a) a permanent population;
(b) a defined territory;
(c) government; and
(d) capacity to enter into relations with the other States.
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165
L.N.T.S. 1925. The United Nations Charter provides:
Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace loving
States which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter
and, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry
out these obligations. U.N. CHARTER art. 4.
10. A.J.G.M. SANDERS, INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE IN AFRICAN CONTEXT 177
(1979). According to Sanders, "it may well be that the relative importance of treaty
law as a manifestation of international law is increasing rapidly."
11. Harold H. Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347,
2358-59 (1991) (The Allied victory in World War II contributed to this development).
12. See generally Myres S. McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A
Contemporary Conception, 82 HAGUE RECUEIL 137 (1953).
13. Id. (This does not suggest that it is an illegitimate Way of creating international law. Acquiring and maintaining a privileged position is consistent with the
power and policy understanding of international law).
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III. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND TREATY OBSERVANCE
The decline in esteem which developing countries' accorded international treaties was produced by two experiences. The first relates
to the succession of new states to international treaties and the second
to the frustrations of developing countries resulting from their inability
to effect material remodelling of international law. Speaking to the former experience, developing countries emerging from colonial subjugation found it onerous to yield to an international regime whose essence
derived from a set of "principles by which the Western Powers agreed
to live and to conduct their business. " " In concrete terms, these countries had'" two options: (1) succumbing to the conservative view 7
which held that new States were born into an already preexisting legal
system, upon which they depended for their creation and existence, 8

14. In the discussion that follows, note that Latin American countries do not fit
perfectly into the picture sought to be created because these countries had both a
long history and a different colonial experience.
15. S. PRAKASH SINHA, NEW NATIONS AND THE LAw OF NATIONS 23 (1967).

16. Past tense is utilized here, and in the following discussion, because in material terms the debate is no longer considered useful, and when it is revived, as is
oft to happen, it assumes a more sophisticated tenor.
17. The literature on the subject sometimes refers to this view as the "positivist"
view. This school of thought concludes that for new States to legally join the international community they:
must formally enter into the circle of law-governed countries .. . [and]
do something with the acquiescence of the latter ["civilized" States], or
some of them, which amounts to an acceptance of the law in its entirety
beyond all possibility of misconstruction.
WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 47 (1924).

Some adherents refused admittance of new States to the international community claiming that "[a]n undignified compulsion to admit these entities as full-blown
members of the international society upon achieving independence has impeded, not
advanced, the emergence of a mature code of conduct." A.V. Freeman, Professor
McDougal's 'Law and Minimum World Public Order', 58 AM. J. INT'L L., 711, 712
(1958). L. C. Green warns that wanton recognition and grant of equal status to new
States would result in "a breakdown of rules and the reassertion of anarchy". L.C.
Green, The Impact of New States on International Law, 4 ISRAEL L. REV. 27, 31
(1969).
Thus, law is intrinsically objective and the binding force of legal rules is unrelated to the attitudes of states toward these rules. Georges Abi-Saab, The Newly
Independent States and the Rules of International Law, 8 How. L. J. 95 (1962). See
also MORTON KAPLAN & B. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961); and W. FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1964).
18. The philosophical justification being that:
[T]he sovereign State is an intellectual artifact; its character, its form,
and its qualities derive from a theoretical exposition of political organization which is nothing if not Western and has its roots in the Age of
Reason as much as has international law. New States can hardly claim
the privileges and faculties of States and yet repudiate the system from
which these derive; yet this is precisely what the argument involves. It
overlooks that a State, when it commences to exist as a State, does so
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or (2) embracing the naturalist ' 9 view which proclaims that for any
rules of international law to be accepted erga omnes, they must obtain
the consensus of the great majority of States, including the new
States.2" Although it would be fallacious to pretend that developing
countries had an unvarying response,2" it is nevertheless true that, by
and large, the latter view represented the majority opinion. 2' The
Nyerere Doctrine' best elucidates this majority view and embraces
the tabula rasa or clean-slate argument.2 4 The argument adopts the
presumption that new States come into existence without assuming
the obligations of their predecessors.' Obligations that predecessor
States owed lapse upon the declaration of independence and the new
States have an absolute right of election as to which rules of interna-

in a structural context which gains its form from law, just as a child
when born into society becomes subjected to it by virtue of the order of
being in which it is integrated.
D.P.O. O'Connell, The Role of International Law, 95 DAEDALUS 636 (1966).
19. M. Mushkat, Some Remarks on the Factors Influencing the Emergence and
Evolution of InternationalLaw, 7 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REv. 341 (1961) (Cited also
as the sociological view).
20. BIERLY JAMEs LESLIE, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9
(1958).
21. OKON UDOKANG, SUCCESSION OF NEW STATES To INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
10 (1972) (There have been many instances which display a vacillation towards traditional norms of international law by developing countries).
22. Herbert Kraus, Systemes et Fonctions des Traitds Internationaux, 50 RECuEIL
DES COURS 311, 322 (1934). Attitudes of many new States are best understood by
analyzing the definitional character of treaties. A majority of these States preferred
the following definition:
treaties in international law are unions of wills, in solving obligations
between members of the community governed by international law.
From this premise, new States argue that during colonialism they were not
able to express their will and were, therefore, incapable of executing treaties. Paradoxically, colonial powers regarded indigenous people as incompetent to enter into
treaties but insisted that they be bound by treaties executed by these powers when
independence was finally granted. See, e.g., Ole Njogo and Others v. Attorney General and Others [1914] 5 E.A.P.L.R. 90. The court after describing the Maasai as
" . . . a large nomad tribe of pastoralists and warriors who have in the past proved
a terror and scourge to the surrounding peoples" concludes that:
... it would seem that an agreement between a civilized State and
uncivilized community is not governed by International Law. It must
however, I think, be taken to be governed by some rules analogous to
International Law and to have similar force to that held by a treaty,
and must be regarded by Municipal Courts in a similar manner ....
Id. at 98.
23. See, Materials on Succession of States, United Nations Legislative Series,
1967, at 177, United Nations, Secretariat, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.BJ14 (1967); Joseph Salli Poonyane Molefi v. The Government of Lesotho [1967-1970] LESOTHO L.R.
237, 254-259 (Derived from a declaration deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations on December 9, 1961 and signed by Prime Minister Nyerere of Tanzania).
24. See generally YILMA MAKONNEN, THE NYERERE DOCTRINE OF STATE SUCCESSION (1984).
25. Id. at 54.
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tional law they wish to recognize as binding upon them.2"
The second experience relates to the post-independence woes that
the majority of developing countries have endured. The political grant
of independence bestowed little more than formal equality with old
States. Because these new States comprised a majority of the world's
most impoverished countries, both in political as well as economic
terms,27 momentum was generated towards the infusion of material
essence into this formal equality.' This led new States to question
the legitimacy of international treaties which perpetuated what they
perceived to be an inequitable and biased international regime. In
another posture, this logic evolved into the New International Economic Order (NIEO)' crusade.
This article does not adopt or approve the above arguments as
they relate to the conceptualization of international law. In fact, the
stance taken by new States respecting international law is misguided.
The world is an arena in which States, albeit very important players,
accept policies on the basis of enlightened self-interest.0 Within this
framework, international law evolves as a fusion of authoritative power and effective control, informed by a flow of decisions resulting in the
formulation, invocation and application of policies for the promotion of
predetermined community goals." Under this framework, international law closely approximates the minimum power that international
elites are ready to cede for the sake of attaining a minimum, and
workable, world communion. These elites are constantly engaged in
the preservation of their interests and owe very little fidelity to ab-

26. Id. See also MUDIMURANWA MuTnTI, STATE SUCCESSION To TREATIES IN RESPECT OF NEWLY INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES (1976); THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
ASSOCIATION, THE EFFECT OF INDEPENDENCE ON TREATIES (1965).
27. B.H. SIMAMBA, AN AFRICAN PREFERENTIAL TRADE AREA 123 (1993) (Simamba,
commenting on the relevance of poverty on the practice of international law among
members of the PTA, concludes that "[a] young and large economic grouping comprising basically poor, economically insecure countries, cannot be expected to easily
accept a superior international order.").
28. SANDERS, supra note 10, at 125. (The argument sought to create some relevance to the numerical superiority of new States in international legislative fora).
29. The NIEO is a concept strongly supported by developing countries which
seeks to introduce equitable principles in trade and economic relations between developed and developing countries. The origin of this concept, at least in its popular
form, is credited to the Bandung Conference of Asian-African States of 1955. See
Asian-African Conference Communique, Bandung, 24 April, 1955, A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1945-75 1:2-3 (1975). See generally
T. FRANK & M. MANUANSANGU, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING? (1982); Karl P. Sauvant, The NIEO Program: Reasons, Proposals,and Progress, CHANGING PRIORITIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA:
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 78-138 (1981).
30. See generally McDougal, supra note 12, at 9. (This may also be expressed as
the "syndrome of parochialism."). See also Freeman, supra note 17, at 715.
31. Id. at 181.
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stract notions of international law that fail to take into account this
dynamic." Given that international elites are not motivated by altruism, unless of course such altruism simultaneously perpetuates their
interests, it is unrealistic for new States to presume that their numerical superiority, and nothing more, can compel the old states to compromise their interests.
It is, however, critical to make a distinction between
the objective
evaluation of the character of international law and the subjective
understanding of international law. Whereas the former forms the
basis for proper theoretical analysis, the latter, even in its erroneous
articulation, informs decisions of many new states.3 In order to understand the way new States treat and practice international law it is
critical to appreciate these attitudes. 4 This should not be taken to
mean that there exists a general animosity among the new states
toward international law but rather that new states disapprove of
order that they perceive to be unjust. The above discussion illuminates
one crucial point: the attitude of new States towards international law
has generally eroded the fidelity that these states accord regional treaties, which are a genre of international law. One consequence of this
attitude is evident in the treatment of treaties by national courts.
IV.

INTEGRATION TREATIES IN DOMESTIC JURISPRUDENCE

Before delving into the precise investigation of integration treaties
in municipal law, an understanding of the theoretical background of
this subject is essential.35 Analysis of how existing theories on the
subject, and the judicial interpretations they have spawned, have affected and influenced the treatment of integration treaties in developing countries remains important. The question has traditionally been
framed as one involving a conflict between monist and dualist theo-

32. H. Laski, Morris Cohen's Approach to Legal Philosophy, 15 U. CHI. L. REV.
575 (1947-48). Addressing this general dissatisfaction with traditional notions of
international law, Laski notes that:
[w]hat has done most damage of all is the effort to think of law and
the law maker as something abstracted from life and living, a quasi
independent existence of its own.
33. C. Wilfred Jenks, State Succession in Respect of Law-Making Treaties, 29
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 105, 108 (1952) (Jenks notes that "[t]he psychology of newly won
independence is a formidable reality, and juristic speculation on state succession
which ignored it would be an altogether unprofitable exercise.").
34. UDONKANG, supra note 21, at 9. See also W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 318 (1964). Relating these attitudes to economic
factors, Friedmann concludes that:
[i(n the present as it has done in the past and will do in the future, a
status of economic underdevelopment will produce certain attitudes and
approaches toward international law, which will change or even be reversed as the underlying conditions change.
35. Koh, supra note 11, at 2351-52.
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ries.3" Taken to its logical conclusion, the inquiry addresses the difference between international law on the one hand and municipal law on
the other. It is not difficult to see why this difference between international law and municipal law forms part of the inquiry. Loosely defined, and acknowledging that numerous exceptions exist, international law is a law that regulates the relations between sovereigns whereas municipal law, generally speaking, regulates the power structure
and relations operating within a state. Because often times the two
systems of law purport to apply to the same set of facts at the same
time, a tension arises which necessitates the establishment of rules to
delimit the jurisdictions of the two regimes.
According to the dualist school, international law and municipal
on a horizontal plane, each with its own sphere of influcompete
law
37
ence. When the issue is so posited, the controversy ceases to exist
because no possibility of conflict can arise when each regime has its
own exclusive area of competence. Because of this difference:
... the Law of Nations can neither as a body nor in parts be per se
a part of Municipal Law. Just as Municipal Law lacks the power of
altering or creating rules of International Law, so the latter lacks
absolutely the power of altering or creating rules of Municipal Law.
If, according to the Municipal Law of an individual State, the Law
of Nations as a body or in parts is considered to be part of the law
of the land, this can only be so either by municipal custom or by
statute, and then the respective rules of the Law of Nations have
by adoption become at the same time rules of Municipal Law.38

The monist school sees international law as intrinsically superior
to municipal law and any dispute between the two, even within the
municipal sphere, ought to be resolved in favor of the former.39 This
school asserts that international and municipal law are "manifesta-

36. Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal,
100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2292-94 (1991).
37. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw: A TREATISE 37 (1967). Oppenheim lists
three determinative differences between municipal law and international law as
being:
(i) that in respect of sources, municipal law evolves from municipal
customs and statutes enacted by the local sovereign; (ii) that whereas
municipal regulates relations between individuals inter se and between
individuals and the State, international law is concerned with the relations between States; (iii) that "whereas Municipal Law is a law of a
sovereign over individuals subjected to his sway, the Law of Nations is
a law not above, but between, sovereign States, and is therefore a
weaker law."
38. Id.
39. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950). (The main

thrust of Prof. Lauterpacht's thesis is the elevation of the individual to a lawful subject of international law and thereby elimination of the need to relate international
law to sovereigns).
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tions of a single conception of law."' "It is only by reference to a higher legal rule in relation to which they are all equal, that the equality
and independence of a number of sovereign States can be conceived".4'
Several scholars have criticized Borchard's misgivings stemming
from the fact that both schools fail to acknowledge that the two regimes are linked and that an interdependence between the two exist.42 McDougal, in line with his theory of international law,' warns
of the futility of regarding the inquiry as one needing hierarchical
rules for its resolution. Rather, the proper approach should be to look
at the entire social and power processes in which powers of national
and international elites coalesce to produce certain desired common
interests." McDougal's view best explains the inconsistencies that the
application of the monist and dualist theories have produced when
analyzing the same fact patterns.
Switching to practice, international treaty law' and international
tribunals" have consistently pronounced that international obligations are not negated by contrary domestic law when the issue is before an international tribunal. However, no such certainty can be
found when the issue relates to the place and competence of international law in domestic adjudication. Aside from those countries that expressly acknowledge the supremacy of international law in their constitutions,47 most countries require that a qualitative step be taken to
transform international law into binding domestic law. In the absence
of such transformation, municipal courts refuse to acknowledge the
existence of such law within their domestic jurisdictions. The practice

40. Id. at 38.
41. Id. After laying the foundation for his basic norm theory, Kelsen concludes
that:

Since the basic norms of the national legal orders are determined by a
norm of international law, they are basic norms only in a relative sense.
It is the basic norm of the international legal order which is the ultimate reason of validity of the national legal order, too.
HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 367-8 (1945).
42. Borchard, The Relation Between International Law and Municipal Law, 27
VA. L. REV. 137, 140 (1940).
43. See generally McDougal, supra note 12.

44. Myres S. McDougal, The Impact of InternationalLaw Upon National Law: A
Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4 S. L. REV. 25, 37-38 (1959).

45. Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May
22, 1969, opened for signature May 23, 1969, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) states
that: "A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for
its failure to perform a treaty."
46. See Greco-Bulgarian Communities, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17, at 32 (the
Permanent Court of International Justice, in an advisory opinion, stated that:
it is a generally accepted principle of international law that in the relations between Powers who are contracting Parties to a treaty, the provisions of municipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty).
47. E.g., FRENCH CONST. art. 55; STATUUT. NED. [Constitution] art. 66.
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of the United Kingdom and the United States will help focus on the
two philosophical approaches that predominate in this area.

A. The United Kingdom's Experience
The United Kingdom, with its unique character of not having a
constitution, makes a distinction between customary international law
and treaty law. So far as customary international law is concerned,
English law (the common law position) regards international law as
automatically forming part of the law of England.' Sir William
Blackstone is credited with the refinement of this approach and the
following passage is said to capture its modern exposition:
In arbitrary states this law [of nations], wherever it contradicts or
is not provided for by the municipal law of the country, is enforced
by the royal power: but since, in England, no royal power can introduce new law, or suspend the execution of the old, therefore the
law of nations, wherever any question arises which is properly the
object of its jurisdiction, is here adopted in its full extent by the
common law, and is held to be part of the law of the land."'
In so far as treaties are concerned, English law mandates that these
have to undergo "transformation" by an act of parliament to imbue
them with efficacy within the domestic arena. The justification for this
rule is that while the conduct of foreign affairs falls solely within the
executive's prerogative, the executive may not legislatively effectuate
this power since parliament is the only body vested with legislative
power.'

B. The United States' Experience
In the United States the preeminence given to the Constitution
means that no treaty can stand if it offends a constitutional provision.
As will be shown below"1 , this 'constitutional focus is stronger than
that exhibited by most EEC countries and partly explains some of the
dispute resolution mechanisms that the United States has adopted
when entering into regional integration.52 Justice Sutherland's state-

48. Triquet v. Bath, 97 ENG. REP. 936, 938 (KIB. 1764); Heathfield v. Chilton, 98
ENG. REP. 50, 51 (K.B. 1767). (The central figure in the articulation of this ap-

proach, as the two cases indicate, was Lord Mansfield).
49. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 5:67. (This is the general preposition

and, like most such prepositions in law, has several exceptions: e.g., a rule of international law will not be applied if it is contrary to a statute). Mortensen v. Peters 8
F. (J.C.) 93 (1906). See also, IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 45-50 (1978).
50. See, The Parlement Belge, 4 PD 129 (1879); Attorney-General v. De Keyser's
Royal Hotel Ltd., 1920 App. Cas. 508; Regina v. Kent Justices, ex parte Lye and
Others, 2 QB 153 (1967).

51. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
52. William Graham, addressing the issue in the context of the GATT, Uruguay
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ment in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation' that the United
States' treaty power "must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution" represents the United States'
position.' Ratification by Congress is, therefore, mandatory. However,
the internal effects of a treaty may not be repealed by an ordinary
statute on the doctrine of lex posteriorsince ratification infuses constitutional status into these treaties. 5 The fidelity that the United
States accords international treaties has recently been questioned
following a series of controversial Supreme Court decisions culminating in the Mexican Abduction case.'
Having analyzed the general attitudes of various countries towards treaty law and having presented a picture of the domestic treatment of treaties, the next task is to investigate the extent to which
these attitudes and practices have had an impact on the formulation
and implementation of regional integration treaties. A comparative
analysis of the EEC, the ANDEAN Group, and the East African Community experiences shows how these attitudes have affected practice.
Close attention must be paid to the divergent opinions that very similar treaty provisions have produced in the different regions.
C. The EEC's Experience
The EEC Member States' attitudes towards integration treaties
has been greatly influenced by past experiences under provisions of the
ECSC days when the High Authority, the Community's main autono-

Talks has stated that,
The United States, at least until then, had always resisted the notion of
a dispute resolution. The U.S. Senate had indicated clearly in the Nicaragua case that it was not in the tradition of the United States to accept the surrender of sovereign power where a multilateral body would
determine binding rules, interpret them, and say: 'Jnited States, you
must do this, or you must do that.' The Europeans were even less willing to accept that.
William Graham, Remarks, Economic Development in the Third World: What Can be
Expected from the GATT Uruguay Round? 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoC. 578, 590-91
(1987). See also art. 2003-2022 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, December 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2003-2022.
53. U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 319-320 (1936).
54. Emc STEIN ET AL, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVEs: TEXT, CASES AND READINGS 103 (1976). (Caution should be exercised in
this regard as the United States Constitution does not specifically provide that treaties concluded must conform to the provisions of the Constitution).
55. ANDREW GREEN, POLITICAL INTEGRATION BY JURISPRUDENCE 481 (1969).
56. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). See also, David Almroth,
Extradition Treaty-Treaty Interpretation-Abduction of a Defendant from Mexico at the
Behest of the United States' Government Does Not Defeat a Court's Jurisdiction Despite the Extradition Treaty Between the Two Nations, 23 SETON HALL L.R. 1128
(1993). See also Robert Bork, Kidnapping Foreign Nationals, 29 NAT'L INTEREST 3
(1992).
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mous institution, was vested with "power to adopt self-executing '
measures which were directly binding on individuals."'8 The ratification of the Treaty of Rome 59 meant that this power could be executed
notwithstanding the monist or dualist make up of the national legal
order of the constituent Members.' This apparently simple provision
held tremendous import since the EEC, as we know it today, would be
a totally different creature without the exercise of this power. Therefore, the infusion of a federal structure into the community had been
laid well before the Treaty of Rome was signed.
What has been the nature of this federalism and what are its
main tenets? Briefly, the EEC has originated, in the absence of political union, a very unique system of federalism. 1 This has been made
possible by the coalescence of three basic principles: constitutionalism,
supremacy and preemption. This article will focus on two62 of these
principles, constitutionalism and supremacy.

57. The foundation of the theory of self-executing treaties is generally regarded
to have been created by the United States Supreme Court in Foster v. Nelson, 27
U.S. 253, 314 (1829). Chief Justice Marshall stated in that case that:
In the United States a different principal is established. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to
be regarded as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the
terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties
engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the
political, not to the Judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.
See also Claudy, The Treaty Power and Human Rights, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 699, 720
(1950) (criticizing this decision).
58. Joseph Weilee, Community, Member States and European Integration: Is the
Law Relevant, 21 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 39, 42 (1982).
59. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, done at Rome,
March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 as amended by the Single European Act, done at
the Hague, February 17 and 28, reproduced in 25 I.L.M. 507 as amended by the
Treaty on European Union and Final Act, done at Maastricht, February 7, 1992,
reproduced in 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
60. Weilee, supra note 58.
61. The EEC "is not a State, nor is it a Federal State. It is a Community of a
"
special kind in a state of progressive integration, an 'inter-State institution' ...
PIERRE PESCATORE, THE LAW OF INTEGRATION: EMERGENCE OF A NEW PHENOMENON
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BASED ON THE EXPERIENCES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 35 (1974). See also William Wallace, Less Than a Federation, More Than a
Regime: The Community as a Political System, in POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 403 (1977) (Wallace rhetorically wonders:
what sort of animal is the Community: a federation in the making, an
unusually well-developed framework for the management among governments of complex interdependence, or some sort of hybrid the like of
which cannot easily be identified either in the contemporary international system or in earlier times?).
62. For judicial articulation of the preemption doctrine see Case 22/70 ERTA
[1971] ECR 263. See also Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of
Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 224-30 (1990).
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1. Constitutionalism
To speak of constitutionalism within the context of the Treaty of
Rome, in the absence of political union within the EEC, often times
suggests a contradiction of terms. This is because constitutionalism is
popularly understood as the study of the distribution and balancing of
political power and to this extent the term has been catapulted to an
esoteric status.6 However, the Treaty of Rome, unlike other treaties,
utilizes constitutional law and administrative law concepts in such a
manner that national public law becomes the preferable tool of interpretation over public international law.6' To this extent, the Treaty of
Rome is a treaty sui generis in that it has, through the process of
constitutionalization, originated a structure having little in common
with a traditional international organization, while at the same time
not exhibiting qualities traditionally associated with a federal structure.6" The Treaty of Rome has become "the basic constitutional charter"' of the Community without the negation of the State. 6' A peculiar aspect of this development is that it was not prompted by express
provisions of the Treaty of Rome. Rather, it was the product of what

63. GREEN, supra note 55, at 22 n. 16. Andrew Green in attempting to demystify
the term has stated that:
... doubts about this usage of the word constitution persist. Part of
the difficulty is that of conceiving of constitutions and constitutional law
as esoteric things, and somehow as different in an ineffable way from
ordinary law. Such a conception is not valid. Constitutional law differs
from ordinary law only with respect to the subject matter it deals with.
No one is surprised these days to hear it stated that treaties can make
law. Consequently, no one should be surprised to hear it stated treaties
can make constitutional law and that treaties can thus be constitutions.
In fact, the American Constitution may be considered a treaty, for even
if the delegates did not officially represent the states, the Constitution
was ratified by three-quarters of the states. What makes a treaty into a
Constitution is the fact that it deals with the manner in which political
institutions shall be constituted, and with the powers which such institutions shall have. Any mystery about treaties as constitutions is dispelled by a little common sense.
64. JOHN T. LANG, THE COMMON MARKET AND COMMON LAW 34-35 (1966).
65. See generally Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 406 (1989) (providing a theoretical analysis of the conflict between
constitutionalism, democracy and treaty-making).
66. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2407
(1991).
67. Id. at 2480. (Weiler notes that the EEC, is neither state nor community. The
idea of community seeks to dictate a different type of intercourse among the actors
belonging to it, a type of self-limitation in their self-perception, a redefined self-interest, and, hence, redefined policy goals. To the interest of the state must be added
the interest of the community. But crucially, it. does not extinguish the separate
actors who are fated to live in an uneasy tension with two competing senses of the
polity's self, the autonomous self and the self as part of a larger community, and
committed to an elusive search for an optimal balance of goals and behavior between
the community and its actors.)
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some regard as judicial activism' on the part of the European Court
of Justice, with the help of national courts, which extended deference
to it.69 The development is peculiar because ordinarily national courts
tend to exhibit great hostility to external laws and bodies which present an affront to national constitutions and other national laws. Yet
national courts within the community have been willing to allow clear
cases of constitutional incompatibility" to stand for the sake of a wider goal: European integration. Here lies one of the most prominent
features that distinguishes the EEC from other integration processes.
The constitutionalization of the Treaty of Rome was cemented in
1963 by the European Court of Justice in the Van Gend case.71 In
that case the court made its famous pronouncement that:
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common
Market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested
parties in the Community, implies that this Treaty is more than an
agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the
contracting states. This view is confirmed by the preamble to the
Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples. It is
also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institutions
endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member States and also their citizens.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the nationals of the states brought
together in the Community are called upon to cooperate in the functioning of this Community through the intermediary of the European
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee ....
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which
the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited
fields, and the subject of which comprise not only Member States
but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member
States, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on
individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which
become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only
where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason
of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way
upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the
institutions of the Community."2
This pronouncement conferred upon individuals, uncertain subjects

68. Id.
69. See GREEN, supra note 55; and Professor Simitis, Address before the Forum

for the Practice of International Law, at the Yale Law School (Apr. 7, 1993).
70. Id. (Italy and Germany are good examples).
71. Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie Der Belastingen, Case
26/62, [1963] ECR 1, [1962] CMLR 105, [1961-1966] Common Mkt. Rep.
72. Id. at 12.
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under international law, the power to sue their national governments
for breach of treaty provisions. Member states could no longer hide
behind the labyrinth of national law and traditional international law
norms. A treaty that had been created by independent states ceased,
through the Van Gend jurisprudence, to be an artificial international
instrument. Instead it generated a life of its own, independent from
that of the originating parties. 3 The evolution of this doctrine made it
possible for the Community to escape the hazard of being completely at
the mercy of the Member States regarding both the formulation and
implementation of policies under the Treaty of Rome.74
2. Supremacy
The second doctrine that the Community evolved was that of
supremacy which established a hierarchical system of norms within
the Community. Here again, the European Court tests the tensile
strength of the Treaty of Rome by groping around for more implements
to effectuate the spirit of the Treaty. In the Costa case,7" the court in
enunciating this doctrine, stated that:
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty
has created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of
the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the
Member States and which their courts are bound to apply. By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity of representation
on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers
stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers
from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus
created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.

The integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions which derive from the Community, and more generally the
terms and the spirit of the Treaty, make it impossible for the

States, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and
subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent
with the legal system. The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives

73. Roger Clark, Legal Principles of Non-Socialist Economic Integration as Exemplified by the European Economic Community, 8 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1,
19-20 (1980) (providing a discussion of the impact of Van Gend case on European
integration).
74. Weilee, supra note 58, at 45 (asserting that without the evolution of the
doctrine of constitutionalism the Community would "resemble a small GATT" in its
operations).
75. Flamino Costa v. Enel, Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585.
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of the Treaty .... The obligations undertaken under the Treaty
establishing the Community would not be unconditional, but merely contingent, if they could be called in question by subsequent
legislative acts of the signatories .... The transfer by the States
from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of
the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a
permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a
subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the
Community cannot prevail.76
By virtue of this decision, national legislation, even if enacted
subsequent to the Treaty of Rome and even if constitutional in nature,
is subordinate to Community law. National courts may enforce contrary national law, but the Member State concerned would have committed a breach of the Treaty of Rome and would be liable to proceedings before the European Court.77
The net effect of the above doctrines has been to remove the administration of European integration from the sole discretion of political elites and the empowerment of individual persons and corporations
within the Community. These individuals and corporations keep the
Community moving and guarantee its stability, because the called
upon parties ensure the success of the Community and have a direct
impact on its the direction. While it would be an exaggeration to state
that Member States have been reduced to a state of irrelevance," it is
impossible to ignore the power of non-governmental parties within the
Community.
So far, national courts have acquiesced in the above process, but
doubts abound about how long this will continue. It does seem that
national courts went along with judicial activism79 by the European

76. Id. at 593-94.
77. Treaty of Rome, supra note 59, at art. 170.
78. Weilee, supra note 58, at 46. Some scholars attribute the disintegration or
weakening of the Community's decisional process to the judicial process of
constitutionalization. This process has led to,
[t]he insistence of the Member States in controlling every phase in the
process of Community decision-making must have been influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the knowledge that in many spheres decisions are "for real"; that they will have the force of law, will override
national law and will be enforceable by virtue of direct effect in the
courts.
See also Weiler, supra note 66, at 2407. (Weiler argues that the process of change
within the Community especially in respect of constitutionalization of the Treaty of
Rome has received flawed analysis by the elevation of law above everything else. He
concludes that "[1legal and constitutional structural change have been crucial, but
only in their interaction with the Community political process.")l
79. HJALIE RASMUSSEN, ON LAw AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE POLICY-MAKING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING 602 (1986).

(There has been a sustained attack on judicial activism by the European Court. The
most vocal of these critics has undoubtedly been Prof. Rasmussen who has character-
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court, because they thought it was a temporary measure which would
be validated through the Community political process". However, because the European court has not been granted express powers by the
Community, the legitimacy of the Court has been questioned. National
courts which have hitherto been willing to allow their national constitutions to be subordinated to Community law, as exemplified by Italy81 and Germany, 2 are showing increasing signs of irritation at the
lack of express powers being granted to the European Court which
may cause them to retract their deference.'
In the overall context of European integration, the European
Court of Justice has played an important role in the consolidation of
European integration and in the attainment of the goals of the Treaty
of Rome. Integration has been pushed forward, particularly where
express political will was lacking.
D. The ANDEAN Experience
Because of the transient existence of most regional processes in
developing countries, no endurable judicial jurisprudence has emerged.
However, intermittent judicial opinions shed light on the attitudes and
practices of these countries. The most important case to have emerged
from the Andean process, in regards to the interpretation of the Andean Agreement," is the 1972 Colombian Supreme Court decision on
the Andean Foreign Investment Code.8" In that case, the court was
called upon to try the issue of whether the President of Colombia had
the constitutional power, in the absence of express legislative sanction,
to implement the Andean Foreign Investment Code.' The plaintiff
ized the decision in Costa v. Enel, "as an example of judicial activism 'running wild'"
and the decision in Van Gend as a case of 'revolting judicial behaviour'.").
80. Weiler, supra note 66, at 2417-18. As Weiler has noted:
National courts were likely to accept direct effect and implied-powers,
but found it difficult to swallow the notion that Community law must
prevail even in the face of an explicitly later-in-time provision of a national legislature to whom, psychologically, if not in fact constitutionally,
Member State courts owed allegiance. Accepting this supreme law without some guarantee that this supreme law would not violate rights fundamental to the legal patrimony of an individual Member State would
be virtually impossible.
81. GREEN, supra note 55, at 348-88 (discussing the constitutionality of Community law under Italian Law).
82. Id. at 35 (discussing of the constitutionality of Community law in Germany).
83. Simitis Address, supra note 69.
84. Agreement on Andean Sub-regional Integration, done at BogotA, May 26,
1969, reproduced in 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969).
85. Judgement of Jan. 20, 1972, Sup. Ct. of Justice, Colombia, 144 GACETA JUDIcLAL 10 (1972), 10 DERECHIO DE LA INTEGRACION 155 (1972), translated in 11 I.L.M.
576 (1972). See also, Comment, The Colombian Supreme Court Decision on the Andean Foreign Investment Code and its Implications for the Law of Treaties, 8 J. IN'L
L. ECON. 113 (1973) (providing an analysis of the case).
86. Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and Trademarks, Patents,
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claimed that the Presidential decree,87 seeking to implement the Common Regime, offended article 76-18 of the Colombian Constitution
and8 that the President exceeded his constitutional powers when he
proclaimed the said decree, relying on art. 120-20 of the Constitution.89
The government's response was that the President was merely
bringing Colombia in line with its prior treaty commitments, which
had already received Congressional approval. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument and, in its opinion, read the Cartagena Accord" as mandating national legislative approval. The Supreme Court
refused to internationalize the dispute and chose to view the conflict as
being "purely a matter of internal public law".9' Because the Presidential decree failed to meet constitutional requirements, it could not
stand and the Cartagena Accord92 could not be read to supersede "internal rules of law without previously clarifying and transferring to
the international entities the jurisdiction reserved to the States, except
in situations of the utmost urgency."9 3
Clearly the Colombian Supreme Court did not see itself as a participant in the regional integration process, obliged to give a favorable
interpretation to legislation that furthered the regional process. On the
contrary, the Court exhibited some hostility to the notion of an inter-

Licenses, and Royalties, Decree No. 24 of Dec. 31, 1970, Commission of the
Cartagena Agreement, as amended by, Decree No. 37 of Jun. 24, 1971, and by Decree No. 37-A of July 17, 1971, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 126 (1972).
87. Id. at Decree No. 1299 of June 30, 1971.
88. CONSTITUTION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA, art. 76-78 (Columbia) 886, (amended
1944), providing that:
Congress is vested with the power of making the laws. By means of the
laws it exercises the following functions:
To approve or reject treaties and conventions entered into with
either states or with entities that function according to international law, the state may assume obligations, through treaties or
agreements approved by the Congress, in order that, on a basis of
equity and reciprocity, supranational institutions may be created
for the purpose of promoting or consolidating economic integration
with other states.
89. Id. at art. 120-20. The powers of and duties of the President of the Republic as the chief of state and chief administrative authority are:
To direct diplomatic and commercial relations with other states
and entities recognized under international law; to appoint diplomatic agents; to receive the respective agents; to conclude treaties and conventions with other states and entities recognized under international law which shall be submitted to the Congress
for approval.
90. Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and Trademarks, Patents,
Licenses, and Royalties, supra note 86, at Decree No. 24.
91. The Colombian Supreme Court Decision on the Andean Foreign Investment
Code, supra note 85, at 581.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 582.
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national obligation contradicting domestic law.94 This response has
been typical of most judicial entities in developing countries when
interpreting regional treaties. It may be argued that the absence of an
Andean regional court,95 which could have been the proper entity to
rule on the interpretation of the Cartagena Accord,96 was to blame.
Rather, the Supreme Court's judgment leaves little doubt that, in its
view, national law is qualitatively superior to regional law. This decision markedly contrasts to the response of national courts within the
European Community which have shown a more regional bias.9 7
E. The East African Community Experience
The East African Community, while it lasted, was certainly the
most advanced integration process that existed in the developing
world. The three Member States of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania had
convertible currencies, unitary services, and common educational and
economic policies. Most important, the East African Court of Appeal
served as the highest court for the three countries. In more than one
way, the East African Community exhibited a higher level of integration than even that of the EEC. It is, therefore, surprising to note that
this level and intensity of integration did not filter into the operation
of national courts.
A good example of the seemingly parochial attitude that national
courts have had of regional integration treaties may be found in the
case of Okunda and Another v. Republic.9" In this case, two prosecutions were brought by the Attorney-General of Kenya against two persons under the Official Secrets Act of the East African Community-"
Section 8(1) of the Act states that "[a] prosecution for an offense under
this Act shall not be instituted except with the written consent of the
Counsel to the Community." No such consent was sought. The accused
persons raised an objection questioning the validity of the prosecution
in the absence of consent. The Attorney-General responded that section
8(1) of the Act was in conflict with section 26(3)(a) of the Kenyan Constitution which provides that:
The Attorney-General shall have power in any case in which he
considers it desirable so to do(a) to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any
person before any court (other than a court-martial) in respect of

94. Infra notes 114-120 and accompanying text.
95. In fact, the confusion generated by this decision resulted in the setting up of
an ANCOM Court of Justice. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena
Agreement, done May 28, 1979, translated in 18 I.L.M. 1203 (1979).
96. The Colombian Supreme Court Decision on the Andean Foreign Investment
Code, supra note 85.
97. RASMUSSEN, supra note 79.
98. Okunda and Another v. Republic, 1970 E. AFR. L. REP. 453 (Kenya).
99. LAWS OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY, Ch. 4 (1970).
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any offence alleged to have been committed by that person.
The Attorney-General submitted that section 8(1) operated as a
clog to his constitutional powers, and, to that extent, the section was
rendered null and void by the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.1"
Counsel for the East African Community made a three-pronged
presentation with the aim of showing that the two apparently conflicting provisions of law could be harmonized. First, he argued that the
Treaty for East African Co-operation (TEAC)'0 ' at article 95 requires
each Member State "to take all steps within its power" to pass legislation to give effect to the treaty and, in particular, "to confer upon
Acts of the Community the force of law within its territory." The court
rejected this argument claiming that it was satisfied that Kenya had
"carried out its obligations under this article."0 2
Second, counsel for the Community made reference to article 4 of
the Treaty for East African Co-operation which mandates, inter alia,
that Member States "shall make every effort to plan and direct their
policies with a view to creating conditions favorable for the development of the Common Market and the achievement of the aims of the
Community." The court yet again rejected this argument stating that
there was no conflict between the Treaty and the Kenyan Constitution
but rather a conflict between the Constitution and a piece of legislation
passed by the Community. °3 The Court was making a distinction between the Treaty for East African Co-operation and legislation made
under the Treaty. This is a surprising distinction, particularly because
no suggestion was made that the legislation was ultra vires. If the
Community was competent to pass on the legislation, that legislation
must surely become part of the Treaty for East African Co-operation.
Yet, on appeal the Court of Appeal for East Africa refused to acknowledge the existence of such a distinction.'"

100. CONSTrruTION OF KENYA, chapter 1, section 3, provides that:
This Constitution is the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya and shall
have the force of law throughout Kenya and . . . if any other law is
inconsistent with this constitution, this Constitution shall prevail and
the other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.
101. TREATY FOR EAST AFRIcAN CO-OPERATION, signed at Kampala, Uganda, June
6, 1967 entered into force December 1, 1967, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 932 (1967).
102. Okunda and Anor v. Republics, supra note 98, at 455.
103. Referring to the concepts of direct applicability and supremacy of regional
law, even if all the COMESA Member States were to incorporate the Treaty into
their domestic law, this would not create a regional body of law as "its internal
applicability will be subject to domestic legislation". SIMAMBA, supra note 27, at 112.
Supremacy is understood as a concept that provides that once a positive regional
measure already exists any conflicting national norm becomes inapplicable. See
Weilee, supra note 58, at 48.
104. East African Community v. Republic, 1970 E. Afr. L. Rep. 457, 460 (appeal
taken from Kenya).
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Third, counsel for the Community invoked international law, in
particular two cases decided by the old Permanent Court of International Justice: The Greco-BulgarianCommunities case' °5 and German
Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case (Merits). °6 The two cases pronounce the supremacy of international treaties over municipal laws.
Echoing its previous reasoning the court held that there was no conflict between the Treaty for East African Co-operation and the Kenyan
Constitution or any other Kenyan law. The court stated that:
A State signs a treaty in the full knowledge of its contents and in
the full knowledge of its own laws and legal policy. An international tribunal would be doing the right thing by saying that a State
must stand by its treaties. This cannot, however, be said of laws
passed by a body established under the treaty. The contents of such
laws (which might cover a wide field) could not have been within
the contemplation of the parties at the time of signing the treaty. 107

The court again returned to the distinction between the treaty
and legislation promulgated under the treaty and concluded that the
two are materially different. The court did not attempt to read the
treaty and the Constitution as complementary regimes, but rather regarded the Constitution as infinitely superior to any other law with
"its influence and power... all-pervading."' The court continued
that "if a constitutional lawyer were to write about Kenya in the same
strain as Dicey did about England, he would, to be accurate, have to
emphasize the supremacy of the Constitution rather than of any one
organ of Government."'"
On appeal, the Court of Appeal for East Africa dismissed the case
on a technical procedural ground."' However, the surprising aspect
of the appellate court's decision is that, although it touched on the
merits of the case in obiter dictum, it did not demonstrate any movement towards establishing a jurisprudence that would have given more
deference to East African Community law when there was a conflict
between that law and domestic law. This is surprising because the
Court of Appeal for East Africa was established under Chapter Seven
of the Laws of the East African Community."' Being an organ of the
East African Community it would have been expected that it would
have read domestic law in such a manner as to avoid the invalidation

105. The Greco-Bulgarian Communities, 1930 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 17, at 32.
106. German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1925 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 7, at 19.
107. Okunda and Another v. Republic, supra note 98, at 456.
108. Id. at 457.
109. Id.
110. The case ostensibly was dismissed because the appellant, the East African
Community, was found not to have had locus standi to institute the appeal or in
any other way to be a party to a criminal prosecution.
111. LAws OF THE EAST AFRICAN CoMMUNITY, Ch. 4 (1970).
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of East African Community law. Instead, the court went out of its way
to reiterate the supremacy of national constitutions and articulates a
philosophy that diminishes the force of East African Community
2
law."
V. ANALYSIS OF TREATY LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON DOMESTIC LAW
The above experiences illustrate a marked difference between the
attitudes and practices of developed" 3 and developing nations when
engaging in integration processes. Courts in developed nations seem
ready to allow their constitutions to be subordinated to regional treaties if such subordination would further the objectives of integration.
On the other hand, courts in developing countries do not generally
identify themselves as articulators of regional policy, but instead view
their role as that of guarantors of domestic law against infringement
by international law. In other words, when courts in developing countries are presented with a situation in which there is an apparent
conflict between domestic law and a treaty provision to which these
countries are parties, they overwhelmingly uphold the former over the
latter.
There are several factors that influence this attitude. First, the
degree of maturity and sophistication of the domestic legal system
affects the flexibility of that system. Stable democratic nations do not
expose their legal systems to tumultuous phenomena when they allow
their constitutions, to be, so to speak, trampled upon by regional treaties. Their stability guarantees this result. On the other hand, developing nations, because of their relative constitutional and political fragility, are frequently not in a position to compromise the stature of national constitutions when a conflict arises between it and some international treaty. As a result, regional law fails to develop which in turn
contributes to the disintegration of regional processes " ".

112. East African Community v. Republic, supra note 104, at 460. In a sweeping
statement the court declares that:
the Constitution of Kenya is paramount and any law, whether it be of
Kenya, of the Community or of any other country which has been applied in Kenya, which is conflict with the Constitution is void to the
extent of the conflict ....
If the provisions of any treaty, having been
made part of the municipal law of Kenya, are in conflict with the Constitution, then to the extent of such conflict such provisions are void.
113. Koh, supra note 11 and accompanying text. (It may be an unripe conclusion
given the fact that it is based on the experience and attitude of only one process in
the developed world. The US/Canada Free Trade Agreement, for example, does not
exhibit this tendency. Nevertheless, it is true to state that developed countries honor
treaty obligations more than developing countries.).
114. See the Costa case, supra note 75, at 593 (As seen above recognition and
enforcement of regional law depends on the existence of a regional legal system. It
means that the most efficient regional arrangement is that which makes no distinction between regional law and domestic law.).

1995

INTEGRATION TREATIES: THE

COMESA

PROCESS

Second, courts in developing countries neither view themselves as
international players nor consider their decisions as having international repercussions. This self-disdain produces two results. On the one
hand, it creates a subversive psychological attitude towards international law in that courts seem to be in a perpetual belligerent state of
affairs with respect to international law."' It is as if these courts are
constantly reiterating their authority over international law, a regime
they regard as an undeviating menace to their eminence. On the other
hand, courts in developing countries seldom consider extra-territorial
factors because they have determined ab initio that they cannot possibly make an impact outside their domestic jurisdictions.
Third, with respect to regional treaties in developing countries, no
matter how sympathetic to regionalism a judge may be, these treaties
are so imperfect in declaring enforceable legal norms"6 and so inarticulate in substance, that they can permissively be regarded as nudum pactum."7 For an international treaty to be enforceable, it must
provide for an elaborate legal regime that courts can subsequently
create a jurisprudence around.' At present, most regional treaties

115. This is in marked contrast to the manner in which the European Court and
the United States Supreme Court have approached the subject. In these two jurisdictions:
In interpreting the reach of a Treaty provision defining the power of the
Community, the Court of Justice looks to "the spirit, general scheme
and the wording" (esprit, economie, texte), or, in other terms, to "the
objects and purposes." The formula bears considerable resemblance to
the approach adopted by Chief Justice Marshall in the important early
case of McCulloch v. Maryland. The question whether the Constitution
conferred one or another power, Marshall wrote, depends upon "a fair
construction of the whole instrument". A constitution, he suggested,
should not be interpreted with the literalness appropriate to a statute.
Reference must be made to "its great outlines" and "its important objects".
ERIC STEIN & TERRANCE SANDALOW, On the Two Systems: An Overview, COURTS AND
FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 3, 16-7
(1982).
116. See generally Evans, Self-Executing Treaties in the United States of America,
30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178 (1958) (When considering whether to hold a treaty selfexecuting, the crucial criterion is that it contains rules susceptible to judicial application without prior legislative implementation.).
117. An over-simplified example would be the comparison of the Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) done November
30, 1993, at Kampala, Uganda, to the Treaty Establishing the North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA) done December 17, 1992 at Washington/Ottawa/Mexico City.
118. It can also be argued that courts in developing countries have not tried to
prop up these otherwise imperfect treaties through constitutionalizing these treaties
as the EEC courts have done. The result is that regional processes in the developing
world resemble in their "operational structure a small GATT," an extremely unflattering comparison. Weilee, supra note 58, at 45. With reference to the European
Court and the concept of constitutionalism, Weilee concludes that
[alt the strict legal level the Court was merely applying the principal of
effectiveness. Moving from the premise that the obligations contained in
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in developing countries espouse political ambitions and consequently
aggrieved parties can only seek political remedies" 9
Fourth, the jurisprudence of many courts in developing countries
seem to exhibit both an unsophisticated appreciation of their powers
and a lack of institutional constraints. These courts fail to understand
that an important precept for the exercise of judicial power is judicial
restraint or moderation. There is a tendency to exercise power for its
own sake merely because it is available, not because it will achieve
some positive end. For reasons of prudence, courts should not always
exercise their formal authority to the fullest extent. Such power "exists
to be used at the right times, not lost in atrophy" as a court "can be
destroyed by the weakness as well as the recklessness of its members." ° The common sense import of this exercise of power means
that courts must ordinarily temper reason by experience, and the application of rules and principles by their effects in order for a balanced
institutional operation to emerge. Courts in developing countries have
yet to understand this concept.
VI. HARMONIZATION OF LAWS AND TREATY COMPLIANCE

The foregoing analysis demonstrates the urgency of enlisting a
system that will bring national laws in line with regional treaties,
particularly in developing countries. A clear demarcation between the
competence of national law and regional law must be firmly established."' Conflicts, and the attendant transaction costs that they engender, seem to be primarily caused by the uncertainty2 that exists

the Treaty and in legislation enacted by Community organs (in which
the Member States have crucial say) were undertaken in a bona fide
fashion with an underlying intention to be bound, the Court's revolution
was no more than an instrumental mechanism to give effectiveness to
these obligations.
119. Gerhard Bebr, Directly Applicable Provisions of Community Law: The Development of a Common Concept, 19 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 257, 268-78 (1970) (The essential requirements necessary for the direct applicability of Treaty provisions have
been listed as: 1. clear treaty provisions, 2. unconditional obligations, 3. no further
measures required and 4. no discretion in taking necessary measures.).
120. EUGENE RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 177 (1962).
121. It can be argued that the rule of pacta sunt servanda already compels national courts to give effect to the intention captured in international treaties. While
the rule was conceived at a time when states were the only proper subjects of international law, subsequent development of international law and the demands of the
modern world import a rationale that has legal force allowing for the interpretation
of the rule in such a way that it can give effect to the intention of treaties. The
maxim itself does not generate the problem but rather it is the unwillingness of
states to submit their internal law to regulation by treaties. See also GREEN, supra
note 55, at 373.
122. See, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: New Directions in Dispute Settlement, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 251, 263-67 (panel discussion) (1989) (not only
is actual conflict the source of uncertainty but even the perceived conflict between
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between the two bodies of law. Harmonization12 3 of these laws will
remove a significant dynamic of disintegration.
Harmonization,' or integration of laws, is a task that stands on
a higher plane than domestic constitutional considerations. 5 Member countries which have deeply entrenched constitutional provisions,
which cannot easily be changed, should not be allowed to join the union unless they are able to bring their constitutions in line with the
treaty establishing the organization. Integration treaties must, therefore, be seen as instruments that are not constitution-friendly, and
countries seeking to enter into such an arrangement must realize that,
for a workable system to be established, the two regimes, domestic and
international, must be rid of all contradictions and inconsistencies. It
is for precisely this reason, that most regional treaties require member
states to bring their national laws into conformity with their international obligations. 2 ' The Treaty of Rome, for example, requires that
in the admission of new members, the potential member must first
bring its national law into compliance with EEC laws before it may be
admitted.
An even more imperative inquiry relates to the practicality of
achieving harmonization between countries that have different judicial
systems and traditions. The Common Market for Eastern and Souththe two can generate anxiety.).
123. Harmonization as a term of art which refers to "a set of principles derived
from some economic model that would enable all reasonable men to agree that such
a subject should be regulated at federal or community level while another should be
regulated at State level." RICHARD BUXBAUM ET AL., EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION 1 (1991).
124. See Wallace, supra note 61, at 181. A distinction must be made between unification and harmonization. Whereas a law that is fashioned to apply automatically
within the member countries of the organization is said to be an instrument for the
unification of laws within the region, a law that merely specifies the legal objectives
to be attained but which leaves matters of form and methods to effectuate the objective to the member countries is said to be an instrument for the harmonization of
laws within the region.
125. This is particularly true if one were to adopt a strict meaning of
supranationalism with reference to regional entities to mean " . . . over and above
national individual states." A. H. Robertson, Legal Problems of European Integration,
1957 REcUEIL DES COURS 105, 143. However, regional structures and processes involve "bits and pieces of the national governments ...
" A.
SHONFIELD, EUROPE:
JOURNEY To AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION 17 (1972).
126. Treaty of Rome, supra note 60, at art. 39(h) (mandates the Community to
move towards "the approximation of the laws of member States to the extent required for the proper functioning of the Common Market." Other provisions in the
Treaty that compel harmonization include arts. 27, 43, 54(3)(g), 56(2), 57(2) and (3),
70, 75, 99, 100, 117, and 235.).
The COMESA Treaty, supra note 117, at art. 4(6)(b) (provides that Member
States undertake to "harmonize or approximate their laws to the extent required for
the proper functioning of the Common Market." At art. 5(2) the Treaty states that
"each Member State shall take steps to secure the enactment of and the continuation of such legislation to give effect to this Treaty . .
").
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ern Africa (COMESA) exhibits a labyrinth of judicial systems and
traditions: common law, Anglo-Dutch, civil law, Islamic law and
Amharic law systems, all represented within the arrangement. In such
a situation, both the substance of the law and procedural differences127 tend to stultify attempts at harmonization." Linguistic diversity poses an additional problem within the union.' The task of harmonization, especially when harmonization is defined to include a
political dimension, 30 becomes a daunting task. Yet economic integration can only be meaningful if harmonization of laws exists.
Included in the general understanding of harmonization is the
establishment of regional conflict of law rules.' Whether one views
conflict of law as a subject touching on procedural aspects of law, or as
one that speaks also to the substance of the law, whenever there is
intercourse between two or more systems of law there are bound to be

127. Eighty percent of the Member States of the COMESA are common law jurisdictions and, as such, procedural complications do not affect these countries substantially. Author's interview with Dan Ameyo, Senior State Council at The AttorneyGeneral's Chambers, in Nairobi, Kenya (Oct. 20, 1993).
128. Id. There is a general consensus among the drafters of the COMESA Treaty
that diversity of legal systems does not pose serious problems in as far as substance
of the law is concerned, because general law and commercial law are fairly uniform
across these different systems. Diversity is considered an issue in relation to procedural aspects. To resolve this difficulty, the drafters envisaged the enactment of an
elaborate statute to govern procedures in the COMESA Court. However, sufficient
evidence supports the view that there is little value in attempting to create a material distinction between substance and procedure in international commercial litigation.
129. COMESA, supra note 117, at art. 185 recognizes only English, French and
Portuguese as the official languages of the Common Market. However, English,
French, Portuguese, Arabic, Amharic and Kiswahili are the various official languages
of the member states.
130. GREEN, supra note 55, at 21. It is difficult to speak of harmonization without
considering its political manifestation for " . . . political integration really means
legal integration. It means legal integration not only in the sense that political integration can be effected only by means of legal integration, but also in the sense that
legal integration, or an integration of laws, is, of itself, political integration."
See also Scott Horton, Peru and ANCOM: A Study in the Disintegration of a
Common Market, 17 TEY INT'L L.J. 39 (1982). Indeed it has been stated that 'Ithe
study of a common market requires the simultaneous awareness of three different
levels of development: political, economic and legal".
131. Treaty of Rome, supra note 59. (Within the EEC there exists a regional
treaty governing conflict of laws. By virtue of art. 220(4) of the Treaty of Rome,
Member States undertook to enter into negotiations with each other with a view to
securing for the benefit of their nationals the simplification of formalities governing
the reciprocal recognition of, and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals,
and of arbitral awards.); See also D. LASOK & P.A. STONE, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN
THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY 149 (1987) (Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, done at Brussels on 27th
September, 1968, was adopted. To effectuate this undertaking a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, done
at Brussels on 27th September, 1968, was adopted.).
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queries and legal anxieties to which substantive and/or procedural law
will apply. Just as there is a paucity of domestic judicial decisions on
treaties within the COMESA, there is a deficiency of domestic judicial
decisions on conflict of law. When domestic rules have not been clearly
settled, it becomes even more difficult to generate regional rules. During the drafting of the COMESA Treaty, the issue of conflict of laws
was discussed but not incorporated into the treaty." 2 Opponents argued against incorporation to avoid crystallizing or codifying current
international conflict of law rules. 3 It is likely, however, that Member States really wanted to be given time to develop their own domestic rules before agreeing on regional rules. Dispute resolution within
the COMESA is bound to be complicated by the above lacunae.
The characteristic instrument of harmonization in the COMESA is
the Directive, 3 ' while the regulations 3 5 are instruments of unification, since they seek to force compliance on Member States without
giving them an option in the formulation or implementation of the law.
Issuance of Council Directives'36 must both state the reasons 37 on
which they are based and notify those affected"3 .
VII.

CONCLUSION

As the survey shows, COMESA Member States do not appear
ready to accord the COMESA Treaty131 the necessary domestic competence that will allow it to operate as envisioned. This coupled with
the traditional hostility of domestic courts in the region towards international law is sure to lessen the impact and efficacy of the Common
Market.
Whether there is a new attitude towards regional integration
within COMESA will, to large extent, depend on the COMESA Court
and how it articulates the competence of regional law in relation to
municipal law and how national courts react to this delimitation. Similarly, whether the COMESA Court will assert a regional jurisprudence
that elevates treaty observance above municipal considerations, especially in view of the conduct of the former East African Court of Appeal
with respect to the defunct East African Community, depends on the

132. Ameyo, supra note 127.
133. Id.
134. COMESA Treaty, supra note 117, at art. 10(3), (with reference to directives
art. 10(3) states that: "[a] directive shall be binding as to the result to be achieved
upon each Member State to which it is addressed but not as to the means of
achieving it.").
135. Id. at art. 10(2). (This article states that: "[a] regulation shall be binding on
all the Member States in its entirety.").
136. Id. at art. 10(1).
137. Id. at art. 11.
138. Id. at art. 12(2).
139. Id.
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supreme political organs of Member States of COMESA. If these political organs acquiesce to the new philosophical thinking that, for successful integration real power must be given to regional organs, then
there is a realistic chance that municipal law will not intrude into
spheres reserved for regional law.
However, as discussed in this article, COMESA Member States
have traditionally viewed treaties as foreign instruments with a nuisance value and in the same vein with an accent on dualism."4 Difficulties in reorienting this thinking towards a more positive predisposition arise precisely because by their very nature, integration processes
require a lot of giving in the initial stages before any benefits can be
reaped. Because the returns are slow in coming, there will be a tendency to give priority to these regional instruments early, followed by a
period in which a negative development asserts itself to re-establish
municipal dominance. However, if Member States are able to beat back
this fatalistic tendency, not only will the regional process prosper, but
developing countries may adopt a benevolent attitude towards international law in general, and treaties in particular.

140. See, Brilmayer, supra note 36, at 2292-94 (some scholars indeed regard dualism as the dominant paradigm of international law.).

Kicking the Habit: Russia's Addiction to
Nuclear Waste Dumping at Sea
JASON H. EATON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Russian Navy's nuclear experience is ending much as it
began. The only difference is the scale of the damage inflicted on
people and the environment. When the K-19 entered the Soviet fleet
as its first nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarine, the Soviet
Union extolled the boat's technological advances.' The crew was rewarded with smoked fish, chocolates and cheeses, chow other sailors
envied.2 The perks soon were eclipsed, however, after a nuclear reactor cooling accident threatened to incinerate the ship.3 Crewmembers
sacrificed themselves to radiation in order to weld a new cooling system.4 The ship made it back to Russia under tow. The crew was not
so lucky.'
"Right on the spot their appearances began changing. Skin not
protected by clothing began to redden, faces and hands began to swell.
Dots of blood began to appear on their foreheads, under their hair.
Within two hours, we couldn't recognize them," said Capt. Nikolai
Zateyev. "People died fully conscious, in terrible pain. They couldn't
speak, but they could whisper. They begged us to kill them.'
Of the twenty-two men killed, six were so radioactive that their
corpses were entombed secretly in Moscow.7 Their families were not
notified.8 The gear used to treat the crew at hospitals was destroyed.9 And those delectables aboard the K-19 were put onto a

* Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve, Judge Advocate General's Corps. B.A. 1992,
University of Arizona; J.D. 1995 with certificate in environmental law, Lewis & Clark
College Northwestern School of Law. The author wishes to thank Prof. James Bailey
for his inspiration and comments on an earlier draft of this article. This article does
not represent the views of the United States Navy or the Judge Advocate General's

Corps.
1. Matt Bivens, Horrorof Soviet Sub's '61 Tragedy Told, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1994,
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barge along with clothing, equipment and the sailors' possessions.' °
That barge was moored off the Kola Peninsula with warning signs."
But the signs were ignored, and the barge was plundered for its valuables.12 "Who knows what became of those [people] once they'd sampled the delicacies of that damned barge," Zateyev said. 3
Equally unknown is the total damage that more than thirty years
of Russian nuclear propulsion has inflicted upon the sea. Until the
end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union,"'
information concerning nuclear propulsion was considered a state secret. 5 Residents of the USSR and surrounding countries were unable
to determine the magnitude of nuclear propulsion production. Equally
unknown was the number of accidents occurring at nuclear facilities
or aboard ships. And while Russians are a technologically-advanced
people, they lack a systematic approach to deal with their nuclear
waste. Even if they had better nuclear waste safety measures, Russian citizens themselves lack the incentive to become involved in
decisions concerning nuclear waste disposal.
This paper examines the amount of radiation released into the
marine environment from Russia and its predecessor. Part II describes Russia's nuclear propulsion program and its dumping of nuclear waste at sea. Part III examines Russia's environmental laws and
applicable international law. Part IV suggests three methods to improve the nuclear situation in Russia as it pertains to the sea. First,
additional aid given to Russia should be tied to environmental assessments of the nuclear problem. Second, Russia should enact technology-forcing laws to reduce emissions on an "as practicable as possible"
basis. Third, Russia should promote private land ownership as a
means of encouraging environmental enforcement. Part V concludes
that adoption of these recommendations would reduce the harm to the
environment by breaking Russia's dependence on ocean dumping.
II. THE

LEGACY OF

RUSSIA'S

NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM

Russia's environmental destruction can be traced to Stalin's
obsession with industrialization.'" Stalin's five-year plans for agri-

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES AccoRD, Dec. 8, 1991 (Rus. Legis.)
1991 WL 496610) (the USSR ceased to exist when Russia, Ukraine and Belarus
signed the accord).
15. Kathleen M. Maloney-Dunn, Russia's Nuclear Waste Law: A Response to the
Legacy of Environmental Abuse in the Former Soviet Union, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 365, 385 (1993).
16. Peter M. Langrind, An Overview of Environmental Law in the USSR, 11
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 483, 485 (1991) (Stalin's push for ever-greater
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culture and industrial production paid no heed to environmental
issues. 7 The Second World War generated greater emphasis on the
industrial output needed to meet the demands of battle.' After the
war, rather than reduce its industrial drive, the Soviet Union pressed
for more industrialization. Production of more goods meant bonuses
for workers; compliance with environmental laws yielded no such rewards.9

The rush to nuclear weapons and nuclear energy in the face of
such lax environmental controls has been catastrophic. The creation of
atomic destruction and power has led to the "creation of a problem of
handling large quantities of 2radioactive waste, whose solution was
never given special attention."

1

A. The Soviet Nuclear PropulsionProgram
Nuclear power plants are the ideal steam generator for submarines, and nuclear power's advantages over oil-fired plants were not
lost on the Soviets. Nuclear reactors can be built smaller than oil-fired
plants.2 ' They don't need any air.22 The concentration of energy on a
weight and volume basis is greater than oil. 2 The nuclear reaction

generates heat, which is used to boil water into steam.24 The highpressure steam pushes turbines, which generate electricity and turn
the submarine's propeller.25
The Soviet Union's nuclear propulsion program began with the
creation of a fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers.2 6 Quick to follow
was a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines such as the K-19."
In addition, the Soviet Union produced a series of nuclear-propelled
ballistic missile submarines carrying nuclear warheads.' Although
the United States was the first nation to build a nuclear submarine,

industry "created in the minds of the Soviet central planners a maniacal compulsion to increase industrial output that ran roughshod over environmental concerns").
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Maloney-Dunn, supra note 15, at 386.
20. FACTS AND PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE DUMPING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE IN
THE SEAS SURROUNDING THE TERRITORY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION § 2,

GREENPEACE (Russian trans., Oct. 24, 1993) (materials from a government report on
the dumping of radioactive waste, commissioned by the President of the Russian
Federation) [hereinafter FACTS AND PROBLEMS]. A copy of the report is available in
English from Greenpeace, 1436 U Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.
21. TOM CLANCY, SUBMARINE 110 (1993).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at § 4.
27. Id. See generally, CLANCY, supra note 21, at 250.
28. Id.
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the Soviet Union quickly caught up.' By 1990, the USSR had put
230 nuclear submarines to sea.3 ° The U.S. had launched 170.31
Today, Russia possesses sixty percent of the world's nuclear reactors.32 It has about 235 warships with nuclear power plants.33 Another thirteen reactors are inside icebreakers operated by the
Murmansk Shipping Company.34 Russian submarines typically carry
two nuclear reactors driving one screw. 5 Russian ballistic missile
submarines also carry between eight and twenty-four intercontinental
nuclear missiles." The reactors within the Russian attack submarines use a liquid-metal cooling system, which while generating greater heat transfer, has made them difficult to cool and refuel.37
About 100 nuclear submarines await decommissioning." By the
year 2000, the Russians will add another eighty nuclear submarines
to the backlog as arms control treaties take effect.39 And even as old
Russian submarines pile up at navy yards, the Russian government
continues to invest in stealthier nuclear-propulsed submarines.' The
nuclear race Russia so adamantly sought to win, however, is returning to haunt them as it becomes clear that Russia failed to consider
what to do with the ships at the end of their life cycles."
B. Lack of Nuclear Waste Storage and Treatment Facilities
When Russia built its submarines, they were completed "without
a thought to the future."42 Today the Russian Navy is being swal
lowed by nuclear waste. The operating navy's ships produce about
20,000 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste and 6,000 tons of solid

29. Joshua Handler, No Sleep in the Deep for Russian Subs, THE BULLETIN OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Apr. 1993, at 7.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at § 4.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. CLANCY, supra note 21, at 250-70 (A "screw" is navy parlance for "propeller").
36. Id.
37. CDR George R. Kraus, U.S.N.(Ret.), Papa, Alpha, and Soviet Submarine
Innovation, PROCEEDINGS, Feb. 1994, at 88.
38. John J. Fialka, U.S. Is Studying Ways to Help Russia Dispose of Aging
Nuclear Submarines, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1993, at A5C.
39. Handler, supra note 29, at 7.
40. Rob Holzer, How Far Under for Subs?, NAVY TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at 42.
Russia will launch the Papa-IX attack submarine in 2005. The submarine will rival
the United State's new Seawolf (SSN-21). Id.
41. Norman Friedman, World Naval Developments, PROCEEDINGS, Oct. 1994, at 9192 (Weapons-grade plutonium and uranium appear to be slipping through the Russia
government's fingers as well. Western governments have uncovered several attempted
sales of the material to Third-World countries).
42. Handler, supra note 29.
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radioactive waste a year." Of the thirty-five out-of-service submarines in the Pacific Fleet, only half have had their nuclear fuel removed." The situation is worse in the Northern Fleet, where nuclear
fuel has been removed from only a fourth of its forty-five retired submarines.' According to the Russian naval officer in charge of decommissioning Pacific Fleet boats, the fleet can process only one-and-onehalf submarines a year." At the current rate of decommissioning, it
will take more than three decades to scrap old Pacific Fleet submarines.47 And the Pacific Fleet is ahead of the Northern Fleet, which
just initiated a program." By the year 2000, Russia will have 300
nuclear reactors waiting to be scrapped.4
There is no room for the resulting nuclear waste. "Our storage
facilities - two in the North and two in the Far East - are almost
100 percent filled and there's no place to put spent fuel," according to
the admiral in charge of the Russian navy's maintenance.' A landbased nuclear storage facility will not be ready until the year 2000.51
The Northern Fleet is holding about 21,000 spent fuel assemblies
in storage.5 2 The Murmansk Shipping Company holds another 4,500
assemblies on three floating "technical bases" without room for additional fuel.' The Pacific Fleet has 8,400 spent fuel assemblies.5' Additionally, three submarines with damaged reactors are stored
pierside because their spent fuel cannot be off-loaded."5
The condition at the three floating bases is characterized as being
in an "emergency" status because (for reasons unknown) the assemblies stored there are irrecoverable.' A Pacific Fleet nuclear-waste
dump recently leaked radiation when snowmelt caused a floor to
collapse, releasing radiation 1,000 times greater than the normal
background radiation level.5 7 The Pacific Fleet responded to the cri-

43. Id.
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. Some observers estimate the Russians will take 50 to 70 years to
completely retire their submarines. See Viktor Kitovkin, More Environmental Disasters Predicted for Russia: Safe Disposal of Scrapped Nuclear Ships Lag Due to Lack
of Funds, IZVESTIA, July 9, 1993, at 6.
48. Handler, supra note 29, at 7-8.
49. Id. at 7.
50. Kitovkin, supra note 47, at 6.
51. Handler, supra note 29, at 8.
52. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at 26.
53. Id.

54. Id.
55. Id. (One of the submarines apparently suffered an explosion and fire
pierside in 1985).
56. Id. at 27.
57. Radioactivity Leaks at Russian Nuclear Waste Site, Japan Economic
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sis by building floating reactor holds.' By dismantling a submarine's
outer hull and welding the reactor compartment to two adjoining
compartments, the Russians have constructed floating holds.59 These
reactor holds then are towed to the nuclear submarine base at
Vladivostok and tied to the pier.' The more typical response of the
Russians has been to dump its nuclear waste at sea. This is the result
of Russia's "unreadiness to develop" nuclear waste treatment and
storage facilities."'
C. The History of Russia's Nuclear Waste Dumping
Just as the United States was the first nation to develop a nuclear submarine, so too it was the first to dump nuclear materials at
sea.62 Russia's first nuclear-waste dumping in 1959 was tied to its
testing of nuclear-powered submarines and the icebreaker Lenin.' In
1960, the USSR began the regular practice of dumping liquid radioactive waste, and in 1964, the dumping of solid radioactive waste, into
Northern and Far Eastern oceans." The Russian government estimates that it has dumped 24 kCi of liquid radioactive waste into the
marine environment, primarily into the Barents Sea."5 The
Murmansk Shipping Company, builder of the icebreakers, stopped
dumping liquid radioactive waste at sea in 1984.' The Russian Navy, however, continues to dump liquid radioactive waste at sea67 because it lacks storage space and funds to build disposal facilities on
land.'

Newswire, June 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, JEN File. The fleet
lacks the money to seal the breach and repairs have been postponed indefinitely.
The Russian Navy refuses to allow civilian inspectors on its facility. Id.
58. Handler, supra note 29, at 8.
59. Id. By stripping the ship to its reactor, the Pacific Fleet saves 4.1 billion
rubles (1990 value) if it avoids the cost of maintaining its submarines pierside with
their crews. Id.
60. Id.
61. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at 25.
62. Id. at 3. The first dumping of radioactive waste at sea occurred in 1946
about 80 miles off the coast of California. Great Britain began dumping in 1949,
followed by Japan in 1955. Id. The Soviet Union's first nuclear waste dumping at
sea occurred in 1959 when it discarded 600 cubic meters of low-level radioactive
waste. Id. at 10.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 11. This does not include radioactive leaking from on-shore facilities
or nuclear submarine accidents. The Kara Sea received 8,500 Ci; the Barents Sea
12,153 Ci; the White Sea 100 Ci; and the Baltic Sea .2 Ci. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. See also Fred Hiatt, Russia Rethinks Nuclear Dumping, WASH. POST,
Oct. 21, 1993, at A22 (Russian navy backs down from plan to dump 800 tons of
liquid radioactive waste after Japan protests the dumping of 900 tons of liquid
radioactive waste into the Japan Sea.)
68. Id.
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While it continues to dump liquid radioactive waste, the status of
Russian dumping of solid radioactive waste at sea is uncertain. The
Murmansk Shipping Company stopped dumping solid radioactive
waste at sea in 1986.69 The Russian Navy continued dumping solid
radioactive waste at least until 1992.7" There is no public information about the amount of solid nuclear waste the Russian government
has disposed of at sea since 1992.
According to the Russian government, the greatest amount of
solid radioactive waste was dumped between 1967 and 1982."' Most
of this waste consisted of low- and medium-level radioactive waste
generated during the operation of both surface ships and submarines.72 The greatest environmental concerns stem from the disposal
at sea of reactors, many with fuel still loaded. Off the coast of Novaya
Zemlia, a northern Russian island, the government has placed:
one submarine with two loaded reactors;
a reactor section with two reactors loaded with spent fuel;
a reactor section with one reactor with loaded spent fuel;
one reactor without fuel;
one submarine reactor with spent fuel; and
one reactor assembly with a partial load of spent fuel.73
All the reactors with spent fuel except one were filled with a
hardening mixture designed to prevent salt-water exposure to radioactive sources for up to 500 years. 74 Even so, the safety of the Russian
measures are suspect. Witnesses to nuclear-waste dumping told the
Russian government that at times the navy shot at the metal containers to speed their sinking.75 In addition, the nuclear waste was not

separated from other hazardous wastes before dumping.6
Not all the nuclear reactors dumped with fuel were intentional
scuttles. In 1989, the submarine Komsomolets sank 300 miles off the
69. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at 12.
70. Id. at 16. In 1992, the Russian Navy dumped 2,741 cubic meters of solid
radioactive waste into the Sea of Japan and off the coast of Kamchatka. The same
year, the Russian Navy dumped 6,652 cubic meters of liquid radioactive waste. Id.
at tbl. 9.
71. Id. at 12.
72. Id. at 11.
73. Id. at 12. The six submarine reactors were dumped with fuel in place
because reactor accidents rendered the cores too hot to remove. The reactor assembly, from the icebreaker Lenin, was sunk for the same reason. Id.
74. Id. at 12-13.
75. Id. at 19. Solid radioactive waste was put into steel containers designed to
corrode one millimeter each century. Because the containers used were so thin,
radioactive material should reach the ocean within 10 years of dumping. Id. at 20.
76. Id. at 20.
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Norwegian coast.77 When the submarine hit the ocean floor at a
depth of 5,525 feet, the submarine exploded and its titanium hull
breached.7" Two nuclear torpedoes on board were damaged as well.79
Salt water is expected to reach the plutonium in the torpedoes within
five to six years." When the plutonium hits the water, it will meld
with water particles and drift for tens of miles.8 ' While the amount
of plutonium that will be released is small in comparison to previous
amounts of radioactivity introduced into the Arctic, the disintegration
of a Russian nuclear hulk worries Norwegian fishers. "When 2the leaks
start, no matter how small, no one will buy Norwegian fish."
The Komsomolets is not alone on the ocean floor. Experts estimate it is joined by about fifty nuclear weapons.' Two United States
nuclear submarines, the Thresher and the Scorpion, also lie on the
ocean floor.' They are joined by Russian nuclear submarines lost off
Cape Cod, northwest of Hawaii, southwest of the Azores, northwest of
Spain, and northeast of Bermuda.'
D. Effects of Dumping on Ocean Ecosystems
Radiation in high doses can kill instantly, but scientists debate
the effects of low level radioactive waste on people and the environment." All life is subject to a continual shower of "background" radiation emanating from space and from within the earth.87 The ques-

77. Norman Polmar, Campaigning for the Komsomolets, PROCEEDINGS, Mar.
1994, at 76-77.
78. Id.
79. Id. The nuclear torpedoes carry 20 pounds of plutonium. In comparison,
Arctic oceans have been exposed to between 450 and 650 pounds of plutonium
already through nuclear weapons testing. Id.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. quoting Igor Spassky, designer of the Komsomolets.
83. Id.
84. Id. See also Robert Cooke, The Nuclear Sea, NEWSDAY, Jan. 11, 1994, at 55.
The U.S. also lost two capsules carrying nuclear materials for bombs when a B-47
bomber carrying them was lost between Florida and Europe.
85. Cooke, supra note 84, at 55. The Russians have lost about 24 submarinelaunched nuclear missiles and at least six nuclear torpedoes. Id. Not all man-introduced radiation has come from military operations. In 1964, radiation from a
nuclear power generator aboard a satellite reentering the earth's atmosphere scattered plutonium across the earth's surface. P. Kilho Park, et.al., Radioactive Wastes
and the Oceans: An Overview, in 3 RADIOACTIVE WASTES AND THE OCEAN 3, 22 (P.
Kilho Park, ed. 1983).
86. NICHOLAS LENSSEN, NUCLEAR WASTE: THE PROBLEM THAT WON'T Go AWAY

16 (WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE) (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter WORLDWATCH].
87. Id. at 17. Radiation breaks the bonds holding molecules together, which
leads to cell death or mutation. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, HEALTH EFFECTS OF
EXPOSURE TO Low LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION 9, 65 (National Academy Press
1990).
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tion is whether additional human-generated radiation, diluted by
ocean water, is harmful.
Some studies suggest that marine organisms are less sensitive to
radiation than people." However, assessing the impact of radiation
on marine life is difficult due to problems of accounting for the differing factors of source, dosage, and time exposed. 9 Additionally, scientists have difficulty determining how deep-sea ocean currents and sedimentation affect radioactive-waste dispersal and its subsequent intake by marine life.' The result is that while governments cannot
"choose an abiotic dump site in the ocean," neither can they be sure
how nuclear-waste dumping at sea will affect marine life or the food
chain.9
Policymakers argue that until scientists agree on the effects of
ocean dumping, such practices should be banned.92 The Russian government, on the other hand, believes that "there is no danger to anyone ...

and, if no means of processing the radioactive waste on shore

is found, life itself will force us to discharge it into the sea again." 3
Current studies appear to support Russia's position. A recent RussianJapanese-South Korean scientific study of the Sea of Japan found
radioactivity at dumping sites within normal background levels."
Another study of dump sites in the Kara Sea found that contamination was localized and not harmful to nearby areas.95 Despite these

88. Park, supra note 85, at 19.
89. Id. See also WORLDWATCH, supra note 86, at 16-17 (discussing differences
between doses and period of exposure in assessing radiation effects on humans).
90. Park, et. al., Requirements for Radioactive Waste Management in the Ocean,
in 3 RADIOACTIVE WASTES AND THE OCEAN, supra note 85, at 481, 497.
91. Id. at 503. Governments should study nuclear waste dumping at sea thoroughly lest they inadvertently "short-circuit[] otherwise remote links to man." Id.
Non-scientific factors also weigh heavily in the argument, including the dependence
of some nations on ocean resources, the costs and benefits of nuclear power, and
the belief that the ocean requires special protection. Judith Spiller & Cynthia
Hayden, Radwaste at Sea: A New Era of Polarization or a New Basis for Consensus?, 19 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 345, 351 (1988).
92. Nations Agree on Limits to Sea Dumping, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Oct. 7,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, REUWLD file. ("If scientists cannot agree,
it's better not to risk the marine environment," according to Dik Tromp, the chairman of the London Convention on Dumping.).
93. Pacific Fleet Commander Denies Japanese Submarine Radiation Danger
Story, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 23, 1994, translating ITARTASS, 0136 GMT, Apr. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File
(statement of Vice Admiral Georgiy Gurinov).
94. Okean Expedition Find No Ecological Damage From Nuclear Waste Dumping, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 29, 1994, translating Russian
broadcast from Vladivostok, 0715 GMT, Apr. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, World
Library, BBCSWB File.
95. Radioactive Contamination in Kara Sea Said to [Be] Localized, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 7, 1994, translating ITAR-TASS, 1445 GMT, Sep.
22, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File.
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studies, only the Russians are willing to conclude the dumpings are
not harmful. The United Nations is studying Russia's once-secret
dumping grounds, including the area around the Komsomolets." The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is studying the effects of
military-generated radioactive pollution.9" Until science can provide
answers to the unpredictability of nuclear-waste dumping at sea,
prudence requires that governments create alternate means of handling such wastes.
III.

LEGAL REGIMES GOVERNING RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DUMPING

The dumping of nuclear waste at sea is governed by the London
Convention on Dumping.9" The Soviet Union was a signatory to the
convention,99 and Russia accepted the convention as part of its assumption of the USSR's obligations.'" The convention prohibits the
1
dumping of pollution into seas, other than internal waters.' The
ban on pollution does not apply, however, to vessels with sovereign
immunity, ' such as warships, but the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) requires that data on nuclear dumping be submitted
regardless of the source. 3 Russia admits that its dumping was conducted in violation of the London Convention.'" In addition, Russia
is a signatory to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, ' which requires that Russia
reduce Baltic Sea pollution. Russia also is a party to the Convention

96. Thomas Land, United Nations: UN to Study Seas Used for Nuclear Dumping, REUTER TEXTLINE, May 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTRAN
File. The first foreigners to have access to the area off the Novaya Zemlya islands
were Norwegians who began a joint study of the area with Russia in August, 1994.
Russia Opens Undersea Nuclear Waste Site to Foreign Inspection, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
23, 1994, at 7.
97. Jean-Marie Cadiou, The Environmental Legacy of the Cold War, NATO REV.,
Oct. 1993, at 34. NATO currently is working on a study, Cross-Border Environmental Problems Emanating from Defence-Related Installations and Activities, which will
focus on both chemical and radioactive pollution. Id.
98. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matters, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120, in NAGENDRA
SINGH, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW CONVENTIONS 2526 (1983).
99. Id. (the Convention came into effect for the USSR in 1976).
100. Commonwealth of Independent States Accord, supra note 14.
101. London Convention, art. I-IV. Art. I states that signatories "shall promote
the effective control of all sources of pollution of the marine environment, and
pledge themselves especially to take all practicable steps to prevent pollution of the
sea . . . ." Id. Art. IV bans some dumping, and requires permits from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for dumping of radioactive wastes. London
Convention, art. IV.
102. London Convention, art. VII.
103. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at 2.
104. Id. at 10.
105. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea
Area, 13 I.L.M. 544 (1974).
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on the Protection of the Black Sea Against10 7Pollution,"
radioactive waste dumping in the Black Sea.

which bans

Furthermore, there is no lack of Russian environmental law. By
1987, the USSR had passed more than 1,000 environmental laws."°
However, these laws were ineffective because they contained no enforcement means and were generally ignored.' °9 The Russian Navy
dumped radioactive waste at sea despite its own regulations and the
regulations of other agencies prohibiting such dumping. " The Russian Navy benefited from a hole in the nation's environmental laws,
which failed to address nuclear hazards."' The Russian parliament
has passed a bill limiting nuclear waste disposal."' Overall, however, the Russian environmental law system has "exerted very little
influence over Soviet industrial practices or military policies to
date.""
Recent Russian law, however, is different from its predecessor's
in many ways. The Russian Constitution includes three articles relating to the environment. The first, article 9, states that land is the
"basis of the life and activity of the peoples."" 4 In addition, every
Russian "has the right to a decent environment, reliable information
about the state of the environment" and payment for personal or
property damage because of ecological harms."5 Finally, the Russian
Constitution states that every citizen is "obliged to protect nature and
the environment and to show solicitude for natural wealth."" 6 In

106. Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution, 32 I.L.M.
1101 (1993).
107. Id.
108. Environmental Law and Policy in the USSR, 17 ENVT'L L. REP. (Envt'l L.
Inst.) 10,068 (Mar. 1987).
109. Id.
110. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at 9.
111. Maloney-Dunn, supra note 15, at 379.
112. Russia Passes Bill to Limit Nuclear Waste Disposal, Japan Economic
Newswire, July 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, JEN File. The bill,
passed July 7, 1994, is Russia's first comprehensive nuclear waste law. The law
bans dumping liquid nuclear waste beneath the earth's surface and in waterways.
The government does, however, continue to assert its exemption to the international
ban on nuclear waste dumping at sea. The law also limits the release of information about nuclear waste dumping. Id.
113. Id. Despite the lack of facilities or laws to adequately handle the nuclear
waste dilemma, Russia has engaged in negotiations to receive Western nations'
hazardous waste. The Swiss nuclear power industry admitted to such negotiations
in September, 1994 after Greenpeace leaked a secret memorandum to the press.
The Swiss plan calls for shipping nuclear waste to a yet-to-be-complete'd nuclear
recycling plant. Swiss Nuclear Power Industry Admits to Talks on Shipping Toxic
Wastes to Russia, IN'L. ENVTL. DAILY, Sept. 21, 1994, available in WESTLAW,
BNA-IED fie.
114. RUssIAN FEDERATION CONST., art. 9, cl. 1 (Dec. 12, 1993).
115. Id. at art. 42.
116. Id. at art. 58.
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contrast, the USSR Constitution only provided for the protection of
the environment for future consumptive use.117
In addition to including the environment in its constitution,
Russia passed an environmental law in 1992 defining the rights of
The law also bans the
citizens with regard to the environment.'
importation and disposal of nuclear waste."' Citizens are given the
right to sue polluters,' and to demand closure of polluters for noncompliance. 12 ' Despite these legal regimes, Russia has not yet been
able to deal effectively with its nuclear waste dilemma. A lack of
information regarding environmental degradation, the absence of a
comprehensive nuclear waste handling policy, and the need for better
use of land-ownership rights all have kept Russia hooked on dumping
at sea.
IV. KICKING RUSSIA OF THE NUCLEAR DUMPING HABIT

Russia has not been the only country that dumped nuclear waste
at sea. Cold War-era nuclear activities by both sides have caused
"such formidable damage to the environment, to human health and
perhaps even to the human genotype, that the consequences will be
felt for decades."2 Even so, several nuclear-capable powers still remain drawn to the concept of the seas as the great diluter of nuclear
pollution. Great Britain, France, China, and Belgium had objected to
a proposal to ban all nuclear dumping at sea until recently.'m Great
Britain said that while it believed that controlled dumping presented
no threat to the environment or25 human health, it would comply.'
Russia remains the only holdout.'
A. Use of Trade to EncourageResponsible Nuclear Waste Treatment
When the issues of trade and the environment are mentioned in
the same breath, the conversation inevitably turns to sustainable

117. USSR CONST., art. 18. (1977), in THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH ITs LAWS 29
(Leo Hecht ed., 1983) ("In the interest of future generations, necessary steps are to
be taken in the USSR to protect and to make rational use of the land and its
mineral and water resources .... ").
118. RSFSR LAw ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1992) translated by FBIS,
JPRS-TEN-92-007 (Apr. 28, 1992).
119. Id. at art. 50(3).
120. Id. at art. 12.
121. Id. at art. 91.
122. Jean-Marie Cadiou, The Environmental Legacy of the Cold War, NATO REV.,
Oct. 1993, at 33. The concern over transboundary movements of hazardous and
nuclear wastes has spurred the military alliance to start 30 studies concerning
waste disposal. Id. at 34.
123. Radioactive Waste: Ban on Ocean Dumping Accepted by U.K, 33 DAILY
ENv'T REPORT (BNA) d4, Feb. 18, 1994.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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development. As a concept, sustainable development is defined as "an
economic development approach that allows for growth and satisfies
basic human needs while avoiding profligate resource exploitation and
pollution."'26 The reality of sustainable development is more problematic, since it has yet to be achieved.' But it is a useful guiding
concept for Western countries when determining which projects they
will fund abroad, and for spurring environmental awareness.
Russia has made many trips to Western coffers - to the tune of
$82.9 billion at the end of 1993."= The majority of its loans comes
from Western governments." Additional assistance arrives in the
form of monetary aid from multilateral financing institutions such as
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The money
Russia receives is desperately needed and it barely helps. Russia had
been counting on money pledged by Western nations to fund critical
areas of its budget and thereby reduce inflation. 30 But of the $24
billion pledged in 1992 and the $28 billion offered in 1993, only $4
billion has reached Russia.'
When Western nations have come
through with money, it often is tied to bettering the Russian economy
for Western business or is earmarked for specific projects.' 32
Currently, Russia is waiting for $1.5 billion in International
Monetary Funds to be released for use in its foreign exchange and for
"general financing."" The World Bank recently made a $300 million
loan to improve 7,200 miles of Russian roads.' Western countries
also have arranged for a $6 billion currency stabilization fund and
$10 billion in export credits. 5 Money for environmental projects in

126. Marvin S. Soroos, From Stockholm to Rio: The Evolution of Global Environmental Governance, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S 299, 310 (Norman J.
Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2d ed. 1994).
127. Margaret Bowman & David Hunter, Environmental Reforms in Post-Communist Central Europe: From High Hopes to Hard Reality, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 923,
975 (1992).
128. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Mopping Up Foreign Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1994, at

C1, C5.
129. Id. (Russia owes 25 percent of the $82.9 billion debt to commercial banks,
the rest to Western governments.).
130. Jeffrey Sachs, Reformers in Retreat: Indecision Costing West its Chance to
Rescue Russia, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 6, 1994, at 83A. Mr. Sachs is a well-known
international trade professor at Harvard University who was an adviser to the
Russian government. By paying for part of the budget, Western nations could
reduce the amount of money the Russian government was printing, and reduce
inflation. That, in turn, would have freed more money for social programs. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Bowman & Hunter, supra note 127, at 976.
133. International Finance: Camdessus Estimates Russia Loan Will Be Approved
Around May 1, 11 INTL TRADE REP. (BNA) 13, Mar. 30, 1994. The IMF loan has
been conditioned on Russia tightening its budget and enacting other reforms. Id.
134. Russia Borrows $300M for Roads, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 18, 1994, at 6.
135. International Finance: Group of Seven Warns Russia About Need for Economic Reforms, 11 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 9, Mar. 2, 1994.
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Russia thus far has been limited to paying for the dismantlement of
nuclear missiles. The United States is paying $1.2 billion over three
years toward nuclear-warhead destruction. 36 According to the Department of State, the United States would like 3to
offer more for the
7
environment, but is limited by its own resources.'
Even if the Western world cannot generate the billions of rubles
needed to fund the building of a nuclear waste storage and treatment
facility, it can use its money to promote environmental awareness.
One of the key problems with nuclear dumping at sea and with environmental problems in Russia generally is the lack of information in
the hands of its citizens and the rest of the world.1 3' Russia has no
law similar to America's Right-to-Know Act."' Nor does Russia have
a law comparable to the United States' National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA).' 4 NEPA's environmental impact statements (EISs) are
required to include the environmental impact of any proposed federal
action and any alternatives." NEPA EISs are then made available
to anyone who wants them." This has the effect of "enrich[ing] the
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation.""4 In contrast, Russian officials have sought to
limit the flow of information to the public. 1" Thus, Russians are
without laws that ensure their access to information about the effect
of government actions on the environment. Without independent
sources of information, Russians are likely to continue to receive
inaccurate information about nuclear-waste dumping." Accurate

136. James E. Goodby, Averting Nuclear Chaos: The Tasks Before Us, 4 DEP'T
ST. DIsp. (Oct. 11, 1993).
137. Id. See also Handler, supra note 29, at 9. The U.S. Navy is midway
through a $2.7 billion effort to decommission about 100 nuclear submarines by the
year 2000.
138. See Maloney-Dunn, supra note 15, at 429. See also David A. Colson,
Russia's Radioactive Waste Disposal: A Matter of Grave Concern, 4 DEP'T ST. DISP.
47 (Nov. 22, 1993). ("The international community was deliberately misled by the
USSR. Those responsible did no credit to themselves, and they did a disservice to
the marine environment, the international community and its institutions, their
country, and its people.")
139. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001-11050 (1988).
140. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d)
(1988). NEPA requires an environmental impact statement for every "major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment ....
" 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(C).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i-iii).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(G).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
144. See, Russia Passes Bill to Limit Nuclear Waste Disposal, Japan Economic
Newswire, July 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, JEN File.
145. For instance, one newspaper recently wrote that the Russian government
stopped nuclear-waste dumping at sea in 1991 and that some of the most hazardous waste dumped near the Novaya Zemlya islands in the Arctic Oceans was "not
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information, however, would put Russian citizens in a better position
to pressure governments and change their own polluting behavior.'
With restructuring, Western aid could provide some of that information.
The World Bank has a process similar to NEPA through which it
prepares environmental assessments (EAs).'47 The primary goal of
an EA, however, is to "help reduce the risk of cost overruns and delays... as a result of unanticipated environmental disruptions."'
Thus, the World Bank's environmental-assessment process is less
concerned with examining alternatives and getting information to
people than it is with ensuring that its funds are not depleted by
dealings with unforeseen environmental factors. This makes the assessment process nearly valueless for the country receiving the aid. As
Congress made clear when it debated NEPA, "our... present state of
knowledge, our established public policies, and our existing governmental institutions are not adequate to deal with the growing environmental problems and crises the Nation faces."'4 9 The assessment
procedure does little to further knowledge when the information it
generates is tailored for funding purposes.
America's NEPA is inadequate to cover the responsibility of providing environmental assessment information to foreign residents.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has refused to apply environmental laws
abroad because plaintiffs lack standing."' Therefore, application of
NEPA abroad is not an option for people wanting information on U.S.sponsored activities. Practically, the people most in need of the information lack the resources to bring a NEPA enforcement suit anyway.
NEPA may not apply to multilateral financing institutions because
they are not "federal," even though the United States may provide
most of their capital. American environmental laws therefore fail to
provide a meaningful environmental assessment device for residents
of foreign countries.

very harmful." Vladimir Lagovsky,

Lenin's Heart Beats on the Sea Bottom,

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, May 18, 1994, at 1, 4 translated by Russian Press Digest

available in LEXIS, World Library, SPD File.
146. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992: DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT

87 published for the WORLD BANK by Oxford Univ. Press (1992). Information also
tends to encourage a more rational environmental debate. Id.
147. Id. at 81.

148. Id.
149. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
quoting S. REP. NO. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess 4 (1969).
150. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1991). While not deciding on
the issue of extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge a Department of Interior rule stating that the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988), did not apply abroad. Id.
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On the other hand, the present World Bank structure offers a
good foundation. The United States has pressured multilateral development banks to promote sustainable development and require environmental assessments by forbidding American directors within these
institutions to vote for any bank action that would significantly affect
the environment. 5 ' Additionally, the U.S. law contemplates that the
results be given to "affected groups and local nongovernmental organizations."'5 2 The United States should continue, however, to press for
more meaningful assessments.
First, as under America's NEPA, the multilateral development
banks should be required to focus their assessments on alternatives to
a proposed project. The alternatives should strive to meet the goals of
sustainable development. Providing alternatives ensures that
policymakers will have thought through the proposed project's impact." Additionally, alternatives give local leaders a choice of options in deciding whether to accept a bank's project or to protest it.
Local constituents are in the best position, by virtue of their historical
link with a specific location, to approve of a project and to determine
how it should be constructed. They have a greater environmental
stake in projects; therefore, they should be aware of all alternatives
before supporting new construction.
The alternatives data are useless, however, unless locals receive
the assessment information. To ensure that they do, Western countries should use the United Nations as a clearinghouse. The U.N. is
ideally suited to handle the passing-down of information because it is
globally known and has offices worldwide. The multilateral development banks, in conjunction with Western governments and the governments receiving assistance, should establish and fund environmental information centers. These centers could be run through U.N.
relief offices, U.N. development offices or the facilities of the multilateral banks and Western governments themselves. The multilateral
banks would be required, before receiving additional capital from the
West, to send their environmental assessments to the centers via the
U.N. The assessments should be provided free of charge to local governments, media and citizens in their native languages. Local citizens
should be encouraged to pick up copies of assessments. This would
provide a concrete means of better educating local groups about Western funding projects and the environment in general. Such information would encourage interaction between the banks, government, and
citizens. This would, in turn, enable policymakers to better under-

151. International Development and Finance Act of 1989, 22 U.S.C. § 262m-7
(Supp. IV 1992) (A director may vote in favor of a project having a significant
environmental effect if an assessment has been completed and provided to affected
groups.).
152. 22 U.S.C. § 262m-7(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
153. Defenders of Wildlife, 627 F.2d at 1243.
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stand local situations and make decisions that more reasonably reflect
the policy of sustainable development.
Generating information is the best way to use trade to help alleviate the environmental problems associated with nuclear-waste
dumping at sea absent agreement among Western nations to build a
nuclear waste storage and treatment facility. Using other trade policies to solve the problem would not be effective, since trade in general
has only an indirect effect on nuclear waste production. Russia's nuclear waste dilemma is a creature of military design, not one resulting
from the rampant use of natural resources to generate trade. Additionally, the use of trade policies themselves are a "blunt and uncertain tool" for environmental governance because the environment often can be harmed more by trade policies designed to prevent ecological problems." If Western governments are going to push their belief that trade is an environmental issue,' they should provide developing countries with the information about Western projects needed to meaningfully assess the ecological impacts. Once empowered
with information about the environment, local governments and citizens are less likely to tolerate acts such as Russia's nuclear-waste
dumping, and pressure policymakers to halt such environmentally
degrading practices. "That debate -

sure to be vigorous -

should be

viewed as an opportunity for dialogue and progress, rather than as a
threat to any particular economic system or order.""s The value of
information becomes greater when viewed as a tool to overcome social
behavior that is environmentally damaging.' As a method of fostering better environmental practices through trade, information via
environmental assessments is the best service the West could provide
to developing countries. The use of other trade-based policies, such as
sanctions, would not have as positive and direct an impact as the
release of information would. Western nations should use their influence to stimulate the worldwide flow of information about the environment. A simple means to accomplish this is through an expanded
environmental assessment program.

154. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT

1992,

supra note

146, 67. See generally

ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 1190

(1992).
155. Alan Riding, Gore Insists Environment is a Trade Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
15, 1994, at C1.
156. Scott McCallum, Local Action in a New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 621, 631
(1993).
157. Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft, Conclusion: The New Environmental
Agenda, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S, supra note 126, at 369-70.
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B. Using Technology-Forcing Laws to Spur Better Environmental
Practices
Regulation of environmental problems manifests itself in two
basic schemes. First, regulators can use health-based approaches
which seek to reduce the amount of harm to people by requiring industry to meet certain emissions levels." 8 The other method of regulation depends on the level of technology available to the entity regulated.'59 This second approach, when combined with a "technologyforcing" scheme, 60 offers the best solution to putting Russia on a
system of nuclear waste control.
A health-based regulatory scheme for nuclear waste is unworkable because of disagreement over the harmfulness of radioactive
waste dumping at sea.' 6' The Russian government has reached a
"preliminary conclusion" that the dumping of liquid radioactive waste
poses no danger to the general populace or to people who live in coastal areas or work the seas.'62 The Russians cannot, however, determine the threat to the human environment from the dumped solid
radioactive wastes."8 Scientists still believe information is needed
regarding at-sea radioactive waste disposal, including how biota uptake radionuclides." 6 Without more concrete data, it is impossible to
calculate meaningful health-based standards since there is no indication, one way or another, exactly how nuclear waste dumping at sea
affects people or the marine environment.
Ideally, a nuclear-waste management scheme has two parts.
First, the waste must be classified and evaluated.'65 This process allows the generator to know what it is dealing with and what storage
conditions and treatments are appropriate." The generator iden-

158. See generally PERCIVAL, supra note 154, at 146-53.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 165-68. "Technology-forcing" is the imposition of standards more
stringent than those attainable by then-available technology to compel polluters to
come up with innovative solutions. Id. at 167.
161. Radioactive Waste: Ban on Ocean Dumping Accepted by U.K, supra note
123.
162. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at 18.
163. Id. at 20.
164. Park, Requirements for Radioactive Waste Management in the Ocean, in 3
RADIOACTIVE WASTES AND THE OCEAN, supra note 85, at 481, 482. (Information should
be gathered on the behavior of radioactive wastes in saltwater and sediments,
biological uptake and effects of radiation.).
165. INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY WASTE MANAGEMENT

SECTION, DIVISION OF

NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE, TECHNICAL PAPER IN SUPPORT OF THE CODE OF PRACTICE ON
TRANSBOUNDARY SHIPMENTS OF NUCLEAR WASTES (Apr. 1989), reprinted in
TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS AND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 374, 378 (Barbara Kwiatkowska & Alfred Soons eds., 1993) [hereinafter
TRANSBOUNDARY HAZARDOUS WASTES].

166. Id.
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tifies the best storage and treatment options as the next step. 16 , It
then implements procedures to ensure the safe daily operation of
nuclear waste facilities undertaking these chores.l" The chief international adviser for countries implementing 169nuclear programs is the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Russia apparently has a method of determining what wastes are
low, medium and high level radioactive. Until recently, however, no
attempt had been made to quantify the amount of nuclear waste
Russia was generating or how it was dealing with such waste.' A
lack of record-keeping has required a post-hoc expert-generated "best
guess."' The chore of finding storage methods has been left to various fleet commanders, apparently without any systematic evaluation
or coordination. Nor is there apparently any type of inspection or
auditing of nuclear-waste storage in the fleets beyond the basic identification of radioactive levels. 7 2 Such a disjointed scheme for nuclearwaste management suggests that Russia needs to adopt systemic
regulations
that put the bureaucracy on a technology-forcing pro17 3
gram.
The Russian technology-control program should be implemented
in three phases. Each phase would lead to greater restrictions on
nuclear waste releases into the environment. The three phases are:
(1) Best Practicable Technology;
(2) Best Available Technology; and
(3) Lowest Achievable Emission Rate.

167. Id. (Looking at the storage and treatment options entails conducting engineering and feasibility studies, safety assessments, environmental impact statements.).
168. Id. at 379-80 (Safety concerns encompass employee training, record-keeping,
quality assurance programs, and independent oversight by inspections and audits).
169. "The General Conference . . . calls upon the [IAEA] to give priority consideration to requests by developing countries for assistance in the field of nuclear
waste management." INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), RESOLUTION
OF THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE ON DUMPING OF NUCLEAR WASTES (Sept. 23,

1988), reprinted in TRANSBOUNDARY HAZARDOUS WASTES, supra note 165, at 355,
356.
170. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at i.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 10 ('The evaluation of radioecological consequences of dumping [radioactive waste] on the basis of the information provided . . . is quite problematic
due to the lack of detailed information on the radionucleic content of the waste and
the protective qualities of the containers").
173. Maloney-Dunn, supra note 15, at 368-369. Russia has been debating a new
nuclear-waste law, but it has yet to be passed. The law would supplement the
current environmental law banning the foreign import of nuclear waste by forbidding the burial of foreign nuclear waste on Russian soil. It does not, however,
implement any procedures for dealing with current waste problems.
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The most important factor to remember about each of the technology levels is that they are temporary. Under the U.S. Clean Water
Act, for example, Congress envisioned Best Practicable Technology
applying for no more than three years. 74 No matter what level the
polluters obtain, it would be up to the Russian government to revisit
the technology controls and adjust them as necessary. Under the
Clean Water Act, the EPA must review effluent limitations every five
years and make adjustments as necessary.'75 The result is that the
technology is always ratcheted toward greater limits on pollution.
1. Best Practicable Control Technology
Best Practicable Control Technology (BPT) is the low point of
technological-based controls. BPT is designed to be the entry point in
the system and would allow the Russian government to ease into the
regulation. The key factors to consider should mirror the Clean Water
Act "76
' and include the cost of applying the technology to the benefits
received, the age of the equipment involved, engineering methods, and
environmental impact.'
Because of the cost prohibitiveness of most procedures, the level
of BPT for Russian nuclear-waste level would be low. The main regulatory scheme likely would consist of record-keeping requirements,
studies of current procedures, 7 ' and the creation of a general
oversight and inspection regime. However, these are all essential
elements of a nuclear waste regulatory scheme approved under the
IAEA's formulation.'79 It is unlikely, given the current complete lack
of Russian control over its nuclear waste stream, that dumping at sea
would cease. Environmentalists and other nations will continue to
pressure Russia to stop such dumping.' Nevertheless, the international community must recognize that building a nuclear waste
regulatory scheme after a country is already burdened with such
wastes is an onerous task. As long as the Russian government maintains its technology-forcing plan, Western governments should adopt a
supportive stance.

174. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387,
(1988) [hereinafter FWPCA].
175. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(d).

1311(b)(E)

176. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B).

177. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B).
178. Park, Requirements for Radioactive Waste Management in the Ocean, in 3
RADIOACTIVE WASTES AND THE OCEAN, supra note 85, at 481, 502. The importance

of studies in these circumstances cannot be understated. "The intelligent and safe
use of practical waste space will require both scientific knowledge of the environment and technical understanding of the wastes."
179. TRANSBOUNDARY
180. See,

HAzARDOUS WASTES, supra note 165, at 378.
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The BPT plan also should include methods for dealing with sunken nuclear submarines outside Russia's territory. Here the application
of BPT necessarily will be on a site-specific basis. The Russian government already has undertaken extensive study of the submarine
5
Komsomolets."'
It is unclear whether equally extensive surveys of
wreckage have been conducted for the other submarines lost at sea.
Therefore, application of BPT to these submarines may entail information-gathering expeditions and coordination with other countries if
Russia decides to apply its laws extraterritorially. At this stage, it is
unlikely that sealing the vessels or salvaging the submarines would
be financially feasible; therefore, the sunken submarines would remain in situ pending the step to the next technology level.
2. Best Available Technology
Once the Russians achieved BPT, their control technology should
jump to Best Available Technology (BAT). BAT reflects a weighing of
the same factors as under BPT'82 except no direct cost-benefit analysis is conducted. Instead, cost is one of the factors entered into the
mix and is no longer the overriding consideration.' The Russians at
this stage could be utilizing the Pacific Fleet's hold-construction strategy to reduce both costs to the government and the number of people
exposed to radiation.' Again, due to Russia's severe financial difficulties, it is doubtful that a total ban on nuclear-waste dumping could
be enacted at this level of technology. Russia could, however, conform
its dumping to IAEA standards, which it presently does not do. Under
the LAEA guidelines, disposal at sea of low- and medium-level radioactive waste is limited to specially delimitated areas that lie 200
miles offshore in waters deeper than 4,000 meters and are between
fifty degrees North and fifty degrees South.' It is not likely that
Russia could afford more extensive treatment for its lost submarines.
However, at the BAT stage, Russia would be constructing a nuclear
waste treatment and storage facility. The BAT technology level would
require Russia to build on its BPT record-keeping and studies by
enacting controls to ensure the site is built properly and management
plans are in place. This would ensure that when the nuclear storage

181. Polmar, supra note 77, at 77.
182. FWPCA, supra note 174, at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B).
183. Id. See, e.g. the language of the Clean Water Act, infra note 186, regarding
BPT ("total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction
benefits") as compared with the factors to consider with BAT ("the cost of achieving
such effluent reduction.") FWPCA, supra note 174, at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(1)(B) and
1314(b)(2)(B).
184. Once the boats are dismantled and their nuclear fuel holds constructed,
there is no need for an on-board crew. They would be dismissed and the supervisors of the nuclear-waste storage facility would assume responsibility for monitoring.
185. FACTS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 20, at fig. 1.
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facility comes on-line in the year 2000 there is a complete plan for its
operation and the movement to Lowest Achievable Emission Rate.
3. Lowest Achievable Emission Rate
By the time the Russians have a new nuclear treatment and
storage facility available in the year 2000, the regulatory scheme
should be ratcheted up to Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER).
Under the U.S. Clean Air Act, LAER is "the most stringent emission
limitation which is achieved in practice . .. "18 At this point, Russia
should have a full program in place (which it developed through its
application of BPT and BAT) for the decommissioning of nuclear
submarines. If storage and treatment plans are carried through, Russia will be able to abide by its London Convention obligations and be
able to cease any low level radioactive waste disposal at sea. In addition, it should be able to conform to IAEA guidelines for nuclear treatment and disposal facilities. It is under LAER that the Russian government would become a responsible nuclear power.
The success of such a regulatory scheme depends heavily on
bureaucrats whose track records currently are shabby. "[M]any of the
[t]hese old structures pose
old bureaucratic structures remain ....
substantial challenges to environmental protection reforms .... ""'
These officials and their institutions will require that reformers use
their political will to ensure that regulatory schemes are meaningful.
Russia already has taken steps to consolidate what had been overlapping administrative agencies by creating in 1992 a Ministry of
Ecology and Natural Resources." As Russian leaders face re-organization and regulation of nuclear activities, they should focus on what
is most appropriate for their country and not what Western countries
would like to see. As it is, none of the former Eastern European countries can meet all of the European Community environmental standards.8 9 A BPT to BAT to LAER approach will ensure that Russia
evolves toward the safest and most internationally acceptable nuclear
waste regulatory scheme. That program alone, however, is insufficient
without the will to enforce. As a result, Russia's move toward the
privatization of land should help.

186.
1990).
187.
188.
189.

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, 7501(3)(B) (1988 and Supp. II
Bowman & Hunter, supra note 127, at 973.
Maloney-Dunn, supra note 15, at 416-17.
Bowman & Hunter, supra note 127, at 970.
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C. The Use of Land Values to FosterBetter Environmental Decisions
Under the Soviet system, the government held all land." For
nearly 75 years, individuals did not own land. When the USSR collapsed, Russia adopted land values similar to those of the United
States. Today, Russia's constitution provides for private ownership of
land.' 9' It states that "[diwellings are inviolable." 92 Individuals
can "freely possess, utilize and dispose of land and other natural
resources provided that this does not damage the environment and
does not violate the rights and legitimate interests of others."' 93 Furthermore, Russians are entitled to money damages when the state
damages their property unlawfully. 9 4 The adoption of Western land
values, where socialist ideas had taken root, has led to some discontent. The new Russian land system has de-emphasized the agrarian
lifestyle in favor a free-market approach. "A weakening desire to work
the land is a great danger to the national character," says Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn. "Among our people, the peasant sensibility has been
trod underfoot .

. . ."9

Reaction to the system illustrates the strong,

long-cultivated connection between Russia's land and its people. Yet
the new land ownership law offers "a relatively low-transaction-cost
method of inducing people to 'do the right thing' with the earth's
surface.""9 It is this attitude among private landowners that could
be useful in insuring Russia takes steps to control its nuclear waste.
One of the chief advantages private ownership offers over group
ownership is the motivation among individual land owners to police
their land.' 97 Under the old Soviet regime, private individuals had
no recourse when the government harmed the environment. Now,
however, individuals have an incentive to seek money from the government when it harms private property. Not only is the environment
harmed, but their land is injured - property which when sold or
passed down to future generations benefits the owner. These owners
have a personal stake in their land. The government no longer has

190. USSR CONST., art. 10. ("The basis for the economic system of the USSR is
socialist ownership of the means of production in the form of state property (belonging to the people), and collective-farm and cooperative property").

191. RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONST., art. 9 ("The land and other natural resources
are utilized and protected in the Russian Federation as the basis of the life and
activity of the peoples inhabiting the corresponding territory. The land and other
natural resources can be in private, state, municipal or other forms of ownership").
192. Id. at art. 25.
193. Id. at art. 36.
194. Id. at art. 53.
195. ALEKSANDR I. SOLZHENITSYN, REBUILDING RUSSIA: REFLECTIONS AND TENTATIVE PROPOSALS 30 (1991).
196. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327 (1993).
197. Id. at 1328 (The author notes that a "sole owner bears the entirety of any
loss stemming from his slack oversight, whereas a group member bears only a
fraction.").
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the unfettered right to maltreat one's land. Damage inflicted on private property from nuclear-powered devices could run into the billions
of rubles, creating a strong incentive for the government to adopt
safer practices. There is doubt, however, whether the Russian government will have money to pay such damages. 98 Even so, the pressure
private landowners can exert on governmental agencies can be considerable. As information about contamination in Russia has spread,
more environmental activist groups have arisen, due to looser government regulation.' These groups already have prevented some nuclear-waste dumping. °°
Further progress in using land ownership as a means of providing pressure for better environmental practices depends on more
widespread acceptance of the notion of private land. This concept is
completely new to Russia, and should be adopted cautiously. Russian
leaders must develop their own concept of private ownership which
melds both the agrarian values and the new entrepreneurial spirit.
Western countries must remember that their own land values come
from centuries of development. As Russians find their own way with
land ownership, government also must develop and encourage individuals to exercise the rights of land ownership. When combined with
newly created rights of speech 20 and assembly,' °2 private ownership rights can help insure that government practices are protective of
the environment. While this benefits the ocean only indirectly, since
no one owns a plot of the sea, it nonetheless is crucial to the development of Russian ecological law. 0 3 Without private ownership generating pressure on the government both monetarily, politically, and
collectively with other interest groups, Russia would have no reason
to change its nuclear waste practices from within. International pressure is less useful than internal demand for change. One way for
Russia to find supporters for its economic policies is to build constitu-

198. Larisa Krasavchikova, Comments on the Law on Property in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, 24 ST. MARY's L.J. 481, 493 (1993) (The author
notes that allowing takings-type claims may be more of a political move than one
based on "well-founded regulations of ownership.").
199. Maloney-Dunn, supra note 15, at 416.
200. Id.
201. RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONST., art. 29, cl. 1 ("Each person is guaranteed freedom of thought and speech.")
202. Id. at art. 30, cl. 1 ("Each person has the right of association, including the
right to create trade unions to protect his interests. The freedom of the activity of
public association is guaranteed.").
203. Russia has recognized this and implemented the concept of group participation in ecological matters into the RSFSR LAW ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
supra note 118, at art. 13 ("Environmental associations and other public associations which perform environmental functions have a right .. . to organize meetings, rallies, picket lines, marches, demonstrations and petition drives and gather
signatures, and to make proposals regarding discussion of projects and referendums.").
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encies based on a strong environmental policy. This would allow the
government to spend its precious administrative capacity more efficiently. A strong environmental policy means the adoption of a progressive program to halt the disposal of nuclear waste at sea.
V.

CONCLUSION

The collapse of the Soviet Union has not been easy on the Russian people. They bear the brunt of a dangerous Cold War legacy.
Nuclear waste from the days of military expansion haunts their safety
and ability to live in a prosperous economy. It clogs their government,
preventing an easier transition to non-military production. And it
embarrasses them internationally. Yet the tools are there for a program, which if adopted and vigorously enforced, could free Russia
from many of these atomic burdens.
First, Western governments should adopt a more extensive system of environmental assessments tied to their lending. The creation
of information centers where Russians could obtain information about
proposed projects, alternatives, and environmental impacts would
empower citizens by giving them knowledge. Decades of environmental damage have been inflicted in the war with the West; the countries that won now have the opportunity to make that damage clear
and give Russians the information they value in their own societies.
Next, the Russian government should create a technology-based
regulatory scheme which constantly ratchets up the controls on emissions of radioactive waste. Beginning with a basic Best Practicable
Technology scheme, Russia will acquire the information and recordkeeping systems needed to build a stricter nuclear waste management
program. At the Best Available Technology level, Russia can advance
to a better level of nuclear waste management than now present, even
if nuclear waste dumping at sea is not totally stopped. When its new
storage and treatment facility is ready, Russia can move to the Lowest Achievable Emissions Rate and into the accepted norms within the
international community for nuclear waste control. This
BPT/BAT/LAER program is a gradual easing of control over the system where none existed before. It contemplates Russia's sensitive economic situation, but yields a result that ultimately is more protective
of the environment.
Insuring that Russia follows its plans for environmental control
requires pressure from people. Russia's new land owners, with their
right to compensation for takings, are the ideal group to accomplish
this goal. Whether government is moved by concerns about paying for
private property claims or by pure political pressure from a group,
Russia's leaders will have to deal with them by generating a more
responsive, efficient environmental program. This program, if success-
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ful, could result in constituencies for Russian leaders to draw upon
when enacting other reform measures.
All waste is transboundary waste. Matter disposed of at sea or on
land on the other side of the globe will find its way into the ecological
cycle. Russia's dumping practices of the past have not borne this in
mind. Yet Russia's nuclear-waste problems are not without solutions.
Even if the West were to write a check tomorrow for the construction
of nuclear waste facilities, Russia still would face the lack of a comprehensive system to ensure that the same difficulty does not occur
again. Simple changes in the West's loan procedures, the implementation of a new technology-based regulatory scheme, and further land
reforms would help guarantee that some responsible system develops.
It is only with such a system that Russia can kill off the ecological
ghosts which threatened the nation's and the oceans' livelihood.

The Unconstitutionality of Long-Term
Nuclear Pacts that are Rejected by Over
One-Third of the Senate
ANDREW T. HYMAN*

In recent years, some Americans have invented the doctrine that
treaties and executive agreements are wholly interchangeable ....
The Committee on the Judiciary cannot agree that the President
acting alone, or the Congress and the President acting together,
should bypass the treaty procedure whenever the approval of twothirds of the Senators present and voting appears doubtful. The
treaty clause is an integral part of the Constitution, which both
Senators and Representatives have taken an oath to protect and
defend.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution confers on the President the "Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present Concur."2 Some scholars have suggested that the President and Congress can circumvent
this clause requiring a two-thirds Senate majority vote simply by labeling all international accords "agreements" instead of "treaties."3 Not-

* J.D., Lewis and Clark's Northwestern School of Law (1994). This article
benefitted greatly from the advice of Law Professor Daniel J. Rohlf. Thanks also go
to Mr. Randy Rydell of the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Mr. Steve
Dolley of the Nuclear Control Institute, Mr. Eldon Greenberg of Garvey, Schubert &
Barer, Law Professors Anne-Marie Slaughter, Bruce Ackerman, and William Funk,
Ms. Claire Reade of the American Bar Association, Mr. J. David Yeager, Mr. Mark
Lear, and my family. These people do not necessarily, however, share all the views
herein expressed.
1. S. REP. No. 1716, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1956) (this report was submitted
by Senator Dirksen on behalf of the Judiciary Committee). As indicated by the text
accompanying this note, the report took issue with those who say that the Constitution allows for complete interchangeability of treaties and executive agreements.
The main theme of this report, though, was that the Constitution should be amended to explicitly ban accords inconsistent with the Constitution.
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
3. See generally Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and CongressionalExecutive Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: 1, 54 YALE L.
J. 181, 261 (1945). The views of McDougal and Lans are in marked contrast to the
pre-1940 consensus. See generally Francis B. Sayre, The Constitutionality of the
Trade Agreements Act, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 751, 755 (1939) (Assistant Secretary of
State Sayre distinguished between treaties on the one hand and executive agreements covering adjustments of detail or temporary arrangements on the other hand).
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withstanding this fashionable doctrine of complete interchangeability,
and despite the haziness of the line separating treaties from agreements, many major accords necessarily fall within the meaning of the
word "treaty" as used in Article II of the Constitution, just as many
routine or short-term accords obviously need not be Article II treaties.
In 1987, President Reagan presented to Congress a proposed nuclear cooperation "agreement" with Japan.' More than one-third of the
Senate voted in opposition to the pact.5 Nevertheless, this U.S.-Japan
Pact was enforced, in violation of the Article II treaty clause which had
prevailed since 1787.
According to its terms, the U.S.-Japan Pact is ordinarily irrevocable and "shall remain in force for a period of thirty years."' During
this time the United States and Japan are supposed to cooperate in
the production of huge quantities of weapons-usable plutonium, for use
in the world's first commercial-size breeder reactors outside of Russia.
President Clinton sees merit in a worldwide ban on plutonium production, but the U.S.-Japan Pact is impeding U.S. support for such a
ban.7 Meanwhile, the European nuclear agency (EURATOM) is requesting the same unprecedented long-term concessions that the United States was willing to make to Japan,8 with negotiations currently
in process.
The remainder of this article will not address the merits of whether accords like the U.S-Japan Pact warrant support, or whether advocates of a worldwide ban on plutonium production have the better

Also see generally Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty,
53 YALE L. J. 664 (1944) (arguing against the notion of complete interchangeability
of treaties and executive agreements).
4. H.R. Doc. No. 128, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987). This agreement was
transmitted to Congress pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 123(d), 42
U.S.C. § 2153(d) (1988), and it remains in force to this day. See Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Nov. 4, 1987, U.S.-Japan, Hein's
No. KAV 1050. The State Department contends that the pact is valid because of
"the critical fact" that the Executive Branch complied with all relevant acts of Congress. Letter from Fred McGoldrick, Principal Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear
Energy Affairs, U.S. State Department, to Andrew Hyman (July 26, 1994) (on file
with author). Nonetheless, compliance with acts of Congress does not free the Executive from complementary constitutional strictures.
5. 134 CONG. REC. 4558 (1988). Of 83 Senators present, 30 voted against the
pact.
6. H.R. DOC. No. 128, supra note 4, at 19.
7. See, e.g., Thomas W. Lippman, infra note 118 and accompanying text.
Throughout this article, "plutonium production" refers to the extraction and purification process known technically as "plutonium reprocessing." The other process for
making bomb-usable material is called " high enrichment of uranium," and neither
process is necessary to operate normal nuclear plants.
8. Fred McGoldrick, Problems of Assurance of Nuclear Supplies, Address Before
the Atomic Industrial Forum (May 27, 1987), in DEP'T ST. BULL. Sept. 1987, at 48.
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arguments. 9 The crucial legal issue is whether President Clinton may
enforce a major long-term accord such as the U.S.-Japan Pact, which
limits the suspension rights of the United States, notwithstanding the
manifest inability to obtain two-thirds Senate approval. This article
will demonstrate that the President may not blatantly violate the
Constitution's Article II treaty provisions by enforcing such an accord,
and that the U.S.-Japan Pact is the only such violation in United
States history. The Pact will continue to be unlawful as long as the
President refuses to seek the requisite concurrence of the Senate.

II.BACKGROUND
The requirement of a two-thirds Senate vote was designed to
ensure that strong national consensus exists before the United States
commits itself to a course that involves the American people in activities beyond their sovereign control. Some scholars believe that the
treaty process anachronistically excludes the House of Representatives,' but the President can negotiate treaties which, by their terms,
are conditioned upon House approval." It is also sometimes argued
that the treaty process necessarily leads to protectionism and isolationism. However, few treaties have been derailed by the Senate, the most
noteworthy one being the Treaty of Versailles negotiated by President
Wilson. 2 History shows that the primary effect of the two-thirds requirement has been that treaties "are by necessity truly national and
not merely partisan ... The two-thirds rule has often colored negotiations, since those who make treaties have to be aware, as Wilson really

9. See, e.g., Time to Ban Plutonium Production, N.Y. TIMEs, July 10, 1993, at
18.
10. See, e.g., LouIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 175 (1972).
11. This has often been the case; on one occasion the House even went so far as
to kill a treaty which two-thirds of the Senate had approved (a trade treaty with
Mexico was signed in 1883, the Senate approved it by a two-thirds vote, but the
House refused to go along). See generally V. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 222 (1906). Even when House approval is not required by a
treaty, it is often necessary in order to implement its terms (though the House then
has a strong moral duty to make good on the country's promise).
12. ROYDEN J. DANGERFIELD, IN DEFENSE OF THE SENATE 310 (1933). According
to Dangerfield, 787 treaties were formally considered by the Senate from 1788 to
1928, and only seven of them were defeated by a minority of Senators. Id. at 312.
The only memorable one of those seven treaties, the Treaty of Versailles, established
the League of Nations at the end of World War I. When that treaty was before the
Senate, a majority of Senators decided to add several reservations to it, and those
reservations caused President Wilson to oppose final Senate approval. It is wellknown that Wilson's opposition doomed the treaty, which lost by a vote of 49 Senators in favor of ratification to 35 against. 19 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
839 (1983). Wilson "made the serious error of not including any Republicans or any
senators from either party in his delegation" to the Paris Peace Conference. HARRY
S. TRUMAN, WHERE THE BUCK STOPS 359 (Margaret Truman ed., 1989). (Wilson was
also "intransigent and childish" in responding to the Senate's complaints about the
treaty.)
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was not, of the danger of losing the needed support." 3
Proponents of circumventing the treaty process contend that the
President always has complete discretion to negotiate an executive
agreement instead of a treaty, and that congressional authorization or
approval may (in the case of "congressional-executive agreements") or
may not (in the case of "sole-executive agreements") be required. 4
This ill-conceived theory is of recent date, and thus has not yet been
addressed by the courts. This article will not explore in detail the prospects for judicial review; suffice it to say that the courts have been
willing to deal with similar issues."
As will be shown below, any significant long-term international

13. 1 BRADFORD PERKINS, CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
68 (Warren I. Cohen ed., 1993). See also Michael J. Glennon, The Constitutional
Power of the United States Senate to Condition its Consent to Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 533, 570 (1991). As Glennon states:
The requirement of two-thirds Senate approval is directed at ensuring
that significant international commitments undertaken by the United
States have the overwhelming support of the American people. We have
learned, to our sorrow, that when significant national commitments are
made without the support of the people, the results can be tragic and
costly, in systematic legitimacy as well as human life.
14. See McDougal & Lans, supra note 3. There are various ways in which the
President can bring an international accord into force. See generally Jack S. Weiss,
Comment, The Approval of Arms Control Agreements as Congressional-Executive
Agreements, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1533, 1535 (1991). In addition to the options listed by
Weiss, the President can negotiate a treaty explicitly requiring House approval. V.
MOORE, supra note 11, at 222.
15. Often the validity of international accords has been challenged by private
plaintiffs, and several such cases are addressed below. Legislators too have sometimes litigated the validity of international accords. For instance, in Goldwater v.
Carter, 144 U.S. 996 (1979), the President and Senator Goldwater were at odds over
the President's claim of right to terminate a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan absent Senate approval. The Justices evenly split on whether the case presented a
nonjusticiable "political question," and Justice Powell concurred in the Court's refusal
to address the merits, arguing that the case would not be ripe until "either the
Senate or the House has rejected the President's claim." Id. at 998. As far as the
U.S.-Japan Pact is concerned, over a third of the Senators present did in fact reject
the pact, so the ripeness and political question doctrines do not appear dispositive of
whether the Supreme Court would address the merits. In Edwards v. Carter, House
members sued the President for making a treaty to dispose of the Panama Canal
without House approval, and the courts willingly addressed the merits. 580 F.2d
1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied 436 U.S. 907 (1978). In Dole v. Carter, Senator
Dole sued the President for agreeing to return a crown to Hungary absent Senate
consent, and the court found no justiciable controversy because the court was not
aware of any judicially manageable standards for resolving the issue. 569 F.2d 1109,
1110 (10th Cir. 1977). In Cranston v. Reagan, congressional plaintiffs as well as private plaintiffs claimed that nuclear pacts with Norway and Sweden violated the
Atomic Energy Act, and the court predictably dismissed the case because neither the
Senate nor the House made an "attempt to pass a concurrent resolution disapproving either of the Agreements ....
despite their statutorily-guaranteed opportunity
to do so." 611 F. Supp. 247, 251-253 (D.C. 1985).
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compact (i.e. one which is significant enough to warrant the
President's personal scrutiny) is necessarily an Article II "treaty,"
whereas other compacts may or may not have to be classified as "treaties." An international compact is not "long-term" if it specifies that
each party can take action to revoke the deal on short notice for any
reason. 16
Unfortunately, the international nuclear policy of the United
States is 17now controlled by people who have apparently accepted the
"extreme" theory that any international pact may be approved as a
congressional-executive agreement. This theory "explicitly contravenes" 8 and "consciously disregards the intent of the framers." 9 It is
also contrary to Supreme Court precedent, to the accepted usage of the
word "treaty" under the Articles of Confederation, to early commentary
regarding treaties and agreements, and to the past practices of the
political arms of government. In truth, compliance with acts of Congress does not free the Executive from complementary constitutional
limitations on international deal-making.
Part III of this article provides further background about the
current constitutional controversy. Part IV explores the constitutional

16. The United States can revoke any treaty at any time for any reason, regardless of what the treaty itself says, because the latest expression of the sovereign will
is controlling. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). However, there is general
agreement that the superseding of a treaty by subsequent act of Congress "does not
relieve the United States of its international obligation or of the consequence of
violation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §115.1 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
17. Kenneth C. Randall, The Treaty Power, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 1089, 1094-95
(1990).
18. Weiss, supra note 14, at 1559.
19. Id. at 1562. Incidentally, there are variations on this theory, according to
which any pact may be processed as a congressional-executive agreement, if it concerns a topic within the enumerated powers of Congress, regardless of whether the
pact is binding for a considerable time. However, the explicit right to withdraw from
an accord, such as the Uruguay Round of GAIT, Apr. 15, 1994. 33 I.L.M. 1144, is a
major safeguard protecting American sovereignty. The Uruguay Round of GATT was
approved by a Senate vote of 76 to 24 on December 1, 1994. 140 CONG REC. S15379
(1994). See generally The World Trade Organization and the Treaty Clause, Prepared
Statement of Laurence H. Tribe Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, October 18, 1994 [hereinafter Tribe's Statement], reprinted in
GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. 285 (1994); Memorandum from
Laurence H. Tribe, Harvard Law School, to various government officials (November
28, 1994) reprinted in 140 CONG. REc. S15077-01(1994). According to the Justice
Department, "[allthough we insist on the variety of legal instruments by which the
United States may make agreements with foreign nations, we do not dispute Professor Tribe's view that some such agreements may have to be ratified as treaties."
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, to Ambassador Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative (November 22, 1994) at 4, n. 13 (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). See generally infra note 40.
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principles in greater depth, and dispels any notion that the meaning of
the Constitution's treaty provisions is entirely obscure. ° Part V
brings this constitutional analysis to bear on the U.S.-Japan Pact. Part
VI concludes that long-term nuclear accords are necessarily Article II
treaties, and are thus unconstitutional and ultra vires when rejected
by one-third of the Senate.

III. THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY IN BRIEF
Until World War II, even the most ardent opponents of the Article
II treaty process acknowledged its inescapability.2' Today's prevailing
view is quite different. According to the American Law Institute:
Since any agreement concluded as a Congressional-Executive agreement could also be concluded by treaty ...either method may be
used in many cases. The prevailing view is that the CongressionalExecutive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty
method in every instance.'
The Reporters' Notes to the Restatement seek to justify the prevailing view, a view which the American Law Institute does not endorse.23 According to Reporters' Note 8, "[s]cholarly opinion has rejected" the idea "that some agreements can be made only as treaties, by
the procedure designated in the Constitution." In fact, however, many
scholars do not agree with the reporters' position,24 and consider the

20. See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

SENATE, S. RPT., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1993). According to the Congressional
Research Service, "the understanding of the Drafters remains largely obscure" and it
remains unclear "whether any subject that is dealt with by treaty may also be effected by an executive agreement . . . " Id. at 53.

21. For example, Secretary of State John Hay wrote to President McKinley in
1899 that "I see no escape from it, since the Fathers in their wisdom chose to assume that one-third of the Senate in opposition would always be right, and the
President and the majority generally wrong." HENKIN, supra note 10, at 377. Incidentally, Hay had been an aide to President Lincoln, and would later serve as Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of State.
22. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 303 cmt e.
23. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 303, Reporters' Note 8. The Reporter's Notes
reflect the views of the reporters, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
American Law Institute. Id. at xi. According to the American Law Institute, "treaties constitute one category of international agreement that constitutionally requires
a particular process and has a particular status." Id. at 146. This position of the
American Law Institute seems to be at odds with the reporters' notion that the
President, the House, and the Senate are subject to no requirements whatsoever in
deciding what process to use for a given international accord. Incidentally, the Chief
Reporter for the RESTATEMENT is listed as Louis Henkin. Id. at v; see generally
HENKIN, supra note 10.
24. Randall, supra note 17, at 1094-95. Randall writes that "many scholars" articulate positions different from the "extreme" view that "congressional-executive
agreements and treaties are entirely interchangeable." Id. Unfortunately, the extreme
view is currently the prevailing view.
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reporters' view "contrary to the intent of the framers. " ' Although the
reporters mention as precedent several recent international commitments which purportedly bypassed the Article II treaty process," all
of the commitments cited in Reporters' Note 8 were approved by twothirds of the Senators present. There was never any Article II issue
when Senators overwhelmingly supported joint resolutions on the following matters:27 the Bretton Woods Agreement,' membership in
the International Labor Organization,' and the U.N. Headquarters
Agreement.'
25. Weiss, supra note 14, at 1560. To support their thesis in Reporter's notes 8,
the reporters cite an article by McDougal and Lans. See generally supra note 3. The
reporters omit to mention that the Senate Judiciary Committee has rejected the
doctrine of McDougal and Lans. See supra text accompanying note 1. The reporters
also rely upon an opinion of the Attorney General, regarding the United Nations,
but in that opinion the Attorney General specifically declined to consider "whether or
not there are circumstances under which a given international compact must take
the form of a treaty." 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 469, 470 (1946). Furthermore, the reporters
seek to buttress their position with a book by the Chief Reporter, Mr. Henkin, but
in fact Mr. Henkin's book is ambiguous; he writes that "the President can seek
approval of any agreement by joint resolution of both houses of Congress instead of
two-thirds of the Senate only" and at another point Mr. Henkin writes that "[olne is
compelled to conclude that there are agreements which the President can make on
his sole authority and others which he can make only with the consent of the Senate." HENKIN, supra note 10, at 175, 179.
26. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 303 Reporters' Note 8.
27. There is no reason why treaties need to be designated as such. According to
the RESTATEMENT: "Whatever their designation, all agreements have the same legal
status, except as their provisions or the circumstances of their conclusion indicate
otherwise." RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 301 com a. By the same token, there is
no reason why treaties cannot be approved by the Senate under the designation of a
joint resolution. See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901).
In Fourteen Diamond Rings, the Supreme Court faced a situation in which twothirds of the Senate had formally consented to a treaty with Spain, and Senators
thereafter sought to impose a condition upon this consent, by way of a joint resolution (the President had not yet put the treaty into operation). The Supreme Court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Fuller, held that the joint resolution "was adopted by
the Senate by a vote of 26 to 22, not two thirds of a quorum : and that it is absolutely without legal significance on the question before us." Id. at 180. Justice
Brown concurred that, if the Senate had approved the joint resolution by a twothirds vote, then the resolution would have been effective as part of the treaty, but
only if the President and the other contracting party consented. Id. at 182. Of
course, the President as well as the other contracting parties did indeed consent to
the International Labor Organization, the Bretton Woods Agreement, and the U.N.
Headquarters Agreement, and those accords can therefore be considered valid Article
II treaties. Although those three accords did not proclaim themselves to be "treaties,"
and the Senate did not refer to them as Article II "treaties," those facts are not
dispositive of whether they were in fact Article II treaties; the Supreme Court has
long held that "[tihe Constitution looked to the essence and substance of things, and
not to mere form." Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 573 (1840).
28. The Senate vote was 61 to 16. 91 CONG. REC. 7780 (1945).
29. Passed by unanimous consent in the Senate. 78 CONG. REC. 11343 (1934).
See also 78 CONG. REC. 12238 (1934) (providing more information about the Senate
vote).
30. The Senate gave its final approval to the Headquarters Agreement "without
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International accords such as NAFTA31 and the 1947 GATT accord have also gone into effect without blatantly violating Article II,
Section 2 of the Constitution, because such accords never represented
long-term commitments. NAFTA, as well as the 1947 GATT accord,
allow the United States to withdraw upon six months' notice.' In
32

objection." 93 CONG. REC. 10400 (1947).
31. The North American Free Trade Agreement, December 17, 1992, Hein's No.
KAV 3417 [hereinafter NAFTA]. The Senate's final vote on NAFTA was 61 in favor
to 38 against the pact, short of the two-thirds that would have been needed for a
treaty. 139 CONG. REC. 16712-13 (1993). Article 2205 of NAFTA specifies that a
party may withdraw from the agreement with six months' written notice. Incidentally, President Clinton negotiated side accords to NAFTA which were not formally
presented to Congress or to the Senate. In discussing those side accords, Senator
Stevens succinctly restated the position that treaties and executive agreements are
not always interchangeable:
Although the President has some discretion to choose the instrument
that he will use to enter into an international agreement, he must respect the confines of the instrument he chooses. I believe the Constitution refers to treaties, to compacts and to agreements as some of the
choices the President has. But, I believe that there are some parameters
on any President in choosing the instrument that he is going to use for
international accords.
139 CONG. REC. 16352 (1993).
32. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A74
(1947) [hereinafter 1947 GATT]. Article XXXI of the 1947 GATT provides that parties can speedily withdraw if they so choose. The 1947 GATT was not submitted to
the Senate, nor was it formally submitted to Congress. John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L.
REV. 249, 253 - 265 (1967). The 1947 GATT has been used to support the notion
that "no consistent pattern supports any substantive common law principle requiring that significant agreements or long-term agreements take the form of Article II
treaties." Weiss, supra note 14, at 1557. This statement is incorrect inasmuch as the
1947 GATT accord cannot properly be regarded, constitutionally, as a long-term
commitment, since it is revocable at will. Of course, even an accord which purports
to allow for revocation at will can represent a long-term commitment, if the accord
sets up a mechanism for actions against signatories who revoke the accord, but the
1947 GATT accord does not contain such a mechanism.
33. This is not to say that such accords could not or should not be dealt with as
treaties; it is often advisable to seek treaty approval of a revocable accord in order
to obtain widespread support, even when there is no legal requirement that the
treaty mechanism be used. Furthermore, even if an accord does not necessarily fall
within the Framers' definition of "treaty" (due to its revocability), it still may require
treaty approval if Congress would otherwise be violating another part of the Constitution. See generally infra note 40. Incidentally, the debate over NAFTA has
spawned an extraordinary onslaught of constitutional argumentation. See Bruce
Ackerman and David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799
(1995). Ackerman and Golove dwell upon the Senate's approval in 1947 of a
trusteeship accord submitted by President Truman. See 93 CONG. REC. 8850 (1947).
That accord passed without noticeable opposition from a single Senator, and there
was not the slightest controversy about its validity. Id. According to Ackerman's and
Golove's line of reasoning: (1) the Senate surrendered its exclusive treaty role during
a four-year period culminating with the 1947 accord, (2) the Senate's failure to challenge an insignificant remark by President Truman "speaks louder than a formal
amendment" of the Constitution, (3) the law in this area remains where it was left
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stark contrast, long-term pacts like the thirty-year nuclear accord between the United States and Japan are, by their terms, ordinarily
irrevocable, and they therefore fall squarely into the group of compacts
that are necessarily "treaties" under the Constitution. Thus, long-term
pacts like the U.S.-Japan Pact cannot be valid without implicit or
explicit approval of two-thirds of the Senate.
IV. How

TREATIES AND ExEcuTIvE AGREEMENTS DIFFER

To determine the constitutionality of an international accord, the
first place to look is to the words of the Constitution, and to the definitions used by its authors. If the Constitution is ambiguous on its face,
then it may be necessary to seek guidance in similar provisions of prior
laws, most notably the Articles of Confederation. The intended meaning of the Constitution can also be clarified by the early legal commentaries written while the Framers were still able to recount their deliberations. Furthermore, an examination of case law can produce evidence as to constitutionality, as can an analysis of precedents set
throughout the country's history by the executive and legislative
branches of government. For the sake of thoroughness, all of these
sources are consulted below, although it would be sufficient to study
the words of the Constitution's treaty provisions, which are in many
respects unambiguous.
A. Terms of the Constitution and their Definitions
Article II of the Constitution sets forth a brief rule on the formation of international treaties.3 4 This rule can always be changed
through the amendment process,3" but until then the rule remains the

in 1947, (4) we now have no authority to displace these judgments, and (5) President Truman codified this constitutional amendment in 1947. See Bruce Ackerman
and David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REV. 799, 895, 903, 908,
913, 924 (1995). Despite this attempt to make a mountain out of a molehill, the
1947 trusteeship accord has no precedential value on the question before us, because
over two-thirds of the Senate acquiesced to it. Even if 34% of the Senate had opposed the accord, it would still have been valid because, for example, it did not
imply any commitment that the United States would not unilaterally terminate the
accord. See 12 Bevans 951. See generally Francis B. Sayre, Legal Problems Arising
from the United Nations Trusteeship System, 42 AM. J. INT'L. L. & PoLicY 263, 289290 (1948) (Sayre, by the way, was President Wilson's son-in-law). President Truman
realized that the treaty clause was carefully designed as a limitation upon presidential power, and he certainly never codified an amendment of it. See infra note 134.
See generally infra note 40 (Professor Tribe's conclusion with regard to this matter).
34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
35. George Washington said:
If in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification of the
Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by
an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let
there be no changes by usurpation; for though this, in one instance,
may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which
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law of the land in keeping with the clear and ordained intent of the
Framers.36
The Constitution gives the President power to make treaties, if
two-thirds of the Senate concurs. The Framers intended that treaties,
including commercial ones, be dealt with only in this way, 37 regard-

free governments are destroyed.
George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 35 WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 214, 229 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
There have been attempts to amend the Constitution's treaty provisions. For instance, the House Judiciary Committee once proposed an amendment that it felt was
necessary to give Congress power to allow treaties, but that proposal ultimately
failed. H.R. REP. No. 2061, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). The constitutional
amendment process is the only safe way for the people to exercise their virtually
unlimited legal power.
36. Abraham Lincoln said: 'The intention of the lawgiver is the law." Abraham
Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1861), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 133, 135 (1989).
37. Treaties could conceivably be made in other ways, if it were admitted that
the express treaty provisions of the Constitution are not exclusive. For instance, one
could argue that Congress has an implied treaty power, since Article II, Section 2
says the President "shall have power" instead of "shall have the power" to make
treaties. Nevertheless, it is well-established that the treaty power was meant to be
an exclusive power that cannot be exercised without the approval of two-thirds of
the Senate (the approval of the House may or may not also be required). As President Washington stated:
Having been a member of the General Convention, and knowing the
principles on which the Constitution was formed, I have ever entertained but one opinion on this subject; and, from the first establishment
of the Government to this moment, my conduct has exemplified that
opinion, that the power of making treaties is exclusively vested in the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided
two-thirds of the Senators present concur, and that every treaty so
made and promulgated, thenceforward became the Law of the land . . .
George Washington, Letter to the House of Representatives (Mar. 30, 1796), in 35
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 2, 3-4 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940) (emphasis
added).
The records of the Constitutional Convention confirm the exclusivity of the
treaty power. For example, Mr. Morris argued that Congress would be unwilling to
declare war if two-thirds of the Senate were needed to approve a peace treaty.
JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 685 (E.H. Scott ed., 1893).
Likewise, the Founders realized that commercial treaties "may be so framed as to be
partially injurious" to minorities, and it was in order to provide "security" for minorities that the Founders permitted one-third of the Senate to block commercial treaties. George Mason, Comment on Draft Constitution, in SUPPLEMENT TO MAX
FARRAND's THE REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 209 (James H.
Hutson ed., 1987). The Constitution does give Congress power to regulate foreign
commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. However, as Mason observed, the Constitution qualifies that grant by prohibiting the entry of the United States into commercial treaties which are opposed by one-third of Senators present. The Necessary and
Proper Clause does allow Congress to make "laws" to carry out its powers, but not
"treaties." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 19. Treaty-making power is distinct from lawmaking power. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Constitution clearly states where
the treaty-making power resides: with the President and the Senate. U.S. CONST.

1995

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF LONG-TERM PACTS

less of whether the treaty relates to peace, military alliance, cooperation, or anything else.' As John Jay wrote,
[tihe power of making treaties is an important one especially as it
relates to war, peace, and commerce; and it should not be delegated
but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the
highest security that it will be exercised by men the best qualified
for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the public
good. 9
The Framers viewed treaties as only one type of transnational
accord. The language of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution includes: "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation" and "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress... enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power." Thus, the word "treaty," as used in the Constitution, does not
signify every compact with a foreign country, since otherwise there
would be no way for a state to make an "agreement or compact" with a
foreign power. This suggests that the Framers intended that the national government also have the ability to enter into compacts distinct
from "treaties,"' while at the same time it is manifestly clear from the
text of the Constitution that not every "treaty" can be characterized as
an "agreement." If that alternative were always available, then the
word "treaty" in Article I, Section 10 would be surplusage."' Although

art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
38. The language of Article II does not restrict the types of treaties that the
President and Senate can make. Alexander Hamilton observed that the treaty powers of Great Britain are similarly unrestricted, inasmuch as the King of Great Britain can "of his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of every
other description ....

The [King] can perform alone what the [President] can only

do with the concurrence of a branch of the legislature." THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at
419 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). It has long been recognized
that, because the "power to make treaties is given by the Constitution in general
terms, without any description of the objects to be embraced by it," then consequently this power includes "all those subjects, which in the ordinary intercourse of
nations had usually been made subjects of negotiation and treaty." Holmes v.
Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 595 (1840) (emphasis added).
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 390 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
40. Professor Tribe correctly discerns an important constitutional limitation on
international accords, which are ratified by mere congressional majority. They are
presumably valid only insofar as they "could have been accomplished by a combination of Congressional delegation and the President's inherent power over foreign affairs". Laurence Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1223, 1277 (1995). See
generally ROOSEVELT, infra note 49 (Theodore Roosevelt on the limits of executive
power).
41. The Constitution does not explicitly delegate to the President any power to
enter into non-treaty accords. However, the Supreme Court has held that the Tenth
Amendment reservation of nondelegated powers is inapplicable in the realm of foreign affairs, because foreign affairs powers had already been delegated by the states
before 1789. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
(opinion delivered by Justice Sutherland). The Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright said
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neither the text of the Constitution nor the records of the Convention
explicitly defines the difference between a "treaty" and an "agreement
or compact,"42 the definitions of the Framers have not been permanently lost.
The Supreme Court has observed that "[tihe international jurist
most widely cited in the first 50 years after the Revolution was
Emmerich de Vattel."4' In 1775, Benjamin Franklin declared that
Vattel's The Law of Nations "has been continually in the hands of the
members of our Congress now sitting... " The Supreme Court has
quoted The Law of Nations45 in order to prove how the Framers employed the word "treaty," as follows:
Vattel, page 192, sec. 152, says: "A treaty, in Latin fcedus, is a
compact made with a view to the public welfare, by the superior
power, either for perpetuity, or for a considerable time." Section
153. "The compacts which have temporary matters for their object,
are called agreements, conventions, and pactions. They are accomplished by one single act, and not by repeated acts. These compacts

the "broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except
those specifically enumerated in the Constitution ... is categorically true only in
respect of our internal affairs." Id. at 315-16. The Court correctly pointed out that
"the power to make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in
the constitutional sense" exists "as inherently inseparable from the conception of
nationality." Id. at 318. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated that "there may
be matters . . . that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
42. The Constitution does make it "absolutely clear" that treaties are, by definition, not completely interchangeable with non-treaties, because the Constitution allows states to make "agreements" or "compacts" with foreign powers (if Congress
assents) while forbidding states to make "treaties" with foreign powers (even if Congress assents). Tribe's Statement, supra note 19, at 4. See also U.S. CONST. art. I,
§10. The Supreme Court long ago concluded that the word "treaty" has the same
basic meaning in Article II, Section 2 as it does in Article I, Section 10. The Court
said in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 571 (1840): "In speaking of the
treaty-making power . . . [w]hatever is granted to the general government is forbidden to the states, because the same word is used to describe the power denied to
the latter, which is employed in describing the power conferred on the former." However, the Supreme Court has also recognized that the language of Article I ("treaty,
alliance, or confederation") limits the meaning of the word "treaty" according to the
rule of construction noscitur a sociis. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519
(1893). According to this rule, "when two or more words are grouped together, and
ordinarily have a similar meaning, but are not equally comprehensive, the general
word will be limited and qualified by the special word." 2A NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.16 (1992). Thus, the words "treaty, alliance, or confederation" in Article I are usually understood to include only those
treaties which may encroach upon national authority. The meaning of the word
"treaty" in Article II, though, is not limited by any nearby words.
43. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n., 434 U.S. 452, 462 (1977).
44. Id.
45. 3 EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATU-

RAL LAW (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (this volume consists of an English
translation of the 1758 edition).
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are perfected in their execution once for all; treaties receive a successive execution, whose duration equals that of the treaty." Section
154. Public treaties can only be made by the "supreme power, by
sovereigns who contract in the name of the state."46

Vattel also wrote that short-term pacts, unlike long-term pacts, may be
classified either as "treaties" or "agreements:"
Treaties which do not call for continuous acts, but are fulfilled by a
single act, and are thus executed once for all, those treaties, unless
we prefer to give them another name (see §153), those conventions,
those compacts, which are executed by an act done once for all and
not by successive acts, are, when once carried out, fully and definitely consummated. 7
These passages from Vattel account for the distinction which the
Framers made between treaties and other compacts. Long-term pacts
which are important enough to warrant the attention of the supreme
power who contracts in the name of the state (i.e. the President) are
necessarily treaties within the meaning of the Constitution, and other
5
pacts may or may not be "treaties.""
This nation's first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, echoed
the distinction between transitory agreements which can be conveniently dropped, and treaties which may provide otherwise. Jefferson
wrote the following words of caution to President Washington:
It is desirable, in many instances, to exchange mutual advantages
by Legislative Acts rather than by Treaty: because the former,
though understood to be in consideration of each other, and therefore greatly respected, yet when they become too inconvenient, can
be dropped at the will of either party: whereas stipulations by Treaty are forever irrevocable but by joint consent, let a change of circumstances render them ever so burthensome 9
46. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 572 (this case is discussed at length
in Section D below). Numerous scholars have agreed that Vattel's definition of "treaty" applies to the Constitution. See e.g. Abraham C. Weinfeld, What Did the Framers
of the Federal Constitution Mean by "Agreements or Compacts?" 3 U. CHI. L. REV.
453 (1936). Vattel was cited repeatedly during the Constitutional Convention. See
infra note 58.
47. VATrTEL, supra note 45, §192.
48. At one time, the Department of State-Legal Adviser contended that "Vattel's
distinction has nothing to do with 'important' or unimportant." Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements - 1975: Hearings on S. 632 and S. 1251 Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 392 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Senate Hearings] (Department of State
Legal Adviser's reply to Senate Office of Legislative Counsel memorandum on certain
Middle East agreements). Apparently the State Department Legal Adviser, Mr. Monroe Leigh, did not realize that routine agreements made by subordinate officials
would not be treaties according to Vattel's distinction because those agreements do
not require approval from the supreme "sovereigns who contract in the name of the
state."
49. Thomas Jefferson, Report of the Secretary of State to the President (Jan. 18,
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The definition of "treaty," as that word is used in the Constitution,
is not the same as the definition that is prevalent in modern international law. The Supreme Court has explained that,
[t]he word treaty has more than one meaning. Under principles of
international law, the word ordinarily refers to an international
agreement concluded between sovereigns, regardless of the manner
in which the agreement is brought into force. Under the United
States Constitution, of course, the word "treaty" has a far more
restrictive meaning."0
Under the Constitution, the word "treaty" necessarily applies to accords of importance and permanence, which in turn depends upon

whether the accord is important enough to warrant the President's
scrutiny, and upon whether the accord is irrevocable for a considerable
time. A quarter century is manifestly a "considerable time,"5 and

1791), in 18 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 565, 570 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1971). See
also 2 CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES
372-73 (1902) (stating that "[tihe danger of reciprocal legislation is that either country can repeal or modify its own legislation and deprive citizens of the other country
of the protection formerly afforded"). See generally supra note 16. Incidentally, Presidents have often entered into commitments binding only upon themselves. See, e.g.,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 510, (1920) (stating that "it was far pref-

erable that ... we might be proceeding under a treaty which was the law of the
land and not merely by a direction of the Chief Executive which would lapse when
that particular executive left office."). James Wilson, who attended the Constitutional
Convention, and was also a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, explained that public officials who lack power to authorize treaties may nevertheless authorize promises and
engagements with other countries, provided that those compacts bind only the officials who have approved them, rather than invalidly attempting to bind the nation
after those officials have left office. See 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 155 (James
D. Andrews ed., 1896).
50. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 (1981) (citations omitted). The
Weinberger Court also observed that: "[a] 'treaty' which requires only the consent of
the President is not an Article II treaty," thus implying that some international
accords do "require" more than the President's consent.
51. Congressman Otis Pike once asked National Security Adviser Henry
Kissinger the following question: "For how long a period of years could an executive
agreement be made which was not required to be a treaty? Could it be for 25 years,
for example?" Dr. Kissinger replied that a 25-year agreement would, in his opinion
as a political scientist and not as a presidential assistant, "look more like a treaty
to me." The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty)
and the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), Including an Associated Protocol,
Signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 391, 407 (1972) (Congressional briefing by National
Security Adviser Kissinger on the five-year Interim Agreement submitted to Congress
instead of the Senate) [hereinafter Kissinger Briefing]. Suppose Presidents Clinton
and Yeltsin signed an accord to put people on Mars within 25 years. This would
have to be an Article II treaty if it forbade U.S. withdrawal (e.g. in the event Russia invaded a neighbor) and unless the U.S. merely leased Russian equipment in
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anything over six years is "considerable" for constitutional purposes.
Six years is the maximum term of office for federal elected officials, and therefore commitments which exceed six years greatly impinge upon the American people's liberty to reshape foreign policy. The
Constitution was intended to secure the people's liberty to manage
their affairs, both domestic and foreign, and the liberty to manage
foreign affairs cannot be legally forfeited if a third of Senators vote
"no." The U.S.-Japan Pact is the only international accord ever enforced by the United States, over the objections of more than one-third
of the Senate, which has pledged continued enforcement for more than
six years.
The twin standards of importance and duration are easily applied
to international accords, and they are also judicially manageable. As
will be seen below, these standards of importance and duration are
supported by usage of the terms "treaty" and "agreement" during both
the Articles of Confederation and the early years of the Constitution.
They are also substantiated by the case law, as well as by the conduct
of American foreign affairs since 1776.
B. "Treaties"Under the Articles of Confederation
The Framers considered the duration of compacts to be very important. They required, in the Articles of Confederation, that any state
seeking congressional approval for an interstate treaty specify accurately "how long it shall continue." 2
Under the Articles of Confederation, each state was akin to a
foreign nation with respect to every other state, so a "treaty" between
two confederated states was analogous to an international "treaty"
under the Constitution. It follows that the meaning of an interstate
"treaty" under the Articles of Confederation can illuminate the meaning of the same word in Article II of the Constitution.
Under the Articles, the states granted powers to the Federal Congress, including the exclusive power to make treaties with other nations.' With regard to treaties between states, the Articles of Confederation said: "No two or more states shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the
United States in Congress assembled.. .."5' Thus, when commission-

return for an up-front payment (the U.S. would then have no ongoing obligation).
52. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI (1781).
53. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (1781) (requiring two-thirds approval of
Congress for foreign treaties).
54. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI (1781). This article also required congressional assent for any "conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty" between a state
and any "King, prince or state," but the word "state" as quoted here has always
been understood to mean a state outside of the Confederation. See generally supra
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ers from Virginia and Maryland met at Mount Vernon in 1785 to settle
differences over their common waterways, a controversy arose as to
whether the resulting Mount Vernon Compact55 had to be submitted
to Congress for approval. One of the leading Virginia legislators,
James Madison, wrote the following to James Monroe:
The Compact with Maryd. has been ratified. It was proposed to
submit it to Congs. for their sanction, as being within the word
Treaty used in the Confederation. This was oppd. It was then attempted to transmit it to our Delegates to be by them simply laid
before Congs. Even this was negatived by a large Majority.56
Mr. Madison felt that the Mount Vernon Compact was necessarily a
"treaty, confederation, or alliance" within the meaning of the Articles
of Confederation, but his fellow Virginia legislators felt otherwise.
This controversy about the Mount Vernon Compact flared up
again at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, where Mr.
Madison said that:
no two or more states can form among themselves any treaties &c.
without the consent of Congs. Yet Virgia. & Maryd. in one instance
- Pena. & N. Jersey in another, have entered into compacts, without previous application or subsequent apology. 7
A week later, Maryland Attorney General Luther Martin responded
that the "treaty between Virginia and Maryland about the navigation
of the Chesapeake and Potomac, is no infraction of the confederacy."'
It appears from these statements that the Framers agreed about the
meaning of the free-standing word "treaty," but disagreed about
whether its meaning should be limited by the adjacent terms in the
phrase "treaty, confederation, or alliance." After all, it is a canon of

note 42 (describing rule of noscitur a sociis). Incidentally, the fact that Article VI referred to any "agreement, alliance, or treaty" is further evidence that the founders
consistently distinguished between the words "agreement" and "treaty."
55. The success of the Mount Vernon Conference, which was hosted by George
Washington, led the Virginia legislature to set up a wider conference, the Annapolis
Convention, which in turn led directly to the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The
Mount Vernon Conference was thus "the preliminary to the preliminary." CLINTON
ROssITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 54 (1966). See also George Mason, The
Mount Vernon Compact, in 2 PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 812, 812-23 (Robert A.
Rutland ed., 1970) (containing, among other things, the text of the compact). Incidentally, the Mount Vernon Compact is still in force. VA. CODE ANN. §7.1-7 (Michie
1993).
56. James Madison, Letter to James Monroe (Dec. 30, 1785), in 8 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 465, 466 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1973)
(original emphasis). Madison supported the actual compact but felt that proper pro-

cedures should be followed.
57. Madison, supra note 37, at 190 (for June 19, 1787).
58. ROBERT YATES, SECRET PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 119 (1909) (emphasis added) (Martin made his remarks on June 27, 1787 and
during the course of those remarks he repeatedly cited Vattel as authority).
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statutory construction that when words are grouped together and usually have similar meanings, the more general words are limited by the
special words. 9 Madison and Martin agreed that the Mount Vernon
compact was a "treaty," but disagreed about whether it was a "treaty,
confederation, or alliance."'
There was never any quarrel as to the duration of the Mount
Vernon Compact. The thirteenth article of that compact said: "never to
be repealed or altered by either without the Consent of the other." The
only dispute concerned whether the Articles of Confederation were
intended to affect such compacts not harming the union of states.61
The prevailing view in the Virginia House of Delegates was that the
Articles of Confederation were irrelevant to purely local arrangements
between Virginia and Maryland.
The Supreme Court of the United States agreed with the Virginia
House of Delegates many years later in the case of Wharton v. Wise,62
in which the Court decided whether the Mount Vernon Compact had
been validly formed under the Articles of Confederation. The Court
held that "[t]he articles inhibiting any treaty, confederation, or alliance
between the States without the consent of Congress were intended to
prevent any union of two or more States, having a tendency to break
up or weaken the league between the whole."' The Wharton Court
concluded that "the compact of 1785 was not prohibited by the Articles
of Confederation. It was not a treaty, confederation or alliance within
the meaning of those words as there used. . . "4 The Court thus
agreed that a pact could necessarily be a "treaty" within the prohibitory language of the Articles of Confederation, but only if that "treaty,
confederation, or alliance" weakened the league, which the Mount
Vernon Compact did not. 5

59. See SINGER, supra note 42, at § 47.15 (describing rule of noscitur a sociis).
60. In a report on the Mount Vernon Compact presented to the Governor of
Maryland in 1885, a member of the Baltimore Bar, I. Nevett Steele, said that the
"question which presents itself is, whether the compact was a 'treaty, confederation
or alliance,' within the true meaning of those words as used in the Articles of Confederation, and it seems probable that there was a difference of opinion on this
question among the public men of the time." Appellant's Brief, Wharton v. Wise, 153
U.S. 155 (1894) (No. 1054), microformed on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs
(Scholarly Resources, Inc.).
61. The commissioners at the Mount Vernon Conference felt that a compact between the two states for providing naval protection ought to be submitted "to Congress for their Consent to enter into Compact." 2 Mason, supra note 55, at 815.
Similarly, the Virginia House of Delegates felt that a trade compact involving more
states than just Virginia and Maryland would require the involvement of Congress.
Madison, supra note 56, at 471.
62. Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155 (1894).
63. Id. at 167.
64. Id. at 171.
65. The Wharton Court essentially ruled against James Madison, without ever
mentioning his name. However, the Supreme Court was aware of Mr. Madison's
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Of course, the word "treaty" in Article II of the Constitution is free
of any limiting context. The limiting context in the Articles of Confederation was the decisive reason for the legitimacy of the Mount Vernon
Compact. Neither the Founders nor the Wharton Court ever expressed
any doubt that the Mount Vernon Compact would have required congressional consent if the Articles of Confederation had inhibited any
"treaty" instead of any "treaty, confederation, or alliance."
The history of the Mount Vernon Compact shows that the Framers pondered the meaning of the word "treaty," just as there is analysis
today of whether the U.S.-Japan Pact is a "treaty." Both documents
are indeed "treaties" within the definition used by the Framers, and
for the same reasons - both were made by the highest authorities and
both ordinarily forbid revocation for a considerable period of time.
C. Early Treatises on the Subject of "Treaties"
The distinction between treaties and other agreements was examined by scholars throughout the early years of the Constitution. This
indirect evidence about the Constitution's treaty provisions is useful
since much of the direct evidence from the Constitutional Convention
has been lost to history.
St. George Tucker was a judge, and a representative alongside
James Madison at the Annapolis Convention, which was the "preliminary" to the Constitutional Convention." In 1803, Tucker cited Vattel
as authority for the meaning of the word "treaty" in the Constitution:
Here we find a distinction between treaties, alliances, and confederations; and agreements or compacts. The former relate ordinarily to
subjects of great national magnitude and importance, and are often
perpetual, or made for a considerable period of time; the power of
making these is altogether prohibited to the individual states..."
This excerpt, and its citation to Vattel, shows yet again that Vattel's
definition of "treaty" was relied upon during the early years of the
Constitution. It was then understood that accords of great national
magnitude and importance, and made for a considerable period of
time, must be "treaties." Tucker went on to say that,
agreements, or compacts, concerning transitory or local affairs, or
such as cannot possibly affect any other interest but that of the

view that Virginia and Maryland had violated the Articles of Confederation by entering into the Mount Vernon Compact absent congressional consent. See supra note 60.

66. See generally supra note 55.
67. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITuTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 310 app. (1803). See generally
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 571 (stating that "treaty" has the same basic meaning throughout the Constitution).
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parties,
consent
entered
class of

may... be entered into by the respective states, with the
of congress. The compact between this state and Maryland,
into in the year 1786, may serve as an example of this last
public agreements."

This second excerpt shows, once more, that Vattel's definitions of "treaty" and "agreement" were indeed used by the public figures of the
Revolutionary era in their debate about the legality of the Mount
Vernon Compact. That compact was neither a nationally significant
"treaty, alliance, or confederation," nor a mere transitory "agreement."
Rather, the Mount Vernon Compact was, as its name suggests, a "compact" within the meaning of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. 9
According to Tucker's analysis, compacts of national magnitude

68. TUCKER, supra note 67, at 310 app.
69. This helps to explain why the Framers of the Constitution added the catchall term "compact" in the phrase "agreement or compact," instead of just using the
word "agreement." They wanted to ensure that future pacts like the Mount Vernon
Compact would fall within the meaning of Article I. As the Supreme Court has
observed:
In expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must
have its due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the
whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly
added. The many discussions which have taken place upon the Construction of the Constitution, have proved the correctness of this proposition;
and shown the high talent, the caution, and the foresight of the illustrious men who framed it. Every word appears to have been weighed with
the utmost deliberation, and its force and effect to have been fully understood. No word in the instrument, therefore, can be rejected as superfluous or unmeaning; and this principle of construction applies with
peculiar force to the two clauses of the tenth section of the first article,
of which we are now speaking, because the whole of this short section
is directed to the same subject; that is to say, it is employed altogether
in enumerating the rights surrendered by the states; and this is done
with so much clearness and brevity, that we cannot for a moment believe that a single superfluous word was used, or words which meant
merely the same thing.
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 570-71. There has never been any doubt
that the Framers did intend that future pacts similar to the Mount Vernon Compact
should fall within the ambit of the Compact Clause. Tucker had no doubt of this.
See supra text accompanying note 68. Joseph Story viewed this issue the same way;
he wrote that "the consent of Congress may be properly required" for interstate
compacts regulating "the mutual comfort, and convenience of states, bordering on
each other." 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES 272 (1833). The Supreme Court has endorsed this position of Tucker and
Story; in the case of Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893), the Court held that
Virginia and Tennessee did form an Article I "agreement or compact" when those
two states ratified their mutual boundary. Id. at 521. The Court also held in Virginia v. Tennessee that congressional approval of the boundary agreement could be
"fairly implied" because Congress did not raise any "questions or dispute." Id. at
522. But cf. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n., 434 U.S. 452, 462 (1977)
(holding that "not all agreements between states are subject to the strictures of the
Compact Clause").
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and considerable duration are necessarily "treaties" within the meaning of the Constitution. This analysis leaves plenty of room for other
"treaties" under the Constitution. Tucker, like Vattel, did not rule out
treaties in which the parties consent to a brief duration, nor did he say
that all short-term pacts are immune from the treaty requirement. He
simply said that accords which have national importance and are made
for a considerable time necessarily fall within the meaning of the word
"treaty" as used in the Constitution.
Another early commentator, Joseph Story, recognized that
Tucker's discussion was somewhat lacking. Seven years before Story
participated in Holmes v. Jennison as a Supreme Court Justice, he
called Tucker's treaty analysis "loose and unsatisfactory,"70 but did
not go so far as to say that Tucker was wrong. Story pointed out that
treaties are often made "for short periods, and upon questions of local
interest, and for temporary objects," and he desired greater clarity
with regard to such accords. Story, in fact, agreed with Tucker that
important long-term accords are necessarily "treaties," as is evidenced
by Story's wholehearted endorsement of Chief Justice Taney's opinion
in Holmes. 1 Story's concurrence in the Holmes case shows that he
and Tucker were "united in theory,"72 in that both viewed Vattel as
authority for the meaning of the word "treaty" in the Constitution.73
D. Several Court Cases Regarding Pacts With Other Nations
Chief Justice Taney quoted extensively from Vattel's Law of Nations in his Holmes opinion.74 That opinion, joined by Justice Story
and two others, contains the most explicit guidance ever given by the
Supreme Court regarding the definition of the word "treaty."7" Al-

70. STORY, supra note 69, at 271.
71. Justice Story declared that Taney's opinion in Holmes "is a masterly one and
. I entirely condoes his sound judgment and discrimination very great credit ...
curred in that opinion with all my heart; and was surprised that it was not unanimously adopted." BERNARD C. STEINER, LIFE OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY 212 (1922).
See also supra text accompanying note 46.
72. President John Adams, during his retirement, remained inquisitive about the
principles, the characters, and the views of the American Bar. In particular, he

wanted to know this: "Are Tucker and Story united in theory?" John Adams, Letter
to Benjamin Waterhouse (Jun. 5, 1813), in 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 38
(Charles Francis Adams, ed., 1856).
73. It bears emphasis that the frequent occurrence of unimportant and shortterm treaties throughout U.S. history does not in any way contradict the idea that
significant long-term accords are necessarily "treaties."
74. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 571.

75. See generally supra text accompanying note 46. One of the nine justices was
absent, and another, Justice Catron, was substantially in accord with Taney's opinion even though he did not technically join in that opinion. The Supreme Court's
Reporter observed "that a majority of the Court concurred in the opinion" of Chief
Justice Taney. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 598. Indeed, the Court's
holdings in Holmes have "been respected and given effect in an unbroken line of
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though the Holmes opinion ostensibly dealt with Article I "treaties,"
the Court in dicta said that its logic applies also to Article II "treaties."76
The plaintiff, George Holmes, had been arrested in Vermont on a
warrant issued by Governor Jennison, in order that Holmes could be
extradited to Canada to face murder charges. The Supreme Court of
Vermont decided that Holmes could lawfully be extradited, but, on
appeal, four of the eight sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices held that
the extradition "agreement" between Vermont and Canada violated
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. A fifth Justice, Mr. Justice
Catron, "had intended to concur" with the opinion delivered by Chief
Justice Taney, but Justice Catron was not prepared to say that an
Article I agreement would exist until the actual delivery of Holmes to
the Canadians, absent any evidence of a request from the Canadians.7 7 Thus, the Court split evenly with regard to its jurisdiction, and
the case was dismissed. The Supreme Court of Vermont subsequently
concluded that "a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States
was ... adverse to the exercise of the power in question"71 to extradite Holmes without statutory authority "either of congress or of the
state legislature."79 Thus, the Supreme Court of Vermont voided the
accord with Canada, and set George Holmes loose.
In the Holmes case, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court of Vermont both recognized that important long-term accords (so
important that they are committed to writing and approved by the
highest governmental authorities) are necessarily "treaties," and are to
be distinguished from other accords of lesser permanence or importance. This is precisely the distinction which some scholars now seek to
abandon by redefining treaties and agreements so that they are interchangeable.'
In 1912, seventy-two years after Holmes, the Supreme Court de-

later decisions." Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 70 (1928).
76. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 571.
77. Id. at 595.
78. Ex Parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 642 (1840).
79. Id. at 641. The Supreme Court of Vermont also observed that, had the U.S.
Supreme Court been aware of an application to Governor Jennison from the Governor General of Lower Canada soliciting the surrender of Holmes, then U.S. Supreme Court Justice Catron "would have concurred with the other justices, and the
judgment of this court would have been reversed." Id. at 641. The Canadian application to Governor Jennison, which was accompanied by a copy of the indictment
against Holmes, sought a one-time-only deal. Id. at 632, 633. This explains why the
Supreme Court of Vermont classified this transaction as a compact that could have
proceeded with authority from congress, instead of as a treaty. (In contrast, Taney
had not been prepared to say that the compact was a treaty, absent any evidence of
a written accord.)
80. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, at § 303, Reporter's note 8.
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cided the case of B. Altman & Co. v. United States.8' The Altman
Court held that a commercial agreement with France82 "was not a
treaty possessing the dignity of one requiring ratification by the Senate," thus implicitly reaffirming that some compacts do require Senate
approval. Indeed, both opposing parties in Altman explicitly agreed
that Holmes is proper authority for the meaning of the word "treaty" in
the Constitution.'
The Altman Court held that, although not an Article II treaty, the
commercial agreement with France was nevertheless a "treaty" within
the meaning of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act. That fact gave the
Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear Altman's appeal. In addressing the
merits, the Court upheld the lower court's decision that a bronze bust
imported by Altman was not "statuary" dutiable at the low rate set by
the commercial agreement.
The Altman case offers no support for the proposition that treaties
and other agreements are wholly interchangeable." The commercial
agreement at issue in Altman never necessitated Senate approval
because it was always revocable upon short notice. The agreement had
been unilaterally revoked by the United States long before the Supreme Court issued its opinion, and the agreement did not pledge the
United States to any long-term commitment. This commercial agreement thus fell squarely into the Holmes category of international compacts that are not necessarily treaties within the meaning of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Altman in the case of United
States v. Belmont.' The Belmont Court, in an opinion by Justice
Sutherland," held that an international compact "is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate." Thus, Belmont, like

81. B. Altman & Co. v. U.S., 224 U.S. 583 (1912).

82. Protocol Respecting Commerce, May 28, 1898, U.S.-Fr., T.S. No 98. This
agreement stated that it was agreed upon "in accordance with the provisions of
Section 3 of the United States Tariff Act of 1897." Id. at art. II. The agreement did
not commit to any particular duration, and it was terminated by the United States
in 1909 when a new tariff law took effect. 7 Bevans 857. The French Government
objected to the termination because the agreement contained no termination provision, but the State Department replied that termination was implicit "in the absence
of enabling legislation by Congress." V GREEN H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 429 (1943). This position of the State Department (with regard to com-

mercial accords) is entirely consistent with the Restatement, according to which "in
the absence of provisions stating or implying the contrary, a right to withdraw may
be implied." RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 332 com b.
83. 224 U.S. at 601; Id. at 585 (argument of plaintiff); Id. at 591 (argument of
the United States).
84. Contra HENKIN, supra note 10, at 423.
85. U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
86. Incidentally, Justice Sutherland also delivered the Court's opinion in CurtissWright, supra note 41.
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Altman, implies that some international pacts do require Senate participation while some do not. Justice Sutherland's opinion in Belmont,
like his other writings, s" is inconsistent with the complete
interchangeability of treaties and executive agreements.
The compact at issue in Belmont involved an exchange of diplomatic correspondence between President Franklin Roosevelt and Soviet
Ambassador Maxim Litvinoff, in which the Soviets assigned to the
United States Government legal title to all amounts owed to the Soviets by American citizens." The purpose of the Litvinov Assignment
was to enable the Soviet Union to reach a "final settlement" 9 of its
claims through diplomatic rather than legal channels, and this purpose
was accomplished at the stroke of a pen. The Belmont Court held that
the Litvinov Assignment provided a valid legal basis for the United
States to recover Russian deposits in a New York bank, notwithstanding New York law.
The executive agreement at issue in Belmont, like that in Altman,
did not pledge the United States to any long-term commitment, and
therefore it was not required to be an Article II "treaty." Belmont was
later cited approvingly in United States v. Pink," which again involved the Litvinov Assignment.
The Supreme Court addressed another international accord in
Dames and Moore v. Regan,91 in an opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist, now the Chief Justice. This case involved the deal with
Iran which freed American hostages, and which also set the stage for
resolving claims between the citizens and governments of the two
countries." Dames and Moore argued that the Treasury Secretary
should not be allowed to enforce the U.S.-Iran agreement by tying up
funds which the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran owed to Dames
and Moore. The Court held that the U.S.-Iran agreement was legiti-

87. With regard to the distinction between treaties and other international agreements, Justice Sutherland most definitely had a sense of which are which:
[I]nternational agreements which are not treaties in the full constitutional sense, are perhaps confined to such as affect administrative matters, as distinguished from policies, and those which are of only individual concern, or limited scope and duration, as distinguished from
those of general consequence and permanent character.
GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 120 (1919), quot-

ed in Borchard, supra note 3, at 671. It is thus erroneous to assert that Justice
Sutherland never differentiated between Article II treaties and other agreements.
Contra HENIUN, supra note 10, at 179.
88. Exchange of Notes Regarding General Relations, Nov. 16, 1933, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
11 Bevans 1248, 1256-58 [hereinafter the Litvinov Assignment].
89. Id.
90. U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1942).
91. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981).
92. Settlement of the Hostage Crisis, Jan. 18, 1981, U.S.-Iran, 20 I.L.M. 223.
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mate since "Congress acquiesced,"93 and since "the President does
have some measure of power to enter into executive agreements without obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate."94
Thus, the Supreme Court implied in Dames and Moore, as it had
in Altman and Belmont, that the President does not have complete
power to avoid the treaty process by negotiating executive agreements,
even if Congress has "placed its stamp of approval on such agreements." 5 In holding that the claims settlement agreement with Iran
did not require a two-thirds Senate vote, the Court in Dames and
Moore cited the Litvinov assignment as precedent.9" Like the Litvinov
Assignment, the U.S.-Iran agreement was short-term, with respect to
claims by private parties against the respective governments. As the
Supreme Court observed, the agreement imposed a deadline of six
months for transfer of assets frozen in U.S. banks.97 The U.S.-Iran
agreement would not have bothered the Founders, who consistently
distinguished between treaties and other agreements.9" The U.S.-Iran
agreement was valid because of its short-term character, and because
more than one-third of the Senate did not reject it.
E. Customary PracticesRegarding Executive Agreements
Several times in the history of the United States Constitution, the
meaning of the words "treaty" and "agreement" has been debated. All
of those controversies were resolved in conformity with Vattel's definitions.
In 1817, the United States and Great Britain entered into the
Rush-Bagot Agreement,' which led to the disarmament of the Great
Lakes. This was not a long-term commitment, as is evident from the
provision allowing each party to cancel the deal with six months' notice
to the other."° The Rush-Bagot Agreement was therefore properly
implemented by President Monroe without submission to the Senate
for a two-thirds vote. Monroe did obtain Senate consent a year later, in

93. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688.
94. Id. at 682.
95. Id. at 680.
96. Id. at 682.
97. Id. at 665.
98. See, e.g., supra note 49 and accompanying text.
99. Arrangement Respecting Naval Forces, Apr. 29, 1817, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat.
231 [hereinafter Rush-Bagot Agreement].
100. "If either party should hereafter be desirous of annulling this stipulation,
and should give notice to that effect to the other party, it shall cease to be binding
after the expiration of six months from the date of such notice." Id. President Monroe felt that this aspect of the arrangement was sufficiently important to mention in
his first State of the Union Address. James Monroe, First Annual Message (Dec. 2,
1817), in 2 COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 580,
581 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
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order to please the British Ambassador and appease disgruntled Senators, but he did not think it absolutely necessary that the compact be
communicated to the Senate.'' That is, he did not think that the
compact was blatantly "such an one as requires the advice and consent
0 2
of the Senate.""
President Monroe served in the Federal Congress
prior to 1789, and also participated in the Virginia Ratification Convention, so he might be expected to have had a good grasp of the word
"treaty" in the Constitution.
Another major accord was the arrangement by which the Republic
of Texas became part of the United States in 1845. President Tyler had
negotiated a treaty for this purpose, but a majority of the Senate rejected it.'0 3 Later, when the electorate had become more favorable to
annexation, President Tyler made an innovative suggestion to the
House:
[W]hile I have regarded the annexation to be accomplished by treaty as the most suitable form in which it could be effected, should
Congress deem it proper to resort to any other expedient compatible with the Constitution and likely to accomplish the same object I
stand prepared to yield my most prompt and active cooperation."'
The House subsequently deemed that a joint resolution, offering statehood to Texas, would suffice instead of a treaty. Congressmen reasoned
that the transaction would be of brief duration, and so would not necessarily constitute a "treaty" within the meaning of the Constitution.
For instance, Congressman Bayly observed that, from "the language of
the Chief Justice of the United States in the case of Holmes vs.

101. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams (Monroe's successor as President) recorded in his diary the following entry:
Met and spoke to Mr. Bagot this morning on my way to the President's.
He asked me if it was the intention of the President to communicate to
Congress the ... arrangement concerning armaments on the Lakes,
which he said was a sort of treaty. I spoke of it to the President, who
did not think it necessary that they should be communicated. It has
been usual heretofore with the message at the opening of the session of
Congress to send a collection of documents with it relating to the principal subjects mentioned in it. This was not done at the present session,
and some inconvenience has resulted from the omission.
Diary entry (Jan. 14, 1818), in 4 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QuINcy ADAMS 41-42 (Charles
Francis Adams ed., 1969).
102. See James Monroe, Letter to the Senate (April 6, 1818), in 2 COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 602 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1897). It is also noteworthy that Congress had authorized the President to lay up
the warships on the Great Lakes. Ch. 62, Para. 4, 6, 3 Stat. 217, 218 (1815).
103. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 698 (1844) (only 16 Senators voted for
the treaty, while 35 voted against it).
104. John Tyler, Letter to the House of Representatives (June 10, 1844),in 5 COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 2176, 2180 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1897). Incidentally, President Tyler was President Truman's greatgreat uncle.
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Jennison ....
it seems that the gentleman from Massachusetts [Rep.
Winthrop] is mistaken in supposing that all stipulations and agreements between nations are necessarily treaties."' 5 Congress thus approved the joint resolution,'" Texas accepted Tyler's offer, and Congress finished the entire international transaction by admitting Texas
as a state.
The Texas Accord was not a long-term international compact.
Texas quickly lost its national sovereignty and became a state subject
to the control of the American people. The annexation of Texas in 1845
is no precedent for long-term pacts that are not "treaties." Likewise,
the annexation of Hawaii in 1898 was perfectly constitutional.'
In 1972, when President Nixon submitted the Antiballistic Missile
Treaty to the Senate, he simultaneously submitted an Interim Agreement, regarding strategic arms limitation, to Congress.' The National Security Adviser at the time was Henry Kissinger, later to become Secretary of State. Kissinger explained the rationale for Nixon's

105. CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 124 (1845). Also see generally supra
note 46 and accompanying text (quoting the Chief Justice in the Holmes case). The
theme of Congressman Bayly's remarks has been recurrent throughout U.S. history;
for example, consider this statement of Congressman Dow with regard to the SALT
I Interim Agreement:
Some days ago, I was curious as to why this particular agreement was
not handled as a treaty, but instead, comes as an agreement to be accepted by both Houses of Congress. The Library of Congress has given
me some good reasons, and I want to share them with my colleagues.
This agreement ....
does not seem to have the permanence that would
be expected in the treaty form.
118 CONG. REc. 29102 (1972) (statement of Rep. Dow). See generally note 51 supra
(discussing the Interim Agreement).
106. Far from being ignored, the constitutionality of the joint resolution was extensively debated. Senators on both sides of the issue concurred in the opinion that,
as Senator Merrick put it:
[Were Texas a terrestrial paradise, its sands all gold, its streams ambrosial nectar, and its hills and rocks the bread of life - though it
should promise us peace without end, and strength, prosperity, and
glory such as the world has never seen - yet should this measure not
be adopted here, if it be forbidden by the constitution. To support that
constitution we have all registered our oath in Heaven's chancery. The
obligations of that oath are paramount to all earthly considerations; and
there cannot be a senator here who would not spurn Texas from him as
a most loathsome, hideous thing . . . if she could be obtained only by
our making such a sacrifice.
CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 229 (1845) (agreeing with Sen. Choate)
(original emphasis). The Senate vote in favor of the joint resolution was 27 to 25.
CONG. GLOBE, 28th, 2d Sess. 362-363 (1845).
107. The joint resolution annexing the Hawaiian Islands was approved by a vote
of 42 to 21, well over the two-thirds that would have been required for a treaty. 31
CONG. REc. 6712 (1898). Incidentally, not even a treaty could cede territory of an
unwilling state. De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
108. See supra note 51.
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approach by pointing out that the Interim Agreement would last for
only five years. As Kissinger put it, the foreign affairs of the United
States raise an "important Constitutional question: At what point does
an executive agreement achieve character of such permanence that it
should really more properly be in the form of a treaty?"1" Congress
agreed with Kissinger that accords which last for only five years, less
than a Senator's term of office, do not necessarily fall within the definition of the word "treaty" as used in the Constitution."'
The State Department has long maintained that executive agreements are impermissible when an accord should instead be dealt with
by treaty. This policy is stated in a document known as Circular
175.1"l The current version of this document lists eight criteria which
should be given "due consideration" in deciding whether a particular
accord must be dealt with as a treaty, and whether a congressionalexecutive or a sole-executive agreement would be appropriate:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

The extent to which the agreement involves commitments or
risks affecting the nation as a whole;
Whether the agreement is intended to affect State laws;
Whether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment of subsequent legislation by the Congress;
Past United States practice with respect to similar agree
ments;
The preference of the Congress with respect to a particular
type of agreement;
The degree of formality desired for an agreement;
The proposed duration of the agreement, the need for prompt
conclusion of an agreement, and the desirability of concluding
a routine or short-term agreement; and
The general international practice with respect to similar
agreements."

109. Kissinger Briefing, supra note 51, at 407.
110. See, e.g., supra note 105 (statement of Rep. Dow).
111. The State Department issued Circular 175 in 1955, stating that:
Executive agreements shall not be used when the subject matter should
be covered by treaty ... Where there is any serious question as to
whether an international agreement should be made in the form of a
treaty ....

whenever circumstances permit, consultation shall be had

with appropriate Congressional leaders ...
U.S. DEPIr OF STATE, CIRcuLAR No. 175 (1955), reprinted in 50 AM. J. INT'L. L. &

PoLIcY 784 (1956).
112. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAN. § 721.3, reprinted in 1975
Senate Hearings, supra note 48, at 285. From time to time, various scholars have
listed similar criteria to differentiate executive agreements from treaties, and such
lists almost invariably include "duration." See, e.g., Letter from Professor Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Harvard Law School, to Senator Ernest F. Hollings 5 (October 18, 1994)
[hereinafter Slaughter Letter] reprinted in GATT Implementing Legislation: Hearings
on S. 2467 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. 286-290 (1994). Duration is not a mere indicator of whether to submit an accord as "treaty." To the contrary, Professor Slaughter agrees with Professor
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Circular175 does not say which of these criteria determine whether an
executive agreement can be used instead of a treaty, nor does it say
which of the criteria determine the type of executive agreement. From
a constitutional point of view, criterion "g" is crucial in the first determination; accords which are neither "short-term" nor "routine" are outside the scope of executive agreements.
Circular175 states that the Senate possesses constitutional powers which could be "invaded" or "compromised" if the Circular 175
criteria are carelessly applied."' Indeed, the Senate's Office of Legislative Counsel has taken the position that "[s]trong support exists for
the proposition that an agreement which... qualifies as a treaty under the 'Circular 175' criteria employed by the Department of State is
in violation of the Constitution if entered into by the President without
the advice and consent of the Senate.""' Circular 175 contradicts, yet
again, the view that treaties and executive agreements are entirely interchangeable under Article II of the Constitution.
V. THE U.S.-JAPAN PLUTONIUM PACT
When President Reagan submitted the U.S.-Japan Pact to Congress in 1987, the Senate rejected a joint resolution"' that would
have defeated it."' The Senate vote was 53 to 30, short of a twothirds majority." 7
The terms of this thirty-year nuclear cooperation accord say that
it is ordinarily irrevocable, and that it is binding upon future Presidents who might otherwise oppose it. This accord is currently facilitating the worldwide proliferation of weapons usable plutonium, despite
growing sentiment in favor of a proposal to ban plutonium production.
President Clinton has, according to press reports, expressed the view
that plutonium production
"is not justified on either economic or national security grounds,

Tribe that some international accords "must... be submitted to the Senate for
ratification by a two thirds majority of Senators present" (emphasis added). Id. at 6.
See generally Tribe's Statement, supra note 19.
113. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAN. § 721.3, reprinted in 1975

Senate Hearings, supra note 48, at 285.
114. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 48, at 373 (Senate Office of Legislative
Counsel memorandum on certain Middle East agreements).
115. S.J. REs. 241, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
116. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 123(d), 42 U.S.C. §2153(d) (1988). (Section 123
specifies that any proposed nuclear cooperation agreement will not take effect if
Congress promptly passes a concurrent resolution opposing the agreement, and of
course the President would then be constitutionally entitled to veto the resolution).
117. See 134 CONG., REC. supra note 5 (the 17 Senators who did not vote were
absent).

1995

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF LONG-TERM PACTS

and its accumulation creates serious proliferation and security dangers".... [but] in an Oct. 20 letter to Rep. Fortney "Pete" Stark
[he said the] "proposal would breach existing U.S. commitments,"
such as an agreement allowing Japan to extract plutonium from
fuel that originated in the United States, and would "lead to confrontation with Russia and our allies."'18
The U.S.-Japan Pact may thus be the crucial factor preventing the
nations of the world from halting the production of the most dangerous
material on Earth, or at least may be providing our leaders with an
excuse to avoid taking responsibility. If this is indeed true, then the
U.S.-Japan Pact may rank as the most consequential violation of the
Constitution in the history of the United States.
North Korea used the U.S.-Japan Pact to justify its own plutonium program, citing the U.S. "double-standard" by which Japan can
have tons of plutonium while North Korea cannot1 , and there is every reason to expect that other countries will use this justification in
the future. The security risks inherent in the U.S.-Japan Pact led to
significant Senate opposition in 1988,2' and Senators have also expressed grave concerns about the severe environmental and public
"
health risks posed by the pact.12
'

118. Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton Refuses to Ask Britain to Halt New Plutonium
Plant, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1993, at A10.
119. Jonathan Power, Japan's Growing Nuclear Equivocation, BALT. MORN. SUN,
Dec. 10, 1993, at 31A (quoting North Korea's official press agency). See also David
E. Sanger, Effort to Solve Energy Woes Clashes With Nuclear Safety, N.Y. TIMES, August 20, 1994, at 1 (stating that North Korea has consistently made the straightforward argument that they should not be forbidden to do what Japan is allowed to
do).
120. For example, Senator Glenn said that "[t]here is no parallel in the history of
U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements that I am aware of for such a limitation on our
right to suspend a consent for a foreign nuclear activity, especially with regard to
activities involving ton quantities of nuclear weapons-usable material in a nonnuclear
weapons state. Ton quantities of this plutonium, I am talking about, that will be
transferred. Do you know how much it takes to make a nuclear weapon with plutonium if you know what you are doing? Somewhere under 5 kilograms." 134 CONG.
REC. 4511 (1988) (a kilogram is equivalent to 2.2 pounds). Senator Cranston noted
that, according to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S.-Japan Pact
poses "an extreme environmental hazard, a proliferation peril, and a would-be
terrorist's dream come true." Id. at 4543. Senator Helms pointed out that, "[w]hile
the proposed agreement could be suspended by the United States unilaterally, there
is concern that the terms of this suspension right are such that it can never be
exercised." Id. at 4506.
121. U.S. Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary has stated that, "plutonium is potentially dangerous, even in very small amounts, whether it is ingested or inhaled.
Plutonium from reactors can also be used to make nuclear weapons." Thomas W.
Lippman, Pluto Boy's Mission: Soften the Reaction, WASH. POST, March 7, 1994, at
All. However, Japan's Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation
has distributed a video cartoon which falsely claims that bombs would be "extremely
difficult" to make with reactor plutonium, and has also falsely asserted that no proof
exists of plutonium's carcinogenic effects in humans. Id. Likewise, Japanese Energy
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Article 12 of the basic agreement establishes the grounds for either party to suspend cooperation if the other party violates the agreement.122 Article 3 of the implementing agreement also allows for unilateral suspension, but only "in the most extreme circumstances of
exceptional concern," and provided that this concern is "from a nonproliferation or national security point of view," and if, furthermore,
the suspension is "for the minimum period of time necessary."" According to the State Department, Japan has such "outstanding nonproliferation credentials" that "[amny instance of increased proliferation
or national security risk in the case of Japan would inevitably arise
out of "extreme circumstances of exceptional concern. " "4 Even if one
accepts the State Department's assurances to Congress, the U.S.-Japan
Pact's suspension limitations make it impossible for the United States
to suspend the pact on the grounds that: 1) the United States simply
made a policy error in agreeing to the pact in the first place, or 2)
because new environmental or public health risks warrant suspension,
or 3) because Japanese authorities have consistently given false information to their people, or 4) because plutonium is lost or mysteriously
turns up on the black market, or 5) for any number of other reasons.
The minutes to the implementing agreement allow for suspension
of the U.S.-Japan Pact if actions of "governments of third countries"
cause the U.S.-Japan activities to "clearly result in a significant increase in the risk of nuclear proliferation or in the threat to the national security of the suspending party."'25 However, suspension of
the U.S.-Japan Agreement remains impermissible if: 1) the U.S. merely concludes that it ran a foolish risk when it entered into the U.S.-Japan Pact despite the threat of plutonium theft, or 2) the U.S. concludes
that Japanese inattention to environmental or public health risks warrants suspension, or 3) the U.S. believes that assisting Japan's plutonium program makes it too difficult to oppose weapons-usable programs
throughout the world, or 4) the prospects for developing safer energy
sources become more promising.
The terms of the U.S-Japan Pact state that the pact cannot be
dropped at will by the United States for a considerable period of time.
The Pact is not scheduled to expire until the year 2018. If this pact
Minister Satsuki Eda has asserted that reactor plutonium is "insufficient" for nuclear
weapons. Richard Read, Nuclear Work in Japan Raises Many Concerns, OREGONIAN,
Dec. 23, 1993, at A3. Although President Reagan agreed to the U.S.-Japan Pact for
fear that the Japanese would take their business elsewhere, the United States has
consistently discouraged Japan from using plutonium. David Holley, Japan Pursues
Plutonium Reactor, OREGONIAN, Mar. 20, 1994, at A5.
122. H.R. Doc. No. 128, supra note 4, at 16.
123. Id. at 44.
124. United States-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Hearings Before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 528 (1987 & 1988) (State
Department's analysis of suspension rights under the proposed agreement).
125. H.R. Doc. No. 128, supra note 4, at 62.
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now continues in force, it will continue to be manifestly unconstitutional, unless the President convinces two-thirds of the Senate to endorse
the U.S.-Japan arrangements, or until the Pact is renegotiated so as to
remove the long-term commitment.
VI. CONCLUSION

Important long-term accords, such as the U.S.-Japan Pact of 1988,
require a two-thirds Senate concurrence. This was the unmistakable
and overwhelming intent of the Framers of the Constitution, and has
been the consistent practice throughout every phase of American history. In summary, Senate consent or acquiescence is requisite for any
international covenant which is significant enough to warrant the
scrutiny of the President and which, by its terms, may not be terminable at will by the United States for six years or more.
There is an urgent need for the three branches of government to
reaffirm that a line of demarcation exists between executive agreements and Article II treaties, and for the courts to decide whether that
line, whatever may be its precise contours, has been crossed. That is
"the $64 question."" 6 The U.S.-Japan Pact proves that the line of demarcation has not been merely crossed; it has been steamrolled.
The U.S.-Japan Pact is manifestly a treaty within the meaning of
the Constitution. Since it has not been legally ratified, the President
has no authority to enforce it. Unlike other nuclear cooperation accords, the U.S.-Japan Pact was rejected by more than one-third of the
Senators voting. Thus, the Pact is, and always has been, ultra vires
and without legal force. Perhaps the President can persuade Japan to
join him in treating the Pact as a nullity, or perhaps the matter will
end up in court. An ongoing accord violative of the treaty-making procedure is no more immune from judicial scrutiny than would be an accord passed in violation of the Bill of Rights.' 7 Even in the unfortu-

126. This quote is from an interesting session of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, excerpted below:
Senator Gillette: A few years ago I prepared what I thought was a good
paper on this thing, and I wrote the State Department and asked them
how they drew the line, how did they differentiate between what they
considered a treaty and what they considered an executive agreement,
and they answered me that a treaty was a document that you had to
send to the Senate for confirmation, and an executive agreement was
one that you did not.
Senator Smith of New Jersey: That was a very satisfactory reply; the
$64 question was still left.
Senator Gillette: That is actually the way they explained it.
Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
463 (1952).
127. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 397 (1990). The Court in
Munoz-Flores held that a "law passed in violation of the Origination Clause
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nate event that the President continues to enforce the U.S.-Japan Pact,
it is no precedent for similar pacts such as the upcoming EURATOM
accord, which may face opposition from one-third of the Senate."
The Supreme Court invalidated an executive agreement for the
first time in 1957, in the case of Reid v. Covert."2 The Court then declared that "[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution." 3' To be sure, the American people have always aspired to have
a "government of laws and not of men."' It would be unfortunate if
today we instead have a government which places international accords above the law, by allowing the sovereign prerogatives of future
Presidents and electorates to be bargained away without the strong

would . . . be no more immune from judicial scrutiny because it was passed by both
Houses and signed by the President than would be a law passed in violation of the
First Amendment." The Origination Clause, of course, says that "All Bills for raising
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
1. Similarly, Professor Tribe has pointed out that "it is not the prerogative of those
who temporarily hold public office to abdicate structural constitutional protections and, of course, it is not within their power thereby to bind the nation for all time
by such abdication." Tribe's Statement, supra note 19, at 12.
128. According to the Supreme Court, "That an unconstitutional action has been
taken before surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a
later date." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969). It should be emphasized that there is apparently nothing unconstitutional about those nuclear cooperation agreements which have been approved by two-thirds of the Senate (either by
acquiescence or by vote). Furthermore, there is apparently nothing unconstitutional
about the terms of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. § 2153), because
those terms do not purport to authorize cooperation agreements that bind the United
States for more than six years over the objections of one-third of the Senate (the
Atomic Energy Act can and should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
Constitution).
129. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). This case involved agreements with Great
Britain and Japan which authorized trial by court martial of American civilians in
time of peace. The Court held these agreements violative of the Bill of Rights. This
holding eased Senators' concerns that international accords should be kept in conformity with the Constitution (if not in pursuance of it). See generally S. REP. No.
1716, supra note 1. The Court in Reid dramatically interposed itself in the domain
of foreign relations, in order to rescue the Bill of Rights, and did so fourteen years
after one of the unconstitutional accords had been signed. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
at 15. However, there need not be any such interposition with regard to the U.S.Japan nuclear pact; the courts can simply put the onus with the President and the
Senate, where it belongs. It is for the Senate and the President to decide whether to
ratify the U.S.-Japan accord, and they are by no means obligated to do so. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 311(3) (opining that a nation may "invoke a violation
of its internal law to vitiate its consent to be bound [if] the violation was manifest
and concerned a rule of fundamental importance"). If there is one thing that has always been manifest to all nations of the world, it is this: that the one way to obtain an indisputably durable commitment from the United States is by getting twothirds of the Senate to go along.
130. 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957).
131. MASS. CONST. part I, art. XXX (written by John Adams and associates in
1780, during the Revolutionary War, and adopted that year by freely elected delegates).
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Senate approval required by the Constitution.
This is no plea for isolationism - a policy which has no place in
this day and age.' 32 The United States must actively pursue a happy
and healthy world by making significant short-term as well as longterm international commitments. Long-term accords, however, still require the strong two-thirds Senate approval in adherence to the Constitution. Without such adherence, the United States risks incautious
commitments which could spark renewed isolationism, or worse.
During recent decades, international accords have grown in both
quantity and influence, so it is more important than ever for such
accords to be formed using the proper procedures. The two-thirds Senate procedure is meant to restrain the United States from rashly entangling itself in lasting foreign commitments, and is not supposed to
provide an appendant method of oligating future leaders, or of permanently compromising vital American resources.133 The treaty safeguard remains crucial as we approach a new century, which promises
rapid changes and which will require a flexible foreign policy to deal
with those changes. Above all else, the future will require a decent

132. See generally Roosevelt's Address at San Diego Touching on Home and Foreign Problems, N. Y. TIMES, October 3, 1935, at A14 (in which President Franklin
Roosevelt spoke of "[o]ur national determination to keep free of foreign wars and
foreign entanglements . . . "). There is a big difference between opposing entanglements, as Roosevelt did in 1935, and favoring restrained and cautious entanglement,
as the Constitution does. Indeed, it is not inconsistent to favor the Constitution's
treaty process, while at the same time urging that the U.S. greatly expand its international role. American diplomacy has for many years followed an isolationist handsoff path regarding a wide range of touchy "internal affairs," including exploitation of
child labor, insecure conditions for the elderly and disabled, unequal treatment of
women, and rampant deforestation. These are all crucial international economic problems, and merely frowning upon them will not uplift our trade partners or prevent
overpopulation. When we marginalize these problems (and others such as unsafe
workplaces, pollution, and substandard wages) we make them worse, while sacrificing good American jobs to countries that can make products at unfairly low costs.
We need not amend the treaty process; what we need are internationalist leaders
who understand how to use it in concert with other nations.
133. See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, § 594
(1801), reprinted in H.R. Doc No. 256, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 115, 296 (1991)
(unequivocally stating that the two-thirds provision was meant "to restrain the Executive and Senate from entangling and embroiling our affairs with those of Europe").
See also JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 686 (E.H. Scott
ed., 1893) (recounting that "it had been too easy in the present Congress to make
treaties altho' nine States were required for the purpose"). As Madison's comment
illustrates, the Framers of the Constitution purposely raised the treaty-making hurdle higher than it had been under the Articles of Confederation, by necessitating the
cooperation of the President in addition to the two-thirds approval that had been
needed under the Articles. See supra note 53. The strong consensus required by the
Constitution has ensured that the United States does not lightly abrogate or undermine its treaty obligations, and in this sense the treaty process is not only a hurdle,
but is also "a bulwark" which has made the United States a reliable international
partner. Slaughter Letter, supra note 112, at 7.
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134. Professor Slaughter has written eloquently that:
[C]onstitutionalism is an international as well as a domestic value. The
Constitution mandates special safeguards for the conclusion of international agreements with direct, significant, and lasting constraints on
U.S. sovereignty. These safeguards cannot be circumvented by semantic
sleight-of-hand. If ...
agreements qualify as a treaty, they must be
passed as a treaty. The Senate should give its full attention to that
question, in the best interests of both the domestic and the international
rule of law.
Slaughter Letter, supra note 112, at 8 (emphasis added).
President Harry Truman, had this to say about the treaty process:
Paragraph 2 of Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States provides that: "He (the president) shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of
the Senators present concur" . . . . If the powers of the President are
further limited . . . the country may as well readopt the Articles of
Confederation ...
The men who wrote the Constitution knew history,
were familiar with government as practiced in their day and had become experienced in the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation.
Letter from Harry S. Truman to Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. (March 25, 1955),
reprinted in OFF THE RECORD: THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF HARRY S TRUMAN 314 (Robert H. Ferrell ed., 1980) (commenting on a proposed constitutional amendment).
See generally supra note 12 (President Truman's views on the Senate's rejection of
the Treaty of Versailles). Incidentally, it was on August 6 of 1945, fifty years ago,
when, in accordance with the orders of President Truman, a bomb using highly enriched uranium decimated Hiroshima. A plutonium bomb hit Nagasaki less than 75
hours later. Whether or not dropping the bombs was appropriate, they showed an
unknowing world what boundless horror can be unleashed upon innocent people; the
bombings gave all free nations a chance to face the facts, and to pull back from the
brink.

International Capital Markets
Section

Recent Developments in International
Securities Regulation
SAMUEL WOLFF*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The defining characteristic of modem securities markets is that
they are organized and regulated primarily on a national basis.' Yet
in the past ten to fifteen years international offerings of securities,
international trading and the cross-border provision of financial services have increased dramatically.2 The development of international
securities regulation is in large part a reaction to these related market
developments. There are three principal facets of the internationaliza-

* Of Counsel, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., Washington, D.C.
Reprinted from Emerging Trends in Securities Law 1994-1995 by Harold S.
Bloomenthal and Samuel Wolff by permission of Clark Boardman Callaghan. Copyright © 1994, Clark Boardman Callaghan. All rights reserved.The section of this
article concerning the Russian Federation and the Central Asian Republics was prepared by Bonnie H. Weinstein (J.D. 1983, The University of Chicago). Portions of
this article also were adapted, with permission, from materials prepared by Harold
Bloomenthal.
1. See Securities and Investment Board, Regulation of the United Kingdom
Equity Markets: Discussion Paper, Feb. 1994, at 1, 7.
2. E.g., Griffiths, Trends in InternationalEquity Issuance, in GLOBAL OFFERINGS
OF SECURITIES: AcCESS TO WORLD EQuITy CAPITAL MARKETS (M. Brown and A.
Paley, eds. 1994) [hereinafter Brown and Paley] ("[bly the end of 1993 we saw the
emergence of a new, global capital market overlying the long-established domestic
markets"); see also Breeden, Reconciling National and International Concerns in the
Regulation of Global Capital Markets, in the INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE REGULATORY RESPONSE 27 (Fingelton ed. 1992) [hereinafter Fingelton];
Neuberger, LSE Financial Markets Group, Special Paper No. 33 (unpublished paper
from Conference on European Financial Markets, London Oct. 1990) [hereinafter
Capital Markets] ("[wlith wider economic integration, the notion of largely national
markets which trade shares in domestic companies between institutions and individuals which are based domestically must be coming to an end").
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tion of securities regulation. First, national securities regulation, by
dealing more frequently and directly with international issues, has
taken on an increasingly international dimension. Thus, for example,
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
"Commission") adopted an integrated disclosure system for foreign
private issuers in the 1980s and expanded it in the 1990s.' Second,
national securities regulators have expanded significantly cooperative
efforts to address, both bilaterally and multilaterally, international
securities problems. For example, in 1991 Canada and the United
States adopted amendments to their own national regulations designed
to accommodate and facilitate increased securities transactions between the two countries.4 Third, several regional or international institutions, the most successful being the European Union ("EU"), are
attempting to develop (in the case of the EU, has developed) regulatory
responses to the internationalization of the world's securities markets.' Despite a significant increase in international efforts to regulate
world securities markets, however, at present securities regulation is
still primarily carried out on a national basis.'
The discussion of emerging trends in international securities regulation necessarily begins with a review of data concerning the interdependence of the world's securities markets. Foreign private issuers
filed registration statements with the SEC in 1993 covering approximately $46 billion of securities.7 According to some estimates, in 1993
foreign issuers also privately placed over $50 billion of securities in the
United States, including approximately $24.5 billion of securities in
"Rule 144A placements."' For the period July 1991 through December
1993, 50 Canadian issuers filed 70 registration statements, covering

3. Adoption of Foreign Integrated Disclosure System, See. Act Rel. No. 33-6437,
[1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
72,407 (Nov. 19, 1982); Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign Companies; Safe
Harbors for Public Announcements of Unregistered Offerings and Broker-Dealer Research Reports, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-7053, [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 9 85,331 (Apr. 19, 1994).
4. Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration
System for Canadian Issuers, Sec. Act. Rel. No. 33-6902, [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,812 (June 21, 1991); Multijurisdictional Disclosure System,
National Policy Statement No. 45, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
4,250.
5. E.g., Warren, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievement of
the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L. J. 185 (1990).
6. See Goodhart, The Crash of October 1987, LSE Financial Markets Group,
Special Paper No. 06, at 5 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (that
banking systems and capital markets have close interrelationships is "clear beyond
peradventure").
7. UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 51 (1994) [hereinafter SEC 1993 ANNuAL REPORT].
8. Tom Kershaw, Scouring the Globe for the Traditional Private Market, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Mar. 7, 1994, at 16. Both the private placement and 144A
figures reported are under-inclusive in the sense that they reflect only transactions
conducted by or through a placement agent.
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over $11 billion of securities, pursuant to the U.S. Multijurisdictional
Disclosure System ("MJDS").9 At the end of 1993, there were 588 foreign companies from 40 countries filing reports with the Commission. 0
In 1993, domestic registrants filed registration statements covering approximately $822 billion of securities," some portion of which
was sold offshore. For the period November 1992 through the end of
1993, 97 issuers filed unallocated shelf registration statements with
the SEC covering $73.1 billion of securities. 2 During 1993, U.S. issuers reportedly sold approximately $123 billion of securities in private
placements, including $66.8 billion of securities sold in Rule 144A
placements. 3 U.S. issuers borrowed $24.8 billion on international and
foreign bond markets in 1993,14 Eurodollar offerings accounting for
$16.1 billion of this amount. 5 In the same year U.S. companies issued
$9.9 billion of international equities,1" some pursuant to registration
and some pursuant to SEC Regulation S. "Hundreds of U.S. equities
are traded on foreign stock exchanges by the larger U.S., Japanese,
and European broker-dealers, which have
established trading desks at
7
the major markets around the world.
The SEC made unallocated shelf registration available to foreign
issuers in April 1994, although it has not extended this privilege to
registrants filing pursuant to the U.S. MJDS. Unallocated shelf registration is already an important financing tool for domestic issuers and
is likely to become one for foreign issuers as well since it increases the
ability to take advantage of propitious market conditions on a regis-

9. J. Quinn, Summary of Activities Involving the Division of Corporation Finance, in 2 SEC SPEAKS IN 1994 815 (1994). The SEC adopted the U.S. MJDS on
June 21, 1991.
10. Id. at 797.
11. SEC 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 51.
12. Quinn, supra note 9, at 801. Unallocated shelf registration became available
to domestic issuers effective October 29, 1992. Unallocated shelf registration allows a
registrant to register debt, equity and other securities on one registration statement
without indicating at the time of filing or effectiveness the amount of each type to
be offered.
13. Kershaw, supra note 8. Again, Kershaw's figures include only transactions
conducted by or through a placement agent and are under-inclusive to this extent.
14. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Financial Markets, 57 FIN. MARKET TRENDS, 54 62 (Feb. 1994) [hereinafter OECD 57
FIN. MARKET TRENDS].

15. Id. at 72-73.
16. Id. at 75.
17. DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 11-13,

11-14 (1994). "The trading of U.S. equities by U.S. broker-dealers on foreign exchanges amounts to several million shares per day. Most of this trading is done abroad
because of time zone differences between the major markets in New York, Tokyo,
and London." Id.
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tered basis. The increase in cross-border securities transactions is
associated with advances in automation, improvements in clearance
and settlement systems, enhanced transparency of markets, new financial instruments and markets,"8 as well as issuers' voracious appetite
for capital at the lowest possible cost. The internationalization of capital markets is as much a part of the liberal ideal as free trade since
without free flow of and access to capital the benefits to be derived
from an efficient allocation of world resources and division of labor are
not fully attainable.19
The internationalization of securities regulation is a direct response to the increasing inter-dependence of the world's securities
markets. Ironically, de-regulation is emerging as the approach of
choice among national securities regulators, although it is a de-regulation focused not on domestic standards but rather on impediments to
cross-border transactions that national regulators have been pursuing
with studied persistence."0 Thus, in 1993-1994 the SEC expanded access to short-form registration for foreign private issuers, extended
unallocated shelf registration to them and made certain accommodations for their financial statements, expanded the class of Canadian
issuers entitled to use MJDS, and granted exemptions from Rule 10b-6
for certain distributions by foreign issuers. In 1993-1994 Canada, for
its part, expanded the availability of the Canadian Multijurisdictional
Disclosure System ("CMJDS') 2 and adopted a ruling designed to facilitate private placements in Canada in connection with certain international offerings.22 The European Union ("EU") adopted the Investment Services Directive in 1993 which will enable investment firms licensed in any EU member state to provide investment services
throughout the Union on the basis of its home state license, and also
adopted the controversial Capital Adequacy Directive which attempts
to harmonize capital standards throughout the EU.' In May 1994,
the European Union also adopted a measure that will allow companies
with a specified reporting history in one member state to list
throughout the Union without re-publication of full listing particulars.24 Measures taken by national securities regulators to accommo-

18. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Organization
and Regulation of Securities Markets, 54 FIN. MARKET TRENDS 14, 17-24 (Feb. 1993)
[hereinafter OECD 54 FIN. MARKET TRENDS].
19. INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURTIES REGULATION § 1.01 (Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff eds., 1st & rev. ed. 1994) [hereinafter ICMSR].
20. See OECD 54 FIN. MARKET TRENDS, supra note 18, at 14-17 (deregulation of
access to the securities industry, deregulation of commission rates, removal of restrictions on financial transactions, particularly foreign exchange transactions, and
opening up domestic capital markets).
21. See infra § III[B].
22. See infra § II[B].
23. See infra § VI.
24. See infra § III[C].
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date or facilitate international securities transactions have not been
matched by any appreciable degree of regulatory progress on the international level.25
II. EXEMPT OFFSHORE OFFERINGS
A. United States (Herein of Regulation S)
It is impossible to gauge the full extent of unregistered offshore
offerings by U.S. issuers made pursuant to Regulation S. In 1993, U.S.
issuers borrowed $24.8 billion on international and foreign bond markets," and presumably a large amount of these bonds were unregistered. In the same year, U.S. companies issued $9.9 billion of international equities.27 OECD categorizes this amount as follows: "Euro-equities," $8.5 billion; "other international share placements," $1.4 billion." A large portion of the $8.5 billion was probably sold pursuant to
registration. One source estimates that since the "SEC approved Regulation S in 1990, $6 billion has been raised by U.S. companies via
[Regulation S] issues."' The Wall Street Journal observed that,
"[w]hile it is believed that billions of dollars have been raised through
Regulation S transactions during the past four years, no one tracks
these unregistered deals." °
1. Resales in the United States
Any resale into the United States of securities initially sold offshore under Regulation S will involve the means of interstate commerce and must be exempt from registration (or the securities must be
registered). The exemptions that will usually be at issue in the case of
resales outside of Rule 904 are Sections 4(1) and 4(3)31 of the Securi-

25. See infra § VII.
26. OECD 57 FIN. MARKET TRENDS, supra note 14, at 62.
27. Id. at 75.

28. OECD defines "Euro-equities" as "[nMew issues and initial public offerings
(IPOs) of common and preferred shares, participation certificates, 'certificates
d'investissements' and similar instruments and international offerings taking place
in the context of privatization." Id. at 76. n. 1 It defines "other international share
placements" to include "secondary offerings, private placements, issues of redeemable
convertible preference shares and internationally placed units of closed-end funds."
Id. n. 2
29. SAGA Offers Regulation S Fund to Non-US Funds, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
GLOBAL MONEY MANAGEMENT, Jan. 24, 1994, at 8. "Past issuers of 'S' stock include
United Airlines in New York which raised $600 million, Newmont Mining ($295 million), Dell Computer Corporation ($23 million), and banking concern MidAtlantic, of
Edison, New Jersey ($98 million)." Id. The Commission announced the adoption of
Regulation S in Sec. Act. Rel. No. 6863, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,524 (Oct. 5, 1990) [hereinafter Release 6863].
30. Laurie R. Cohen, Rule Permitting Offshore Stock Sales Yields Deals that
Spark SEC Concerns, WALL ST. J., April 26, 1994, at C1, col. 3.
31. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(1) (1988) (exempt-
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ties Act and the safe harbor under these exemptions provided for by
Rule 144A.32 After the expiration of the restricted period, securities
sold offshore may be resold in the United States to the extent that
either Section 4(1) or Section 4(3) is available.33 While Regulation S
itself is silent on this point, the Release adopting Regulation S provides in a footnote stating that "[u]pon expiration of any restricted period, securities
(other than unsold allotments) will be viewed as unrestricted. " '4
The staff has not issued any no-action letters, subsequent to the
adoption of Regulation S which clarify the extent to which securities
sold offshore may be resold in the United States. Moreover, in postadoption informal discussions the staff is known to have pointed to
Preliminary Note 6 for the proposition that securities acquired offshore
may be resold in the United States only if registered or an exemption
from registration is available. This assertion, of course, simply begs the
question concerning the circumstances under which Section 4(1) is
available for resales into the United States after the expiration of the
restricted periods. The Commission, in the Releases proposing and
adopting Regulation S, gave every indication that securities sold offshore pursuant to Regulation S would be unrestricted after the expiration of such periods.' If the offshore purchaser is relegated to Rule
144 for domestic resales the question naturally arises as to why the
Commission expended so much effort to reduce the restricted periods
previously established under Release 4708.3" The result of such a construction would be that the abbreviated restricted periods of Regulation S would be of little practical benefit to offshore purchasers and, as
the position became widely known throughout the industry, to issuers,
distributors and other persons selling offshore.37
ing "transactions by any person other than the issuer, underwriter or dealer"); id. at
§ 77(d)(3) (exempting certain transactions by dealers).
32. Private Resale of Securities to Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d) (1994).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(i) (1988).
34. Release 6863, supra note 29, at 80,676 n.110. The Release does not limit
this statement to securities of reporting companies, although the statement appears
in the section of the Release discussing so-called Category 2 securities (which include
securities of reporting companies). Id.
35. E.g., id. In the Release proposing Regulation S, the Commission discussed
the resale offshore of securities privately placed in the United States. Note that the
"restricted period" for Category 2 transactions in the initial Proposal was 90 days,
and that Proposed Rule 906, the predecessor to the current resale rule, Rule 904,
allowed a resale offshore pursuant to the same restrictions that applied to the issuer
(with several exceptions).
36. The restricted period for offshore equity sales under Release 4708 was generally considered to be one year. The Commission proposed to reduce the restriction
in Category 2 transactions to 90 days. Offshore Offers and Sales, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,
676 (1988) (proposed June 17, 1988). Upon reproposing the rules, the Commission
proposed to reduce the proposed 90-day restricted period to 40 days. Revised Proposed Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,073 (1989) (proposed Sept. 13, 1989). This is the
period actually adopted.
37. The ability to re-sell under Rule 904 on a DOSM is useful to purchasers, yet
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On the other hand, confirmation by the staff that after expiration
of the restricted periods offshore purchasers could re-sell in the United
States privately or in routine trading transactions would codify an
apparent contradiction between Regulation S and Rule 144. If, for
example, common stock of a domestic reporting issuer is placed privately under Section 4(2) or Regulation D in the United States the
securities are "restricted securities," the resale safe harbor for which
under Rule 144 is two or three years, depending upon the circumstances.' If the same securities are sold offshore by the issuer under Rule
903 the restricted period, at least literally, is forty days.39 The staff's
post-adoption retreat into Preliminary Note 6 seems to be based upon
the not unreasonable apprehension that this anomaly poses the potential for an abusive circumvention of Rule 144. Nonetheless, if the Commission insists on compliance with Rule 144 for resales in the United
States of securities sold offshore, one of the principal purposes of Regulation S as reflected in its administrative history would seem to be
severely compromised. It is unclear if, when or how this issue will be
resolved.
In the meantime, confusion abounds in the industry and securities
bar concerning the law of U.S. resales. At a March 1994 trade conference, the staff "shook up lawyers in the audience at a panel that discussed potential abuses of Regulation S. .

. ."

A staff member ex-

plained that "she has seen a number of U.S. companies make substantial placements offshore at big discounts, only to sell them back into
the United States.""1 The Director of Corporation Finance said that
"'[i]f people are playing games, we are going to find them and we are
going to take action,'

. . .

predicting that Regulation S cases will be-

come a topic at next year's meeting."42 At a different conference in
March, the Director of Corporation Finance stated that "flowback" into
the United States "in and of itself is not a problem." However, she told
the group, if the Rule is being used to "'wait out the 40 days and get

the staff had already partially accomplished this innovation through the no-action
process under Release 4708. College Retirement Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 78,420, at 77,362 (Feb. 18,
1987) (resales on Paris Bourse without investigation as to nationality of counterparty).
38. Rule 144 is not the exclusive means of re-selling restricted securities, however.
39. If securities are resold offshore pursuant to Rule 904, literally, the seller,
except for dealers and persons receiving selling concessions, need not observe any
restricted period. See Rule 904(c)(1). This construction assumes that Rule 904(c)
supersedes statements to the contrary in the Release proposing Regulation S. Offshore Offers and Sales, Sec. Act Rel. No. 6779 [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,242 at 89,140 n. 131 (Sept. 26, 1988).
40. Karen Donovan, SEC Officials Outline Agency's Agenda, NAT'L L.J., MAR.
21, 1994, at B1, B3.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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into the U.S. markets, that's a problem. '"' These developments
were followed by a Wall Street Journal article, entitled "Rule Permitting Offshore Stock Sales Yields Deals That Spark SEC Concerns,""
reporting that a "little known but increasingly controversial Securities
and Exchange Commission Rule known as Regulation S allows public
companies to sell stock to offshore investors at substantial discounts
without ever registering the shares with the SEC or telling stockholders about the sales."' The Journal quotes SEC Commissioner Roberts
as saying "'[t]he indications of abuse of Regulation S may be sufficiently serious to call for a revisitation of the Rules by the Commission[.]'" The Enforcement Division staff reportedly has indicated
that the SEC is concerned about transactions by small, OTC companies
that have privately placed large blocks of stock at discounts to market
prices."7 The staff has indicated that "in some cases, these Regulation
S private placements appear to be 'schemes to evade registration requirements.'"' Finally, the Journal discussed a practice that has
troubled the SEC: offshore investors selling short stock of a domestic
issuer and replacing the borrowed shares with Regulation S stock. 9
The day following the Journal article, the Honorable Edward Markey
(D-MA), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunication
and Finance, wrote the SEC and requested a review of Regulation S
and a report to Congress on whether the Rule should be repealed or
modified.' Markey indicated that he was "'extremely concerned about
indications of wide-spread abuses associated with Regulation S offerings.' "" Markey also asked for an analysis of the impact of the incentives the Rule creates for foreign speculators to drive down share
prices and U.S. companies through short sales."52 On May 6, 1994,
Chairman Levitt responded in a two-paragraph letter to Markey as
f'ollows:
This is in response to your letter dated April 27 expressing concern
about possible abuses associated with Regulation S. The Commission has been aware for some time of situations in which unregistered offerings were purportedly made in reliance on Regulation S
where such offerings may have been required to register under the
Securities Act of 1933. In response, the Division of Enforcement
and the Division of Corporation Finance are currently involved in a

43. Issuers "PushingEnvelope" of Reg. S Safe Harbor, Quinn Warns, DAILY REP.
FOR EXECUTIVES, Mar. 9, 1994, at 4, 6.
44. Cohen, supra note 30, at C1.
45. Id.
46. Id.

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Markey Calls on SEC 'to Review Regulation S, 20 CORP. FINANCING

WEEK, May 2, 1994, at 14, 18.
51. Id.
52. Id.

1995

INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION

coordinated review of various offerings under Regulation S in an
effort to determine the most effective method to address perceived
and actual abuses in connection with unregistered offshore offerings.
Over the last several months, the Commission's staff has
discussed in public forums that it is reviewing offshore offering
practices under Regulation S. As noted in these forums, this review
may result in revisions to Regulation S as well as in one or more
enforcement proceedings over the next several months. We will
apprise you of any actions taken by the Commission to revise Regulation S."
A wide range of choices confronts the practitioner trying to make
his or her way through the morass of is Regulation S. At one extreme
is the conservative practitioner who ceases to represent issuers and
others engaged in Regulation S transactions until the SEC sees fit to
clarify the law. At the other extreme is the more aggressive practitioner, who takes the position that not only does Regulation S speak for
itself, it does so clearly, at least insofar as the offshore sale itself is
concerned; and that Regulation S does not make distinctions based
upon the price of securities (discount) at the health of companies. Such
practitioners, zealously representing their clients within the bounds of
the law, or at least the written law, or at least the written law as they
see it, might advise their clients that it is permissible to engage in
Regulation S transactions until the SEC repeals the rule, irrespective
of the discount, the health of the company, etc. The unspoken assumption of this approach is that if the Administrative Procedures Act
means anything, it means that speeches may not amend a rule of law.
Although the appellate courts may ultimately sustain such a position,
the aggressive practitioner may win the battle but lose the war after
all of the litigation expenses are tallied.
A middle ground would be to advise clients not to engage in the
type of transactions against which the staff railed in 1994, viz., heavily
discounted transactions, simultaneous short sales or use of derivatives,
etc., especially where the principal market for the securities is in the
United States. Similarly, a practitioner could advise the voluntary,
contractual imposition of additional prophylactic measures, such as
longer restricted periods, certifications of non-U.S. personhood during
the restricted period, and certifications against short sales and use of
derivatives. Another approach would be to assume that securities sold
offshore pursuant to Regulation S in a transaction that would otherwise result in the securities being "restricted securities" within the
meaning of Rule 144 may not be resold in the United States except in
accordance with Rule 144 (or possibly Section 4(1 1/2)).' Until the

53. Letter from SEC Chairman Levitt to Rep. Edward Markey (May 6, 1994).
54. Concerning Section 4(1 1/2), see Harold S. BLOOMENTHAL & HOLMES, ROBERTS & OWEN, SECURITIEs LAw HANDBOOK § 10.02 (1994).
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SEC amends Regulation S or makes its views known through an enforcement case, it is every practitioner for herself, but caution would
appear to be the order of the day.
2. Legends
The offering restrictions, applicable to Category 2 and 3 safe harbors, require during the restricted period the use of a legend on the
prospectus and in other offering materials and documents. Technically,
the only legend required on a certificate is in connection with the sale
of equity securities of a non-reporting U.S. company in reliance on the
category 3 safe harbor.' The following legend literally complies with
the requirements of Regulation S relating to certificates issued to purchasers of equity securities in reliance on the category 3 safe harbor:
The securities covered by this Certificate have not been registered
with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission under
the Securities Act of 1933 ('the Act"). Holders of the securities prior
to [day after expiration date of the restricted period] can resell the
shares only if registered under the Act, pursuant to an exemption
from registration under the Act, or in transactions effected in accordance with the provisions of Rule 904 of Regulation S adopted under the Act.56
The legend fails to reflect all of the nuances of Regulation S, and
it may not be possible to do so in a meaningful fashion. Further, although the issuer-distributor safe harbor may not depend on it, the
purchaser-investors are not fully informed by the foregoing legends of
the conditions of their safe harbor or, insofar as the offering restrictions are concerned, that there are any restrictions on their resale. The
following legend may be more informative in this respect:
The securities covered by this Certificate have not been registered
under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Act") with the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission and it is not intended that
they will be registered. Prior to [day after expiration date of the
restricted period] the securities cannot be offered or sold in the
United States or to U.S. persons as defined by Rule 902(o) adopted
under the Act, other than to distributors, unless the securities are
registered under the Act, or an exemption from the registration
requirements of the Act is available. Purchasers [Holders] of the
securities prior to [day after expiration date of the restricted period] can resell the shares only pursuant to an exemption from registration under the Act, or in transactions effected outside of the
United States [including transactions executed on the Exchange]

55. SEC Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(cX3)(iiiXB)(3) (1994) (The issuer or
seller could voluntarily place a legend on Category 1 or 2 securities as a prophylactic measure.).
56. Id.
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and provided they do not (and no one acting on their behalf) solicit
purchasers in the United States or otherwise engage in selling
efforts in the United States. A holder of the securities who is a distributor, dealer, subunderwriter or other securities professional, in
addition, cannot prior to [day after expiration date of the restricted
period] resell the securities to a U.S. person as defined by rule
902(o) of Regulation S unless the securities are registered under
the Act or an exemption from registration under the Act is available.
One might add to all of the above legends a paraphrase of Preliminary Note 6 that might read as follows:
Thereafter [after the restricted period] the securities can be sold in the
United States only if registered or if an exemption from registration is
available.
If a legend is used with the "thereafter" clause attached, the combined statements add up to little more than a statement that the securities cannot be sold in the United States (or during the restricted
period to a U.S. person) without registration or an exemption from
registration. Such a message is singularly uninformative, and for this
and possibly other reasons is unattractive to investors and transfer
agents alike. Investors generally do not, of course, want a legend which
interferes with the marketability of the securities. This is not to suggest that investors necessarily intend to transgress a restriction on
resale when they buy restricted securities. Even if they fully intend to
comply with the applicable restrictions investors still prefer to have
unlegended securities because legends are simply one more impediment to selling. Except possibly when completely self-operating, (e.g.,
until X date the securities may not be sold in the United States or to
U.S. persons), legends usually require the investor, when he desires to
resell, to obtain (and pay for) an opinion of counsel to persuade the
transfer agent to transfer the securities. A legend of the type quoted
above - "thereafter [after the restricted period] the securities can be
sold in the United States only if registered or if an exemption from
registration is available" - would surely prompt the transfer agent
upon transfer instructions to request an opinion of counsel as to
whether an exemption is available. Although the total absence of a
legend presents the easiest case for a transfer agent, a self-operating
legend (no resales in the U.S. or to U.S. persons until X date) would
seem not require an opinion of counsel from the transfer agent's point
of view. However, in today's litigious environment, many transfer
agents would probably request an opinion anyway. A self-operating
legend of the foregoing type does not, in fact, reflect the nuances of
Regulation S. 7 Assume, for example, that on March 15, 1994 a

57. Legends, self-operating or otherwise, also are problematic if it is intended
that the securities will trade on a stock exchange.

DENV. J. INVL L. & POL'Y

VOL. 23:2

NASDAQ-traded issuer sells Category 2 ' securities to non-U.S. persons as part of an offshore distribution. A legend to the effect that
until April 24, 1994 the securities cannot be resold in the United
States or to U.S. persons is placed on the certificates (even though
technically a legend is not required for Category 2 securities). The selfoperating legend implies that on April 25, 1994 all of the securities
may be re-sold in the United States, by any means, which may or may
not be the case, depending upon how the SEC and courts apply Preliminary Note 6. Preliminary Note 6 states that offshore purchasers
must find their own exemption for resales, and the staff is known to
have stated informally that Preliminary Note 6 means exactly what it
says. A legend reflecting only a forty-day restriction works uneasily in
this context.
3. No-Action Letters
The staff has issued several no-action or interpretive letters under
Regulation S since its promulgation, although most of them deal with
issues that are somewhat tangential to the operation of Regulation S.
Following is a discussion of several of these letters.
One of the "general conditions" of Regulation S is that no "directed selling efforts" be made in the United States by an issuer, a distributor, any of their respective affiliates, or any person acting for any of
them.59 "Directed selling efforts" are any activity undertaken for the
purpose of, or that could reasonably be expected to have the effect of,
"conditioning the market" in the United States for any of the securities
being offered offshore.6" Both the Regulation6 1 and the Adopting Release62 enumerate categories of activities that do not constitute directed selling efforts. Whether the dissemination in the United States of
broker-dealer's quotations for securities offered offshore in reliance on
Regulation S constitutes directed selling efforts is determined on "an
individual interpretative basis."' Quotations in PORTAL are not
deemed directed selling efforts." Quotations of foreign broker-dealers
distributed by a third party system primarily in foreign countries are
not deemed directed selling efforts if (1) securities transactions cannot
be executed with persons in the United States through the system, and
(2) participants in the offering and foreign broker-dealers and other
participants in the system do not initiate contacts with U.S. persons or
persons within the United States beyond those contacts exempted

58. SEC Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(2) (1994). See also supra note 55
(technically, Category 2 securities need not be legended.)
59. SEC Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b) (1994).
.60. SEC Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(b)(1) (1994).
61. SEC Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(b)(2)-(6) (1994).
62. Release 6863, supra note 29, at 80,669-71.
63. Id. at 80,671.
64. Id. at n. 71.
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under Rule 15a-6.65 In 1993 the staff indicated that a quotation on
The Stock Exchange Automated Quotations ("SEAQ") system of a security of a foreign issuer does not constitute directed selling efforts piovided that the quotation is not undertaken for the purpose of conditioning the market in the United States, and provided further that the
issuer, distributors, their respective affiliates and persons acting on
their behalf covenant not to, and do not, initiate contacts with U.S.
persons or persons within the United States beyond those exempted by
Rule 15a-6.' The staff gave a favorable response to this letter even
though trading information concerning the securities quoted in SEAQ
could be made available to U.S. persons and persons located within the
United States. With respect to SEAQ quotations, the prohibition
against contacts beyond those permitted by Rule 15a-6 only applies to
the issuer, distributors, their affiliates and persons acting on their
behalf and does not extend to other foreign broker-dealers and other
participants in the system.6 7
In Coral Gold Corporation," the staff took the position that the
filing with the Commission under cover of Form 6-K of an offering
circular pursuant to Rule 13a-16(b) would not constitute directed selling efforts where the circular contains no more information than is
legally required by the laws of the foreign issuer's jurisdiction and
bears a legend to the effect that the subject securities have not been
registered under the Act and may not be offered or sold in the United
States or to U.S. persons (other than distributors) absent registration
or an exemption. The problem addressed in Coral Gold Corp. arises in
other contexts in which disclosure requirements of U.S. or other law
are at odds with prohibitions against directed selling efforts. For example, an offshore offering may be important to the registrant's liquidity
and capital resources and thus otherwise merit discussion in the
MD&A, yet it certainly would be possible to draw domestic attention,
inappropriately, to an unregistered offshore offering through statements in the MD&A. Rule 135c, adopted in 1994, provides guidance in
this regard. 9
Resales of securities acquired in the United States or offshore may
be made in "offshore transactions" pursuant to Rule 904 of Regulation
S. One type of qualified "offshore transaction" for purposes of the resale safe harbor is a transaction executed in, on or through the facilities of a designated offshore securities market (DOSM) described in
Rule 902(a).7 ° Aside from the DOSMs specified in Rule 902(a)(1),71
65. SEC Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(b)(6) (1994).
66. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, SEC No-Action Letter, [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 76,677 (May 18, 1993).
67. Id.
68. Coral Gold Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 9 79,707 (Feb. 19, 1991).
69. See supra § II[D].
70. SEC Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(a) (1994) and SEC Regulations, 17
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other foreign securities exchanges or "nonexchange markets" may qualify as DOSMs if "designated" by the Commission.72 Subsequent to the
adoption of Regulation S the SEC has designated the following markets as DOSMs: Helsinki, Mexican, Oslo, Alberta, Istanbul, and the
Stock Exchange Automated Quotation (SEAQ) International.73
4.

Public Announcements of Unregistered Offerings

An issuer that is making or has determined to make an unregistered private or offshore offering must balance the need to disclose or
desirability of disclosing material information to the market with the
countervailing obligation not to engage in a general solicitation," or
directed selling efforts in the United States,75 as the case may be.
Even though an issuer many not have a continuous, affirmative obligation to disclose to the market all corporate developments, even if material, it does have such an obligation under certain circumstances.76
Aside from an obligation to disclose, an issuer may wish to disclose the
fact that it is making or intends to make a private or offshore offering
as this fact may be favorably perceived. Yet Regulations D and S clearly prohibit general solicitations, and directed selling efforts in the
United States, respectively. To address these issues, in November 1993
the Commission proposed Rule 135c, a safe harbor for public announcements of unregistered offerings.77 Rule 135c provides that for
purposes of Section 5 of the Securities Act, an issuer's notice that it
proposes to make, is making or has made an unregistered offering is
not an "offer" (and therefore is not subject to the registration requirements) if it contains only limited, specified information concern-

C.F.R. § 230.902(i)(lXii)(BX2) (1994). ([N]either the seller nor any person acting on
its behalf may know that the transaction has been pre-arranged with a buyer in the
United States.)
71. SEC Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(a)(1) (1994). The Eurobond market, as
regulated by the Association of International Bond Dealers; Amsterdam Stock Exchange; Australian Stock Exchange; Bourse de Bruxelles; Frankfurt Stock Exchange;
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong; International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom
and the Republic of Ireland; Johannesburg Stock Exchange; Bourse de Luxembourg;
Borsa Valori di Milan; Montreal Stock Exchange; Bourse de Paris; Stockholm Stock
Exchange; Tokyo Stock Exchange; Toronto Stock Exchange; Vancouver Stock Exchange; Zurich Stock Exchange.
72. SEC Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(a)(2) (1994).
73. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. (July 7, 1990) (Helsinki); Mexican Stock Exchange (Feb. 15, 1991); Oslo Stock Exchange (Dec. 13, 1991); Alberta Stock Exchange
(Mar. 9, 1993); Istanbul Stock Exchange (Oct. 26, 1993); First Boston Corporation
(June 14, 1990) in Stock Exchange Automated Quotation International (SEAQ).
74. SEC Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(I) (1994).
75. SEC Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b) (1994).
76. See generally SFCL Chapter 9.
77. Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign Companies; Safe Harbors for Public Announcements of Unregistered Offerings and Broker-Dealer Research Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 33,7029, [1993 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 85,252, at 84,689 (Nov. 3, 1993).
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ing the issuer and the offering, and the conditions specified in Rule
135c are met.78 The Commission adopted Rule 135c in April 1994"9
substantially as proposed except that the Commission limited reliance
upon the Rule to reporting companies or companies complying with
Rule 12g3-2(b). A notice of an unregistered offering will not qualify
under the Rule if it is "used for the purpose of conditioning the market
in the United States for any of the securities offered. .

."

Rule 135c

establishes other conditions and limits the information that may be
included in the notice. Although the issuer may announce, inter alia,
the "amount and basic terms of the securities offered,"8 ' it is understood to be the staff's position that this phrase does not encompass
the offering or selling price of the unregistered securities. This is consistent with the Release adopting Rule 135c which states that the
information permitted by Rule 135c corresponds to that which is allowed under Rule 135.82 Unlike Rule 134, which applies to communications after a registration statement has been filed, Rule 135 does not
allow the disclosure of price. It is, however, permissible under Rule
135c (and Rule 135) to disclose the amount of the offering. Although
Rule 135c applies most clearly in the context of a press release, the
staff has indicated informally that the Rule provides appropriate guidance for discussions of unregistered offerings in publicly filed disclosure documents, including discussions and analyses of financial condition and results of operations. Management may wish to discuss unregistered financings in the liquidity and capital resources portion of
the MD&A, but must be careful not to make a general solicitation or
directed selling efforts in doing so.
B. Canada
In December 1993 the Ontario Securities Commission ("OSC")
issued an order ("Blanket Ruling") designed to facilitate exempt transactions in Canada carried out in the context of an international securities offering." The exemptions provided in Clauses (72)(1)(c)" or
78. 15 U.S.C. § 135(c) (1988).
79. Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign Companies; Safe Harbors for Public Announcements of Unregistered Offerings and Broker
Dealer Research Reports, Exchange Act Rel. No. 33-7053, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,331 (Apr. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Release 7053].
80. 15 U.S.C. § 135(c)(1) (1988).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 135(c)(3) (1988).
82. Release 7053, supra note 79, at 85,208. Rule 135 applies to notices to the
effect that an issuer proposes to make a public offering.
83. Blanket Ruling In the Matter of the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, As
Amended, and In the Matter of Regulation 1015, R.R.O. 1990, As Amended, and In
the Matter of Certain International Offerings By Private Placement in Ontario, No.
5 Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 473-066 (Dec. 3, 1993) [hereiiafter Blanket Ruling]. See
also Ontario Commission Removes Obstacles to Distributions by Certain Foreign Issuers, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Dec. 14, 1993, at 16, 18; Lococo, OSC Rules on Private
Placements, 32 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 39, 39 (Jan. 1994); Edward Waitzer, International
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72(1)(d)"5 of the Ontario Securities Act ("OSA")," as modified by
Subsection 27(1) of the Regulations ("Regulations") under such Act, 7
may be used by qualified U.S. and other non-Canadian issuers to sell
securities in Ontario without compliance with the prospectus requirements of the OSA. However, in general, an issuer delivering a disclosure document to a prospective investor in Ontario must give the
investor a contractual right of action for rescission or damages against
the issuer under certain circumstances and describe such right of action in the offering memorandum.89 This allows an investor to rescind
the transaction or obtain damages as a result of a misrepresentation in
the disclosure document if the investor elects to pursue such remedy
within 90 days from the initial payment for the securities.'
In December 1993, the Ontario Securities Commission ruled, pursuant to Subsection 74(1) of the OSA, that a distribution of securities
in Ontario as part of an international offering of securities is not subject to the prospectus requirements of Section 53 of the OSA,9 ' provided that (i) the issuer is a foreign issuer92 (hereinafter "non-Canadian

Securities Regulation-Coping With the 'Rashomon -Effect', CANADA NEWSWIRE, April
11, 1994, 1, 4. Although this section is included in the subchapter entitled "Exempt
Offshore Offerings by U.S. Issuers," it is recognized that a U.S. issuer may wish to
sell in Canada securities that are registered under the U.S. Securities Act but exempt under provincial law in Canada.
84. This Section provides an exemption if the party purchasing is a person other
than an individual and is recognized by the OSC as an exempt purchaser. Exempt
purchaser status has been granted in the past to established institutional investors
such as pension plans and mutual funds. Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, §
72(1)(c).
85. Id. at § 72(1)(d), (together with applicable Regulations, provides an exemption
if the investor purchases as principal and if the trade is in a security that has an
aggregate acquisition cost to such purchaser of not less than $150,000).
86. Id. at c. S.5, as amended, 3 Can. Sec. L. Rpt. (CCH) $ 450-001.
87. Regulations Under the Securities Act, R.R.O. 1990, Can. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
$ 452-001.
88. Other prospectus exemptions, without limitation, include: (1) rights offerings,
as well as securities issued upon the exercise of rights; (2) sales of certain securities
issued in connection with a statutory amalgamation or arrangement; (3) sales by an
issuer of its own securities to employees; (4) certain "limited offerings"; and (5)
placements of "Eligible Eurosecurities."
89. See Regulations, supra note 87, at § 32 (requiring provision of the contractual right of action under specified circumstances).
90. Id. (The investor is deemed to have relied upon the misrepresentation).
91. Ontario Securities Act, supra note 84, at § 53 (provides that no person shall
trade in a security where such trade would be a "distribution," unless a prospectus
has been filed and receipts therefor obtained from the director of the OSC).
92. Blanket Ruling, supra note 83. For purposes of the Blanket Ruling, a "foreign issuer" means an issuer that is not incorporated or organized under the laws of
Canada or a province or territory of Canada, except where: (a) voting securities carrying more than 50 percent of the votes for the election of directors are held by
persons whose address is in Canada; and (b) either: (i) the majority of the senior
officials or directors of the issuer are citizens or residents of Canada; (ii) more than
50 percent of the assets of the issuer are located in Canada; or (iii) the business of
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issuer"); (ii) the distribution of securities is made in accordance with
an exemption provided by Clause 72(1)(c) or 72(1)(d) of the OSA, as
modified by Subsection 27(1) of the Regulation (see above), except for
the contractual right of action, which may be omitted; (iii) a non-Canadian disclosure document is delivered to an Ontario purchaser which
includes either (A) a prospectus prepared in accordance with specified
U.S. SEC registration forms93 and pursuant to which an offering of
securities concurrently is being made in the United States, (B) a private placement memorandum pursuant to which an offering of securities concurrently is being made in the United States,94 or (C) a U.K.
prospectus, which constitutes or includes "listing particulars" within
the meaning of the Financial Services Act, is prepared in accordance
with such Act and pursuant to which an offering of securities concurrently is being made in the United Kingdom.9" In any case, the nonCanadian disclosure document must disclose that the securities being
offered are those of a non-Canadian issuer and that the Ontario purchaser will not receive the contractual right of action otherwise required by Ontario law. Additional disclosure concerning remedies under U.S. or U.K law must be provided. Specifically, the disclosure
document must indicate that Ontario purchasers must rely on other
remedies that may be available, including (in the case of a U.S. prospectus or private placement memorandum) "common law rights of action for damages or rescission or rights of action under the civil liability provisions of the U.S. federal securities laws."" The practical effect of the Blanket Ruling is to eliminate contractual rights of action in
offerings that otherwise qualify for the specified exemptions."
The Commission's ruling was based upon applications by market
participants who represented to the OSC, inter alia, that "[i]n previous
international offerings which have been extended into Ontario, some
issuers and selling shareholders have expressed resistance, on both
legal and logistical grounds, to the issuer providing a Contractual
Right of Action and in the past, the [OSC] on application has granted
full or partial relief from the requirement to give a Contractual Right

the issuer is administered principally in Canada.
93. Securities Act of 1933, at S-1, S-2, S-3, F-i, F-2, or F-3.
94. If a U.S. private placement memorandum is delivered, the securities offered
must be either those of a U.S. issuer, or those of a non-U.S. issuer, and the substantive preparation of the private placement memorandum must have involved of
U.S. interstate commerce or other significant conduct in the United States.
95. See Blanket Ruling, supra note 83. See also Ontario Commission Removes
Obstacles to Distributions by Certain Foreign Issuers, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Dec. 14,
1993, at 2, 4.
96. Blanket Ruling, supra note 83, at 58,766. Lococo, supra note 83, at 39 ("It
will be interesting to see whether some issuers, when faced with a requirement in
the Blanket Ruling to alert investors to potential rights of action under U.S. or U.K
law, may not in some cases prefer to give the Ontario contractual right with its
limited 90 days exercise period.")
97. Id. Lococo.
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of Action on a case by case basis."98 The applicants further represented that Ontario purchasers would have the benefit of various remedies
under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Financial Services Act, as the
case may be." Although the contractual remedy would no longer apply
if the terms of the Blanket Ruling are met, Ontario common law liability standards would remain applicable."°
As summarized by the OSC, the Ruling allows certain international offerings by non-Canadian issuers "to be made in Ontario by way of
the exemptions contained in Clauses 72(1)(c) or 72(1)(d) ... without
requiring that purchasers in Ontario be given a contractual right of
action against the issuer in compliance with Section 32 of the Regulation, provided that the offering concurrently is being made in the United States or the United Kingdom, specified U.S. or U.K. disclosure
documents are being delivered to Ontario purchasers and other condi°
After the Blanket Ruling was announced,
tions are satisfied."'O
Societe Nationale ELF Aquitaine reportedly relied on it to facilitate an
Ontario offering as part of a global offering."0 2
Separately, the OSC issued a letter on December 3, 1993, giving
issuers permission to include in disclosure documents used in connection with international offerings made pursuant to the Blanket Ruling,
a representation that the securities will be listed or quoted on a stock
exchange or automated quotation system that includes at least the
London Stock Exchange, a registered stock exchange in the United
States or NASDAQ NMS. In order to qualify for this privilege, the
application to list or quote the securities must have been made and the
applicable conditions to the application must have been disclosed or
satisfied."3
C. Europe
States that are members of the European Union (EU) must require that any offer of securities to the public "within their territories"
be subject to the publication of a prospectus by the offeror, absent an
exemption.' The directive is expressly inapplicable to certain types
98. Blanket Ruling for Certain International Offerings by Private Placement in
Ontario, supra note 83. "In many offerings, the issuer has been unwilling to give
such a right of action, especially where the proceeds of the offering accrue to a selling security holder rather than to the issuer. In addition, granting a contractual
right of rescission raises corporate capacity problems in certain jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, Ireland and Italy." Lococo, supra note 83, at 39.
99. The Securities Act of 1933, at §§ 11 or 12(2) or § 10(b) (depending upon the
circumstances); or The Financial Services Act of 1986, at § 150.
100. Waitzer, supra note 83.
101. Blanket Ruling, supra note 83.
102. See Waitzer, supra note 83.
103. Blanket Ruling for Certain International Offerings by Private Placement in
Ontario, supra note 83, at § 3a(3).
104. Council Directive of 17 Apr. 1989 Coordinating the Requirements for the
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of offers and securities including "Eurosecurities which are not the
10 5
subject of a generalized campaign of advertising or canvassing."
Member states ard not required to enact this or other exemptions into
national law and may make exemptions subject to limitations."°
Most of the national laws of Western Europe recognize some type of
private placement, professionals, or "Euro-"exemption, although practitioners must confirm the availability of such an exemption in any
given case. In the U.K., the Companies Act provides that an offer of
securities to persons "whose ordinary business it is to buy or sell
shares or debentures (whether as principal or agent)" is not a public
offer.1"7 Thus, an issuer might offer securities to a professional investor, such as a fund manager, without a prospectus required by the
Companies Act. 8 A U.K. commentator observes:
[T]here has been much debate as to how wide the exemption goes.
Many would argue that it does not extend to institutions such as
insurance companies, however big their portfolios, because their
'ordinary business' is (for example) to provide insurance, not to
deal in securities. Certainly, the exemption does not help if targeted investors in the UK are industrial corporates, again however
large, unless their investments are managed by a dedicated treasury subsidiary" placement to purchasers who take the securities with investment intent.1
French law likewise recognizes exempt non-public offerings,"'
although the law in this area is somewhat vague and unsettled. In
general, the securities may not be listed on an exchange, and further,
may not be distributed beyond a circle of 300 persons, placed through
financial institutions, advertised in the French media, or placed by
way of customer solicitation to the residence or workplace of potential
investors or in a public place."' Offers should be limited exclusively

Drawing-Up, Scrutiny and Distribution of the Prospectus to be Published When
Transferable Securities are Offered to the Public, art. 4. The directive applies to
securities offered to the public for the first time in a member state if such securities
are not already listed on a stock exchange in that state. Id., art. 1.
105. Id., art. 2, no. 2. "Eurosecurities" are transferable securities which are to be
underwritten and distributed by a syndicate at least two of the members of which
have their registered offices in different states; are offered on a significant scale in
one or more states other than that of the issuer's registered office; and may be
subscribed for or initially acquired only through a bank or other financial institution.
Id., art. 3.
106. Meredith Brown, Global Offerings of Securities, INT'L SECURITIES MARKETS,
Aug. 12, 1992, at 287, 287-288.
107. Companies Act, 1985 § 79(2).
108. E.g., Frank, Savory and Crosthwait, United Kingdom, in Issuing Securities,
INT'L FIN. L. REv. 47 (Special Supp. Mar. 1993).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Thibaud, France, in Issuing Securities, supra note 108, at 22.
112. Id.
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to professional and institutional investors, the offering document
should state that the information contained therein may not be publicized and that resale of the securities in France is prohibited, and no
subscription form should be attached to the document.'13 There must
be no publicity to promote the offering and no canvassing of potential
clients." 4 Other types of exempt offerings are (i) Euro-offerings qualifying as such under the EU's Prospectus Directive; (ii) certain mutual
fund offerings; and (iii) certain offerings in connection with business
combinations and related transactions."' "Issuers from non-OECD
countries must in any event secure the approval of the Ministry of
Finance for any offer of securities. There is no exemption for sales to
sophisticated/professional investors as such.""1 6
In Germany, the Stock Prospectus Requirements Act has been
adopted to implement the EU's Prospectus Directive." 7 The Act contains a number of exemptions that are co-extensive with those permitted under the EU Prospectus Directive. Exemptions from prospectus
requirements include, inter alia, securities offered solely to persons
who purchase and sell securities for professional and trade purposes;
securities offered solely to a restricted circle of persons; securities that
may only be acquired in certain large denominations or amounts; and
securities that qualify as "Euro-securities.""8 Although the availability of an exemption should be verified in any given case, as indicated,
most or all of the other West European countries have exemptions for
private placements, sales to securities professionals or Euro-offerings." 9 Thus it is quite possible for a U.S. issuer to offer a foreign
tranche pursuant to Regulation S (or SEC registration) and exemptions from full foreign prospectus/listing requirements in most Western
European countries. The parameters of prospectus exemptions in Europe must be confirmed on a case-by-case basis.
III.

REGISTERED OFFSHORE OFFERINGS

A. U.S. Registration
It is becoming increasingly common for domestic issuers to include
an offshore tranche when making a public offering in the United
States. Section 5 applies extraterritorially in this context, unless the
issuer complies with Regulation S and, absent such compliance, registration would be necessary unless another exemption were available. A

113. Brown, supra note 106, at 288.
114. Id.
115. Thibaud, supra note 111, at 22.
116. Brown, supra note 106, at 289.
117. ICMSR, supra note 19, at § 8C.07[4].
118. Brown, supra note 106, at 292.
119. Manning Warren, Regulatory Harmony in the European Communities: The
Common Market Prospectus, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 19, 46 n. 167 (1990).
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domestic issuer making a U.S. public offering on a registered basis
would have the option of either registering securities for the offshore
offering as well, or complying with Regulation S for the international
offering, since Regulation S generally would not require integration of
a registered domestic offering with an unregistered offering under
Regulation S, even if contemporaneous. 2 ' Including the international
securities in the registration statement would necessitate paying a
registration fee for the foreign tranche and ordinarily would involve
two prospectuses, one foreign and one domestic. The staffs practice
has been to allow both prospectuses to be filed as part of the same
registration statement - typically, the complete prospectus for the
U.S. offering would be filed, and alternate pages for the international
prospectus would be included after the U.S. prospectus in the registration statement (before Part II of the registration statement). The
alternate prospectus cover page reflects the international underwriters
if a separate syndicate is being used to sell the securities offshore. A
separate "Underwriting" section would describe the underwriting arrangements applicable to the offshore tranche. Typically, the registrant
would enter into a separate underwriting agreement with the international underwriting syndicate."2 Ordinarily, this agreement would
provide, among other things, that the closing of the domestic offering
would occur concurrently with the closing of the international offering.
The international underwriters enter into an agreement among themselves and with the U.S. syndicate (inter-syndicate agreement), while
the members of the international selling group also enter into an
agreement. " '
Registering the foreign tranche has the advantage of protecting
the issuer from Section 5 concerns if the securities sold offshore flowed
back to the United States. Particularly in light of the significant uncertainty concerning the resale in the U.S. of securities sold offshore,"
registration of the foreign tranche is the method of choice when the
issuer is undertaking registration anyway. Although under the alternative approach, viz., selling the foreign tranche under Regulation S,
the registrant would avoid Section 11 liability with respect to the offshore distribution, the risks to the issuer posed by untoward flowback,
not to mention the discount associated with a lock-up, are probably not
worth it.

120.
121.
(1994).
122.
123.

Release 6863, supra note 29, at 80,681.
See, e.g., HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, GOING PUBLIC HANDBOOK App. 47-1
Id. at Apps. 47A, 47B, 47C.
See Resales in the U.S., supra § II(A)(1).
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B. CanadianMJDS
The Canadian Securities Administrators amended the Canadian
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System ("CMJDS") in December 1993 to
make it more accessible to U.S. issuers.'
In general, the amendments reduce the reporting history requirement for U.S. issuers, eliminate the $300 million market value requirement for offerings of certain
securities, including common shares, eliminate the $150 million market value requirement for offerings of convertible investment grade
debt, and accept determinations of investment grade status (i.e., ratings) by SEC-recognized rating agencies. The discussion that follows
summarizes the portions of the CMJDS that apply to offshore offerings
by U.S. issuers of securities registered under the CMJDS, and reflects
the December 1993 amendments.
The CMJDS"' is available for several different types of offerings
by U.S. issuers including offerings of investment grade securities, exchange bids, business combinations, rights offerings, and, if the issuer
meets the "efficient market substantiality test,"'28 any other offering.
Each of these categories requires, at a minimum, that the issuer meet
a set of common eligibility requirements set forth in Section 3.2(1)-(5)
of the Policy Statement. The issuer must be a "foreign issuer"'27 incorporated or organized under the laws of the United States or any
state, territory, or the District of Columbia. Further, the issuer must
be an SEC reporting issuer and have filed all required material' for
124. E.g., Securities Rule Changes, THE FIN. POST, Dec. 16, 1993, at 13.
125. The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) adopted the CMJDS to serve
as the counterpart to the multijurisdictional disclosure system concurrently adopted
in the United States (MJDS or U.S. MJDS). Multijurisdictional Disclosure System,
National Policy Statement No. 45 [hereinafter Policy Statement]. CMJDS was initially proposed by the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) and the Commission des
valeurs mobileres du Quebec (QSC), Canada's two leading securities commissions.
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, 12 O.S.C.B. 2919 (July 28, 1989), [Vol. 11 Can.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 10-192, at 3985; 20 Q.S.C. BULL. No. 29 (July 21, 1989). Subsequently, the Canadian Securities Administrators released Draft National Policy
Statement No. 45. Draft National Policy Statement No. 45, [Vol. 1] Can. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 9 10-200, at 4186 (Nov. 1990) [hereinafter Draft Policy Statement]. CSA
and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted the two measures
in tandem.
126. Although not a defined term, the concept of a "substantiality" test, based
upon the public float of the issuer's securities, plays a pivotal role in CMJDS. Any
U.S. reporting issuer that has been such for 12 months and meets the substantiality
requirement set forth in Section 3.3(2) (public float of U.S. $75 million) may use the
CMJDS for the distribution of any security. Although only an approximation of market efficiency at best, for ease of reference this substantiality test is sometimes referred to herein the "efficient market substantiality test." There are lesser substantiality requirements associated with specific types of offerings under CMJDS as
discussed below.
127. "Foreign issuer" is defined in Section 2(17) of the Policy Statement to exclude nominally foreign issuers that, in reality, are principally owned by Canadians
or located in Canada. Draft Policy Statement, supra note 125, at § 2(17).
128. Id. at § 3.2(3). Specifically, the issuer must have filed all the material re-
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the 12 calendar months preceding the filing of the preliminary prospectus with the principal jurisdiction,'2 9 special provision being made for
successor issuers. Finally, the issuer must not be registered (or required to be registered) as an investment company under the U.S.
Investment Company Act of 1940 and must not be a commodity pool
issuer. In sum, to qualify for the system, the issuer must be a "foreign
issuer" organized under U.S.. law, or an SEC reporting company in
compliance with its reporting obligations which is not registered or required to register under the Investment Company Act. These requirements, set forth in Section 3.2(1)-(5) of the Policy Statement, are hereafter referred to as the "Common Requirements." Another requirement,
common to some but not all of the categories of transactions encompassed by CMJDS, is that the issuer "has had a class of its securities
listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange or quoted on NASDAQ NMS for a period of at least 12 calendar
months immediately preceding the filing of the preliminary prospectus
with the principal jurisdiction and is currently in compliance with the
obligations arising from such listing or quotation."1 30 This requirement hereinafter is sometimes referred to as the "Listing Requirement."
The categories of offerings included within CMJDS are (i) nonconvertible investment grade debt and preferred shares; (ii) investment
grade debt and preferred shares that may not be converted for at least
one year after issuance, if the issuer meets a substantiality requirement; (iii) other securities, if the issuer satisfies the efficient market
substantiality test; (iv) certain rights offerings, and business combinations and securities exchange bids. Compliance with the Common Requirements is necessary for each category. CMJDS is available for
offerings certain derivative securities, namely, warrants, options,
rights and convertible securities if the issuer of the underlying securities is eligible under the Policy Statement.
A seller may distribute investment grade debt and investment
grade preferred shares in Canada, or rights immediately exercisable
therefor, pursuant to CMJDS provided the issuer and the securities

quired to be filed pursuant to Section 13, 14 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act for a
period of at least 12 months immediately preceding the filing of the preliminary
prospectus with the principal jurisdiction. Id. As originally, adopted, the reporting
history requirement was 36 months. Although this condition requires the issuer to
have filed all material required to be filed under the specified provisions prior to
using MJDS, literally it does not require the information to have been timely fied.

Id.
129. At the time of filing the preliminary prospectus in Canada the seller must
select from among the provinces a "principal jurisdiction" to review the offering. The
jurisdiction selected by the issuer to serve as principal jurisdiction may decline to
serve as such.
130. E.g., Draft Policy Statement, supra note 125, at § 3.4(2)(c). (special provision
is made for successor issuers.).
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satisfy the Common Requirements. This category includes securities
having an "approved rating," as such term was amended in 1993.131
Investment grade securities that are convertible are eligible for the
system only if they are not convertible for at least one year and the
issuer's equity shares have a public float of not less than U.S. $75
million.1 3 1 Offerings of other securities, including, without limitation,
common shares, also may be offered pursuant to the system, provided
the issuer meets the Common Requirements and the issuer's equity
shares have a public float" of not less than U.S. $75 million."M A
U.S. issuer may use CMJDS for rights offerings if it meets the Common Requirements and the Listing Requirement, 135 except that for
rights offerings a thirty-six month reporting history is required. The
rights must be exercisable immediately upon issuance, and rights
issued to a resident of Canada may not be transferable to another resident of Canada with certain exceptions. 3 ' Subject to the foregoing,
rights issued to residents of Canada must have the same terms and
conditions as rights issued to residents of the United States. 137 The
Policy Statement provides an alternative eligibility requirement for
certain guaranteed securities."
A U.S. issuer contemplating an offering of securities in Canada
should compare the process of financing pursuant to CMJDS to exempt

131. "Approved rating," when used in relation to debt or preferred shares, means
securities that have received a provisional rating by the Canadian Bond Rating Service Inc., Dominion Bond Rating Service Limited, Moody's Investors Service, Inc., or
Standard and Poor's Corporation in one of the generic categories set forth in Section 2(4) of the Policy Statement. This definition is the same as that in CSA's
shelf prospectus and delayed pricing system, a system that corresponds roughly to
SEC Rules 415 and 430A. The Policy Statement was amended in December 1993 to
accept ratings by any entity recognized by the SEC as a nationally recognized statistical rating organization, as that term is used in SEC Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(F). (corresponding amendment to MJDS adopted by SEC in November 1993).
132. The further requirement that the issuer's equity shares have a market
value of not less than $150 million was deleted in December 1993.
133. "Public float" means the aggregate market value of securities held by persons
or companies not affiliates of the issuer. "Market value" (as used in the definition of
"public float"), with respect to a class of securities, is the aggregate market value of
the securities, calculated by using the price at which the securities were last sold in
the principal market for the securities as of a date specified in the Policy Statement;
or the average of the bid and asked prices of the securities in such market if there
were no sales on the specified date.
134. The requirement that the issuer's equity securities have a market value of
not less than U.S. $300 million was deleted in December 1993.
135. Draft Policy Statement, supra note 125, at § 3.4(2).
136. Id. at § 3.4(3)(c). (rights may be transferred to other Canadian residents who
were granted rights of the same issue by the issuer.) In addition, the prohibition on
transfer of rights does not affect transfer of securities issuable upon exercise of the
rights, nor does it affect the transfer of rights on a securities exchange or interdealer quotation system outside of Canada. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at § 3.6
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financing in Canada. Numerous possibilities of financing in Canada on
an exempt basis are available.' 39 Rather than qualifying securities
for sale in Canada pursuant to CMJDS, a U.S. issuer might, for example, place an issue of securities on an exempt basis in Ontario with a
consortium of banks, trust companies, insurance companies, government agencies, municipalities, or other recognized "exempt purchasers. " " A U.S. issuer could also make an exempt placement in Ontario if the investor purchased as principal and made an investment of
not less than $150,000.'l The principal question for an issuer comparing CMJDS to exempt financing in Canada would be whether the
discount in price associated with an exempt offering is sufficiently high
to justify the time and expense associated with non-exempt financing.
Exempt financing in Ontario in connection with international offerings
of securities has been facilitated by a December 1993 Blanket Ruling
by the Ontario Securities Commission." 2
C. Public Offers and Listing in the EU
In May, 1994, the EU adopted new legislation designed to facilitate stock exchange listings in one member state by companies listed
in other member states. The measure exempts companies that have
been listed in other member states for at least three years from the
requirement of publishing full listings particulars in the host state,
although an abbreviated disclosure document must still be published.
Provision is also made for companies the shares of which have been
dealt in on second-tier markets. In general, the extent to which member states recognize both listing applications and prospectuses from
companies outside the EU is left to the discretion of the member state.
The following discussion of the listing and public offering process reflects the 1994 amendments to EU legislation.
The principal stock exchange directives concern the conditions to
listing securities for trading on a stock exchange situated or operating
within a member country'" (the "Listing Conditions Directive") and
the disclosure and filing requirements applicable to such listing (the
"Listing Particulars Directive").'" The Listing Conditions Directive
sets forth minimum conditions for the admission of securities to listing
on a stock exchange located in the EU.1" These listing conditions involve matters such as the size of the issuer, its period of existence, and
the distribution of its shares in the market." The directive imposes

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
See Ontario Securities Act, supra note 84.
Id. at § 72(1)(d), Regs. 27(1).
Id.
Council Directive 79/279, 1979 O.J. (L66) 21.
Council Directive 80/390, 1980 O.J. (L100) 1.
Council Directive 79/279, supra note 143, at Preamble, art. 3.
Id. at Schedule A. For example, a company must, in general, have published
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numerous responsibilities, including reporting obligations, on issuers of
listed securities. 4 7 The directive does not prohibit the listing of
shares from non-EC countries, but provides that if shares of such a
company are not listed in the issuer's home country or principal market, they may not be listed in an EU country unless the authorities are
satisfied that the absence of the home country/principal market listing
"is not due to the need to protect investors."" Non-EU issuers listing
in an EU country are required to meet the minimum conditions and
obligations of the directive as enacted into national law in the particular country involved.
The purpose of the Listing Particulars Directive is to coordinate
the differences in member state disclosure requirements applicable to
stock exchange listing. 4" This directive requires member states to
ensure that the listing of securities upon a stock exchange in their
territory is contingent upon the publication of a disclosure document
referred to as "listing particulars."" ° The Listing Particulars Directive allows a member state to create numerous exemptions. It also sets
forth detailed disclosure requirements based upon whether the securities to be listed are debt or equity securities.'5 1 Listing particulars
may not be published until they have been approved by the competent
authorities,'52 but must be published for use by the investing public."
The Listing Particulars Directive provides that when applications
for listing the same securities on stock exchanges in several member.
states are made within short intervals of each other, the authorities in
each state should cooperate with each other "to avoid a multiplicity of
formalities and to agree to a single text," where appropriate." The
Listing Conditions Directive has a similar provision.'55 Subsequent to
the adoption of the two principal directives, the Council adopted a
directive requiring significantly further reciprocity 'in the listing process. "56
' This directive applies when applications are made to list securities on two or more exchanges located in the EU, in which event
listing particulars are to be prepared in accordance with home state
rules and approved by home state authorities. 5 7 Once so approved,

or filed its annual accounts for three financial years preceding the listing application. Id. at no. 3.
147. Id. at Schedule C and D.
148. Id. at Schedule A, no. 7.
149. Council Directive 80/390, supra note 144, at Preamble.
150. Id. at art 3.
151. Id. at art. 5 no. 1, Schedules A and B.
152. Id. at art. 18 no. 2.
153. Id. at arts. 3, 18, and 20.
154. Id. at art. 24."
155. Council Directive 79/279, supra note 143, at art. 18 no. 2.
156. Council Directive 87/345, 1987 O.J. (L185) 81.
157. Id., amending the Council Directive 80/390 (Listing Particulars Directive),
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"listing particulars must, subject to any translation, be recognized by
the other Member States in which admission to official listing has been
applied for, without it being necessary to obtain the approval of the
competent authorities of those States and without their being able to
require that additional information be included in the listing particulars."' If the issuer's registered office is not located in a member
state, it must choose an EC country to supervise its listing.'5 9 The
directive allows EC countries to restrict application of the foregoing
mutual recognition rules to listing particulars of issuers having their
registered office in a member state.'6" This is a common theme in the
EU's regulatory scheme relating to the listing/public offering process.
In 1993, the EU considered a proposal to exempt from the requirement
to re-publish full listing particulars in a member state certain issuers
with a three-year listing history in another member state.'6 ' As indicated above, the Council adopted the measure in May of 1994.16' The
1994 amendment authorizes member states to allow the competent
authorities to adopt an exemption from the requirement to publish full
listing particulars where (i) the securities or the shares of the issuer
have been officially listed in another member state for not less than
three years before the application for listing; (ii) during such period (or
such shorter period that the issuer's securities have been listed), "the
issuer has complied with all the requirements concerning information
and admission to listing imposed by Community Directives on companies the securities of which are officially listed;"'63 (iii) a simplified
6
disclosure document meeting specified requirements is published.' '
The abbreviated disclosure document must contain, inter alia, a brief
description of the securities; information specific to the market in
which listing is sought (e.g., income taxes); the latest annual report,

supra note 144, at art. 24.
158. Council Directive 87/345, supra note 156, at art. 24a. The authorities of any
EC country may, however, compel the inclusion of certain limited information specific to the country in which listing is sought. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at art. 1, amending Council Directive 80/390, supra note 144, at art. 24.
161. See Parliament Warns Listing Proposal May Discriminate Against Non-EU
Firms, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Jan. 11, 1994, at 3, 5; Stock Markets: Council GoAhead for "Eurolist"Directive, EUROPEAN REPORT, Dec. 15, 1993, at 102, 102.
162. Council Directive 94/18, 1994 O.J. (L112) of the European Parliament and of
the Council of May 30, 1994 Amending Directive 80/390/EEC Coordinating the Requirements for the Drawing Up, Scrutiny and Distribution of the Listing Particulars
to be Published for the Admission of Securities to Official Stock-Exchange Listing,
With Regard to the Obligations to Publish Listing Particulars. See generally Council
Gives Final Approval to Cross-Border Listing Measure, 6 EUROWATCH 14, June 13,
1994; EU Council Gives Final Approval to Key Cross-Border Listing Measure, INT'L
SEC. REG. REP, May 31, 1994, at 1; EC Will Allow Additional Listings Without Publishing New Particulars,SEC. REG. L. REP., May 20, 1994, at 737.
163. Council Directive 9418, supra note 162, at art. 1. Note that the provision
does not say, "substantially complied with" all of the applicable requirements.
164. Id.
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audited annual accounts, and half-yearly report for the year in question if it has been published; any disclosure document published in the
twelve months preceding the application; composition of management;
capital; any auditors reports required by home country law.'65 This
information must be sent to the competent authorities in the host state
before being released to the public.' "[I]t is for that Member State
to decide whether those documents should be scrutinized by its competent authorities and to determine, if necessary, the nature and the
manner in which that scrutiny should be carried out[.]"'67A parallel
provision allows the listing on the basis of short-form particulars
where a company's shares have been traded "for at least the preceding two years on a second-tier market" under specified circumstances."6 In implementing the provisions of Directive 94/18, member
states
may establish "non-discriminatory minimum quantitative criteria."169
Directive 90/211 (the "Integration Directive") integrates disclosure
in the listing and public offering process.17 Directive 89/298 (the
"Prospectus Directive") provides that where public offers are made
within short intervals of one another in two or more member states, a
public offer prospectus prepared and approved in accordance with the
requirements for listing particulars must be recognized as a public
offer prospectus in the other member states "on the basis of mutual
recognition." 7 ' Under the Integration Directive, where application for
listing in one or more member states is made and the securities in
question were covered by a prospectus prepared and approved in any
member state in accordance with the requirements for listing particulars in the three months prior to the listing application, the public
offer prospectus must be recognized as listing particulars in the member state or states in which listing is sought.'72
The Prospectus Directive coordinates the requirements for the
drawing-up, scrutiny and distribution of a prospectus to be used when
securities are offered to the public. Member states must require (absent an exemption) that any offer of securities to the public "within
their territories" is subject to the publication of a prospectus by the
offeror.'73 The directive is expressly inapplicable to certain types of

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at Preamble.
168. Id. at art. 1.
169. Id. at Preamble.
170. Council Directive 90/211, 1990 O.J. (L112) 24.
171. Council Directive 89/298, 1989 O.J. (L124) 8, 14.
172. Council Directive 87/345, supra note 156, at art. 2, amending Council Directive 80/390, supra note 144, at art. 24(b).
173. Id. at art. 4. The directive applies to securities offered to the public for the
first time in a member state if such securities are not already listed on a stock
exchange in that state. Id. at art. 1.
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offers, including, without limitation, offers of securities to a "restricted
circle of persons" 74 and "Eurosecurities which are not the subject of a
generalized campaign of advertising or canvassing. " "'
The Prospectus Directive approaches public offerings on the basis
of whether the securities in question will be listed in a member state.
If a public offer of transferable securities is made in a member state
and at the time of the offer the securities are the subject of a listing
application in the same state, prospectus requirements must be determined in accordance with the Listing Particulars Directive as distinguished from Article 11 of the Prospectus Directive.' 76 If a public offer is made in one member state and listing is sought on a stock exchange in another member state, the person making the public offering
must have the possibility of using in the public offering a prospectus
governed by the Listing Particulars Directive as opposed to the Prospectus Directive, in terms of both content and procedure, subject to
any changes necessary to reflect the circumstances of the public offer.'77 Article 11 of the Prospectus Directive applies to public offerings of securities for which listing is not sought. Prospectuses for unlisted securities must be published or made publicly available pursuant to procedures established by each member state.' The member
states may provide, however, that the person making the offering may
prepare the prospectus, in terms of its content, and subject to appropriate adaptation, in accordance with the Listing Particulars Directive,
even though the securities in question are not subject of a listing application. 7 In this event, prior scrutiny of the prospectus must be made
by authorities designated by the member states.'s' A prospectus so
prepared and approved by a member state in the three months preceding application for listing must be recognized, subject to translation, as
listing particulars in the member states in which application for listing
is made.' A prospectus so prepared in accordance with the Listing
Particulars Directive must also be deemed to satisfy the prospectus
requirements of other member states in which the same securities are,
simultaneously or within a short time period, offered to the public.'82
A member state may choose to allow issuers not proposing to
apply for official listing to comply with Article 11 disclosure rather

174. Id. at art. 2, no. 2.
175. Ontario Securities Act, supra note 84.
176. Council Directive 89/298, supra note 171, at art. 7.
177. Id. at art. 8(1). This possibility shall exist only in member states which in
general provide for the prior scrutiny of public offer prospectuses. Id. at art. 8(2).
178. Id. at art. 15.
179. Id. at art. 12(1).
180. Id. at art. 12(2).
181. Council Directive 87/345, supra note 157, at art. 2, amending Council Directive 80/390, supra note 144, at art. 24(b)(1).
182. Id. at art. 21(1).
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than compelling them to satisfy the same disclosure standards applicable to issuers concurrently applying for admission to official listing on
an exchange in a member state. Further, a member state is not compelled to give such issuers the alternative of complying with the more
stringent disclosure standards of the Listing Particulars Directive. 1"
Under the Prospectus Directive, a member state has no obligation to
recognize a prospectus meeting the requirements of another member
state that satisfies only the Article 11 requirements."' Where public
offers are made within short intervals of one another in two or more
member states, a public offer prospectus prepared and approved in
accordance with the Prospectus Directive, other than an Article 11
prospectus, must be recognized as a public offer prospectus in such
member states.'8 5 The directive permits member states to limit this
reciprocity requirement to issuers having their registered offices in a
member state.86
IV. U.S. OFFERINGS BY FOREIGN ISSUERS

OECD reports that "[a] particularly noteworthy development [during 1993] was the growth of foreign bond issues in [the United States]
where new offerings rose by 53 percent to $35.4 billion."'8' Canadian
issuers accounted for almost one-third of the foreign bond issues in the
U.S. during 1993.'m OECD observes as follows:
In addition to favourable interest rate conditions [during 1993], a
particular attraction of the [U.S.] market continues to be the relative ease with which funds can be raised by lower-rated corporations and public sector bodies. The development of a broad and
diversified market for private placements is also playing an important role in this respect, as indicated by the growing number of
foreign borrowers accessing it either directly or through U.S.-based
subsidiaries.8 9
IDD reports that foreign companies privately placed $50.1 billion
of securities in the United States in 1993.190 In 1993, foreign companies filed registration statements with the SEC covering over $46 billion of securities.' 9'

183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
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art.
art.
art.
art.

12(1).
21(1).
21.
21 no. 4.

187. OECD, 57 FIN. MARKET TRENDS, supra note 14, at 73.

188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id.
Kershaw, supra note 8, at 18, 23.
SEC 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 51.
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Rule 144A Offerings

Measurement of the 144A market may not be accomplished with
precision because a Rule 144A offering is, in some respects, in the eye
of the beholder. Conceptually, of course, Rule 144A deals primarily
with the resale of securities and does not provide an exemption for an
issuer engaged in a private placement. Nonetheless, it is designed to
facilitate a specific type of private placement of an eligible security
involving the purchase of an eligible security by a dealer in reliance on
the Section 4(2) exemption and the resale of the securities to qualified
institutional buyers in reliance upon Rule 144A. In reporting on the
Rule 144A market to Chairman Dingell, the SEC stated that for purposes of such report, "a 'Rule 144A placement' is a transaction involving the sale of securities eligible for resale under Rule 144A which the
market or market participants have identified as a Rule 144A placement."'92 Obviously, to be considered a 144A placement the securities
must be eligible for resale under Rule 144A, and the information-supplying requirement, if applicable, must be satisfied.'9 3
Other factors considered by market participants in determining
whether an initial sale constitutes a Rule 144A placement include:
whether private offerings are made to QIBs only; whether intermediaries purchase, as principals, from an issuer or distributor for immediate
resales in reliance on Rule 144A; whether dealers buy in offshore
transactions under Regulation S for immediate resale to QIBs in the
United States under Rule 144A; whether the securities are eligible for
trading through the Private Offering, Resale and Trading through
Automated Linkages System (the "PORTAL system") operated by the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (the "NASD"); and
whether the securities are initially offered in placements in which the
ability to negotiate the terms of the securities is more like that in a
public offering than a traditional private placement.'94
The statistics collected by the SEC and reported to Dingell relate
to "144A placements" rather than all resales made in reliance upon
Rule 144A. For example, an insurance company may resell securities it
acquired a year ago in a private placement to another insurance company in reliance upon Rule 144A, but this does not necessarily involve
a "Rule 144A placement."
Investment Dealers' Digest follows a similar approach in collecting its 144A statistics. IDD reports statistics based upon sales by or
through investment and commercial banking firms serving as intermediaries in the 144A process.' 95 (This would exclude privately negotiat192. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT ON RULE 144A 1

(1993)
193.
194.
195.

[hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT].
Id.
Id. at 2.
"Most 144A deals," an IDD report states, "are considered private placements
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ed resales made in reliance on Rule 144A without the assistance of an
intermediary). For the year ended December 31, 1993, IDD reports
total "Rule 144A Private Placements" at approximately $91.3 billion,
compared to $41.7 billion for the year ended December 31, 1992. Of the
$91.3 billion of "Rule 144A Private Placements" during 1993, $66.8
billion was made by U.S. issuers and $24.5 was made by foreign issu96
ers.
In its report dated February 1993 to Chairman Dingell, the staff
indicates that from April 1990, when 144A was adopted, to November
30, 1992, -$24.8 billion of securities relating to 206 issuers have been
sold in 211 Rule 144A placements. Of this amount, $9.577 billion of
securities relating to 128 foreign issuers... have been sold in 122
Rule 144A placements."'9 7 The $9.577 billion of securities issued (or
guaranteed) by foreign issuers included roughly $4.8 billion of common
19 8
stock, $4.5 billion of debt, and $338 million of preferred equity.
Thus, "Rule 144A placements have consistently been used in connection with the offer of foreign common equity securities on a private
basis in the United States."'9 9
B.

Registered Offerings

The staff reports that foreign issuers are increasingly participating in the U.S. public markets:
In 1993, more than $49.3 billion of foreign private issuer securities
were filed for registration under the Securities Act. In 1993, 109
new foreign companies from 23 countries, including Argentina,
Australia, Chile, China, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Korea, the United Kingdom and Venezuela entered the U.S. public markets. At the
end of 1993, there were 588 foreign companies from 40 countries
filing reports with the Commission.2"
Thus, foreign issuers from all of the countries with developed
capital markets have entered the U.S. public markets either by making a registered public offering in the United States or by registering a
class of securities under the Exchange Act.2 ' From January 1990 February 1993, over 200 foreign issuers registered about $72 billion of

by the Securities and Exchange Commission, but public securities by the market."
Kershaw, supra note 8, at 16, 22-24.
196. Id. at 22-23.
197. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 192, at 3.

198. Id.
199. Id. (87 foreign issuers as of November 1992).
200. Quinn, supra note 9, at 797.
201. See Richard Kosnick, Comments on Barriers to Foreign Issuer Entry into U.S.
Markets, L. & POL'y INT'L Bus., June 22, 1993, at 1237, 1241. Examples of large
foreign companies that have entered the U.S. public markets .are Telefonos de Mexico, Societe Nationale Elf Aquitaine, Alcatel Alsthom, Grand Metropolitan PLC and
Bass PLC. Id. at 1241-1242.
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securities in over 300 registration statements. 2
1.

1994 Amendments

The Commission proposed in 19932' and adopted in 199421
further rule changes relating to registration and reporting by foreign
issuers, including registration on Form F-3. Currently, one of the
"Transaction Requirements" for use of Form S-3 by a domestic company is that the aggregate market value of voting stock held by nonaffiliates (public float) equal $75 million or more. °5 One of the "Registrant Requirements" for use of Form S-3 is that the registrant have
been subject to the periodic reporting requirements of the Act for at
least twelve months.2° Prior to amendments adopted in 1994, the
corresponding Form for foreign private issuers, Form F-3, provided for
registrant eligibility, with certain exceptions, only if the public float of
voting stock was $300 million or more and the issuer had been reporting for at least 36 months. Based upon "Commission experience with
foreign issuers, as well as the internationalization of securities markets,"' in November 1993 the Commission proposed amendments to
Form F-3 to lower the public float requirement of such Form from $300
to $75 million and to reduce the reporting history provision from 36 to
12 months."°s The Commission reasoned that foreign issuers with a

202. Id.
203. See Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign
Companies; Safe Harbors for Public Announcements of Unregistered Offerings and
Broker-Dealer Research Reports, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-7029, [1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 85,252 (Nov. 3, 1993) [hereinafter Release 7029]. In conjunction with its 1991 rights, tender and exchange offer proposals, the Commission
proposed to amend Form F-3 to eliminate the three-year reporting and $300 million
float requirements in connection with certain transactions. Cross-Border Rights Offers; Amendments to Form F-3, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-6896, [1991 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,802 (Aug. 1, 1991). In Rel. 7029, the Commission
stated that the 1991 proposals relating to secondary offerings, rights offerings, dividend or interest reinvestment plans, convertible securities and warrants "continue to
be considered in light of public comment and issues raised by foreign disclosure
practices." Release 7029, supra this note, at 84,686 n. 37.
204. Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign Companies; Safe Harbors for Public Announcements of Unregistered Offerings and Broker-Dealer Research Reports, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-7053, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %85,331 (Apr. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Release 7053].
205. Form S-3, General Instruction I.B.1. The eligibility requirements for Form S3 comprise "Registrant Requirements" and "Transaction Requirements." Any registrant that meets the Registrant Requirements may use the Form S-3 to register
securities for a transaction that meets any of the Transaction Requirements. The
public float requirement in Form S-3 was reduced to $75 million in Simplification of
Registration Procedures for Primary Securities Offerings, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-6964,
[1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 85,053 (Oct. 29, 1992) [hereinafter
Release 6964].
206. Form S-3, General Instruction I.A.3.
207. Release 7029, supra note 203, at 84,685.
208. Id. at 84,684.
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public float of $75 million or more "have a degree of analyst following
in their worldwide markets comparable to similarly-sized domestic
companies.""' The Commission adopted the November proposals in
April 1994.210 The revised Form F-3 eligibility provisions require the
issuer to have filed at least one annual report prior to the first use of
Form F-3. The April 1994 Release also amended Form F-3 to allow it
to be used by otherwise eligible foreign issuers to register investment
grade non-convertible preferred stock or any other investment grade
non-convertible security irrespective of public float." In addition, the
Commission eliminated the public float requirement of Form F-3 with
respect to qualified secondary offerings, rights offers, dividend or interest reinvestment plans, convertible securities and warrants.212 The
Form F-3 reporting requirement for issuers engaging in these transactions is twelve months.2"3 Registration statements on Form F-3 relating to dividend or interest reinvestment plans will become effective
immediately upon filing." 4
Expanding F-3 eligibility to a wider class of foreign issuers concomitantly will make shelf registration available to more foreign issuers, as Rule 415(a)(1)(x)" 5 under the Securities Act authorizes shelf
registration of securities registered on Form F-3 to be offered and sold
on a continuous or delayed basis by or on behalf of the registrant and
certain others. The Commission also amended Item 512(a)(1) and
512(a)(4) of Regulation S-K to allow Form F-3 registrants to update
shelf registration statements through incorporation by reference,216
making a post-effective amendment unnecessary. In addition, the Commission has also extended "unallocated shelf registration" which is
currently available to domestic issuers, to foreign issuers.2 "7
Unallocated shelf registration, as the name implies, allows a registrant
to register debt, equity and other securities on one registration statement without indicating at the time of filing or effectiveness the
amount of each type of security to be offered. 18 The staff reported that

209. Id. at 84,685. Cf. Lee Spencer, SEC Puts Out Welcome Mat for Foreigners,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 6, 1993, at 9, 12 (positing potential argument of critics to the effect
that "for U.S. investors, worldwide market following may not be as accessible, relevant or rigorous as analyst following in the U.S. market . . . [;] a foreign issuer
may provide less disclosure in its 12 months as a reporting company than its domestic counterpart").
210. Release 7053, supra note 204.
211. Form F-3, Id. at 85,215, General Instruction I. B.2.
212. Id. at General Instruction I.B.3, I.B.4.
213. Id. at General Instruction I.A.1., IA.2.
214. Id. at 85,217, General Instruction III.
215. See Rule 415 under the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415.
216. Release 7053, supra note 204, at 85,204; see also Release 7029, supra note
204, at 84,685.
217. Release 7053, supra note 204, at 85,204; see also Release 7029, supra note
203, at 84,685.
218. See Release 6964, supra note 205, at 83,390 (the amount of the particular
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through the end of 1993, 97 (domestic) issuers filed unallocated shelf
registration statements covering $73.1 billion." 9 Unallocated shelf
registration promises to be an important financing tool for foreign issuers as it will afford them increased flexibility to take advantage of propitious market conditions.
2.

Financial Statements for Foreign Private Issuers

In November 1993 the Commission adopted a number of revisions
to the rules governing financial statements of foreign private issuers.2" The first set of revisions relates to aging requirements of financial statements included in the "F" Forms, which differ from those
applicable to domestic issuers. In general, a foreign private issuer
must include in the registration statement audited balance sheets as of
the end of each of the most recent fiscal years, and audited statements
of income and cash flows for each of the three fiscal years preceding
"
the date of the two most recent balance sheet filed.22
' Prior to the
amendments, Rule 3-19 required a registration statement under the
Securities Act, on its effective date, to have financial statements as of
an interim date within six months of such effective date; further, if the
registration statement would become effective more than five months
subsequent to fiscal year end, it was required to have audited statements for the most recent fiscal year.22 Under the 1993 amendments, if the registration statement becomes effective within six
months after fiscal year end, on its effective date the registration statement must include financial statements, which may be unaudited, as
of a date within ten months of effectiveness.2" If the audited statements for the most recent fiscal year are not available, they may be as
of the two preceding fiscal years. If the filing becomes effective after
six months subsequent to the end of the most recent fiscal year, it
must include audited financial statements as of the end of the two
most recent fiscal years. 4 Thus, a registration statement may become effective with audited statements 18 (rather than 17) months old,

securities to be offered is established by prospectus supplement).
219. Quinn, supra note 9, at 801 (regarding conversion of an existing shelf registration statement to an unallocated registration statement); see 1992 WL 345024,
Transitional Procedure for Converting to an Unallocated Shelf Registration Statement, SEC Interpretative Letter (Nov. 19, 1992).
220. Adoption of Final Amendments to Rule and Form Requirements Which Govern Age of Financial Statements of Foreign Private Issuers, Sec. Act Rel. No. 337026, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 85,247 (November 3, 1993)
[hereinafter Release 7026].
221. See Regulation S-X, Rule 3-19(a), 17 C.F.R. 210.3-19(a).
222. Regulation S-X, Rule 3-19(b), 17 C.F.R. 210.3-19(b) (as revised as of April 1,
1988). Subject to these limitations, under the old rule, like the new one, if the issuer had recently passed the end of its fiscal year, the financial statements could be
as of the end of the immediately preceding two years. Id.
223. Release 7026, supra note 220, at 84,6525. (Regulation S-X, Rule 3-19(b)).
224. Id. (Regulation S-X, Rule 3-19(c)).
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and with unaudited interim statements ten (rather than six) months
old. 225 The new framework is intended to provide foreign issuers
(many of which are not subject to quarterly reporting requirements in
their home country) "uninterrupted access to the public market."226
Financial statements may be up to one year old at the effective date of
the registration statement if the only securities are being offered pursuant to rights, transferable warrants, conversion rights, or dividend
or interest reinvestment plans. 22' Notwithstanding the aging requirements, if the registrant discloses to its shareholders or otherwise
makes public financial statements that are more current than is specifically required by Regulation S-X, those financial statements are to be
included in the registration statement. However, under a 1993 amendment, interim financial information provided pursuant to Rule 3-19(f)
need not be reconciled to U.S. GAAP if appropriate disclosure is provided.22 In April 1994, the Commission proposed to allow domestic
issuers making acquisitions of or investments in foreign businesses to
follow the same aging rules with respect to the financial statements of
the acquired foreign business and equity investees as those applicable
to foreign private issuers registering or reporting under the securities
laws. 9 The Commission adopted the amendments substantially as
proposed."o
In April

1 9 9 4 ni

the Commission also took a noteworthy first step

toward the internationalization of securities regulation by deciding to
accept cash flow statements prepared in accordance with International
Accounting Standard No. 7 without a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP.232
The measure constitutes the first time the Commission has accepted
an International Accounting Standard without requiring reconciliation
to U.S. GAAP.nS Former SEC Commissioner Karmel calls this development "a major conceptual breakthrough," adding that "[allthough the
SEC's decision to recognize IAS no. 7 as authoritative is only a small
step in this direction, and may prove to have little practical signifi-

225. See Spencer, supra note 209, at 9.
226. Release 7026, supra note 220, at 84,650.
227. Rule 3-19(e), 17 C.F.R. 210.3-19(e).
228. Release 7026, supra note 220, at 84,651.
229. Financial Statements of Significant Foreign Equity Investees and Acquired
Foreign Businesses of Domestic Issuers and Financial Schedules, Sec. Act Rel. 7055,
[1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,333, at 85,232 (Apr. 19,
1994) [hereinafter Release 7055].
230. Financial Statements of Significant Foreign Equity Investees and Acquired
Foreign Businesses of Domestic Issuers and Financial Schedules, Sec. Act Rel. No.
33-7118 [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 83,665 (Dec. 30, 1994)
[hereinafter Release 7118].
231. Release 7053, supra note 204, at 85,205 (adoption); Release 7029, supra note
203, at 85,252 (proposal).
232. Id. at 84,687.
233. Spencer, supra note 209 (discussing International Accounting Standards generally).
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cance, it is the first time the SEC has been willing to concede that any
accounting standard other than U.S. GAAP might be acceptable financial disclosure."' In tandem with its recognition of LAS no. 7, the
SEC showed its support for another international standard, IAS No.
22, by proposing (in April 1994) "to eliminate the requirement that foreign private issuers quantify the effects of differences arising solely
from the different criteria applied to the selection of the basic method
of accounting for a business combination if the criteria used in the
primary financial statements for determining the method are consistently applied and are consistent with LAS 22. "235 The amendments
were adopted substantially as proposed." 6In addition, in April 1994
the Commission proposed that "foreign private issuers that have consistently applied accounting policies which amortize goodwill and negative goodwill over periods which comply with the amended guidance in
LAS 22, but which differ from the periods that would be permitted
under U.S. GAAP,... not be required to quantify the effects of that
difference in the reconciliation. "u 7 This amendment was adopted substantially as proposed.
Another amendment the Commission adopted in 1994 relates to
transitional reconciliation requirements for foreign private issuers.
Specifically, the Commission decided to reduce on a transitional basis
the number of years for which foreign issuers filing a Form 20-F for
the first time must reconcile their financial statements and selected
financial data to U.S. GAAP.235 Under the amendments, reconciliation is required for first time registrants only for the two most recently
completed fiscal years; however, "Ii]n each subsequent year, on a prospective basis, an additional year of reconciliation would be required
up to the full reconciliation otherwise required."" 9 "In response to
comments, Form 20-F will be clarified to indicate that the transitional
reconciliation relief also applies to financial disclosures required by
U.S. GAAP and Regulation S-X." ° The Commission also determined
to allow reconciliation to U.S. GAAP pursuant to Item 17 (as opposed
to the more stringent Item 18) of Form 20-F for any offering of invest-

234. Roberta Karmel, New Initiatives for Foreign Issuers, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1993,
at 3, 7.
235. Reconciliation of the Accounting by Foreign Private Issuers for Business
Combinations, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-7056, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 85,334, 85,241 (Apr. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Release 7056]. Differences
in procedures used to implement either the purchase or pooling method would continue to be quantified. Id. See also infra note 249.
236. Reconciliation of the Accounting by Foreign Private Issuers for Business
Combinations, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-7119 [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) % 86,756 (Dec. 13, 1994) [hereinafter Release 7119].
237. Release 7056, supra note 235, at 85,241.
238. Release 7053, supra note 204, at 85,206.
239. Release 7029, supra 203, at 84,687.
240. Release 7053, supra note 204, at 85,206.
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ment grade securities.2" The Commission has also (i) waived reconciliation of the separate financial statements of acquired businesses
and less than majority owned "investees" under certain circumstances;242 (ii) decided to accept compliance with Item 17 of Form 20-F for
financial statements of all significant acquirees and investees; 24 (ii)
made certain accommodations for foreign private issuers using pro rata
consolidation (as opposed to the equity method) for joint ventures;'"
(iii) eliminated the requirement that foreign private issuers furnish
certain financial statement schedules, 2' and proposed the elimination of these schedules for domestic issuers and other schedules' for
both foreign and domestic issuers;247 (iv) proposed to allow flexibility
in the selection of the reporting currency used in SEC filings;2"( v )
proposed to streamline financial statement reconciliation requirements
for foreign private issuers with operations in countries with
hyperinflationary economies; 24' and (vi) proposed to eliminate the requirement under present Rule 3-09 of Regulation S-X that total assets
be considered in determining whether financial statements of a less

241. Id.
242. Id. See also Release 7055, supra note 229, at 85,231 (proposing to extend
same position to domestic issuers making foreign acquisitions or investments).
243. Release 7053, supra note 204, at n. 42 and accompanying text. "Frequently,
the information required by Item 18 of Form 20-F regarding U.S. GAAP and Regulation S-X is more difficult to obtain for financial statements of acquirees and
investees than for the issuer, but it is typically less critical to an understanding of
the issuer's financial condition." See also Release 7055, supra note 229, at 85,231
(proposing to give domestic issuers the same privilege in reporting financial statements of significant foreign business acquisitions or foreign equity investees).
244. Release 7055, supra note 229, at 85,207.
245. Id. The following schedules have been eliminated for foreign private issuers:
marketable securities; amounts receivable from related parties and underwriters,
promoters and employees other than related parties; indebtedness of and to related
parties not current; property, plant and equipment; accumulated depreciation,
depletion and amortization of property, plant and equipment; guarantees of securities
of other issuers. Id. at 85,232.
246. Id. at 85,233 (proposing short-term borrowings; supplementary income statement information; other investments).
247. Id.
248. Selection of Reporting Currency for Financial Statements of Foreign Private
Issuers and Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP for Foreign Private Issuers with Operations
in a Hyperinflationary Economy, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-7054, [1993-1994 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 85,332 (Apr. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Release 7054].
Current rules require presentation of financial statements in the currency of the
country of incorporation or the primary economic environment. A revision to Rule 320 of Regulation S-X has been proposed to allow a foreign issuer to present its financial statements in any currency in which it reports to a majority of non-affiliated
securityholders. Id.
249. Id. "[Tihe Commission is proposing to eliminate the requirement of Items 17
and 18 of Form 20-F that an issuer quantify the effects on financial statements of
its use of a translation methodology for operations in a hyperinflationary environment which differs from SFAS 52 so long as it conforms with IAS 21, provided that
the method used is consistently applied in all periods." Id. at 85,227.
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than majority owned equity investee (foreign or domestic) must be
provided. ° The foregoing amendments were adopted substantially as
proposed.2"'
C.

U.S. MJDS

Concerning use of MJDS to date by Canadian issuers, staff members report as follows: "Through December 24, 1993, there were 70 filings under the Securities Act by 50 Canadian issuers using the MJDS.
A total of $11.54 billion of securities have been registered under the
MJDS. Thirteen of these MJDS have involved non-underwritten rights
offerings and eight have involved exchange offers."" 2 These statistics
do not include use of the Canadian MJDS by U.S. issuers,2" statistical information as to which is scanty.
The U.S. MJDS gives qualifying Canadian registrants the opportunity to make securities offerings in the United States on the basis of,
for the most part, Canadian disclosure requirements.25" The Commission amended MJDS in June 1993255 and again in November
1993.56 Both the June and November amendments are based upon
an April 1993 rule proposal by the Commission.5 7 Specifically, the

250. Release 7055, supra note 229, at 85,231.
251. Selection of Reporting Currency For Financial Statements of Foreign Private
Issuers and Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP for Foreign Private Issuers with Operations
in a Hyperinflationary Economy, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-7117 [1994 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,001 (Dec. 30, 1994); Financial Statements of Significant
Foreign Equity Investees and Acquired Foreign Businesses of Domestic Issuers and
Financial Schedules, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-7118 [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 77,500 (Dec. 30, 1994).
252. Quinn, supra note 9, at 815.
253. Id.
254. The system also extends to qualifying tender offers and exchange offers.
Finally, the system enables qualifying Canadian companies that otherwise would be
subject to U.S. continuous disclosure, proxy, and insider reporting rules to observe,
instead, corresponding Canadian requirements. The objective of the MJDS is "to
facilitate cross-border offerings of securities and continuous reporting by specified
Canadian issuers," and thereby to "remove unnecessary impediments to transnational
capital formation." Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current
Registration and Reporting Systems for Canadian Issuers, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-6902,
[1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,812, 81,861 (June 21, 1991)
[hereinafter Release 6902].
255. Amendments to the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System for Canadian Issuers, Sec: Act Rel. No. 7004 (June 28, 1993), [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) T 85,207 [hereinafter Release 7004].
256. Amendments to the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System for Canadian Issuers, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-7025, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91
85,246 (Nov. 3, 1993) [hereinafter Release 70251.
257. Amendments to the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System for Canadian Issuers, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-6997, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
$ 85,135, at 84,136 (Apr. 28, 1993) [hereinafter Release 6997]. The Commission also
proposed a change to Form F-7 relating to agents for service of process, issued interpretive advice concerning the registration of warrants and convertible or exchange-
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Commission proposed to modify the eligibility requirements for Forms
F-9 and F-10 under the Securities Act, accept ratings by recognized
Canadian (in addition to U.S.) rating organizations and rescind a sunset provision of then-current law that would have automatically eliminated financial statement reconciliation requirements of Forms F-10
and 40-F.25 In June 1993 the Commission decided to retain the financial statement reconciliation requirement of Forms F-10 and 40F. 9 In November 1993 the Commission adopted almost all of the
other proposals.260
Form F-10, in general, is available for any type of security, including common equity and non-investment grade debt, and any type of offering, by a Canadian private issuer that satisfies specified eligibility
requirements.261 The financial statements included in Form F-10
must be reconciled to U.S. GAAP in accordance with Item 18 of Form
20-F." As originally adopted, MJDS provided that such reconciliation would only be required for registration statements on Form F-10
filed prior to July 1993. Form 40-F permits eligible Canadian issuers
to register or report under the Exchange Act essentially by filing with
the SEC a wrap-around of materials they are required to file with
Canadian regulatory authorities. As originally adopted, MJDS required
Forms 40-F filed prior to July 1993 (with certain exceptions) to include
a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP in accordance with Item 17 of Form 20F." Thus, absent Commission action, the reconciliation requirements
for both Forms F-10 and 40-F would have lapsed in July 1993. The
June 1993 amendments to Form F-10 and Form 40-F continued indefinitely the requirement that financial statements included in such
Forms present a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP. 2
Form F-9 is available for the registration of investment grade debt
or preferred securities and extends to convertible investment grade
securities only if they cannot be converted for a period of at least one
year after issuance.265 Prior to the November 1993 amendments,

able securities on such Form and requested comments concerning unallocated shelf
registration of aggregate amounts of securities. Id. at 84,139-40. In the November
1993 Release the Commission adopted the proposed amendment to Form F-7 relating
to specifying an agent for service of process. Release 7025, supra note 256, at 84,
646.
258. Id. at 84,136.
259. Release 7004, supra note 255.
260. The unallocated shelf proposal was not adopted. However, Canadian issuers
may use this procedure in connection with conventional registration to the same
extent as other foreign issuers.
261. There are special provisions applicable to exchange offers, business combinations, and derivatives. See Release 6902, supra note 254, at 81,904.
262. Form F-10, Release 7004, supra note 255, at 84,237.
263. Form 40-F, Id. at 84,238.
264. Id. at 84,235.
265. Form F-9, Release 6997, supra note 257, at 84,136-37.
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Form F-9 required the registrant to be a Canadian private issuer or
crown corporation subject to the continuous disclosure requirements of
any Canadian securities commission or equivalent regulatory authority
for 36 consecutive months (12 months, in the case of a crown corporation) and currently in compliance with such reporting requirements.
Further, prior to such amendments, in order to register convertible
securities on Form F-9 the issuer also had to satisfy a "substantiality
requirement" measured by market capitalization of (CN) $180 million
and public float of (CN) $75 million.26 As indicated above, Form F-10
is available for the registration under the Securities Act of any type of
security (except certain derivatives) and offering by a Canadian private
issuer, provided the issuer satisfies the eligibility requirements, including a substantiality requirement.267 Prior to the November 1993
amendments, the market capitalization of the issuer's outstanding
equity securities was required to be (CN) $360 million and its public
26 8
float had to be at least (CN) $75 million in order to use Form F-10.
Further, the issuer was required to have been subject to the continuous disclosure requirements of any Canadian securities commission or
equivalent regulatory authority in Canada for 36 consecutive months
and currently be in compliance with such reporting requirements. In
April 1993 the Commission proposed to modify the eligibility requirements for use of Forms F-9, F-10 and 40-F by completely eliminating
the market capitalization threshold, setting the public float threshold
at U.S. $75 million, 26 9 and reducing the reporting history requirement to 12 months. In November 1993 the Commission adopted these
proposals.270 Amendments to the Canadian MJDS followed in December 1993.Y'
V.

A.

TRADING PRACTICES RULES

Background

Rule 10b-6 of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for certain
persons interested in a distribution of securities, by the use of the
means of interstate commerce, to bid for or purchase any security
which is the subject of such distribution, or any security of the same
class and series, or to attempt to induce any person to purchase any
such security, until after he has completed his participation in the

266. Id. at 84,137.
267. Form F-10, Release 6902, supra note 254, at 81,904.
268. Id.
269. Release 6997, supra note 257, at 84,137. Insofar as Form F-9 is concerned,
these changes only impact convertible securities, since the market capitalization and
public float requirements do not apply if the securities being registered are not convertible. Form F-9, Id. at 84,142.
270. Release 7025, supra note 256, at 84,643-44.
271. Id.
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distribution.272 This prohibition applies to an underwriter, or prospective underwriter, of a particular distribution; the issuer, or other person on whose behalf the distribution is being made; any broker, dealer
or other person who has agreed to participate or is participating in the
distribution; and any "affiliated purchaser."273 For purposes of Rule
10b-6 only, a "distribution" is an offering of securities, whether or not
subject to registration under the Securities Act, that is distinguished
from ordinary trading transactions by the magnitude of the offering
and the presence of "special selling efforts and selling methods."274
Rule 10b-6 contains a number of exceptions, including one for stabilizing transactions made in accordance with Rule 10b-7" and one
adopted in 1993 for passive market-making.2 7' Rule 10b-8 contains
detailed provisions governing the distribution of securities through
rights. Rule 10b-6, 10b-7 and 10b-8, are referred to herein, as the
"Trading Practices Rules."
Rule 10b-6 does not, by its terms, limit itself to bids and purchases by U.S. persons, bids and purchases for securities issued by U.S.
persons or bids and purchases made in the U.S. capital markets, and
accordingly the Rule has been a major issue in many international and
multinational securities offerings.277 If the issuer or seller is making
a distribution in the United States, the SEC traditionally has asserted
that Rule 10b-6 applies on a worldwide basis to all distribution participants and their affiliated purchasers (absent an exception or exemption). 2" The Rule would thus generally apply in the case of offshore

272. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1995)[hereinafter Rule 10b-6].
273. Id. at Rule 10b-6(a)(1)-(4). See Rule 10b-6(c)(6)(i) (defining "affiliated purchaser").
274. Id. at Rule 10b-6(CX5).
275. Id. at Rule 10b-6(aX4)(viii). The Commission also has the authority to exempt any transaction from Rule 10b-6 as not comprehended within the purpose of
the Rule. See Rule 10b-6(h).
276. Passive Marketing Making, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-6991, [1992-1993 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,126 (Apr. 8, 1993).
277. See, e.g., International Equity Offerings and Market Making Activities on
Foreign Stock Exchanges under Rule 10b-6: Has the Securities and Exchange Commission Gone Too Far?, 14 BROOK J. INT'L L. 389 (1988) [hereinafter International
Equity Offerings].
278. Application of Rules 10b-6, 10b-7, and 10b-8 During Distributions of Securities of Certain Foreign Issuers, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-7027, [1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,248, at 84,654 (Nov. 3, 1993) [hereinafter Release
7027]. Where foreign activities have or may have an impact on domestic securities
markets, "the Commission has taken the position that Rule 10b-6 applies to all of
the distribution participants and their affiliates," wherever located. Request for Comments on Issues Concerning the Internationalization of the World's Securities Markets, Exchange Act Rel. No. 34-21958, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)
83,759, at 87,392 (Apr. 18, 1985). The SEC's position concerning the extraterritorial application of Rule 10b-6 is based upon the premise that trading in
foreign markets "could have the manipulative effect upon distributions in the United
States that the Trading Practices Rules are designed to prevent." Release 7027,
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distributions conducted pursuant to Regulation S if the issuer or seller
also is making a distribution in the United States. Subject to the new
exception discussed below, a Rule 144A offering could also constitute a
"distribution" subject to Rule 10b-6, depending upon the magnitude of
the offering and the presence of special selling efforts.279 While the
SEC has made a very broad assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in
the area of Rule 10b-6, it has granted exemptive or no-action relief on
both individual and class bases on numerous occasions.' 8
B.

144A Transactions

In November 1993 the Commission amended the Trading Practices Rules to exempt from the prohibitions thereof distributions of certain foreign securities to qualified institutional buyers."' The securities must be eligible for resale under Rule 144A(d)(3)u 2 and may be
offered or sold in the United States only to qualified institutional buyers ("QIBs") 83 in transactions exempt under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act,' or Regulation D2" or Rule 144A under such Act."5 Although the requirement that sales be limited to QIBs only applies to
the U.S. tranche, 7 the exception provided by Rule 10b-6(i) extends
to transactions in all markets, both domestic and foreign.' Thus, a
foreign issuer could sell the U.S. tranche to QIBs and qualify for ex-

supra this note, at 84,654.
279. Exceptions to Rules 10b-6, 10b-7, and 10b-8 under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 for Distributions of Foreign Securities to Qualified Institutional Buyers,
Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-7028, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 85,249,
at 84,658 (Nov. 3, 1993) [hereinafter Release 7028]; Changes to Methods of Determining Holding Period of Restricted Securities Under Rule 144 and 145, Sec. Act
Rel. No. 33-6862, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,523, at
80,639, n. 18 (Apr. 23, 1990).
280. E.g., British Airways PLC., SEC No-Action Letter, [1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 76,653 (May 19, 1993); Exemption Regarding Application
of Cooling-Off Period Under Rule 10b-6 to Distribution of Foreign Securities, Exchange Act Rel. No. 34-31943, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 85,117 (Mar. 4, 1993); International Stock Exchange of the U.K and the Republic
of Ireland Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 78,713 (Sep. 9, 1987); Order of Exemptions from Provisions of Rule 10b-6
and 10b-13 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for Canadian
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, Exchange Act Rel. No. 34-29355, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,813 (June 21, 1991).
281. Release 7028, supra note 279, at Rule 10b-6(i).
282. Securities are eligible under this provision if they were not, when issued, of
the same class as securities listed on a national securities exchange or quoted in a
U.S. automated inter-dealer quotation system. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(3) (1995)
[hereinafter Rule 144A].
283. Id. at (a)(1) (defining "qualified institutional buyer").
284. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2); 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(2) (1981).
285. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-508 (1995) [hereinafter Regulation D].
286. Rule 10b-6(i), supra note 272.
287. Id.
288. Release 7028, supra note 279, at 84,659.
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empt market activities worldwide, even if foreign sales are made to
non-QIBs. Nonetheless, the exception provided by Rule 10b-6(i) only
covers Rule 144A-eligible securities, irrespective of the market in
which they are sold and, since securities listed on a national stock exchange or quoted in NASDAQ are ineligible for Rule 144A, 211 "the
Commission expects that transactions effected in the United States
pursuant to [the new rules] will be limited."2 °
C.

Class Exemptions

Building upon a class exemption recently granted 29 ' with respect
to sales of certain German securities, in November 1993 the Commission published a Statement of Policy ("Policy Statement") announcing
its position on the grant of class exemptions from the Trading Practices Rules in the future relating to issuers from other foreign countries.2 2 The overall purpose the Policy Statement is to facilitate distributions of foreign securities in the United States. 3 Prior to the
publication of the Policy Statement, the Division of Market Regulation
("Division"), acting pursuant to delegated authority, granted an exemption ("Germany Exemption") from the Trading Practices Rules to distribution participants and affiliated purchasers for transactions outside
the United States in actively traded securities ("Qualified German
Securities") 4 of highly capitalized German issuers (or certain related
securities, "Relevant Securities"),"' subject to certain conditions.'
Pursuant to the Germany Exemption, transactions effected in Germany are exempt from the Trading Practices Rules if carried out in accordance with the prescribed terms and conditions, while transactions
in the United States must comply with the Trading Practices Rules.
Transactions in "Significant Markets," as defined (generally, a securities market in a single country other than the U.S. or Germany with
ten percent or more aggregate worldwide trading volume), must be
carried out in conformity with the Trading Practices Rules, with cer-

289. Rule 144A, supra note 282.
290. Release 7028, supra note 279, at 84,659 n. 15.
291. Exemptions from Rules 10b-6, 10b-7, and 10b-8 During Distributions of Certain German Securities, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-7021, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) T 85,233 (Oct. 6, 1993) [hereinafter Release 7021].
292. Release 7027, supra note 278.
293. Id.
294. In order to constitute a "Qualified German Security", a security must: (1) be
issued by a foreign private issuer incorporated under German law or a subsidiary
thereof, and (2) be a DAX (German stock market index) component security or meet
certain quantitative tests based upon average daily trading volume (certain related
securities, such as convertibles, also qualify). Release 7021, supra note 291, at
84,533.
295. "Relevant Security" is a "Qualified German Security" or a security of the
same class and series as, or a right to purchase, a Qualified German Security.
296. Release 7021, supra note 291, at 84,533.
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tain exceptions.97 2
The Policy Statement establishes a similar framework for the
grant of class exemptions with respect to issuers from other countries.
The Commission reasons that by limiting the exemptions from the
Trading Practices Rules to actively traded securities of highly capitalized issuers, requiring disclosure in the U.S. market and assuring its
own access to transaction information, "the risks of potential manipulative effects from transactions in the principal foreign market substantially are diminished .... ."2 The Policy Statement does not actually grant other class exemptions but rather clarifies the circumstances under which they may be granted in the future. Transactions
effected in the United States are subject to the Trading Practices
Rules, absent another exemption. 9
Drawing upon the Germany Exemption, the Policy Statement sets
forth criteria the Division will examine in determining whether to
grant a class exemption. "Persons interested in obtaining a class exemption" must apply in writing to the Division."° As part of the application, distribution participants should agree to notify the staff that
they will rely upon the exemption." 1 The applicant must propose a
category of issuers to which the exemption, if granted, will apply. "A
security that is a component of a widely-recognized stock index, and
has a market capitalization that is the equivalent of US $1 billion and
a value of average daily trading volume of the equivalent of US $5
million, generally would qualify for the exemption."0 2 Another element of the exemption is a description of the disclosure that would be
included in the U.S. offering documents.3 3 The Commission advises
that offering documents used in the United States should contain complete disclosure concerning market transactions that may occur in the
home country.304 Further, distribution participants should effect all
principal transactions on (or report them to) a "foreign financial regulatory authority" ("FFRA"). °5 Distribution participants should agree
to report transaction information during the distribution to an independent entity, normally an FFRA in the country in question, and
such entity should agree to pass such information along to the Division
upon request.3"

297. Id. at 84,535-36.
298. Release 7027, supra note 278, at 84,655.
299. Id. at 84,655.
300. Id. at 84,655-56.
301. Id. at 84,656. The offering coordinator (e.g., lead underwriter) may furnish
the notice on behalf of other distribution participants. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. For the definition of foreign financial regulatory authority, see Section
3(a)(51) of the Exchange Act.
306. Id. at 84,657 (the Policy Statement discusses related recordkeeping and re-
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In terms of assessing the structure and scope of future class exemptions, the Germany Exemption is instructive. Counsel to Deutsche
Bank wrote the SEC concerning "possible offerings of equity securities
of certain German companies involving a distribution of some or all of
the securities in the United States." 37" Deutsche Bank proceeded to
detail the adverse consequences of an extraterritorial application of
Rule 10b-6: "the market in Germany for the shares of the company in
question could simply collapse . . . , given the high proportion of trading in the shares that is conducted by the larger German banks, and
the likelihood that most (if not all) of such banks would act as distribution participants in an offering by a blue-chip German company.""5
The Commission granted the exemption. 9 It is understood, from discussions with the staff, that any person - even those not connected to
the person filing the exemptive request - may rely upon the Germany
Exemption if the terms of it are satisfied. Presumably, the same result
would apply to other exemptions granted pursuant to the Policy
Statement.
VI.
A.

FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Investment Services

In May 1993 the Council, at long last, adopted the controversial
directive on investment services." 0 The directive as adopted was
based upon a February 1990 proposal by the European Commission.3 " Although the EU had planned for the new investment services regime to become effective simultaneously with the new banking
program on January 1, 1993, 312 this goal proved unrealistic. One of

porting requirements.).
307. Release 7021, supra note 291, at 84,520. The request did not apply to
straight debt securities. Id. at n.1.
308. Id. at 84,525.
309. Id. at 84,533. The Exemption applies to transactions in Relevant Securities.
As indicated, transactions in "Significant Markets," as defined, must be made in
accordance with the Trading Practices Rules, with certain exceptions.
310. Council Directive 93/22, 1993 O.J. (L 141127) [hereinafter Investment Services
Directive].
311. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Investment Services in the
Securities Field, 1990 O.J. (C 42) 7.
312. Member states were required to implement the Second Banking Directive by
January 1, 1993. Council Directive 89/646, 1989 O.J., and amending Directive
77/780, 1989 O.J. (L386) 1 [hereinafter Second Banking Directive]. This directive
establishes a single license applicable throughout the EEU for the provision of banking and other financial services. Thus, a credit institution is able to provide a wide
variety of financial services throughout the EEU. The Second Banking Directive
depends upon home state supervision and mutual recognition. On the basis of these
principles, "credit institutions" are entitled to engage in, on a community-wide basis,
any or all of the following activities, provided that such activities are covered by the
home state authorization: acceptance of deposits from the public; lending; trading

1995

INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION

the purposes of the Investment Services Directive was to ensure that
non-banks not covered by the Second Banking Directive were not put
at an unfair competitive disadvantage in relation to banks which had
the benefit of the European passport. 3 ' Nonetheless, since the Second Banking Directive, by and large, has already been implemented,
credit institutions do have an advantage over non-banks inasmuch as
the former have the benefit of the European passport as of January
1993"'" whereas national legislation to implement the ISD need not
be effective until December 31, 1995."'
Prior to the 1993 adoption of the ISD, the European Commission
engaged in a heated debate over its terms. 316 One group of member
states, led by France, supported an amendment to the Investment
Services Directive to restrict investment firms from engaging in "off-

transferable securities, money market instruments, options and futures, foreign exchange, and exchange and interest rate instruments; providing investment and financial advisory services; participating in stock issues and providing services related
to such issues. Id. at Preamble, Annex, and art. 18. Other activities credit institutions may engage in on a community-wide basis include financial leasing; money
transmission services; issuing and administering means of payment (e.g., bankers'
drafts); issuing guarantees and commitments; money brokering; safekeeping and safe
custody services; and credit reference services. Id., Annex. Banks may engage in
other activities (i.e., those not included in the Annex) to the extent permitted by the
Treaty of Rome. Second Banking Directive, supra, Preamble. A credit institution may
only engage in the activities that are covered by its authorization from its home
country. Banks operating under the Second Banking Directive may provide all such
services, including investment services, authorized by the home member state, without obtaining an additional license under the Investment Services Directive. Banks
providing investment services in member states would be subject, however, to other
provisions of the Investment Services Directive. Articles 2, no. 4; 8, no. 2; 10 (prudential rules adopted by home state); 11 (host state rules of conduct); 12 (first paragraph); 14, nos. 3 (transactions on regulated markets) and 4 (opt out of same); 15
(access to regulated markets including stock exchanges); 19 and 20 of the Investment Services Directive apply to investment firms that are credit institutions authorized by their banking license to render investment services. See art. 2, no. 1. It is
expected that competition among EU states will lead to wide acceptance of "universal" (combined commercial and investment) banking.
313. THE SECURITIES ASSOCIATION, INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS, 16 (March 1989) [hereinafter SECURITIES ASSOCIATION].
314. It may be possible to mitigate the effect of this regulatory disadvantage
through the use of affiliate corporations. For example, investment firms may find it
desirable to form a banking subsidiary in an EU country. Developments on the Capital Adequacy Directive, FIN. REG. REP., Nov. 18, 1991, at 235. Also, securities firms
which are 90 percent owned subsidiaries of banks may have the ability to provide
Community-wide services, including investment banking services, by virtue of the
banking licenses of their parents, inasmuch as the Second Banking Directive extends
the banking passport to 90 percent owned subsidiaries in certain cases. David
Barnard, Developments in the European Community and the United Kingdom, in
INT'L SECURITIES MARKETS 181, 193 n. 42 (743 PLI 1991) [hereinafter Barnard I];
Second Banking Directive, supra note 312, at art. 18(2).
315. Investment Services Directive, supra note 310, at art. 31.
316. London, AIBD Opposes Plan to Amend EC Directive, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28,
1991, at 30.
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exchange" trading.317 Other countries, such as Britain and Germany,
strenuously opposed France's initiative which they viewed as inconsistent with their loosely regulated off-exchange markets."' The ISD, as
adopted in 1993, allows member states to require transactions to be
carried out on a "regulated market."3"9 However, in this event member states must give residents the right (subject to certain conditions)
not to comply with the requirement "and have the transactions carried
out away from a regulated market."3 20 Another issue contributing to
the impasse over the ISD was the issue of transparency - the extent
to which trade information must be disclosed to the public and the
timing of such disclosure. The matter was resolved in 1993 by adopting
minimum standards but leaving considerable discretion to the regulatory authorities of each member state.321
The Investment Services Directive provides for a home state license that will allow investment firms to provide in any member state
the investment services that are authorized by the home member
state.3 22 An investment firm will be able to provide investment ser-

317. Pan-European Share Markets: More Matter, Less Art, ECONOMIST, Dec. 8,
1990, at 86; Finance Ministers Deadlocked On Off-Exchange Trading Regulations,
INT'L SEC. REG. REP. (BNA) 6 (Dec. 1990); Off-Exchange Trade Compromise Unlikely to Succeed, INT'L SEC. REG. REP. (BNA) 4 (Jan. 14, 1991).
318. Id.; Clarkson, EC States Continue War Over Investment Regime, REUTERS,
Dec. 14, 1990.
319. Investment Services Directive, supra note 310, at art. 14, no. 3.
320. Id. at art. 14, no. 4. "Member States may make the exercise of this right
subject to express authorization, taking into account investors' differing needs for
protection and in particular the ability of professional and institutional investors to
act in their own best interests." Id. Prior to adoption of the ISD, a commentator
observed that "[piractitioners in the Eurobond markets are .. . concerned that the
ability to opt out may be hedged around with restrictions, and would like to see a
specific exemption from the so called 'concentration' provisions for Eurosecurities."
David Barnard, The Evolving Pace of Regulation of The Financial Services Industry
in the European Community, in INT'L SECURITIES MARKETS 212 (PLI 1993) [hereinafter Barnard II].
321. Investment Services Directive, supra note 310, at art. 21. The U.S. has almost immediate reporting of trade data for reported securities on the consolidated
tape. Roberta Karmel, The Stalled Investment Services Directive, N.Y.L.J., June 18,
1992, at 1, 3.
322. Investment Services Directive, supra note 310, at art. 3 and 12. An "investment firm" is any legal (as opposed to natural) person whose regular occupation
or business is to provide any "investment service." Id. at art. 1, no. 2. Member
states may consider natural persons to be "investment firms" under certain circumstances. Id. One commentator points out that there has been a "continuing debate
over whether the single license should be granted to 'natural persons' as opposed
to investment firms. Some member states worry that it may be impossible to separate the capital of the business from that of the owner. However, the counter-argument is that to discriminate against natural persons is contrary to the spirit of the
EC Treaty." Barnard II, supra note 320, at 233 n. 67. "Investment service" is defined below. The 'home member state' is the member state where the investment
firm has its registered office, or its head office if it does not have a registered office.
Investment Services Directive, supra note 310, at art. 1 n. 6. If the investment firm
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vices directly or by establishing a branch in another member state.3
The following are "services" encompassed within the directive: receiving and transmitting, on behalf of investors, orders for securities
(and other specified instruments); dealing in such securities or instruments for the firm's own account; portfolio management; and underwriting or placements.3 24 The investment firm may render only those
services specified in its authorization. If an investment firm is licensed
to render any of the services indicated above (i.e., those referenced in
Annex A to the ISD), the home state may also authorize the firm to
provide certain "non-core services" (i.e., those specified in Annex C to
the ISD). 32 5 The investment firm may provide the foregoing services
with respect to: transferable securities; units in undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities; money market instruments; financial futures contracts, including cash-settled instruments;
forward interest-rate agreements; interest rate, currency and equity
swaps; and options on any of the foregoing, including options on currency and interest rates.3 2' A controversial provision requires host

is a natural person, the home member state is the member state where that person's head office is situated.
323. Investment Services Directive, supra note 310, at art. 14 n. 1. The procedures for establishing a branch and for providing services are set forth in Article 17
and 18, respectively. In Dec. 1990, Italy passed securities legislation which introduced a new financial intermediary, see Italy Reforms Securities Market, DOING BusINESS IN EUROPE , Jan. 14, 1991, at 1. and enacted secondary legislation in July
1991. The new legislation requires any firm desiring to render securities business in
Italy to act through a locally incorporated subsidiary. The U.K government among
others complained to the EU on grounds that the requirement to conduct securities
business through a subsidiary violates the Treaty of Rome. Italy, United Kingdom:
UK Government Complains to EC about Italian Securities Law, DOING BusINESS IN
EUROPE, Jan. 14, 1991, at 865.
324. The exact language of the directive should be consulted concerning the services which may be rendered. Investment Services Directive, supra note 310, at
Annex, Section A.
325. Id. at art. 3, no. 1. The non-core services include custodial, safekeeping and
administrative services with respect to securities and other specified financial instruments; extending margin under certain circumstances; financial, investment and
M&A advice; services related to underwriting; and foreign exchange services related
to investment services. For the precise non-core services, see Id. at Annex, Section C.
Authorization within the meaning of this Directive may in no case be granted for
services covered only by Section C of the Annex. Id. at art. 3, n. 1.
326. Id at Section B. As stated above, pursuant to the Second Banking Directive,
credit institutions will be able, among other things, to trade securities and participate in stock issues on the basis of their banking license, if authorized by the home
state. A bank may provide these services on the basis of its banking license (if covered in its authorization) without obtaining additional authorization under the Investment Services Directive. Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Investment Services in the Securities Field, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 298) 6, 9
(1989); Lobl and Werner, 1992 Effects on Securities Regulation and Mergers and
Acquisitions in the European Community, 21 ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 9, 16 (1989).
Thus, for example, a German bank which was authorized by the banking authorities
to engage in securities business would not also be required to be authorized by a
securities regulator. Securities Association, supra note 311, at 17. Certain provisions
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member states to grant access by investment firms from other member
states to membership of stock exchanges and "regulated markets" in
their country.327 This provision applies to banks as well as non-bank
investment firms," although there is a transition provision for
banks.3" The provision also applies to regulated markets that operate without a physical presence.uO "Member states shall abolish any
national rules or laws or rules of regulated markets which limit the
number of persons allowed access thereto."' Investment firms must
have the choice of becoming members of regulated markets or having
access thereto either directly, by setting up branches in the host state,
or indirectly, through subsidiaries or acquisitions.3 2
Investment firms are required to be authorized by their home
state but not the host state prior to providing investment services.'
To obtain home state authorization, a person must apply to the home
state, furnish a plan of operations, satisfy capital requirements,3

of the Investment Services Directive would apply to such activities, however. Investment Services Directive, supra note 310, at art. 2, No. 1. For example, the "prudential" rules of the Investment Services Directive would apply to all institutions doing
securities business, whether banks or non-banks. ISD, art. 2, no. 1, art. 10. See also
Id. at art. 11 (conduct of business); SECURITIES ASSOCIATION, supra note 313, at 18.
327. Investment Services Directive, supra note 310, at art. 15. The right of access
applies when investment firms are authorized for brokerage (execution of orders
other than for own account) and dealing (dealing for own account). Id. The host
state must also ensure that such investment firms have access to membership of
clearing and settlement systems of the host state exchanges or markets which are
available to members of such exchanges and markets. Id. A "regulated market" is a
market for securities or certain other financial instruments that is so designated by
the home state, functions regularly, and is regulated as described in Article 1, no.
13. Id. at art. 1.
328. Id. at art. 2. Article 15 (among others) applies to credit institutions the
authorization of which covers one or more of the investment services listed in Section A of the Annex. Id. at art. 2, no.1. See generally Kellaway, EC Investment Market Plan Hits Trouble, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1990, at 3. Stock exchanges in some
countries do not allow banks to join as members except through a separate securities subsidiary. Developments on the Capital Adequacy Directive, FIN. REG. REP., Nov.
18, 1991, at 320. The resolution of the issue in the ISD as adopted "will result in a
major change for some EC countries and it will be interesting to see whether it will
result in major over-capacity in some markets, as in the UK after Big Bang and the
deregulation of the London Stock Exchange." Barnard II, supra note 320, at 213.
329. Investment Services Directive, supra note 310, at art. 15, no. 3. States that,
at the time the ISD was adopted, do not grant banks direct access to stock exchanges or other regulated markets may continue to require access only through "specialized subsidiaries" until the end of 1996. Id. Spain, Greece and Portugal may extend
the period until the end of 1999. Id.
330. Id. at art. 15, n. 4.
331. Id. at art. 15, n. 1. "If, by virtue of its legal structure or its technical capacity, access to a regulated market is limited, the Member State concerned shall ensure that its structure and capacity are regularly adjusted." Id.
332. Id. at art. 15, n. 2.
333. Investment Services Directive, supra note 310, at art. 3.
334. Capital requirements that will be applicable to investment firms are treated
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and disclose the names of principal owners who must satisfy home
state suitability requirements. 35 While the directive allows member
states to license subsidiaries of companies governed by the law of nonEU countries, it establishes a procedure similar to that of the Second
Banking Directive for monitoring the treatment of EU investment
firms in third countries.336 Member states, subject to review by the
Council, may limit or suspend the licensing of firms from third countries, except for the establishment of subsidiaries by investment firms
already authorized in the EU or the acquisition of shares of EU firms
by such previously authorized firms.337 The Investment Services Directive expressly allows member states to license subsidiaries of companies governed by the law of non-EU countries. Member states may
not apply to branches of non-EU investment firms provisions that
result in more favorable treatment than that accorded to branches of
member state investment firms.338
The directive requires compliance with the initial and other capital requirements of the Capital Adequacy Directive. 39 Like the Bank
Directive, the Investment Services Directive grants primary supervisory responsibility over an investment firm to the home country. The
directive requires home member states to adopt "prudential" rules
which investment firms "shall observe at all times."3" These "prudential rules" must govern the following aspects of investment firms'
business, among others: administrative and accounting procedures and
internal control; safeguarding investors' funds and securities; recordkeeping; and conflicts of interest.3" It was expected that, at least initially, the EU would continue to allow the host state to regulate some
aspects of investment firms' business (e.g., conduct of business, advertising). 2 There have been suggestions that "conduct of business"
rules eventually would be the subject of another EU directive.' As
adopted in 1993, the Investment Services Directive requires member
states to promulgate rules of conduct applicable to investment
firms.3" "Without prejudice to any decisions to be taken in the context of the harmonization of the rules of conduct, their implementation

in the Capital Adequacy Directive.
335. Investment Services Directive, supra note 310, at art. 3 and 4.
336. Id. at art. 7. See Levintin, The Treatment of United States Financial Services
Firms in Post-1992 Europe, 31 HARV. INT'L L. J. 515 (1990).
337. Investment Services Directive, supra note 310, at art. 7, no. 5.
338. Id. at art. 5.
339. Id. at art. 8.
340. Id. at art. 10.
341. Id. See also Id. at art. 12 concerning compensation (insurance) funds for the
protection of investors.
342. Appel, EEC-1992 and the Securities Industry, 23 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG.,
Apr. 11, 1990, at 70.
343. Lobl and Warner, supra note 327, at 17; New Directive Underway on Capital,
Market Risk, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., June 7, 1989, at 9.
344. Investment Services Directive, supra note 310, at art. 11.
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and the supervision of compliance with them shall remain the responsibility of the Member State in which a service is provided."3 5
The -directive establishes an important grandfathering provisions
for investment firms already operating in EU countries.' Firms operating with a member state license before the end of 1995 will be
deemed licensed for purposes of the ISD if the home state laws require
as a condition of engaging in such activities compliance with applicable
capitalization and suitability requirements.34 7 Member states must,
by July 1, 1995, adopt implementing legislation that must become effective no later than December 31, 1995.'
B.

CapitalAdequacy

In 1993, the Council, based upon an earlier proposal by the European Commission, 349 adopted a directive ("Capital Adequacy Directive" or "CAD") concerning the capital adequacy of investment firms
and credit institutions.3 ° Member states are required to apply some
of the provisions of the Capital Adequacy Directive to credit institutions as well as investment firms.35 States may adopt measures more
stringent than those required by the directive if they choose.352 Investment firms must have initial capital of at least ECU 730,000, 53
unless they fall within one of the exceptions set forth in Article 3 of
the CAD. Firms engaging only in brokerage or portfolio management,
and which (with certain exceptions) do not deal in financial instruments for their own account, or underwrite financial instruments of a
firm commitment basis, must have initial capital of at least ECU
125,000. 3' The initial capitalization requirement decreases to ECU
50,000 where the firm is not authorized to hold clients' funds or securities, to deal for its own account or to underwrite issues on a firm
commitment basis. 355 These minimum capital requirements do not
apply to credit institutions, which are governed in this respect by the
capital provisions of banking directives. 3' A grandfathering provision

345. Id. at no. 2.
346. Id. at art. 30, no.1.
347. Id. at art. 30, n. 1, (requiring compliance with conditions equivalent to articles 3(3) (initial capital, reputation of managers) and 4 (suitability of owners)).
348. Id. at art. 31.
349. Proposal for a Council Directive on Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms
and Credit Institutions, COM(90) 141 Final--SYN 257, 1990 O.J. (C 153).
350. Council Directive 93/6, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 1 [hereinafter Capital Adequacy
Directive].
351. Id. at art. 1 No. 1.
352. Id. at art. 1, no. 2.
353. Id. at art. 3, n. 3.
354. Id. at art. 3, n. 1.
355. Id. at art. 3, n. 2.
356. Article 3, by its terms, applies only to "investment firms," the definition of
which, in article 2, excludes credit institutions. See also EC Briefings: Capital Ade-
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is available for firms "in existence before this Directive is applied."357
In general, an investment firm's capital may not fall below that initially required for authorization."s
The Capital Adequacy Directive requires both investment firms
and credit institutions to maintain a specified amount of capital for
risks associated with certain activities, including trading activities.35 s
These institutions must provide a specified amount of capital to cover
four categories of risk: position risk; counterparty/settlement risk;
foreign exchange risk; and large exposures. 3" These risks must be
quantified in accordance with the directive, the sum of them constituting the "own funds" (capital) requirement. The capital requirement
of investment firms may not be less than the amount prescribed in Annex IV to the CAD (generally, one-quarter of fixed overhead for the
preceding year).3"' Member states may choose to allow institutions
(banks and investment firms) to calculate capital requirements for
trading activities in accordance with the Solvency Ratio Directive362
rather than Annexes I and II of the CAD under certain circumstances ."
VII.

A.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS

Introduction

The International Organization of Securities Commissions and
Similar Organizations held its 1994 annual meeting in Tokyo but
made little tangible progress toward the internationalization of securities regulation. Future annual meetings are scheduled for Paris, 1995
and Montreal, 1996. It had previously appeared that IOSCO might
make a significant contribution to the development of capital adequacy
standards yet the realization of this goal proved illusory in 1992 and
1993. At present, IOSCO presently serves as the principal forum for
the study and discussion on international securities issues but does not
have a mandate to adopt binding international principles. In 1993, the
President's Committee adopted a resolution calling for members to

quacy, INT'L FIN. L. REv., June 1990, at 44. Article 8 of the Second Banking Directive requires initial capital of at least ECU 5 million, with certain exceptions. Bank
capital requirements in the European Union should be viewed in context of the
development of international norms by the Basle Committee of the Bank for International Settlements and the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO).
357. Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 350, at art. 3, n. 5.
358. Id. at art. 3, n. 8.
359. Id. at art. 4.
360. Id. at Annexes 1-4.
361. Id. at art. 4, n. 1.
362. Council Directive 89/647, 1989 O.J. (L. 386) 14.
363. Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 350, at art. 4, n. 6.
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accept cash flow statements prepared in accordance with a standard
developed by the International Accounting Standards Committee. Subsequently, the SEC decided to allow foreign issuers to use the international standard without a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP."
Despite its American origins, IOSCO has become a truly international organization. The 14th annual conference in Venice was attended by representative from all the major financial centers, including
Germany and Japan,3"5 and membership has increased steadily since
that time. The charter members of IOSCO are the countries of the
American continent plus Quebec and Ontario; non-charter members include other countries that have joined the organization. "Affiliate"
membership is a category created for self-regulatory organizations.3"
While affiliate members do not have voting privileges and may not
attend meetings of the President's Committee or the Executive Committee, they are allowed to be members of the Technical Committee
(see below) and its working parties.367 The category of "associate
member" was created to allow participation in the President's Committee and the Technical Committee of organizations of regulators or
other government regulators where a country already has a full member.3" The total number of members (in all categories) in 1993 was
364. Release 7053, supra note 204, at 85,205. The SEC subsequently proposed to
accept another international standard relating to business combinations.
365. In 1988, Japan, West Germany, Austria and Turkey joined IOSCO. See Regulators Agree to Move Cautiously on Enforcement, Accounting Standards, INT'L SEC.

REG. REP., Nov. 11, 1988, at 1. In 1991, IOSCO admitted the following as voting
members: Amman, Kenya, Luxembourg and Mauritius. In 1992, IOSCO accepted four
new voting members: Bermuda, Ivory Coast, Malta and South Africa. In 1993,
IOSCO accepted five new voting members: the Bahrain Stock Exchange; the Central
Bank of Ireland; the Securities Commission of Malaysia; the Corporate Law Authority of Pakistan; and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka. Final
Communique of the XVIIth Annual Conference of IOSCO, Oct. 28, 1993, at 8 [hereinafter 18th Communique].
366. IOSCO Sees Major Effort on Futures and Ethics in Chile, INT'L SEC. REG.

REP., July 16, 1990, at 265; IOSCO Drops Overview of Crash Studies, Will Focus on
Working Group Findings, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Oct. 12, 1988, at 116.
367. IOSCO in Chile, supra note 366. As of July 1990, there were applications for
affiliate membership pending from The New York Stock Exchange, Sidney Futures
Exchange, Investment Dealers' Association of International Bond Dealers, and the
Australian Stock Exchange. Id. In 1991 IOSCO admitted the following as affiliate
members: Mercado Abierto Electronico of Argentina, Tokyo Stock Exchange, Japan
Securities Dealers Association, Oslo Stock Exchange, National Futures Association of
the United States, the CBOT and the Options Clearing Corporation of the United
States. IOSCO admitted six new affiliate members in 1992: Bolsa de Comercio of
Buenas Aires; the Vienna Stock Exchange; Bolsa de Valores de Sao Paulo; the Korea
Stock Exchange; the Korea Securities Dealers Association; and the Thailand Stock
Exchange. Final Communique of the XVIIth Annual Conference of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions, Oct. 29, 1992, at 9 [hereinafter 17th Com-

munique]. IOSCO accepted three new affiliate members in 1993: The Consiglio di
Borsa of Italy, the Taiwan Stock Exchange, and the London International Financial
Futures and Options Exchange. Id. at 8.
368. IOSCO in Chile, supra note 366. In 1988, The U.S. Commodities Futures
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110.369

The organizational structure of IOSCO includes the General Assembly, a General Secretary (and General Secretariat located at the
Quebec Securities Commission,) and various committees. The President's Committee consists of the presidents of all of the member agencies, while the Executive Committee consists of elected members."'
There are Regional Standing Committees, a Consultative Committee" 1 and a Development Committee."' The Technical Committee,
constituted by the Executive Committee in May 1987, focuses on identifying and solving international regulatory problems, while the Executive Committee administers the affairs of the organization.7 3 The
Technical Committee consists of representatives from the leading financial centers.374 This Committee has established a number of
Working Parties to concentrate on specific substantive issues. As of
October 1993, these subgroups of the Technical Committee included
the following Working Parties: (1) multinational disclosure and accounting which has a subgroup on accounting and auditing standards;
(2) regulation of secondary markets; (3) regulation of market intermediaries; (4) enforcement and the exchange of information; and (5) investment management, formed in 1993. These Working Parties, and

Trading Commission and the Association of Swiss Stock Exchanges were admitted as
Associate Members. Regulators Agree to Move Cautiously on Enforcement, Accounting
Standards, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Nov. 23, 1988, at 134. The British Columbia
Securities Commission and the North American Securities Administrators Association
are also Associate Members. IOSCO in Chile, supra note 366. In 1992 IOSCO accepted the Financial Supervision Commission of the Isle of Man; the Financial Services Department of the States of Jersey and the Stock Exchange Commission of the
Zurich Cantonal Department of Economics as Associate Members in 1992. 17th Communique, supra note 367, at 9. The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission of Japan became an associate member in 1993.
369. 18th Communique, supra note 365, at 8.
370. 17th Communique, supra note 367, at 1. Regional Committees and the Development Committee are also represented on the Executive Committee.
371. The Consultative Committee, which "provides specialized worldwide input
into the organization," IOSCO Officials Meet to Map Out Harmonization Effort,
INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Dec. 6, 1990, at 1, was established in 1988 and is composed
of global self-regulatory organizations. IOSCO in Chile, supra note 366.
372. See Harmony and Wariness Coexist at IOSCO's Conference in Venice, INT'L
SEC. REG. REP., Sept. 27, 1989, at 1. The purpose of the Development Committee is
to promote the development of emerging markets, "in particular the exchange of
information and the implementation of common standards." 17th Communique, supra
note 367, at 5. The Development Committee has the following six working groups:
Working Group on Clearing and Settlement; Working Group on Internationalization;
Working Group on Disclosure; Working Group on Institutional Investors; Working
Group on Privatization; and Working Group on Derivatives.
373. IOSCO Drops Overview of Crash Studies, Will Focus on Working Group Findings, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Oct. 12, 1988, at 213, 216.
374. As of 1993, the Technical Committee included representatives from Australia,
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Mexico, Ontario, Quebec, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
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the substantive issues they are addressing, are discussed below.
B.

Substantive Agenda
1.

Disclosure and Accounting

IOSCO's substantive agenda consists primarily of eight substantive items,375 one of which is the harmonization of requirements applicable in the case of multinational offerings. The Working Party
studying this area started its inquiry with the empirical question of
why offerings were not made in certain jurisdictions despite investor
interest in the offering.37 The Working Party's report relating to
multinational equity offerings was adopted at LOSCO's 14th annual
meeting.377 The report, recommending development of a regime that
would allow use of a single disclosure document in multijurisdictional
offerings,378 discussed two principal avenues for reaching the goal of
a single prospectus, namely: (i) harmonization of disclosure standards,
and (ii) reciprocity (acceptance of home country or predominant market
requirements).379 The report also urged the development of internationally accepted accounting and auditing standards upon which a
universal disclosure document could be based.' Finally, the report
recommended the coordination of national timetables for securities
offerings, as well as a study of periodic information that could be used
as the basis for a new issue prospectus; a study of the proper role of
stabilization practices; a study of greater standardization in the area of
resales of privately placed securities; and an annual survey of regulatory changes in financial centers that could affect multinational offerings.3" ' During the 16th Annual Conference, the Technical Committee
released a report entitled ComparativeAnalysis of Disclosure Regimes
and study entitled A Status Report on InternationalAccounting and
Auditing Standards. The final communique for the 17th Annual Meeting states that the objective of the Working Party on Multinational
Disclosure and Accounting is, "so far as is consistent with maintaining

375. International Equity Offerings; Accounting and Auditing; Capital Adequacy;
Off-Market Trading; Memoranda of Understanding; Clearance and Settlement; Futures Market Regulation; and Ethics.
376. Regulators Agree to Move Cautiously on Enforcement, Accounting Standards,
INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Nov. 23, 1988, at 1.
377. Harmonization and Wariness Coexist at IOSCO's Conference in Venice,
INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Sept. 27, 1989, at 1.
378. Roberta Karmel, The IOSCO Venice Conference, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1989, at
16.
379. Technical Committee Issues Disclosure Recommendations, INT'L SEC. REG.
REP., Sept. 27, 1989, at 4.
380. Ruder Says IOSCO Report Offers Blueprint for Global Offerings, INT'L SEC.
REG. REP., Sept. 27, 1989, at 10.
381. Karmel, supra note 378; Technical Committee Issues Disclosure Regulations,
INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Sept. 27, 1990, at 11.
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the quality of regulation necessary for the protection of investors, to
actively promote regulation which facilitates the process whereby
world class issuers can raise capital in the most cost effective and
efficient way in all capital markets where investor demand exists."3"2
The final communique for the 18th annual meeting reiterated this
proposition, except that it deleted the term "world class."383
At the 13th annual meeting, IOSCO refused to endorse the recommendation of a workshop that called for the adoption of common international accounting and auditing standards.3 ' Yet at the following
annual meeting, the Secretary General of IOSCO stated, over optimistically, "'we expect to complete the process of writing international
standards for securities industry accounting and auditing by
1992.' "385 The European Communities have, of course, been working
on their own accounting standards, and IOSCO realized that the adoption of standards by the EC that differ from those ultimately endorsed
by IOSCO could destroy the hope of an internationally acceptable standard.' By 1992, the Working Party on Multinational Disclosure and
Accounting had completed a review of the auditing standards of the
International Auditing Standards Committee (LAPC) and called for recognition of such standards by the international community. The Presidents Committee of IOSCO adopted a resolution to this effect, urging
members of IOSCO to recognize International Accounting Standards
("LASs") for use in cross-border offerings and continuous reporting by
foreign issuers.8 The Working Party has been involved in an analysis of accounting standards developed by the International Accounting
Standards Committee."
In 1993, the President's Committee resolved that members take all necessary steps to accept cash flow statements prepared in accordance with IAS 7 as an alternative to domestic
standards in connection with cross-border offerings and reporting by
foreign issues.389 As part of a recent rule-making action, the SEC,
taking its cue from IOSCO, decided to accept cash flow statements prepared in accordance with International Accounting Standard No. 7,
without a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP. s°
382. 17th Communique, supra note 367, at 2.
383. 18th Communique, supra note 365, at 2.
384. Regulators Agree to Move Cautiously on Enforcement, Accounting Issues,
INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Nov. 23, 1988, at 1.
385. Harmony and Wariness Coexist at IOSCO's Conference in Venice, INT'L
SEC. REG. REP., Sept. 27, 1989, at 56.
386. See IOSCO: EC Moves Could Doom Global Accounting Harmony, INT'L SEC.
REG. REP., Jan. 17, 1990, at 6.
387. 17th Communique, supra note 367, at 3. See also Auditing Standards Win
Approval From IOSCO for Multinational Reporting, SEC. REG. L. REP., Nov. 6, 1992,
at 1730. The full membership of IOSCO also passed a resolution urging recognition
of international auditing standards. Id. These resolutions do not address the questions of auditor qualifications and independence. Id.
388. Id.
389. 18th Communique, supra note 365, at 3.
390. Simplification of Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign Corn-
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Regulation of Secondary Markets

The Working Party on the Regulation of Secondary Markets has
been engaged primarily in a study of the relationship between cash
and derivative markets for equities.39 ' In 1992, IOSCO released a report entitled Report on ContractDesign of Derivative Products on Stock
392
Indices and Measures to Minimize Market Disruption.
A Report entitled Mechanisms to Exchange Open and Timely Communication Between Market Authorities on Related Cash and Derivative Markets
During Periods of Market Disruption was released at the 1993 meeting. This Working Party also prepared a report on so-called market
"transparency" (disclosure of trade information) and will be considering
the feasibility of developing minimum international transparency standards.39
3.

Regulation of Market Intermediaries

In the early 1990s, IOSCO accelerated its effort to coordinate its
positions on capital adequacy with other international regulatory authorities. Toward this end IOSCO, at the 16th Annual Meeting, decided to send a memorandum concerning its views on capital adequacy to
the Basle Committee of Banking Supervision, 394 and thereafter had
several meetings with the Basle Committee. 95 IOSCO announced, in
1992, that it "welcomed" the opportunity to hold further discussions
with the Basle Committee concerning "the use of subordinated loans
and the trading book versus the investment account."396 In 1992, the
President's Committee adopted "Principles Governing the Supervision
of Financial Conglomerates."39 7
In the memorandum to the Basle Committee, the Technical Committee stated that it was willing to conclude an agreement with Basle
designed to establish an international standard for market risk re-

panies; Safe Harbors for Public Announcements of Unregistered Offerings and Broker-Dealer Research Reports, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-7029, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 85,252 (Nov. 3, 1993).
391. 17th Communique, supra note 367, at 3.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is an advisory body engaged
in an effort to develop rules for regulation of international banking. GAO, SECURITIES MARKETS:

CHALLENGES TO HARMONIZING

INTERNATIONAL

CAPITAL STANDARDS

REMAIN 35 (1992). The Committee adopted the so-called Basle Accord in 1988 which
its members regard as binding although it is not enforceable as a treaty. Id.
395. Bank, Stock Regulators Near Agreement on Global Capital Levels for Securities, SEC. REG. L. REP., Feb. 7, 1992, at 170; Breeden and Corrigan Issue Statement
on International Capital Standards, 92-23 THE SEC TODAY, Feb. 4, 1992, at 1.
396. 17th Communique, supra note 367, at 4.
397. Id. See also Ralph Aldwinckle, The Regulation of InternationalFinancial Conglomerates (Oct. 29, 1992) (paper presented at 17th Annual IOSCO Conference).
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quirements and a definition of permitted regulatory capital.39
IOSCO envisioned an agreement that would establish minimum levels
of market risk requirements for internationally active securities intermediaries. 3 One of the principal purposes of IOSCO's overture toward Basle was its recognition that as internationally active banks
become increasingly involved in securities activities, the old regulatory
dichotomies between banks and securities firms tend to become obsolete.'
The Technical Committee indicated in its memorandum to
Basle that it would be willing to adopt a "building block" approach to
capital adequacy which carved out specific risk requirements from
those applicable to general market risk. 4" The Technical Committee
would support the building block approach with respect to market risk
requirements for debt securities. 2 The SEC indicated it would not
oppose this approach as a minimum standard but would retain its
current net capital rule for equities which would require a higher standard. 4 " "There are differences of view about the acceptability of the
building block approach as regards equity securities,"4 4 but the Technical Committee recommended that in any event the international
community should work out an internationally acceptable minimum
capital standard relating to trading in equity securities. 45 For the
"sake of convergence," a majority of the Technical Committee indicated
at the 16th Annual Meeting that it could accept a minimum standard
for highly liquid equities of four percent of capital on gross positions
and eight percent of capital on net positions (netting long and short
positions).' The memorandum to the Basle Committee also sets forth
the Technical Committee's views on the use of subordinated regulatory loan capital by securities firms.
At a subsequent meeting of the Technical Committee, then SEC
Chairman Breeden reportedly angered other committee members by

398. Final Communique of the XVI Conference of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions, Sept. 26, 1991, at Appendix A [hereinafter 16th Communique].
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. Most countries have a single capital standard and do not use the building block approach which requires separate calculations for gross and net positions.
Securities Regulation, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 1991, at 177.
402. 16th Communique, supra note 398.
403. The SEC's approach is referred to as the "comprehensive approach" pursuant to which the capital requirement is a percentage of the portfolio. See Technical
Committee Sends Capital Memorandum to Banking Supervisors, INT'L SEC. REG.
REP., Oct. 7, 1991, at 4. The building block approach treats market and credit risk
separately. Id.
404. 16th Communique, supra note 398, at Appendix A.
405. The 1991 IOSCO Conference, FIN. REG. REP., Oct. 1991, at 245.
406. 16th Communique, supra note 398, at Appendix A; Securities Regulation
supra, note 401. (For equities that are not "highly liquid," the requirement suggested
was eight percent and eight percent as opposed to four percent and eight percent.)
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indicating opposition to the building block approach, in favor of the
"comprehensive" approach."° At the 1992 Annual Meeting in London,
Breeden opposed several aspects of IOSCO's proposed capital standard,"5 in particular the appropriate level of capital to cover risks of
loss on equity securities. The principal issue involves the extent of
capital that should be required in the case of long positions in equities
hedged by short positions. 9 According to the Financial Times, "Mr
Breeden ... insists that long and short positions in equities are not
perfect hedges, and can leave securities firms with substantial exposure."4 1 Mr. Breeden also reportedly allowed that the EU's capital
requirements, which are similar to those proposed by IOSCO, are
"highly unsafe,"4 ' a pronouncement that, not surprisingly, drew fire
from EU spokesmen.41 2 By the end of the 1992 Annual Meeting the
issue of capital adequacy remained unresolved,4 1 and substantial
progress is not expected in the short term.
4. Enforcement and the Exchange of Information
In 1992, the Working Party on Enforcement and the Exchange of
Information completed a report on money laundering designed to facilitate measures in member countries to curb money laundering through
securities and futures markets. This Working Party is also studying
"boiler-room operations" and will be examining "the enforcement issues
raised by screen-based trading."4"4 In 1991, the President's Committee released "Principles for Memoranda of Understanding." The President's Committee adopted a resolution in 1993 concerning transnational retail securities and futures fraud.
5.

Investment Management

In 1992, IOSCO announced it was considering forming a Working
Party concerning the field of investment management. 45" The Work-

407. Disagreement Plagues Committee Discussions on Harmonized International
Capital Standards, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., July 17, 1992, at 238. Again, under the
comprehensive approach a percentage of the portfolio serves as the capital requirement, whereas the building block approach "allows securities firms to offset their
long and short positions." Id.
408. Weston and Corrigan, Breeden Opposes IOSCO Capital Standard, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 1992, at 19.
409. Hopes Dwindle for New Agreement on Capital Requirements, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
28. 1992, at 24.
410. Id.
411. Weston and Corrigan, supra note 408.
412. Weston and Corrigan, Sir Leon Brittan Joins Row Over Capital Standards,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1992, at 22.
413. Corrigan, SEC and Regulators Deadlocked Over Capital Requirements, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1992, at 26.
414. 17th Communique, supra note 367, at 4.
415. Id.
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407

ing Party was constituted in 1993. It is presently concentrating on
open-end collective investment schemes.
THE CENTRAL ASIAN
VIII. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND
41 6

REPUBLICS

A.

The Russian Federation

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the massive transformation from state to private property ownership, the recently formed
Russian Republics have begun to enact a body of securities and corporate laws designed to effect and regulate these sweeping changes.
While such laws are in the process of formation, they are oftentimes
incomplete and suffer shortcomings in both scope and enforcement, the
achievement of creating such an extensive corporate and securities
rubric within a few short years should not be overlooked. In the largest
and most prominent of the Russian Republics, the Russian Federation
(or "Russia"), numerous presidential edicts, government decrees and
resolutions have been promulgated addressing a broad range of corporate concerns, including the massive privatization and corporatization
effort and the regulation of joint-stock companies, investment funds,
stock exchanges, foreign investment and shareholders' rights.
While investing in Russia is still a difficult and risky business,
the promulgation of such legislation leads the way to the development
of a more orderly and workable system, more in keeping with international, western and U.S. business standards. Enactment of corporate
and financial legislation is necessary to create and sustain corporate
structures in what will hopefully be the continued development of a
functioning market economy. Such continued and sustained development will be a factor in giving international companies and enterprises
the confidence to make investments and engage in corporate activities
in this region in the years to come.
B.

Privatization

Since reforms began in 1991, it has been reported that 70 percent
of state and municipally controlled industry has been privatized and,
of these enterprises, two-thirds are profitable.4 7 By the end of 1994,
it is projected that between 80 and 85 percent of Russia's small enterprises and shops, of which there are reported to be about one million, 41' are to be privately held, the state having already privatized

416. Prepared by Bonnie H. Weinstein (J.D. 1983, The University of Chicago).
Weinstein is a corporate and securities lawyer practicing in New York and Washington, D.C.
417. Russian Private Sector Dominant, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1994, at All.
418. Id.
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75 percent of its 20,000 medium and large enterprises.419
The Russian privatization effort commenced in July 1991 with the
enactment of the statute entitled, "RF Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises Act"42 ° which, as stated in its preamble, "sets
forth the legal and organizational principles for transforming property
relations in producer goods in the Russian Federation through privatization of state and municipal enterprises, with the aim of creating an
efficient and socially oriented market economy."4 21 Since then numerous additional presidential edicts and legislative enactments have been
promulgated to address the regulation of this massive change of property ownership. Of special significance are presidential edicts issued in
August 1992 and February 1993 which give effect to the system of
privatization vouchers.422
Privatization basically occurs as follows. In the instance of the
privatization of large concerns (defined as enterprises with assets in
excess of 50 million rubles at July 1, 1992, or which employ more than
1,000 workers),4" a privatization plan, whereby the enterprise will be
corporatized into an open joint-stock company, is prepared by the enterprise's management and workers as well as by related state agencies. The plan is then subject to approval by the State Committee for
the Management of State Property (the "Goskomimushchestvo" or
"GKI"), the agency with primary responsibility for privatization. Under
this process, shares representing an equity interest in an enterprise
are first given to the enterprise's employees and managers free of
charge, and oftentimes to the appropriate employee stock fund, with
additional shares offered to these parties at favorable rates. In addition, the local GKI will in many instances retain shares, especially in
the case of "strategic industries" such as aerospace and defense enterprises, often maintaining a controlling interest.4 24 The remaining
shares, which revert to the state property fund, are then permitted to
be purchased publicly through voucher auctions and public tenders by
other Russian citizens, foreigners, and the numerous Russian-based
investment funds which have proliferated since the commencement of

419. Investment Push for Russia, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1994, at All.
420. IF Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises Act, RSFSR Supreme
Soviet Chairman B. Yeltsin, RSFSR House of Soviets, Moscow (July 3, 1991, with
amendments and addenda No. 2930-1, June 5, 1992).
421. Id.
422. See, e.g., Edict Enacting RF System of Privatization Vouchers; Statute of
Privatization Vouchers, RF Presidential Edict No. 914 (Aug. 14, 1992); Measures to
Regulate the Movement and Cancellation of Privatization Vouchers, RF Presidential
Edict No. 216 (Feb. 12, 1993); State Guarantees for Right of Citizens of Russia to
Participation in Privatization, RF President's Edict No. 640 (May 8, 1993).
423. Similar but different legislation and presidential edicts address the privatization of small and medium-sized businesses.
424. PRIVATIZATION IN EMERGING MARKETS, a co-publication by WORLD EQuITY
and the INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION (IFR Publishers, 1993), at 44.
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privatization. In late 1992, the government issued millions of vouchers,
each with a face value of 10,000 rubles, to all Russian citizens. These
vouchers, which were originally set to expire on June 30, 1994, allow
the holders thereof to purchase shares in the enterprise of their choice
or to sell the vouchers to others. Since buying through the voucher
auctions often proved problematic for foreign investors due to conflicting laws and tax considerations, these investors have found tenders an
attractive alternative to share purchase. 425 Since mid-1993 there
have been many successful foreign tenders, whereby a block of shares
is tendered by a particular enterprise to a strategic foreign investor.426 Management is often desirous of foreign partners with complementary business goals as a means ot preventing possible hostile takeover attempts.427 In May 25, 1994, it was reported that 117 million of
the 148 million vouchers that were issued in connection with the privatization process had been collected. 28
A prospectus is required to be distributed to all investors prior to
an equity purchase, and must include financial statements as to the
value of the enterprise. However, because the valuation of the enterprise is based on historical book value, which reflects non-market values established under the Soviet command economy, without accounting for inflation, and generally bears no relation to market values, enterprises may be improperly valued which presents attractive
opportunities for foreign investment. 9 Since financial data included
in the prospectus is largely considered deficient by international accounting standards, a personal knowledge of the business should be acquired and extensive due diligence undertaken prior to investment to
determine the true value of the proposed investment.
June 30, 1994 was scheduled to be the deadline for the conclusion
of the voucher phase, considered to be the first phase of the privatization process, with cash to be substituted in the post-voucher phase.
One of the benefits of using cash is the hope of making foreign investment a less cumbersome process. In addition, in this second phase
many of the former Soviet enterprises are to become fully privatized,
with the state relinquishing its shares of equity ownership. Recently, it
has been determined that there will be continued use of vouchers during a longer transition period. In Moscow, for example, use of the
vouchers has been guaranteed through the end of 1994." °

425. Id.
426. Id. at 45.
427. See, e.g., id., and Russian Shares: Piercing the Veil, ECONOMIST, Mar. 12,
1994, at 90.
428. THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, NO. 23 at 15 (July 6,
1994).
429. E.g., PRIVATIZATION IN EMERGING MARKETS, supra note 424, at 45; Investment Push for Russia, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1994, at All.
430. THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, No. 26 at 5 (July 27,
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Joint-Stock Companies

Under privatization, large enterprises are corporatized into jointstock companies, which are regulated by statute." Pursuant to this
legislation, every such company is required to be registered with the
Ministry of Finance. This legislation operates in much the same way
as state corporate law statutes do in the United States, and includes
requirements relating to organizational structure, shareholders and
the board of directors, authorized capital shares, stock certificates,
dividends and related matters.
D.

The Stock Markets

Shares of stock representing equity interests in former state and
municipal enterprises can be bought and sold on various stock and
commodity exchanges which, while functional, generally operate on a
rudimentary level. There are stock and commodity exchanges in operation in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Vladivostock and other major cities.
On the Moscow Central Stock Exchange (the "Moscow Exchange"
or "Exchange"), trades in stocks (54.5 percent of total sales in 1993)
and bills, a new form of debt security for the Russian market (43.8
percent of total sales in 1993) predominate. 2 In 1993 trades in options represented 0.0001 percent of the Moscow Exchange's activity,
which reflects the underdevelopment of the futures and options markets in Russia generally.' At July 1993, the Moscow Exchange included the stock of 39 of the country's largest commercial banks
(banks, in general, are a popular investment choice for Russians) industrial enterprises and trade companies. 4 Recently, the Exchange
adopted stricter listing requirements despite the short-term effect of
temporarily forfeiting listings to other exchanges with less stringent
requirements." 5 In 1992 transaction volume for the entire year
dropped to 74.9 million rubles compared with transaction volume of
271.8 million rubles for the period from August to September 1991."
Nonetheless, by February 1994, the Exchange regained its preeminence becoming one of the most highly liquid secondary markets in
Russia. In 1993, volume totaled 779.3 rubles, a ten-fold increase from

1994).
431. Enacting the Statute of Joint-Stock Companies; Statute on Joint Stock Companies, RSFSR Council of Ministers Decree, No. 601 (Dec. 25, 1990, as amended by
No. 255, Apr. 15, 1992).
432. 1993 Activities of Moscow Central Stock Exchange, Prospects for 1994, CENTRAL EuRAsIA WEEKLY, Feb. 24, 1994, at 52.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
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the previous year.

7

Despite these successes, the Russian securities markets generally
retain the features of small developing markets, in which primary
offerings are predominant and the volume and liquidity of the secondary market are low. 8 The basic features of the markets include an
underdeveloped material base and infrastructure. In addition, corruption, massive swindles, and fraud have been major problems. 9 In an
attempt to stem the pervasive securities scams, such as the recent and
much documented MMM investment scandal, fraudulent practices, and
irregularities in the securities markets, and institute general
standards with respect to the regulation of the industry, on November
10, 1994, President Yeltsin issued an edict entitled "On Measures for
State Regulation of Securities Market." At the same time the "statute
on the Federal Commission on Securities and the Stock Market under
the Russian Federation Government," was enacted.
The laws were enacted after much debate, infighting, and behind
the scenes manuevering among those with direct and oftentimes competing interests, viz. the Central Bank, the State Property Committee,
the Ministry of Finance, tax regulators, business owners, and an array
of related private and government interests. The promulgation of these
enactments is seen as a compromise between those in favor of strict
government control and the creation of self-regulating mechanisms
advocated by business interests.
Most significantly, the edict authorizes the creation of a federal
securities commission, with broad powers, including the power to regulate and monitor compliance, issue decrees and directives in such connection, and the ability to regulate and license brokers, dealers, and
other industry professionals. The edict requires the licensing and monitoring of banks, insurance companies, and related institutions in their
participation in the securities markets and exchanges. The legislation
authorizes the creation of a system for ensuring investors' rights and
monitoring the compliance of issuing bodies, and creating rules and
regulations for the creation of regional securities commissions. Under
the edict, information issued with respect to securities are to be regulated by the commission.
Importantly, the edict requires that within three months' time,

437. Id.
438. Id. at 52.
439. See, e.g., Russia Warns of Swindles, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1994, at 6; A New
Russia: Now Thrive the Swindlers, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1994, at A10. As one top
Russian official in the Russian Securities and Exchange Commission reported in
response to the recent MMM investment fund scandal, because of a dearth of efficient laws and an abundance of official inertia "the state is incapable" of cleaning up
the securities markets. Russian officials generally claim they have little control over
their securities markets, and cannot effectively prevent securities scandals. Id.
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the Commission submit draft legislation with respect to regulating
criminal violations of the securities laws. In agreement with the central bank, the Commission also is required to adopt measures to stop
entrepeneurial activities undertaken without the appropriate licenses,
ban the issuance and circulation of securities not envisioned by and in
violation of Russian federal laws, and prohibit the issuance and circulation of securities not registered in the prescribed manner.
The "Statute on the Federal Commission's duties include: the
formulation of policy with respect to the development of the securities
markets and the coordination of the activities of the relevant state
organs regarding the same; ratification of the standards for the preparation and issuance of prospectuses and the registration of securities
offerings, including those issued by foreign entities in Russia; formulation of uniform standards with respect to record keeping, and the public circulation of quotations and listing requirements; licensure of professional activity with respect to the securities market; determination
of standards with respect to investment and nonstate pension funds;
and formulation of recommendations with respect to stock exchange
and related market activities.
In addition, the Commission has the authority to establish mandatory in-house capital and other requirements to limit the risks on
operations involving professional participants, to refuse to issue licenses or have such licenses suspended or revoked in instances when it
determines that stock exchanges or other self-regulating institutions
are acting improperly and illegally, carry out spot checks to verify the
validity of issuing bodies and professional participants to insure compliance, as well as to conduct audits and checks of issuing bodies.
E.

Investment Fund Regulation

Investment or mutual funds, which have proliferated in recent
years despite frequent scams associated with them, are licensed by the
Ministry of Finance. The Statute of Investment Funds"' addresses
the registration requirements of all types of these funds, with the exception of specialized privatization investment funds which accumulate
citizens' privatization vouchers and are addressed by separate enactment." An investment fund is deemed to be any publicly held jointstock company the activities of which include engaging in the attraction of capital through the issuance of its own shares, investment of its
own capital in securities of other issues, and trading in securities." 2
The statute requires that the title of the investment fund include the

440. Organization of Securities Market as State and Municipal Enterprises are
Privatized, RF President's Edict No. 1186, including annexes Nos. 1 and 3 to 6
(Oct. 7, 1992) [hereinafter Edict No. 1186].
441. Id. at Annex No. 2.
442. Id. at Annex No. 1.
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words "investment fund" and that the fund's founders adopt bylaws
written in conformity with Model Bylaws, implement a depositary
contract based on a Model Depositary Contract (included as addenda to
the statute),'" elect a board of directors and employ a fund manager,
pursuant to specified requirements.'
In addition to the statutory requirements which apply to jointstock companies, the bylaws which govern investment funds must
specify whether the fund is open-end or closed-end. In addition, the
bylaws must contain an investment declaration stating the main purposes of and any restrictions on the investment activity of the fund,
the maximum or minimum amounts of authorized capital which may
be invested in various securities, and the procedure for the attraction
of loan funds. Further, the bylaws must contain a statement to the
effect that all of the investment fund shares shall be ordinary shares
with equal voting rights and have the right to receive assets at the
fund's wind-up. The bylaws must identify whether the fund has a
limited or unlimited period of activity, prohibit the creation of any
kind of special or reserve funds, and contain information as to the
place, procedure and timing of dividend payments." The authorized
capital of the investment fund must be contributed at the fund's inception by its founders and must constitute at least one million rubles,
with the first subscription of investment fund shares to be issued within three months of the fund's registration.' In order to register
share issuances, the fund is required to file with the appropriate financial agencies
a prospectus in accordance with the Model Prospec7
tus."

While the above enactments address the registration requirements
with respect to investment funds, there are few mechanisms in place to
handle the pervasive problems of scandal and fraud occurring in connection with such funds. This continues to be an on-going problem and
deterrent to foreign investment.'"
F.

The CentralAsian Republics

Due to the vast wealth of their natural resources, the five Russian
Republics (generally referred to as the Central Asian Republics, viz.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan)
are becoming increasingly significant to the international business
community. These republics, in keeping with what has been occurring
in the Russian Federation, have been privatizing and corporatizing
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444.
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Id. at
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Id. at 9 12.
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their state-owned enterprises, and - some at a rate faster than others
- are in the process of beginning to enact their own corporate and
securities laws to accomplish these aims. Provided below is a brief
description of some of the new laws enacted in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan, two of the more developed republics.
G. Kazakhstan
With extensive oil, gas and mineral deposits, and a popularly
elected president, Kazakhstan is increasingly being viewed as an important potential investment location by the international business
community. Philip Morris and Chevron, for example, have recently
undertaken projects in the country. Kazakhstan, like the Russian Federation, is in the process of privatizing its formerly stated-owned enterprises, based on a voucher system, 9 and has been enacting legislation (albeit with far fewer and less defined enactments than the Russian Federation45), with respect to its new corporate structures, as
well as basic legislation addressing foreign investments,"1 banking, 2 , taxes4' and currency.'
On February 13, 1991, Kazakhstan set forth the foundation of its
corporation law by issuing "The Law on Enterprises. " " Such legislation, as stated in its preamble, "defines the overall legal, economic, and
social principles governing the organization and activities enterprises
under market conditions and under various forms of ownership."'
The law provides for corporate structures to be owned individually, by
juridical persons or by the state. Enterprises may be organized as
corporations (either for private profit, of for charitable, religious, or
other social purposes), partnerships, joint ventures with foreign participation or state enterprises. The statute provides incorporation requirements for such enterprises, including by-law and state registration
requirements, and sets forth the activities that require licensure from
appropriate state authorities, including conducting geological surveys,
exploiting mineral deposits, forest or water reserves, and manufactur-

449. Law
on Denationalization and Privatization of 1991,
from the
KAZAKHSTANSKAIA PRAVDA, Aug. 1, 1991, as published in Russia and the Republics
Legal Matters, THE PARKER SCHOOL OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIvE LAW, Columbia
University, Binder 1, Release 13, Oct. 1993 (Transnational Juris Publications, Inc.
1994) (J. Hazard, V. Pechota, Eds.).
450. At the present time, there is little in the way of securities or stock market
activities or enactments with respect to Kazakhstan.
451. Law on Foreign Investment, (effective Jan. 17, 1991, Release 1, Feb. 1992).
452. Law on Banking of April 14, 1993, Release 16, Apr. 1994.
453. Law on the System of Taxation of December 25, 1991, Release 12, Aug.
1993.
454. Law on Currency Regulation of April 14, 1993, Release 16, Apr. 1994.
455. Law on Enterprises of February 13, 1991, Release 13, Oct. 1993.
456. Id. at 1.
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ing or selling pharmaceutical, toxic or narcotic products."7 Also included are requirements concerning enterprise profits, worker income,
working conditions, environmental concerns, commercial secrets of
state-owned enterprises, credit and accounting relations, prices and
price-setting (state regulation of prices occurs only in cases established
by the Kazakh Supreme Soviet), liquidation and reorganization.' 5 In
addition, the government guarantees the enforceability of law, equal
protection of the rights of all enterprises regardless of the form of
ownership, and equal rights of enterprises in their access to material,
labor, natural, intellectual and informational resources, credit and
foreign investment. The government also guarantees protection from
unlawful seizure and prohibits monopolistic practices." 9
Of particular interest to foreign investors is the "Law on Foreign
Investment,""' which provides favorable terms and incentives to attract foreign investment. Such investments, which are licensed by the
Kazakh Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, may be made in any
sphere of activity with the exception of the manufacture of products
with a direct military purpose. Foreign investments enjoy the same
privileges as Kazakh-owned enterprises, with the additional benefits of
the right of independent decisions on questions of hiring, dismissal,
working hours and compensation of employees." A foreign investor
is, however, required to provide for the training of personnel from the
local population for the purpose of mastery of the technology being
introduced." 2 Property brought into the republic as investments, and
not intended for sale, is duty free.' Foreigners are also permitted to
transfer abroad freely their profits made from their Kazakh investments or from the sale of their interest in a Kazakh business. Nationalization of the foreign venture property is not permitted, except in
exceptional cases in which event the government undertakes to compensate the foreign investor accordingly.'
Foreign investors also are accorded favorable tax treatment. First,
there is the operation of free enterprise zones which permit Kazakhs
and foreigners to engage in business activities with complete independence, receiving very favorable regulatory, tax, and customs treatment,
and without being subject to price regulatory controls or statutory
labor requirements." More importantly, many foreign investment

457. Id.
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activities are completely tax exempt for a five-year period following the
first announcement of a profit, and subject to a tax on profits at a 50
percent reduced rate for the five-year period following thereafter.'
H.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan has also enacted laws with respect to privatization,"7 entrepreneurship and foreign economic activities." Its "Law
on General Principles of Destatization, Privatization, and Entrepreneurship," addresses privatization which in Kyrgyzstan occurs by either a gratuitous transfer to its citizens or by state sale." In
Kyrgyzstan, privatization is effected by establishing special privatization accounts for its citizens, a method slightly different from voucher
privatization. In addition, the statute addresses entrepreneurial and
business issues, including the types of recognized corporate entities,
such as general and limited partnerships, joint-stock companies,47
production cooperatives, 471 leasing and collective enterprises, 472 and
state and other enterprises.473 In addition, provisions are made for
the registration, termination474 and bankruptcy475 of such enterprises, 476 guarantees and protection of entrepreneur's rights, 47 ' and
anti-monopolistic activities.4 8 Many of these provisions are basic and
rudimentary in scope.
Kyrgyzstan's "Law on Foreign Economic Activities," as stated in
its preamble, sets forth the general principles of foreign economic activity in the Republic, the procedures for the state regulation of these
activities, and the powers of the state authorities in the sphere of foreign economic relations. In this enactment (which is relatively brief),
foreign investors are protected against expropriation,479 free economic
zones are referenced' and international joint ventures are permitted. 1
It should be noted that the law in this area is changing rapidly,
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Law of Foreign Investment, supra note 451, at art. 20.
Law on General Principles of Destatization, Privatization, and EntrepreneurDecember 20, 1991, Release 11, June 1993.
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Id. at arts. 14 and 15.
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Id. at art. 21.
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with new enactments constantly being issued and revised. It will be of
general interest and great importance to the international legal and
business community to see how the securities and corporate laws of
the Russian Federation and the Central Asian Republics continue to
unfold in the years to come.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The principal issues confronting national securities regulators market volatility, off-exchange trading and market fragmentation
generally, the appropriate scope of self-regulation, disclosure, insider
trading and other fraud, manipulation, universal banking, capital
adequacy, transparency, clearance and settlement, and derivatives are the same issues that must be dealt with by international securities
regulators. A major problem in the international arena, however, is
that there are no international law-making institutions vested with
the legal authority to address these issues (aside from the European
Union which is not open to the international community at large). Accordingly, the question of international securities regulation devolves
to a hodge podge of national or non-governmental which are working
fitfully, sporadically, and sometimes at cross-purposes on one of the
most complex economic problems of our times. Development of a comprehensive system of international securities regulation would serve,
at a minimum, two important objectives. First, it would facilitate the
process of capital formation pursuant to which capital would be channelled on an intenational basis to its most efficient use, which would
enhance the international economic good. Second, the development of a
system of international securities regulation could play a major role in
averting an international financial crises. 2 Nevertheless, the international community has not, to date, made a major commitment to developing a system of international securities regulation. Only the European Union has developed a comprehensive system of securities regulation that transcends national boundaries.

482. See Kaufman, The Dangerous Volatility in the Financial Markets Isn't Going
Away, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1988, at A23, A23.
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A Permanent International Criminal Court:
A Proposal that Overcomes Past Objections
Sandra L. Jamison*
I. INTRODUCTION

"Those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it."
-

Scripture on the Entrance Gate of
Dachau, World War II Nazi Concentration Camp.

Fifty years after the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps,
egregious violations of international humanitarian law continue.
Bosnians, Rwandans, Haitians, and Guatemalans, for example, face
genocide, torture, rape, and unjust imprisonment at the hands of repressive national regimes. Now is the time to stop these breaches of
international humanitarian law, and to prevent their recurrence in the
future, by creating a permanent international criminal court empowered to try these violators and to enforce their sentences.
Over the past 500 years, the global community has sought numerous ways to confront crimes against humanity. The proposals made
have contributed overwhelmingly to the present desire to establish a
fixed international criminal court, but concerns about extradition, the
virtual impossibility of codifying internationally recognized crimes, and
the Act of State doctrine continue to impede progress in the establishment of such a court.
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In 1993, the United Nations established an ad hoc military tribunal, the International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, at the Hague, to try violators of
international human rights in the former-Yugoslavia (henceforth referred to as the Bosnian ad hoc Tribunal). To date, the court has not
tried any of the alleged offenders. In Argentina in the 1980's, ex-President Alfonsin and the Sabato Commission fought to bring justice to the
leaders of the Guerra Sucia through domestic proceedings, but, these
efforts proved futile when the following president, Menem, pardoned
the perpetrators.
These two phenomena lead to two conclusions: 1) the time, expense, and difficulty of establishing an ad hoc tribunal renders it an
ineffective mechanism of deterring crime; and 2) domestic proceedings
are an inadequate alternative to an international criminal court. Although they did not present long-term solutions to international crime,
these two tribunals should be applauded for the pivotal role they
played in furthering the principles of international criminal accountability.
In recognition of this need for accountability, the
Law Commission concluded its draft proposal for the
permanent international criminal court in July of 1993.
hensive proposal, with certain alterations, should serve
piece for the future of international criminal law.

International
creation of a
This compreas the center-

The purpose of this commentary is to examine the historical efforts to develop an international criminal court, including the reasons
for their various failures, and to incorporate this information into a
new proposal for a workable permanent criminal court. To accomplish
this goal, Section II analyzes these historical proposals, focusing on the
critical contributions each has made to the concept of establishing an
international criminal court. Section III analyzes the current Bosnian
ad hoc Military Tribunal, and the International Law Commission's
proposal for a permanent international criminal court. The final section
of the paper provides a new proposal for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court that overcomes the objections set
forth against the establishment of such a court. The proposal includes
an outline of the institutional framework, jurisdiction, procedural laws,
and enforcement mechanisms essential to an effective permanent international criminal court.

1. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Fifth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993) [hereinafter
ILC Draft].
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II.

HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

A. 1474 to Pre-World War I
The global community has long been aware of its need for international courts to resolve international disputes. In fact, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was initially created to resolve civil disputes,
but the world still lacks a permanent international criminal court to
address violations of international humanitarian law.
The idea of an international criminal court traces back to 1474,
when Peter Von Hagenbush was tried and convicted by Austrians for
crimes against "God and man," following his rule over the people of
Breisach.2 During the twentieth century, colonial powers declined
while international trade, security, and humanitarian relations flourished. Countries have increasingly assented to bilateral treaties, multilateral treaties, and international conventions in exchange for greater
benefits or security. The creation of an international penal code and
court began at the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, during which
the former produced the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, and the latter produced a "Court of Arbitral Justice."3 Whereas
the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899 stipulated that submission to
the court would be optional, by 1907 the leaders of the international
community recognized the importance of "obligatory" participation in
an international forum for dispute resolution. Thus, the Court of Arbitral Justice made a proposal during the Second Hague Peace Convention of 1907, conveying this principle of obligatory arbitration.4 The
Convention's members agreed that the court would only go into effect
upon the occurrence of three events: 1) agreement and ratification of
the proposal during the Naval Conference of 1908, 2) the creation of a
constitution for the court, and 3) the members' selection of judges. Two
events stalled this momentum to develop an international criminal
court and left the international community bereft of its court. First,
the Naval Conference of 1908 never occurred, leaving ratification incomplete.5 Second, the United States modified its original agreement
to the principal of obligatory participation when it perceived a conflict
between the jurisdictional power of the U.S. Supreme Court and the
potential jurisdictional power of the proposed international criminal
court. Justice Weeramantry, currently a member of the International

2. Joel Cavvichia, The Prospects for an International Criminal Court in the
1990s, 10 Dic. J. INT'L L. 223 (1992).
3. David J. Bederman, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9-11 (Mark W. Janis, ed.
1992).
4. BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, VOL. I. 14-15
(1980).
5. Id.
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Court of Justice, states the problem of the Court of Arbitral Justice
well: "it was neither a court, nor was it permanent."6
B. Post-World War I
World War I kept the idea for an international criminal court in
the background until 1919 when, at the end of the war, U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson proposed both the creation of the League of Nations
and a Peace Plan. This Peace Plan contained twenty-six articles, including Article 14 which proposed a Permanent Court of International
7
Justice limited to disputes "which the parties thereto submit to it."
In 1919, the League's Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors
of the Wars and on the Enforcement of Penalties was delegated the
task of investigating persons who had been involved in crimes against
humanity and the laws or customs of war. The Commission considered
crimes such as rape, use of poisonous gas, murders, massacres, and
conspiring to wage aggressive war to be crimes against humanity and
war, and therefore subject to investigation.8 The Commission proposed
a High Tribunal consisting of twenty-two members, chosen by the
victorious powers, who would enforce "the principles of the laws of
humanity and from the dictates of the public conscience. "' The Americans recorded three major reservations to this proposal. First, the U.S.
argued that the Commission's recommendation that Heads of State be
placed on trial was an ex post facto law, which would violate the relished "principle of legality" (no punishment without law, no crime
without law) in the United States. Second, the United States complained that the standard of "laws and principles of humanity", adopted by the Commission, was too vague to provide individuals adequate
notice of the crime."0 In addition, the U.S. suggested that the differing
linguistic and interpretational definitions of all of the court's governing
terms could weaken the court's enforcement powers. These objections
continue to surface today in debates over the establishment of a permanent international criminal court.
The U.S.'s concern, however, over ex post facto laws was outweighed by the desire to hold the Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany responsible for egregious violations of humanitarian law during the First
World War. Accordingly, the U.S. participated in establishing Article
227 of the 1920 Treaty of Versailles, which permitted the arraignment

6. Justice Weeramantry, 1994 Macbougal Law Lecture at the University of
Denver College of Law (Nov. 22, 1994).
7. FERENCZ, supra note 4, at 27.
8. Jean Graven, La Premiere Tentative Consecutive a la Guerre Mondiale de
1914-18, in TOWARD A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COuRT 96 (Julius Stone &
Robert K Woetzel eds., 1970).
9. FERENCZ, supra note 4, at 30.
10. Id.
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of the Kaiser Wilhelm II, a Head of State, for his "supreme offense
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties."" Unfortunately, the Kaiser escaped his trial by abdicating to then-neutral Holland.'2 His escape proved that, in the absence of adequate enforcement mechanisms or extradition procedures, the international criminal
court could not function effectively. At this time, the members of the
Legal Committee of the League of Nations decided that, until a criminal code was adopted by member states, there could be no court to try
international criminals.
During 1920 and 1921, the Executive Council of the League of Nations commissioned an Advisory Committee of Jurists to prepare a
draft statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).
In 1922, many states signed and ratified the draft statute, with the
exception of the U.S., whose Congress failed to support the broad international measures inspired by its own president. The PCIJ became the
predecessor of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) following World
War II.1'
Similarly, at the 1928 Havana Conference of Central American
states, the participants drafted a Code of International Penal Law
which codified piracy and slave trade, among others, as violations of
international law. The one caveat of this Code, however, was that it
would apply only to a state whose national laws also condemned this
conduct."' This provision allowed nations to profit from the "good will"
associated with the Penal Law, but, in effect, did not enhance the
principle of universal criminal accountability.Many efforts continued in
the quest to create an international criminal court. During the 1930's,
the international community took a stance on the punishment of terrorists, and set up a Convention on Terrorism to meet in Geneva on
April 30, 1935. The purpose of the meeting was to: 1) discuss a draft
international criminal code proposed by the noted Italian scholar on
humanitarian rights, Pella, 2) set forth grounds for extradition, and 3)
propose, once again, the establishment of an international criminal
court." Several nations opposed the jurisdiction of the international
criminal court proposed. Therefore, one year later in 1936, the proposal
was amended to bifurcate the issue of terrorism from the issue of the
international criminal court. This decision allowed the Convention on

11. Id. at 32.
12. Graven, supra note 8, at 45-46.
13. MARK W. JANIS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 18
(1992).

14. FERENCZ, supra note 4, at 45-46. See also Conferencias Internacionales
Americanas, 1899-1936,

Carnegie Endowment, Washington,

1938, Supp.,

1938-42

(Washington, 1943).
15. FERENCZ, supra note 4, at 49; League of Nations: Committee for the International Repression of Terrorism, Report to the Council on the First Session of the
Committee (April 30-May 8, 1935).
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Terrorism to move forward, but unfortunately left the reality of an
international criminal court behind."1
By May 1938, nineteen states had signed the Convention on Terrorism, but India was the only nation to ratify the Convention. Although thirteen nations had signed the Convention for the Creation of
an International Criminal Court, none of these nations ever ratified
the court. 7 The major stumbling block for these two conventions was
a controversy
over whether extraditions would be 'discretionary' or
'compulsory.'18 It appears that the majority of these nations were not
yet willing to give up their national sovereignty to a body with compulsory jurisdiction.
C. Post-World War II
After World War II, the concept of an international criminal court
resurfaced in light of Nazi and Japanese wartime atrocities. In 1942,
the Allies met in London's St. James Palace, to discuss the possibility
of prosecuting Nazis for war crimes. The following year, the victorious
powers, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, agreed
to initiate criminal proceedings against the Germans.19 In 1944, the
United Nations set up a War Crimes Commission to investigate the
allegations against the Nazis. This Commission recognized the likelihood that justice would not be served in the national court of a nation
where state policy had actively participated in the atrocities committed,° and thus it created a Convention for the Establishment of an
International War Crimes Court.
The Allies established the International Military Tribunal to prosecute and punish major war criminals of European Axis-power on
August 8, 1945, and a similar tribunal for the Japanese war crimes on
January 19, 1946. They stipulated that subject matter jurisdiction
would consist of the following: 1) Crimes against the Peace, defined as
the planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression,
or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for any of
the forgoing; 2) Crimes against Humanity, defined as crimes such as
murder or extermination 21; 3) War Crimes, as delineated in the War
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21. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East [hereinafter
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Conventions; and 4) Conspiracy to commit any of these crimes. All four
of these crimes were recognized by the world community as general
principles of international law.22
Article 1 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal proposed a tribunal "for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the
major war criminals of the European Axis."23 There were to be four
justices total, one per country from the United States, the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France. Any conviction required a
majority of the vote. In the event of a tie, Article 4 allowed the President, selected at the beginning of the trial by all members, to cast the
deciding vote. Article 6 granted the International Military Tribunal
jurisdiction over Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes
against Humanity. The four powers chose the U.S. Chief Prosecutor,
Prosecutor Jackson, and statutory provisions were made for a fair trial.' This format turned out to be highly successful for the ad hoc tribunal.
In Nuremberg, on October 18, 1945, United States Chief Prosecutor Jackson indicted twenty-four Nazi criminals for Crimes against
Peace, Humanity, War Crimes, and Conspiracy to commit any of these
crimes. Nearly one year later, on October 1, 1946, the final judgment
of the court was read aloud in open court. Three defendants were fully
acquitted, several others received partial acquittals and prison sentences, and ten criminals were executed by hanging.2"
During the time that the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal was active, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur set up a similar military tribunal. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(IMFTE) in Tokyo was established to prosecute Far Eastern criminals
on the same four charges of Crimes against Peace, Crimes against
Humanity, and War Crimes and Conspiracy, and under the same subject matter jurisdiction as Nuremburg.' The trial lasted for two and
one half years, resulting in the conviction of all twenty-eight defendants. A few defendants received light sentences, seven men were
sentenced to death by hanging, but the majority of the defendants
received life imprisonment.2 7
Following the Tokyo Trials, many criticisms surfaced about the
manner in which they were conducted. The criticisms included charges
that: 1) the prosecution did not present its case fairly when it refused
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to examine certain pieces of defense information; 2) the verdicts were
not based on the evidence presented at trial; and 3) the guilt of the
defendants was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' However, no
member of the Trials nor the Nuremberg Tribunal did anything to
address these concerns. The victorious powers of World War II walked
away from the trials satisfied that justice had been done, while the
vanquished walked away feeling that injustice had been imposed.
What distinguishes the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials from the current Bosnian ad hoc Tribunal is the fact that the earlier trials were
imposed by victorious nations on defeated nations. The ad hoc tribunal
for the Bosnian war crimes, conversely, charges both the victorious and
the defeated parties in Bosnia before an "impartial" tribunal. This
distinction may quell some fears that the Bosnian tribunal will be
unjust.
To prevent future similar concerns as those raised by the international community about the Tokyo trials, the United Nations General
Assembly, in 1948, requested that its International Law Commission
(ILC) "study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or
other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organization by international conventions. " "9
In 1949, several Geneva Conventions extended the list of war
crimes to include torture, international infliction of suffering, serious
bodily injury, forcing prisoners to work for imprisoners, and the deprivation of a right to a free trial.30 In August of 1949, these Geneva
Conventions established new humanitarian standards for the treatment of wartime prisoners and civilians, willful killing and torture,
heightened standards for 'military necessity' defenses, and the possibility of a foreign country exercising extradition over another nations'
military personnel. One year later, in 1950, the ILC concluded that the
recent Geneva Conventions be drafted into a "Code of Offenses," which
would supplement the Nuremberg Principles and create a larger codification of international criminal law. Mr. Jean Spiropoulos of Greece
was charged with this task.3' Mr. Spiropoulos submitted a report and
a preliminary draft Code of Offenses to the ILC which delineated
crimes such as the violations of Customs of War, Conspiracy, and

28. RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 204208 (1971). This information is based on a letter written by Ben Bruce Blakeney, on
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Crimes against Humanity. 2 The ILC realized that, in addition to a
Code of Offenses, enforcement provisions must be included in the
realm of international criminal law, or the process would be doomed to
fail.' The efforts to create an international criminal court were too
important to allow weak enforcement provisions jeopardize its effectiveness. Its members felt that the aggression of one man should no
longer be able to bring the world to its knees, as it had during the second world war.
D. The Cold War Era
Following the Genocide Convention, reports and proposals for an
International Criminal Court continued to emerge. At this time, however, the Soviet Union began to articulate opposition to an international criminal court as an unnecessary infringement upon its state sovereignty. This view characterized the Soviet Union's position in the Security Council over this issue throughout the Cold War, effectively paralyzing the Council from taking any action.
After 1950, the U.N. General Assembly appointed a Committee on
International Criminal Jurisdiction which made slow progress for the
following reasons. The Committee's first major controversy arose in the
context of defining "aggression" as a violation of international law. The
Committee appointed a fifteen-member Special Committee to define
"aggression" and to sort through the various state-adopted interpretations. Without consensus on "aggression" there could be no court, and
without a court, no jurisdiction.3 4 This disagreement over the definition of "aggression" continued to paralyze the international criminal
arena until 1974. In addition, the escalation of the Cold War and the
Suez Crisis diverted the U.N. attention away from an international
criminal court.35
During the mid to late 1960's, concern over international crime
continued to escalate, re-emerging in the context of apartheid and racial discrimination. The following international conventions demonstrated the world's desire to try individuals who committed crimes
against humanity: 1) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (1970), 2) the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Nations and Cooperation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970), 3)
the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid (1973), 4) the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,
including Diplomatic Agents (1973), 5) the Terrorism Convention
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(1979), and 6) the International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages (1979).36 The world continued slowly, but steadily, toward a
society in which its members would be responsible for their criminal
actions.

III. THE CURRENT BOSNIAN AD Hoc TRIBUNAL AND FOUR PROPOSALS
FOR A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

In the early 1990's, proposals for an international criminal court
escalated due to the break-up of the former Soviet Union, the demise
of bi-polar stability, the rise of nationalistic and aggressive tendencies
by many nations and the internationalization of trade and policy. As a
result, the following two significant events have occurred: 1) an ad hoc
military tribunal, created by the United Nations, currently functions at
the Hague to try the violators of human rights in the former-Yugoslavia; and 2) four proposals for the creation of a permanent international
criminal court have emerged. These four proposals include: 1) the 1953
U.N. Committee proposal; 2) the 1992 Bryan MacPherson proposal
created through an independent organization from the U.N.; 3) the
1992 American Bar Association (A.B.A.) Task Force on an International Criminal Court; and 4) the 1993 International Law Commission
(ILC) draft proposal. Both the Bosnian ad hoc War Crimes Tribunal
and the most recent permanent court proposal, the ILC draft statute,
will be addressed in detail below. The remaining proposals will be discussed throughout the remainder of this paper.
A. The Bosnian Ad Hoc Military Tribunal
The current upheaval and violence in the former-Yugoslavia
caused the U.N. Secretary General, Mr. Boutros-Ghali, to recommend
the establishment of an ad hoc International Court for War Crimes in
Bosnia, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, in 1993. This chapter
authorizes U.N. intervention to counter a threat to peace.37 The court
is located at the Hague.3" At present, most of the mechanisms of the
court have been put into effect.
The court began in 1992 when the noted international criminal
law scholar, M. Cherif Bassiouni, initiated investigations into war
atrocities committed in the former-Yugoslavia through a five-member
U.N. Commission.39 Based on the Commission's findings that there
was sufficient evidence to justify the establishment of a court, the U.N.

36. Id.
37. Clare Dyer, Judge of Our Inactions, THE GUARDLAN, Oct. 1, 1994 at 29.
38. International Community Prepares Implementation of Peace Plan, AGENCE EuROPE, Reuters, May 6, 1993, available in WL DIALOG, INT-NEWS-C.
39. Sharon Cohen, Team Compiles Bosnia Atrocities for War Crimes Trial, L.A.
TIMES, May 1, 1994, at Al, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, INT'L File.
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Security Council established the tribunal in May, 1993.' On April 16,
1994, the U.N. General Assembly voted to provide eleven million dollars to the military tribunal to charge and prosecute those responsible
for crimes in Bosnia.4'
The full panel of eleven judges was elected by the U.N. General
Assembly on August 11, 1994. Six judges are to serve in two separate
trial courts on panels of three, and the remaining five judges are to
serve as an appeals court.42 According to its Chief Prosecutor, Judge
Richard Goldstone of South Africa, the first trials are scheduled to
take place in early in 1995.
Once elected, the judges adopted ninety-one rules governing the
detention of persons awaiting trial or appeal before the Tribunal,
guidelines for the assignment of counsel, and a unique array of individual protections of witnesses and victims.' Upon completion of the
trials, it has already been determined that the Tribunal will be prohibited from issuing a death penalty sentence, and prison sentences will
be carried out in any of the countries which have offered use of prison
space." The Rules of Detention contain a series of basic principles,
ranging from the management of the detention unit, the rights of
detainees, and the removal and transportation of detainees.' Twentyfour Dutch prisons have been set aside for use of the tribunal to hold
those under indictment.' The use of Dutch prisons for those under
indictment will ensure that tribunal staff can oversee the treatment of
prisoners to make certain that international standards of fair treatment of prisoners are upheld.
The Tribunal has also adopted Rules of Procedure and Evidence
which relate to procedures for granting legal assistance, criteria for
fees and expenses, facilities and guidelines for assigned counsel, and
disciplinary measures for assigned counsel. 47 In particular, the Tribunal amended Rule 96 to include individual protection for victims of
sexual assault or rape."
The court is based on the premise that defendants must be pres-
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ent for trial. Although technically defendants will not be tried in absentia, if an accused fails to appear for trial, three judges will hear the
evidence, and may elect to issue a warrant to Interpol to find the defendant.49 Any convictions resulting from the tribunal are to be carried out in a state of the tribunal's choice.5" As Chief Prosecutor
Goldstone points out, the tribunal has an unfortunate Achilles heel.
While the tribunal is proceeding on the assumption that all countries
will comply with their international obligations, it has no ability to
force states to surrender their accused war criminals for trial." In
fact, Serbia presently refuses to recognize any legitimacy of the
court.52 In light of this incapacity, a strong likelihood exists that
some, perhaps many, defendants will flee to other states. The Tribunal
realizes that this fact leaves a complicated task for Interpol, and perhaps will cause the court to function in name only.
Hopefully, now that most of the administrative and procedural
concerns of the court have been addressed, more time can be spent
seeking perpetrators in Bosnia. So far, only one defendant has been
named, located, and charged. A former Bosnian Serb prison guard,
Dusan Tadic, was arrested in Germany in'February, 1994,' and officially charged at the Hague on November 8, 1994.
B. The InternationalLaw Commission Draft

While the Bosnian ad hoc Court is an important interim step in
the development of international criminal law, the U.N. has determined that the world ultimately still needs a permanent international
criminal court. This decision followed the release of a report by the
ILC in 1990, arguing that human rights violations were on-going
mechanisms of state policy throughout the world. The report examined
the options pertaining to the development of an international criminal
court, and concluded that a permanent international criminal court
must be created as part of the United Nations. 55 In 1991, at its fortythird session, the ILC adopted the draft articles of the Code of Crimes
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against the Peace and Security of Mankind and transmitted these articles, through the Secretary General, to the governments of the U.N.
member states for comments, feedback and observations.56 In 1992, the
ILC set up a Working Group to consider further the issue of international criminal jurisdiction57 and to incorporate the feedback from
member states on the establishment of an international criminal court.
These steps led the Security Council to adopt Resolution 780 on October 6, 1992, requesting the Secretary General to establish an impartial
Commission of Experts to examine and analyze the information submitted, and to conduct such further investigations as necessary to
report to the Secretary General its conclusions on the evidence of grave
breaches of international humanitarian law committed in the territory
of the former-Yugoslavia. 8
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE COURT

The key concerns raised by several nations who are reluctant to
establish a permanent international criminal court include the following issues: 1) sovereignty; 2) jurisdiction (subject matter and personal);
3) the availability of ad hoc courts in its place; 4) cost and bureaucracy
of the court; 5) enforcement; 6) court mechanisms and 7) procedural
mechanisms of the court. Each is discussed separately below.
A. Sovereignty

Because sovereignty has long been viewed as the most fundamental right of a nation, many nations continue to believe that any infringement upon sovereignty is a threat to their livelihood. However,
the internationalization of events and economics over time has created
a world in which the sovereign rights of one nation do infringe upon
the rights of another. For example, Bosnia's internal civil war has
caused a mass exodus of Bosnians emigrating to other European na59
tions, requiring medical attention, shelter, food, and other resources.
Bosnia's alleged "sovereign" rights over internal matters are impacting
the domestic capabilities of other European nations.'
One way suggested to mitigate the sovereignty concern is by creating a court with "concurrent jurisdiction" between national courts
and the international court. This allows the state to bring the defendant to trial, with the option of obtaining a domestic or an internation-
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al proceeding. Although providing the state more sovereignty on this
issue, there may be some other problems with "concurrent jurisdiction." In particular, "concurrent jurisdiction" may undermine the legitimacy of the international court, and/or it may restrict the procedural
rights of individuals brought before another country's domestic court.
The absolute doctrine that a state is supreme in its own authority,
and need not take into account the affairs of other nations, is no longer
tenable.6 In contrast, an international criminal court will help nations to protect their sovereign rights over domestic issues of crime
committed by foreign individuals, because it empowers them to act on
violations of criminal law that were previously out of their control.
Therefore, it is more likely that "by limiting its sovereignty, a state
proves that it is sovereign."62
B. Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional issues raise the questions of: Which laws will be
recognized in the international criminal court? (subject matterjurisdiction) and To whom the laws will apply? (personaljurisdiction).In order
for an international criminal court to assert subject matterjurisdiction
over an individual or state, one of the following must exist: 1) an international criminal code must exist enumerating crimes to which the
country in question is not a 'persistent objector'; 2) a codification of
international conventions relating to criminal law; or 3) some type of
agreement or assent by the country to be bound to this law. In order
for an international court to have personaljurisdictionover an individual, states must sacrifice some portion of their state sovereignty guaranteeing them rights to adjudicate acts which are: 1) committed by
their citizens (nationality); 2) done to one of their citizens (protective
interest); 3) committed on their territory (territoriality); 4) committed
against their government (protective interest); or 5) deemed to be of
universal interest to the world community (universal interest). The
proposals for an international criminal court concern some nations
because they seek to go beyond these internationally accepted bases of
jurisdiction.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Any established court or criminal code must address: 1) which
crimes will be subject to its jurisdiction; and 2) whether the court will
have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction with the national courts over
these crimes. Each is discussed below.
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a. Crimes
Currently, customary international law and conventions define
the parameters of international criminal law. Although customary law
is not codified, it forms international law because its crimes maintain
a high level of universal condemnation. To date, twenty-two crimes
have been codified in the international community through both custom and convention: 1) Aggression, 2) War Crimes, 3) Unlawful Use of
Weapons, 4) Crimes Against Humanity, 5) Genocide, 6) Racial Discrimination and Apartheid, 7) Slavery, 8) Torture, 9) Unlawful Human
Experimentation, 10) Piracy, 11) Aircraft Hijacking, 12) Threat and
Use of Force Against Internationally Protected Persons, 13) Taking of
Civilian Hostages, 14) Drug Offenses, 15) International Traffic in Obscene Publications, 16) Destruction and/or Theft of National Treasures,
17) Environmental Protection, 18) Theft of Nuclear Materials, 19)
Unlawful Use of Mails, 20) Interference with Submarine Cables, 21)
Falsification and Counterfeiting, and 22) Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials.'
Because outrage in the world community has been so high against
these throughout this century, these crimes have been identified and
outlawed in the following: 1) Geneva Protocol of 1925, which outlawed
the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons; 2) the Kellogg-Briand
Peace Pace of 1928, which attempted to outlaw war as a means of
state policy; 3) the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, which punished violators of the international laws of war; and 4) League of Nations and the
United Nations in their perseverance against acts of aggression by
nations.
Through various Geneva Conventions, the world community has
sought to regulate military conduct in armed conflicts by establishing
the concept of 'just' and 'unjust' wars." In particular, the War Convention codified articles to prevent rape, undue forced labor, prisoner
of war mistreatment, and to set standards for noncombatant immunity, war against civilians, and guerilla warfare.6" For any charges levied under these articles, the proportionality of the measure and the
military necessity of the act both play critical roles in determining the
level of culpability.6
The drafters of the War Convention granted Universal Jurisdiction over war crimes in Articles 49, 50, 129, and 146 of the Convention.
However, to this day, the only two bases of jurisdiction used in allega-
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tions of these crimes have been territoriality and nationality."7 Perhaps these nations are reluctant to invoke Universal Jurisdiction out
of fear that another nation may use it later "in kind" to obtain jurisdiction. While there is a need to regulate many other international
crimes, such as environmental terrorism or carelessness, and international drug trafficking, these crimes have not achieved nearly the level
of international condemnation as Crimes Against Peace and Crimes
Against Humanity. The United Nations recently set up a Commission
on Narcotic Drugs, and an International Narcotics Control Board, to
set the framework for future codified international drug trafficking
laws. These ongoing attempts at crime codification will prove fruitful
when the international criminal court is well underway, and considers
expanding its jurisdiction.
The 1992 MacPherson proposal sets out the creation of a complete
international code of crimes as a long-term goal.' In the interim,
MacPherson confers subject matter jurisdiction only over War Crimes
and Crimes against Peace. 9 MacPherson suggests that jurisdiction
over any other crimes be conferred through separate conventions, protocols or agreements as nations are willing to do. He thus suggests
building international criminal law on a step-by-step basis, which
could eventually lead to full consent by nations over all crimes. This
proposal may be preferable to the ILC draft statute which calls for the
immediate codification of a long list of international crimes because
states may not be willing to buy-in to such a large infringement on
sovereignty.
The 1992 A.B.A. Task Force, conversely, would expand jurisdiction
to include crimes such as drug trafficking, genocide, and torture, arguing the need for regulation of these activities.7" Although this plan is
applauded for its brazen initiative, it is unlikely that many nations are
currently willing to place limitations on their own drug trafficking
practices.
The 1993 ILC proposal has not yet resolved its position on jurisdiction. It limits subject matter jurisdiction of the following Conventions: the Genocide Convention; the Geneva Conventions; the Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft Convention; the Apartheid Convention; the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages; and the Safety of Maritime
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Navigation;7 and provides three ways that nations can accept such
jurisdiction: 1) comprehensive opt-in, 2) selective opt-in, and 3) selective
opt-out. Alterative A provides a comprehensive opt-in declaration to the
court, stating that the state accepts the court's jurisdiction over all of
its crimes.72 Alternative B provides each member state a selective optin clause for every individual crime to which the state wishes to confer
jurisdiction. Alternative C provides a selective opt-out provision for any
crime to which a state does not wish to be party. Unfortunately, the
commentary to the article shows the ILC leaning toward the second
option, which allows states to opt-in only to those crimes they desire.
This opt-in method would result in considerable confusion, leaving
most nations wondering which crimes particular states were not supposed to violate, and causing the regulation of international crime to
be little better off than it is under the current system. Additionally,
the ILC Draft does not propose that any of the Conventions actually be
codified into law, but rather that the states, on their own initiative, be
allowed to choose their own obligations under the multilateral conventions. This approach may not send a strong enough message to international criminals to serve as an effective deterrent. What thief would
opt-in to a law prohibiting theft?
Perhaps better in the global view would be a system under which
only a few crimes were defined, such as genocide, apartheid, and hostage-taking, but were strictly enforced against ALL member states.
Later, when the court gains the respect of its members, these members
could agree to expand the court's jurisdiction to a larger number of
crimes. This concept may be preferable to a court which is unable to
obtain jurisdiction over a consistent body of international crime.
b. Exclusive or Concurrent Jurisdiction
The extent to which exclusive jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction,
or transfer proceedings should apply to these international crimes is
also of paramount importance to this discussion.
Under exclusive jurisdiction, states give up all jurisdictional
rights over international crimes within the jurisdiction of the international criminal court. 3 Although exclusive jurisdiction would probably
ensure the most coherent and consistent body of international criminal
law, few states would sacrifice such a large portion of their sovereignty
before the court gains any legitimacy.74 It is possible that an international criminal court could have exclusive jurisdiction over some international crimes, but would reserve concurrent jurisdiction for others.75
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Concurrent jurisdiction, conversely, would allow a state to decide,
on a case-by-case basis, if it would like to submit a criminal case to the
international criminal court, or if it would prefer to make a domestic
adjudication on the matter. A transfer of proceedings approach would
allow the international criminal court to apply the laws of the state
which also has jurisdiction in the international court, and merely
transfer the location of the case to the international criminal court.
This approach may be beneficial to maintain those national procedural
laws in the international court, in the event that the international
laws provide fewer procedural guarantees than the national laws.
However, in some countries, such as the United States, this latter
approach may violate the national constitution, which guarantees its
citizens a judicial body established by the U.S. Congress."
M. Cherif Bassiouni supports concurrent jurisdiction because it
fulfills the states' sovereignty concerns and allows the member states
either to transfer proceedings if they choose, or to retain them in the
national court under its own jurisdiction." To facilitate this process,
Bassiouni proposes a mechanism, called a de facto default, which
would transfer proceedings to the international court if the state has
failed to exercise its own jurisdictional opportunity.7" Further, if the
state chooses to adjudicate the claim itself, and fails to prosecute adequately, then another state should be able to bring the action before
the international criminal court as a challenge to the state's action.
Both the 1953 U.N. Draft, in Article 26," and the 1992 A.B.A. Task
Force"° preferred the option of "concurrent jurisdiction" between the
national courts and the international court.
MacPherson's 1992 Draft, in Article 6, proposes that exclusive
jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction be blended so that the international criminal court would have exclusive jurisdiction over major war
crimes, and concurrent jurisdiction with the national courts on other
international law issues.8 The exclusive jurisdiction over war crimes
and heinous crimes, such as genocide, would alleviate the "Argentinean problem," where military members brought to trial were later pardoned by a new Administration.
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2. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction determines who will be subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The 1992 A.B.A. Task Force and the 1953 U.N.
Commission proposal both agree on personal jurisdiction. This proposal
stated that both the state where the crime was committed and the
state of nationality of the accused must consent to jurisdiction of the
international criminal court in order for the court to obtain personal
jurisdiction over the individuals. s2 These proposals are not very far
reaching, however, because any nation unwilling to extradite an individual under the current international legal framework would likewise
refuse to turn this individual over to the international court's jurisdiction. Even the 1992 A.B.A. Task Force recognized the likelihood that
the U.S. would not grant jurisdiction to an international court if the
crime was against the United States, and the offender could be located
on its territory.8 Establishing a tough bottom line on personal jurisdiction is necessary to prevent the international criminal court from
following the ICJ's poor record of obtaining jurisdiction.
In 1992, the MacPherson proposal noted that personal jurisdiction
must be competent over any natural person, whether the head of government, a public official, or a private individual, and that this jurisdiction may be conferred on the court by convention, agreement, or
unilateral declaration.' In addition, this personal jurisdiction must be
conferred either by the state wherein that accused is located, a state
which is authorized to obtain custody, or any state which would have
jurisdiction based on domestic or international law. 5 This proposal is
more progressive in that it only requires one of the above mentioned
parties to consent to jurisdiction, not both.
C. Problems With An Ad Hoc Court
Many of those resistant to a permanent international criminal
court recognize the need to regulate international crime, but they argue that ad hoc courts can be established as they are needed, eliminating the bureaucracy of a permanent international criminal court.
Supporters of a permanent court counter that, first, an ad hoc
court, such as the Bosnian ad hoc War Crimes Tribunal, may violate
the principle of legality: "Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, Nulla Poena Sine
Lege" (no crime without law, no punishment without law)." It is difficult for an ad hoc court to place individuals on notice of its laws if it is
not in existence. Also, these scholars argue that it would be a gross
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injustice to the international community not to hold an international
criminal liable for egregious violations of international law.8" In U.S.
v. Von List, a case heard during the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, the court held that:
"it is not essential that a crime be specifically defined and charged
in accordance with a particular ordinance, statute, or treaty if it is
made a crime by international convention, recognized customs, and
usages of war, or the general principles of criminal justice common
to civilized nations generally.""

Thus, if it would be reasonable to assume that the individual
would know that a particularly "heinous" crime would be punishable
by law, then some individuals argue that the principle of legality is not
violated with an ad hoc court.89 These justifications have been used to
justify prosecution in all of the ad hoc courts to date. However, an
international criminal code and court is a highly effective way of providing notice to the international community of its subject matter jurisdiction (crimes), and to deter crime effectively at the outset.
Secondly, supporters of a permanent criminal court argue that ad
hoc courts do not deter crime as effectively as a permanent court. An
international criminal will not be afraid of a punishment institution
that does not exist. There is a strong argument that Nuremberg and
Tokyo, although highly effectively at an ex post facto punishment of
war criminals, has failed to deter ex ante other international criminals
from committing the same crimes. Proponents point out that one need
only examine the existence of state repression and genocide in the last
fifty years to sustain this argument.
Thirdly, ad hoc courts require more time and expense to create
than it would take to maintain a permanent court. The current ad hoc
military tribunal at the Hague demonstrates that it takes years to
establish a court, select judges, secure funding, and initiate proceedings. Throughout history, these factors have kept all but three such
courts from being created. The Nazi and Japanese atrocities had endured for years prior to the Allied victory and subsequent proceedings,
and the Bosnians faced years of torture before the initiation of proceedings. In contrast to these three trials, the Kurds, subject perhaps to
the longest repression in this century, have never warranted enough
attention from the world community to establish an ad hoc court. Similarly, the Rwandans, Haitians, and Guatemalans will continue to suf-
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fer from unredressed violations of human rights if the world continues
to rely on ad hoc courts. A permanent institution must be available on
an on-going basis to try perpetrators of human rights violations in all
nations of the world.
D. Bureaucracy and Cost
In addition to the issues of sovereignty, jurisdiction and ad hoc
courts, scholars have argued that the establishment of an international
criminal court would unduly increase the number of international
organs, and augment accompanying expense and obligation. Instead,
these states prefer to limit the number and scope of international institutions." This solution, however, does not address the continuing
threat of international criminals. In order to regulate international
crime, full participation by all countries in the world is needed. Any
reluctance on the part of nations to participate will damage the legitimacy of this court, and likely, the existence of other international
organs. Besides, there would be little benefit from a court if most
states refuse to participate in it.
Secondly, some fear that the court may become paralyzed by an
overloaded court docket if all individuals are given the opportunity to
bring their own cases to the court. A carefully drafted court, however,
can include a Committing Chamber to screen applicants and cases
prior to obtaining personal jurisdiction and proceedings.
Thirdly, some states, who support efforts to regulate international
crime, believe that the International Court of Justice should house
these international criminal proceedings, instead of creating a new
court.91 (This solution would obviously require the ICJ to expand its
jurisdiction.) Since the International Court of Justice has limited
means of enforcement available to it at present, however, this alternative may not be effective. Further, an amendment to the U.N. Charter
to expand the ICJ's jurisdiction is no less complicated a procedure than
a separate ratification process for the new international criminal court
through the U.N. General Assembly. Fourth, a court specifically geared
towards the resolution of international crime should be staffed with
specialists in international criminal law, and not with the general
jurisdiction judges of the ICJ.
E. Enforcement
Adequate enforcement of international criminal law is essential to
the success of an ICC and its anticipated deterrent effect on international crime. As Robert A. Friedlander states: "the history of public
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international law over the past three and a quarter centuries has demonstrated clearly and convincingly that direct enforcement in a community of mutually competing and unequal sovereignties has rarely occurred."92 Friedlander also asserts that any criminal or penal statute
without ample enforcement provisions is at best an 'indirect enforcement model,'93 which will not adequately deter crime.
Many critics of the international criminal court argue that it
would not be able to enforce its judgments, citing the International
Court of Justice as an example. This argument only strengthens the
case for an international criminal court separate from the ICJ. A newly created international criminal court can learn from the lesson of the
ICJ in drafting its enforcement mechanisms. Similar to the current ad
hoc Bosnian court, the international criminal court can use Interpol as
a means of enforcing extradition to the court, and additionally, the
international criminal court can sanction or suspend the U.N. voting
rights of nations who harbor international fugitives. In order to break
the stigmatization of international institutions as ineffective, an international criminal court with effective enforcement mechanisms must
be created.
In discussing enforcement, scholars have tended to divide international crimes into two groups: 1) crimes perpetrated by states (stateled) and 2) crimes perpetrated by individuals (individual non-state
actors). Whereas the sanctions in Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, such
as interruption of economic relations, severance of diplomatic relations,
blockades, and if necessary, the use of force, are typically levied for
state-led crimes94, they often punish the population as a whole. Traditional penal sanctions, such as an international prison, international
community service, or some form of international parole, on the other
hand, may actually be more preferable because they are levied against
the state actors responsible for the violations. Other, non-retributive
forms of penal sanctions have been proposed, which would encourage
the preventive and rehabilitative themes of justice. These penal sanctions include options such as fines, political and moral obligations, economic compensation, military or community service and public announcement of a proven crime character.95 This may be a more functional way to punish criminals for crimes against the international
community, because their punishment adds something back to the international community.
The 1992 MacPherson proposal argues that a wide list of punishments for individuals should be drafted into the court, such as fines,
forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime, compensation to injured parties,
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work release, and probation." Although capital punishment would be
effective for crimes such as genocide, due to its controversy, it should
probably not be included for most crimes. 7
The 1992 A.B.A. Task Force also proposes that the penalties be
severe, but that the death penalty should definitely not be used. 8 The
Task Force offers provisions for a pre-trial detention in the state where
the criminal was apprehended, but it recommends that the sentence be
served out in the country where the crime was committed,99 perhaps
so that the this nation feels that justice has been served. The problem
with this may be the administrative capacity of the tribunal to ensure
that the accused or convicted are being treated in accordance with
international fair standards of treatment. This monitoring is likely to
become complicated when the rights granted are in the hands of a
country who sees a non-national committing a crime on their territory.
This problem brings to mind the 1994 caning of an American citizen in
Singapore, for committing vandalism. This penalty received an onslaught of criticism from the Americans, which threatened the U.S.'
otherwise peaceful relations with Singapore.
The 1992 A.B.A. Task Force stated that "it would seem neither feasible
nor desirable to set up a 'Devil's Island' type of permanent detention
center" for this court,"° especially given the small number of cases
likely to come before the court in its first years. The MacPherson proposal agreed, stating that such a facility would be expensive to maintain and unnecessary so long as state facilities could be used in its
place. In the future, an international penal facility may become necessary and should then be created.
The 1993 ILC Draft proposes that: 1) imprisonment, up to, and
including life terms, 2) monetary fines,'"' and 3) loss of property (the
perpetrator may be required to return property or proceeds wrongly
received in the course of the crime) should be the primary forms of
punishment. ' 2 It states that the death penalty should never be used.
In determining prison terms, the laws governing the state of the
defendant, the state where the crime was committed, and the state
which has custody of and jurisdiction over the defendant0 3 should all
be taken into consideration. To enforce the sentences, the ILC proposed
Article 66, making the court responsible for supervising the prison sentences to ensure compliance with the Standard Minimum Rules for the
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Treatment of Prisoners."" This would be true whether the sentence
is served in the state where the crime was committed or in a voluntary
state. The main concern with this proposal is that it would be difficult
to implement, unless a full time employee of the court is assigned to
each prison where a term is being served. The Draft also sets up a procedure for appeal to the seven judges of the court who did not take
place in the original judgment.0 5
F. Court Mechanisms
In creating an international criminal court, three important issues
to resolve are: (1) where to locate the court; (2) how to select its judges;
and (3) whether the court will be "adversarial", following the U.S. model, or "inquisitorial", following the European model.
1. The Court's Location
The court's sponsor and the responsibility for funding go hand-inhand. If the international criminal court is established as a U.N. organ, the U.N. member states will be required to foot the bill as an
"expense of the United Nations."1"6 On the other hand, if the court is
a separate organ from the U.N., nations would have to agree in a separate convention to support it financially.
The proposal offered by the 1953 U.N. Committee agreed unanimously that an international criminal court should be sponsored by the
U.N. '7 The Committee discussed ways in which an International
Criminal Court might be established under the United Nations Charter: 1) through an amendment of the International Court of Justice to
create a criminal chamber in the I.C.J.; 2) through an action of the
General Assembly, under authority conferred to it in Article 14 of the
League of Nations, to draw up a statute for the court and have states
sign and ratify the court; 3) through an amendment of the U.N. Charter to create a new organ for the International Criminal Court; or 4)
through an amendment of the U.N. Charter to remove any difficulties
which might impede the General Assembly from creating a court.0 8
After analyzing these issues, the Committee favored, instead, creating
an independent organ from the United Nations,
which would be less
09
likely to become politicized than a U.N. organ.
The MacPherson proposal in 1992, in contrast, argued that the
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international criminal court should be established as a subsidiary
organ of the General Assembly or the Security Council under Articles
22 or 29.10 The proposal favored the Security Council over the Gen-

eral Assembly because it is vested with broader authority to maintain
international peace and security through whatever means are necessary, including the ability to create an international criminal court. 1 '
The General Assembly, in contrast, does not have this authority, but,
to MacPherson, is still preferable to a non-U.N. entity.
MacPherson's proposal was considered, but no action was taken in
1993, when the ILC further reviewed the matter in its 1993 Draft
Statute. The ILC failed to resolve this issue."'
2. The Selection of Judges
The next step is to determine how judges will be elected and how
court proceedings will be administered.
The 1953 Committee proposed that 15 judges be elected. The
Committee suggested that the Secretary-General should select candidates from a list of nation-nominated judges and submit these to all
member states for a vote, with the caveat that no two judges be from
the same nation. The judges would be elected for 9 year terms on a
rotating basis, so that every 5 years, 3 judges would retire."'
MacPherson's proposal only differs from the 1953 approach in one
respect; he proposed a two-tiered panel of senior and associate judges.
Senior judges would administer the court, hear the proceedings and
issue rules of procedures. Associate judges would preside over trials
and preliminary hearings." 4 For each trial, three judges would be assigned by lot, and a majority rule would decide the case."' Mr.
MacPherson suggested 9-15 Senior judges and an unspecified number
of associate judges.
The 1993 ILC Draft Statute proposed an even larger number of
judges than the other two proposals, 18 judges, and a longer term, 12
years, to compensate for their inability to be reelected." 6 Following
the earlier two proposals, the judges would be elected from a list of
nominees, one submitted from each state party to the tribunal, such
that no two judges could be from any one state."7 The major shortcoming of the ILC proposal was the Committee's decision to make the
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"permanent" international criminal court one in which judges could sit
only when called to hear a case."' Therefore, these judges would not
receive a salary, but rather, a daily allowance during the period in
which they performed their functions.' 9 This aspect of the proposal
contradicts the nature of a "permanent" court.
3. The Adversarial or Inquisitorial Model
The adversarial model of trial management provides separate
defense counsel for the accused, in order to provide fair legal representation. The inquisitorial model uses only one impartial jurisconsult
to present the case for both the prosecution and defense, and is often
recognized as being more cost-efficient. One controversy over this issue
rests on the requirement by some nations' constitutions, such as the
United States', that the defendants have a right to personal counsel.
Use of the inquisitorial approach could prevent these nations, particularly the U.S., from participating in the court, and thus, would undermine the court's existence.
For this reason, the 1953 ILC proposal, MacPherson's proposal,
and the ILC draft, all advocate the use of the common law adversarial
model for the court. The 1953 and the MacPherson proposals both
stipulate that the defendant's counsel would be paid for by the court,
at the defendant's choice. 2 The ILC Draft, however, placed an addicourt is to pay for the attorney, the court must
tional condition: if the
2
select the attorney.' '
G. ProceduralLaws to Apply
Although M. Cherif Bassiouni states that the applicable procedural law is not of primary importance because "international human
rights norms and standards on fairness have reached such a level that
developing a common denominator of a sufficiently high standard to
satisfy the requirements of most countries of the world is quite possible,"122 some countries clearly provide more. For example, the international human rights norms and standards on fairness do not guarantee as many protections as U.S. citizens are guaranteed in their
Constitution. 1" This problem leaves three options for procedural laws
in the international criminal court: 1) to establish a code of international criminal procedure; 2) to use the procedures of one chosen nation; or 3) to transfer the procedural laws of the state bringing the action to the international criminal court.
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All of the proposals thus far have opted in favor of creating a code
of criminal procedures for the court. The 1952 U.N. Draft Statute includes a chapter on Procedure pertaining to standards for indictment,
right to a fair trial, and innocence until proof of guilt, but does not
provide for the right to a jury trial.124
The ILC Draft Statute builds upon the 1952 chapter to include
the largest number of rights to the accused as possible. It provides
Miranda rights, the right to court-appointed counsel, and freedom from
self-incrimination." 2 In addition, the Draft requires the Prosecution
to initiate an investigation as to whether a sufficient basis exists for it
to proceed with a case before issuing an indictment.'26 The indictment is then to be screened by the Bureau of the Court to ascertain
whether a prima facie case exists before it issues a warrant. 27 The
accused shall, therefore, receive a fair, expeditious, and public trial,
having been informed of all of his/her individual rights in his/her own
language." In addition, a presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused will exist."2 Finally, the accused will not ordinarily be subject to double jeopardy under this statute, unless there was a lack of
impartiality under a previous tribunal. 3 Not only does the ILC
Draft afford protection to the accused, but also to victims and witnesses, which may be imperative for trying the alleged rape victims from
the Bosnian war crimes. 3 ' The ILC Draft, section on Procedure,
should be viewed as a model for the international criminal court.
In sum, the arguments in favor of an international criminal court
clearly outweigh those against its establishment. An international
criminal court is necessary to prevent the ongoing violations of international humanitarian law that are not addressed through the creation of ad hoc courts. Careful drafting of an international criminal
court statute can address the concerns that nations present over sovereignty, jurisdiction, and enforcement, and still effectively adjudicate
international crime.

V. A NEW PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Drawing from the lessons learned from the proposals discussed in
the previous sections, a competent and permanent international criminal court must still be created. This section creates such a proposal,
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and is followed by a sample Draft Statute.
Although the ad hoc Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal is a positive
step in the codification of international criminal law, its failure to
deter ongoing. abuses of human rights in Bosnia alone, demonstrates
the need for a permanent international criminal court. Many of the following proposals find their roots in the 1993 International Law Commission Draft Statute, which should be rewarded for its thoroughness
and rigid stance on enforcement. Several key areas, most importantly
its lack of "permanency," however, are modified.
A. Composition of the Proposed International Criminal Court
1. Framework of the Court
The international criminal court must be a permanent standing
adjudicatory body available to: 1) nations which bring cases to its attention and 2) individuals filing complaints against their own nation,
such as an ethnic minority or a political group. The court should have
a preliminary body,'a Committing Chamber, to investigate the charges
prior to any official charging, similar to the body currently in use in
the ad hoc military tribunal.
The court could be located in any one of several international
cities, but it should be a separate and independent organ of the United
Nations. This separation would serve several purposes: 1) the court
would be less likely to become embroiled in U.N. politics if it were
separate from the General Assembly or the Security Council; 2) the
court would be less likely to receive the stigma of the International
Court of Justice if it is a separate legal institution; 3) the codification
of international crimes and criminal procedures could be administered
or voted on through the General Assembly and the Security Council;
and (4) all member states of the U.N. could then be required to contribute financially to the court pursuant to Article 17, paragraph 2 as
"expenses of the organization."" 2 Because criminal "stigma" in itself
has value, the international community would benefit greatly from a
large number of cases being brought early on in its tenure. This stigma
may deter many countries from committing further violations of international humanitarian law. In addition, the court would benefit from
addressing any administrative problems not foreseen in its creation,
and could demonstrate to the world that it would take a rigid, but fair
and impartial, stance on international crime.
In order to make this court a separate organ of the United Nations, the U.N. Charter could adopt Article 14 of the former League of
Nations, allowing the General Assembly to create a court by statute
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upon a two-thirds majority vote. If the General Assembly does not
reach consensus at first, the Secretary General could ask for comments
from the member nations, and request the drafters of the court, likely
the International Law Commission or the Working Group of the United Nations, to incorporate them. If political controversy inhibits the
General Assembly from creating an effective court, the Secretary General should draft a statute and allow the Security Council to vote for
the court.13 Contrary to the bilingual status of the U.N., the international criminal court should recognize the increased importance of the
Spanish-speaking world in making English, Spanish, and French all
official languages of the court. Irrespective of the official languages of
the court, any individual tried before the court should still have the
right to all proceedings conducted in his/her own native language.
2. Selection and Responsibilities of Judges
The Court should have fifteen to eighteen independent judges
from different nations, drawn from as many geo-political regions of the
world as possible. This approach adopts the International Law Commission proposal that terms be long, such as twelve years, and that
judges not be reelected. A long tenancy may assist judges in gaining
the knowledge necessary to hear cases effectively. These judges should
be elected on a four-year rotational basis, to maintain the highest level
of judicial impartiality.
This approach rejects, however, the International Law
Commission's proposal that the judges be present only when a case is
brought to the court. In contrast, the judges should sit permanently,
and be paid salaries as such. When the court is not is session, the
judges could discuss, research, and write on the expansion of international criminal law. They should use their expertise in the field to
advance public opinion and scholarly research on the principles of
international criminal law. This will assure the international community that, in fact, the court is "permanent."
The election of the judges should be administered through the
United Nations, which already has established voting and participatory procedures, and representatives from all of its member states. The
Secretary General could screen nominations and then compile a list of
candidates to submit to the General Assembly. The candidates with
the highest number of votes from the General Assembly would be
elected to the court, so long as no two of them are from the same country.
If a judge became incapacitated or withdraws at any time while
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seated on the court, another judge from his country could be nominated and approved by a majority vote of the remaining judges on the
court. If the nominated judge did not meet this threshold number of
votes, then any nation could nominate a judge immediately for approval by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In addition, any
judge suspected of impropriety or partiality while exercising official
duties would be removed from the court by a two-thirds majority of the
other judges. No judge would be allowed to serve in any governmental
or judicial position in his/her country while seated on the Court, because this might affect the impartial nature of the judge's position. A
judge could, however, at any time, abstain from participation in a
particular case before the court with no consequences.
Three judges should be selected, on an annual rotating basis to
serve in a Committing Chamber. This Chamber would be responsible
for examining the evidence presented by the complainants to determine if this evidence is sufficient to go to trial, or if further evidence is
necessary and available.
Once personal jurisdiction over an accused was obtained, a panel
of five new judges (none of which served in the Committing Chamber)
would hear the case. Four of the five judges would have to agree in
order to convict a defendant. Should a judge abstain from voting during a particular case, three of the four remaining judges must agree in
order to convict a defendant. Finally, an appeals panel of three judges,
who have served neither in the Committing Chamber, nor on the first
panel, should be available to examine the final judgment if allegations
of legal or procedural violation are alleged.
B. ProceduralGuarantees
As suggested in the proposals set forth above, the adversarial
model of the British-United States systems should be adopted for the
court. This model would call for court appointed defense attorneys for
indigent defendants, and a separate prosecutorial branch administered
by the court, similar to the U.S. Attorney's office. This latter proposal
would allow attorneys competent both in international criminal law
and the court's procedures to bring the case. If nations rejected this option in the General Assembly, due to beliefs that the adversarial process was neither just, nor speedy enough, in favor of the inquisitorial
approach, then an accused with the right to personal defense counsel
in his/her own country should be allowed to retain this right in the
international criminal court.
The high level of procedural guarantees laid out by the International Law Commission in its draft statute should be used as an example." Miranda rights, freedom from self-incrimination, explana-
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tion of all individual rights in the language of the defendant, a presumption of innocence for the accused, protections for witness testimony, a speedy trial, a right to rebut all charges levied, and freedom from
double jeopardy should all be incorporated into the code of procedural
guarantees. In addition, the defendant should have a right to have all
court proceedings translated into his/her native language, so that the
defendant understands the judicial process, all testimony, and court
decisions. There should not be, however, a jury trial in these proceedings, because the selection process would be far too complicated. The
code of procedural guarantees should be drafted either by the first set
of judges elected to the court, the International Law Commission, or
the Working Group of the United Nations, subject to a two-thirds approval vote in the General Assembly.
C. Jurisdiction
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Builders of the international criminal court should lay a solid
foundation that is fully competent over a small number of highly legitimized crimes. The court must demonstrate its capacity to adjudicate
these crimes effectively before increasing the number of codified crimes
to its jurisdiction. M. Cherif Bassiouni states it well:
"An international criminal court is not to be considered as an all or
nothing proposition. It can be developed incrementally as well,
provided that it is given enough standing and competence to develop a record that will permit it to gain more and more confidence
and therefore expand its beneficial role ... Its success should be
enough to reassure anyone who has had the doubts that were
raised in 1950 when the (first) court was established and that are
raised now in anticipation of an international criminal court.""
Following this approach, the international criminal court should initially have exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes already codified in
international conventions, including, War Crimes, Genocide, Slavery,
Diplomatic Immunity, Hostage-Taking and Piracy. The exclusive jurisdiction of the international criminal court is chosen to avoid the "Argentinean problem" mentioned earlier, and to monitor closely the procedural rights afforded to the accused. A "bottom-line", tough enforcement policy with respect to these crimes could help the court to build
its international legitimacy, reputation, and functioning procedures.
After the court has demonstrated its legitimacy, it could begin the
process of codifying new international crimes, eventually to include
more controversial crimes such as drug-trafficking and terrorism. It is
important to add these crimes later, showing respect for the high level

135. Bassiouni & Blakesly, supra note 75, at 171.
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of state sovereignty still omnipresent in the international arena. Controversial crimes at the onset may weaken both the membership and
effectiveness of the court. Codification of these crimes should be
achieved, again, through a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. However, in contrast with the exclusive jurisdiction crimes enumerated above, nations could opt-out of particular crimes.
Any newly codified crimes should be subject to concurrent jurisdiction between the international criminal court and a domestic court. No
accused individual should be subject to "double jeopardy" in the international criminal court: a case adjudicated in the international court
would serve as res judicata in the national courts. Similarly, if a national court has exercised its concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, the
international court could not rule on the issue, but it could review the
procedures for their partiality and potential error. The court's only recourse, in the event of error, would be to remand the case for further
domestic proceedings. This aspect of the court would help to assure nations that they did maintain sovereign rights over crimes affecting
their territory, as long as they provide fair and impartial judicial proceedings.
2. Personal Jurisdiction
The international criminal court should have personal jurisdiction
over all national individuals, whether they are public or private individuals of a state. Allowing public officials both to bring cases and be
tried would help to establish a heightened legitimacy to some governments, and would provide a check on their actions. Universal Interest
Jurisdiction should continue to apply in the international community
as it does now. In addition, however, the court should implement a
system similar to that functioning in the Bosnian ad hoc Tribunal now.
The Committing Chamber, upon deciding that enough basis exists to
bring a case, should use Interpol to issue a warrant to a defendant
wherever this defendant can be located. The court should also establish sanctions or the suspension of U.N. privileges for nations which
refuse to extradite criminals within their borders to the court's jurisdiction. The combination of these resources should greatly increase the
likelihood of lawful extraditions in the international community.
D. Enforcement Mechanisms
Individuals convicted of the crimes within the court's exclusive
jurisdiction should be subject to fines, international community service,
and incarceration. The convicted criminal should serve out a pre-trial
prison sentence in a prison devoted to the international criminal court.
Similar to the Dutch prisons allocated to the Bosnian ad hoc Military
Tribunal, this method should preserve and afford the greatest number
of individual liberties for the accused. Once a sentence has been
handed down, the sentence should be served out in a neutral prison
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(not from the state of either party to the matter) designated for the
court's use. If the treatment of this prisoner falls below established
principles of international treatment, then this prisoner should be
relocated to another prison. There should be no death penalty sentences handed down by the court. U.N.-sponsored executions may seem
hypocritical to the purpose and scope of the court. Finally, this proposal does not advance the need for an international "Devil's Island" at
present. A fairly small number of cases will probably be brought in the
first few years, making this an unnecessary expenditure. Perhaps in
the long run this idea should be reassessed.
The penalties for the concurrent jurisdiction crimes, to be determined in the future, should be slightly more lenient than those stipulated for exclusive jurisdiction. Life imprisonment should not be sanctioned until such time as the Member States and General Assembly
elect otherwise, and the penalties should range from fines, reimbursement to the international community for profits gained from the crime
(such as in the case of environmental, commercial, or expropriation
crimes), international community service, and short incarceration
terms.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the past 500 years, scholars have devoted'a large amount of
time and effort to the creation of an international criminal court. Although the proposals themselves have contained excellent ideas, states
have not been willing to cede sovereignty to an international body on
criminal law, an issue believed to be of a domestic nature. The past ad
hoc proceedings at Nuremberg and Tokyo did not deter the occurrence
of international crime, nor have the current Bosnian proceedings put
an end to human rights violations in Bosnia. One lesson must be remembered: a refusal to adjudicate violations of international humanitarian law encourages belligerents to threaten the peace and stability
of the world. If one positive step for humanity can be achieved from
the current atrocities in Bosnia, it should be the establishment of a
permanent international criminal court. The time for a permanent international criminal court is now.
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DRAFT STATUTE
OF THE
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 1
PURPOSE

The purpose of this statute is to establish an International Criminal
Court to try natural persons of crimes that are generally recognized
under international law, or are widely accepted international conventions.
ARTICLE

2

TYPE OF LAW

The Court shall apply international criminal law for which the states
have conferred jurisdiction to the court, or have assented to the law by
agreement, convention, or otherwise.
ARTICLE

3

PERMANENT NATURE OF THE COURT

The court shall consist of a permanent body and locale. If there are no
cases pending on the court's docket, its judges will dedicate their time
to scholarly research in international criminal law, and any other
endeavors necessary to further the development of international criminal law and the functioning of the court.
ARTICLE 4
LOCATION OF THE COURT

The court shall be established as a separate and independent organ of
the United Nations.
(1)

As an organ of the United Nations, member states will be obligated financially to the court.

(2)

The International Criminal Court will not be linked in any way to
the International Court of Justice.

(3)

United Nations voting procedures through the General Assembly
and the Security Council may be used to codify additional international crimes, to alter any established mechanism of the court,
and to select judges.
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ARTICLE 5
LANGUAGES OF THE COURT

The official languages of the court shall be English, French, and Span-

ish.
CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT
ARTICLE 6
QUALIFICATIONS OF JUDGES

(1)

The Court shall be composed of independent judges who are recognized as experts in international criminal law or human rights,
who possess qualifications to serve on the highest judicial bodies
of their own respective countries.

(2)

Judges may be of any nationality, but no two judges from any one
country shall serve on the court at the same time.

(3)

The judges must represent as many regions and geo-political systems of the world as possible.
ARTICLE 7
NOMINATION OF JUDGES

(1)

There shall be from 15-18 judges seated on court.

(2)

These judges shall be elected for 12 years, and their terms shall
rotate such that every 4 years, 5-6 judges will retire. After the end
of the term, these judges may not be reelected to the court.

(3)

Judges shall be nominated by their own respective nations which
have respected the jurisdiction of the court. From these nominations, the Secretary-General will review these and comprise a list
of potential candidates to the General Assembly for a vote. A twothirds majority must be met, after which the candidates will be
chosen by the highest number of votes, with no two judges from
the same nation.

(4) If a judge should resign or become capacitated while seated on the
court, another judge from his nation may be nominated and must
be approved by a majority vote of the remaining judges on the
court. If the nominated judge is not approved, other states may
nominate judges for immediate acceptance by a majority vote of
the General Assembly, and the Security Council.
(5)

A judge may be removed by the other members of the court by a
majority vote only for reasons which might interfere with that
judges impartial capacity on the court.

(6)

While serving on the court, no judge shall perform any govern-
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mental or judicial function in that judge's respective state.
(7)

A judge may abstain from judgment on any matter within that
judge's discretion.
ARTICLE 8
COMMITTING CHAMBER

(1)

Each year, three judges shall be appointed to examine all evidence
offered by the Complainants.

(2)

If the evidence satisfies the Committing Chamber, the Chamber
shall certify it to the court. If the Chamber is not satisfied with
the evidence presented, it may request further support or dismiss
the case until further satisfactory evidence is admitted.

(3)

These judges will not be permitted to take part in the decisions of
the court on a particular case in which they served in the Committing Chamber.
ARTICLE 9
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AND DEFENSE ATTORNEY
OPTION 1
THERE SHALL BE SEPARATE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS

(1)

The Complainant shall appoint a prosecution attorney who will be responsible for filing an indictment and conduction prosecution before
the court.

(2)

If the Defendant cannot afford private defense counsel, the court
shall appoint one.
OPTION 2
THERE SHALL BE ONE JURISCONSULT

The court will appoint a jurisconsult, elected by the judges of the court to
examine the prosecution and defense, and present the case to the court.
However, if the Defendant would have separate defense counsel in his/her
own nation because of a Constitutional provision, then his/her own nation
may appoint counsel, or the court can 'transfer the proceedings' of the
court to the national court.
CHAPTER III
COMPETENCE OF THE COURT
ARTICLE 10
JURISDICTION OVER PERSONS
(1)

The Court shall be competent to judge natural persons, whether
private individuals or public individuals.

(2)

Universal Interest Jurisdiction shall apply for any crimes with a uni-
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versal interest, such that they threaten to undermine the foundations of the international community as a whole. These crimes need
not be committed within the boundaries of the Complainant State,
nor does the Defendant need to be found on the territory of the Complainant State.
(3)

In the event that a nation does not comply with an extradition request by the court, two penalties shall apply:
(a) that nation's United Nations privileges and voting rights shall
be suspended; and
(b) the Committing Chamber may issue a warrant to Interpol to
seek out the Defendant, and bring the Defendant to trial.
ARTICLE 11
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Subject to further codification through convention as the member states of
the United Nations agree:
(1)

The court shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over War Crimes, Slavery, Genocide, Diplomatic Immunity, Piracy, Hostage-Taking, and
any other crime which is codified into convention at such time as the
court enters into effect.

(2)

The court shall exercise concurrent jurisdiction with national courts
over all other international crimes which are later codified into law.
(a) A nation may decide if it will hear a case within its domestic
courts, or submit it to the international court.

(3)

(b)

No offender shall be subject to double jeopardy: If a case is submitted to the international court, it shall not be retried in a
domestic court, and vice versa.

(c)

If a nation with jurisdiction fails to adjudicate a case adequately
according to international standards, another nation may submit this case to the international court for review. If the court
finds the allegations valid, it may remand the case to the national court for further proceedings.

No provision stated herein shall prevent the nations of the world
from conferring jurisdiction to the international court for a more expansive list of international crimes. International conventions and
treaties may be codified by a two-thirds majority vote within the
General Assembly.
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CHAPTER IV
JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
ARTICLE 12
RULES OF THE COURT

(1)

The court shall adopt rules and procedures which must, at a minimum, incorporate international general principles of law, norms, and
standards of fair trial practice. The General Assembly shall decide if
the rules and procedures established by the court are adequate with
a two-thirds majority vote.
(a)

Issues such as minimum age of the Accused, the necessary mental state for the commission of a crime, duress, and insanity
should be incorporated in these rules.

(b) Privacy rights for individual witness testimony must be provided.
(1)

In the case of rape, the victim shall have the right to privacy, including the right to testify in a separate room from
the accusers in certain circumstances.

(2)

If the standards set forth in these rules does not reach the level of a
nation's domestic standards, and may prejudice the case then the
court may elect to "transfer the proceedings" from the national court
to the international court, and apply the national court's procedures,
or it may elect not to hear the case.

ARTICLE 13
RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT
(1)

There shall be innocence until proof of guilt. An Accused shall not be
required to prove his/her innocence.

(2)

The Defendant shall have the right to freedom from self-incrimination.

(3)

The Defendant shall not be subject to lower standards of fair trial
than he/she would receive in his/her own nation. If defense counsel is
provided in his/her own nation, then it shall be provided by the
court.

(4)

The Defendant has a right to all court proceedings translated into
his/her native language.

(5)

If the Defendant is incarcerated during the pre-trial period, it shall
be in a prison set aside for use by the international court.

(6)

The Defendant has the right to present and rebut all evidence.
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The Defendant has the right to a just and speedy trial, as is possible
in light of the court's docket.
ARTICLE 14

TRIAL

(1)

Five judges shall hear each case, and a majority vote is necessary for
conviction. If one judge should abstain from judgment, and the other
four judges are split, the remaining judges shall designate an impartial judge to cast the deciding vote.

(2)

If judicial error is committed during any part of the trial, the Accused shall have the right to a new trial.
The Defendant shall have the right to one appeal to a panel of three
judges from the court.

(3)

ARTICLE 15
SENTENCING

(1)

For all "exclusive jurisdiction" crimes of the court, the court may impose a fine, life imprisonment or imprisonment for years in a prison
dedicated for the use of the international court. This prison shall not
be in the nation of the Complainant or the Defendant. In addition,
the court may order the Defendant to surrender any profits gained in
the commission of the crime charged.

(2)

For all "concurrent jurisdiction" crimes of the court, the court may
impose a fine, imprisonment as stipulated above, international community service, or a surrender of profits from the crime.

(3)

The death penalty shall not be imposed by the international court.

(4)

Flogging, caning, or any other form of inhumane punishment shall
not be imposed by the court.
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History teaches us that men and nations behave wisely once they
have exhausted all other alternatives.
Abba Eban'
INTRODUCTION
Benjamin Ferencz is an acclaimed scholar and student of international law. In his recent effort, New Legal Foundations for Global
Survival: Security Through the Security Council, Professor Ferencz sets
forth the history of the United Nations Security Council, details its
shortcomings as a mechanism for international security and then offers a set of practical solutions to address the shortcomings. For the
most part, Professor Ferencz's book offers an excellent overview of
international security issues and provides a valuable blueprint for how
the U.N. Security Council can be better utilized as a force for international peace. His attempt to offer a wide range of solutions to current
problems facing collective international security, while the most useful
and noble part of his book, overlooks some practical considerations of
world and national politics. Overall, however, Professor Ferencz adeptly educates the reader and then opens the door for discussion by giving
us his solutions to the ineffective peace mechanism known as the U.N.
Security Council.
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The weakness of Professor Ferencz's book, if truly it can be called
one, is that despite his abundance of creative ideas, as a practical
matter, the U.N. cannot survive without backing and funding from the
United States, that may be disappearing. The U.N. has a peacekeeping
budget of $3.6 billion, of which the U.S. provides $1 billion. The new
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has described the
U.N. as the "long-time nemesis of millions of Americans."2 Additionally, a bill currently before the House International Relations Committee
proposes to effectively sever U.S. contribution.
Other practical considerations that Professor Ferencz largely ignores, or at least does not address as powerful factors pertaining to
international security, include the impact of massive regionalized population growth, religion, ethnicity, race and culture, diminishing natural resources, health disparities and the interaction between them.
Rather than addressing how the U.N. should account for these
changing factors, he realizes that they will create tensions in the future that the U.N. could address. For example, while Professor Ferencz
realizes that the changing demographics will impact security issues, he
does not address the way in which changing demographics will effect
the way States will view their role in a new world order.3
Assuming, however, that the U.S. does not cut funding for the
U.N. and changing demographics and supply of natural resources permits or fosters notions of collective security, scholars and statesmen
should look to Professor Ferencz's book to provide a blue-print for the
future of effective collective security.
A WAY OF THINKING ABOUT THE PROBLEM
While I was an undergraduate at Dartmouth College, former Colorado Governor Richard Lamm taught a course on leadership. During
one lecture, he expounded on what he considered to be the process
through which a meritorious idea must travel before it becomes an
accepted norm. Briefly, the process is described in this manner:
STAGE

THOUGHT

ACTION

1

No Think

No Do

2

Think

No Do

3

Think

Do

4

No Think

Just Do

The premise behind this model is that valuable ideas go through a
2. Donald Rothberg, Foreign Policy Battles Loom, ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Dec.
29, 1994, at A45.
3. See Nicholas Eberstadt, Population Change and National Security, FOREIGN
AFF., Summer 1991, at 115.

1995

GLOBAL SURVIVAL

process of acceptance. At first, a valuable idea is not implemented
because it has not yet been considered. At some point, the kernel of an
idea presents itself to a visionary thinker who presents the idea. At
that time, however, the idea is not acted upon either because it is not
recognized for its value, or because the old system of ideas remains
fully entrenched despite its growing antiquity. In the third step of the
model, the idea becomes recognized for its merit and takes shape into
action. This stage of the process is often accompanied by the growing
pains that the implementation of the idea has created because implementation is often costly and risky. In the final step of the process, the
idea becomes so ingrained, and the actions are so rote, that conscious
thought about the merits of the idea are no longer necessary-in a
sense-and the idea has become a moral imperative. In Global Survival, Professor Ferencz describes the whole process of thinking about
international security and attempts to move his idea, collective security, from stage two to stage three.
THE PROBLEM
Professor Ferencz first analyzes how we got to the current state of
international security and then explains why the current model does
not work. Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the book is that he
explores the evolution of the concepts and ideas behind international
security. Professor Ferencz has always been a visionary thinker on
international organizations in much the same manner Hobbes and de
Tocqueville were visionary thinkers on the modern State. His suggestion that ordered liberty can be achieved only through collective international security parallels Hobbes' analysis of the modern view of the
state in Leviathan: In a society composed of atomistic individuals who
are only minimally related to each other through markets and the
State, each citizen faces the State naked.4 The only way to assure
freedom and guard against the oppression of the State is through the
maintenance of an organized intermediary. de Tocqueville agreed:
"Despotism sees the isolation of men as the best guarantee of its own
permanence."' Likewise, Ferencz sees the isolation of States as the
raison d'etre that the world continues to be dominated by the rule of
might.
Another, albeit similar, undercurrent running through his book is
the notion of federalism. Many of Professor Ferencz's concerns and
observations are reminiscent of this country's struggle between the
notion of states' rights and federalism. Independent states may offer
more flexibility, but the costs of standing alone, especially in terms of
security, can be daunting. In fact, one can see the similarity between

4. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, chs. 20, 22 (1651).
5. ALEXIS DE TocQuEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 509 (J. Mayer ed. 1969)
(1840).
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the reason the original Articles of Confederation were rejected and
Professor Ferencz's explanation of why current international organizations are largely ineffective. In both instances, States must unite to
pursue a common goal before true security can be achieved.
Just as many of my colleagues believe that international law is
non-existent because a State with power can define international law
as it deems useful at that moment, critics of the modern State and
federalism also questioned whether personal freedoms could be expressed in a system where individuals were beholden to the State or
unions of states. As Hobbes and de Tocqueville were not adequately
understood or accepted for their views on the modern state while they
were alive, current writers on international peace organizations are
not fully understood today. Current and past skeptics have never adequately understood the freedoms engendered by peace and the role of
law. But Professor Ferencz challenges the status quo, and sets forth
the need for the organized intermediary of the United Nations to prevent each State from standing naked--especially in an age characterized by mass communication, the capability of mass destruction, and
terrorism.
COLLECTIVE SECURITY

To provide the framework for his book on collective security
through the Security Council, Professor Ferencz contends that there
are "three foundations" upon which orderly society is based: (1) laws
which define the minimum standards of behavior; (2) courts to peacefully settle disputes in accord with the rules of law; and (3) enforcement to insure that the laws are obeyed and the pronouncements of
the courts have meaning. The third foundation is the aspect Professor
Ferencz finds most lacking in today's international society. But he is
not an advocate of the use of force for its own sake. Through all of his
pronouncements regarding the need for better enforcement, Professor
Ferencz demands that force be used as a last resort, in compliance
with the law, and always with a humanitarian goal. He notes that the
"force of law" should supplant the "law of force."
His notion of the "force of law" replacing the "law of force" represents the second stage of Governor Lamm's model: think, no do. Although we have recognized the utility of international security organizations and implemented them (stage three), actually using them as a
collective security force for the purpose of replacing individual state
power represents a departure from the traditional concept of security.
Professor Ferencz presents this concept and argues for its implementation (stage two). No doubt many leaders will vigorously oppose the idea
of collective security because it will force them to give up some control
and power.
Professor Ferencz suggests that we can achieve true international
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security through better use of the U.N. Security Council, as something
of a global police force enforcing indiscriminately the rule of law and
the pronouncements of the international judicial bodies. According to
Professor Ferencz: "Laws have little significance without courts; courts
have no power without enforcement." Thus, the Security Council would
be the enforcers of peace.
In his model, the Security Council would operate as it did during
the Gulf War, using its powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
to authorize collective measures in an effort to enhance security. The
Council initially authorized sanctions and then collective military
force. It was because of the Council's blessing that the unilateral use of
force was forsaken, and the concomitant danger of unilateral, self-serving use of force avoided.
Professor Ferencz recognized, however, that the Gulf War was an
exception to the rule and merely an example of how the Security Council could function. During the Gulf War, the issues and the violations
of the law were clear. Iraq invaded another sovereign with all the
traditional trappings of war. However, most threats to international
security are not so cut and dried and yet may be equally worthy of a
collective response. One of the grave difficulties Professor Ferencz
identifies that must be overcome before we can fully embrace the idea
of an international organization as a global police force-moving from
stage two to stage three--is the difficulty of providing definitions and
norms upon which the Security Council can base its actions. It is impossible to get States to agree to the notion of collective force unless it
is first possible to define when action should be taken. As with civil
statutes and laws, the initial difficult requirement is to find mutually
agreeable definitions. Without definitions, we cannot collectively respond.
For example, there has never been an adequate definition of terrorism.6 Each proposed definition is colored by who is proposing the
definition, and drafted to achieve some specific purpose that may not
have universal application. As a result, there isn't a widely accepted
definition that could serve as a starting point upon which collective
response could be based. We cannot effectively and globally respond to
terrorist threats until we can agree on what constitutes an act of terrorism. Professor Ferencz aptly notes that the international community
lacks definitions for some of the most crucial concepts, including what
aggression is and when we should respond to it: "The international
community has not yet been able to reach agreement on when the use
of force is permissible and when it is impermissible." Generally, Professor Ferencz offers valuable definitions for aggression, terrorism, the

6. See Scott S. Evans, The Lockerbie Incident Cases: Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism, Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine, 18 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 21, 24 (1994).
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justifiable use of force (humanitarian intervention), and self-determination. Even if one doesn't agree with the definitions or the parameters, at least he offers an alternative and gives his readers a starting
point to address the ways those definitions can be used.
Throughout his exposition on the need for definitions, Professor
Ferencz never loses sight of the history of international security
through international organizations. He sets out the history of collective force as the guardian of international peace in an interesting and
insightful manner. Like the early observers of the modern State, Professor Ferencz suggests that true freedom and peace can only be
achieved through interrelation, collective security, accepted definitions
and thus law, courts and enforcement.
DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

Global Survival does not merely detail the history of international
security organizations and criticize their shortcomings. Professor
Ferencz also offers twelve draft United Nations resolutions to strengthen law, courts and law enforcement.
First, he sets forth five resolutions to strengthen the laws of
peace. Specifically, his first resolution would require that both individuals and states utilize a process of mandatory dispute settlement and
subject those who did not comply with this resolution to criminal sanctions. He also offers resolutions defining aggression, prohibiting crimes
against humanity, ending the arms races, and enhancing social justice.
Each resolution is designed to clarify the current rules, explain the
ramifications of noncompliance, prevent individuals and states from
using force as a policy instrument, and encourage respect for human
rights.
Second, Professor Ferencz offers three draft resolutions to
strengthen international courts. He first suggests that the power of the
World Court could be enhanced by requiring states to submit their
legal disputes when the Security Council determines that the dispute
is likely to endanger international security. The Security Council
would also be given the power to use "all necessary means" to ensure
that the decisions of the Court were complied with. Professor Ferencz
also proposes the creation of an international criminal court and a
tribunal for social justice. The criminal court would have broad jurisdiction over violations of the five laws of peace mentioned, infra. The
tribunal for social justice would deliberate on violations of human
rights. Again, the Security Council would be authorized to both submit
cases to these courts and enforce their decisions.
Finally, Professor Ferencz presents four resolutions to strengthen
the weakest component of international security- enforcement. He
suggests creating four agencies to provide the quick response that the
U.N. now lacks: (1) a U.N. Disarmament Enforcement Agency; (2) a
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U.N. Sanctions Agency; (3) a U.N. Police Agency; and (4) a U.N. Social
Justice Agency. The most intriguing agency proposed is the Police
Agency, a peace-keeping force at the disposal of the Security Council
intended not only to restore peace, but also to maintain it. It would be
composed of regular and reserve forces on call for specific military
operations. In essence, the Police Agency would be what the U.N. Military Staff Committee and the U.N. Military Force were intended to be
when they were envisioned in the 1940s.
With these twelve draft resolutions, Professor Ferencz attempts to
provide a blueprint to solve the problems of international security by
enhancing the role of the U.N. Security Council. In a very detailed
manner, he gives citizens of the world community a roadmap on how
to move from merely thinking about world peace to actually acting on
it.
CONCLUSION

In the past, the only time that collective security through the
Security Council has been truly effective has been when it has acted at
the behest of powerful States and within their parameters, such as the
U.N.'s response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It is at these moments
that we can see the power of Professor Ferencz's notions of international security and we realize that it is possible to move from the second to
the third stage of Governor Lamm's model, i.e., from inaction to action.
However, if the organization works within the rules but outside of the
powerful States' definition of the rules, such as when the World Court
sanctioned the United States for mining the harbors of Nicaragua, the
international security organization is called a sham and threatened
with destruction. It is no surprise, then, that Professor Ferencz will
meet much resistance from the traditional state leaders who are comfortable with the status quo; those leaders of nations that have the
military and economic might are comfortable retaining their own sticks
and carrots and playing by the rules that they themselves define and
those leaders of smaller nations that are afraid of being smothered by
the larger states.
Perhaps the most important message of Global Survival is not
explicitly stated. Professor Ferencz realizes implicitly that international legal scholars and Statesmen are increasingly required to shift their
mode of thinking to adapt to changing times. The Cold War is over and
the threats to world peace and security will be originating from other
sources. In creating a world of global security we must focus less of our
attention on preventing global nuclear war and more of our energy in
addressing human rights violations, low-intensity aggression, economic
coercion, terrorism, regional conflicts, and nuclear proliferation. Global
Survival: Security Through the Security Council, begins the process
through which the idea of international security through the Security
Council can become a reality.

The Baltic Path to Independence:
An International Reader of Selected Articles
REVIEWED BY TIMOTHY KEARLEY*
THE BALTIC PATH TO INDEPENDENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL
READER OF SELECTED ARTICLES; Edited by Adolf Sprudzs; W.S.
Hein & Co., Buffalo, N.Y. (1994); ($37.50); ISBN 0-89941-867-8; 392
pp. (pbk).
This is a collection of twelve pieces, reprinted from nine different
sources, on the loss and recent reacquisition of independence by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It devotes most of its attention to the international legal aspects of the topic, but it pays substantial attention to
historical and political aspects of the events as well. This breadth of
scope is matched by the diversity of sources from which the contributions were taken-six journals and three collections of essays, published in the U.S., France, and Germany. Editor Adolf Sprudzs, Foreign Law Librarian and Lecturer Emeritus at the University of Chicago Law School (who was born in Latvia and has published in this field
previously) adds a highly informative introduction and a chronology of
events.
This work is divided into two parts. The contributions in Part I,
"The Struggle for Independence," primarily describe and analyze the
events of 1987 to 1991 which led to the reassertion of sovereignty by
the Baltic states. The first three, written in English,1 deal with one
state each, offering detailed, politically-oriented reviews of events part
way into 1989. The next two pieces focus on Latvia, one in German
reviewing the history of that country's incorporation into the Soviet
Union and subsequent political developments into 1991 (just prior to
the August declaration of independence), and one in English concentrating on the unique demographic aspects of politics in Latvia (where
native Latvians made up only about 52% of the population by 1989).
The final essay in this part is a brief survey, in German, of the environmental situation and environmental politics in the Baltic states.
Given the extent of environmental degradation in the Baltics and the
importance of environmental groups in the independence movements
there, the inclusion of a work on the subject is not as anomalous as it
might seem; however, the work in question does not specifically relate
environmental and independence issues, thus making it somewhat out

* Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law; J.D. and B.A. University of Illinois.
1. Originally published in Juris Dreifelds, Latvian National Rebirth, PROBS. OF
COMMUNISM, July-Aug. 1989, at 77; V. Stanley Vardys, Lithuanian National Politics,
PROBS. OF COMMUNISM, July-Aug. 1989 at 53; Rein Taagepers, Estonia's Road to
Independence, PROBS. OF COMMUNISM, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 11.
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of place here.
The bulk of the book is given over to the six contributions that
make up part II, "International Law and Baltic Independence," written
in German and French. The first piece, which translates into English
as "State Continuity, International Legal Position, and Foreign Political Situation of the Baltic States," by Boris Meissner, points out the
reasons why nearly all Western states held that the incorporation of
the Baltic states into the USSR violated international law, and surveys
the resulting state practice regarding the continued recognition of the
Baltic states as independent nations. Meissner notes, interestingly,
that the Netherlands was the only Western nation to recognize the
incorporation, due to the fact that it first recognized the USSR in 1942
and thus recognized it as it stood then, including the Baltic states.
The second article, Romain Yakemtchouk's "The Baltic States in
International Law: Defeat of an Annexation Carried out in Violation of
Human Rights"2 covers much the same ground, but from a somewhat
different point of view, referring to French authorities and analyzing
in greater detail the French position on non-recognition of the incorporation. It also describes some of the international law issues currently
facing the Baltic states, such as recovering pre-incorporation state
property and establishing their territorial seas and exclusive economic
zones. Both Meissner and Yakemtchouk agree that the current Baltic
independence constitutes a re-establishment of sovereignty that was
never lawfully extinguished, rather than a new sovereignty won
through secession or decolonization.
The contribution of Rahim Kherad, "The International Recognition
of the Baltic States,"3 implies, on the other hand, that the new independence has to be analyzed in terms of secession or self-determination. However, he goes on to recognize that the annexation of 1940 can
be viewed as having only interrupted the independence of those peoples, as the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq suspended Kuwaite independence. Kherad also discusses the process of "re-recognition" of the Baltic states by other nations and their readmission into international
organizations, the early stages of which was made delicate by the reluctance of states to aggravate the Soviet Union's distress or to encourage a series of secession movements.
The final substantive piece, "The Baltic States Face International
Legal Problems: Continuity or State Succession with Regard to Treaties, State Property, and State Responsibility". is Dietrich Loeber's
brief look, in German, at certain international legal problems faced by

2. Originally published in 37 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE
259 (1991).
3. Originally published in 96 REvUE GENaRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 843
(1992).
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the Baltic States. It provides a summary of those states' possible legal
position with regard to the treaties, state property and state responsibilities belonging to the USSR between 1940 and 1990, as well as the
possible continued validity of the treaties entered into by the Baltic
states during their previous period of independence. No definitive answers are offered, but the most important possibilities are considered.
The Baltic Path to Independence provides an excellent review not
only of the unique international legal position and history of these
states, but of some fundamental international legal concepts, such as
state recognition and sovereignty as well. The contributions are well
chosen, and they offer extensive bibliographic references that facilitate
further exploration of the subject matter. Physically, the reprinting
process was largely successful, although the print in three of the essays is rather small and a few of the footnotes barely legible in one.
On the whole, this is a volume well worth purchasing for most international law collections.

Human Rights: A European Perspective
REVIEWED BY DAVID MAZZARELLA*

HUMAN RIGHTS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE; Edited by Liz
Heffernan; Round Hall Press, Dublin, Ireland (1993); ($35.00); ISBN 185800-023-8; 356 pp. (pbk).
During this fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, it is important that we celebrate the great advances in international human
rights law that the United Nations has directly created and indirectly
inspired. This is particularly important now since there is less resolve
to strengthen international institutions. Lest we forget that it took
two world wars and two and half decades to develop the current international legal regime. Although gains on the global level may be slowing, perhaps the best hope for progress in the near future is on the
regional level. The best and most successful model for regional human
rights regimes is the system created by the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
"The European Convention on Human Rights shows how far a
group of like-minded States, sharing a common culture, can go in
building on and developing the basic rights of the Universal Declaration .... ." (at 17). This is the model system for all regional human
rights regimes to aspire to. The right of individual petition makes the
Convention more than a set of goals for member states to work toward;
it makes the Convention's catalogue of rights an enforceable guarantee for the individuals of the nearly 30 states that are members.
Despite the Convention's success and preeminence, human rights
in Europe derive from several legal sources, such as the European
Union, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
constitutional traditions of each state, and of course, the United Nations. It is in light of these overlapping human rights regimes that Liz
Heffernan has assembled a collection of essays entitled Human Rights:
A EuropeanPerspective. Whereas most books in this field focus on one
particular legal regime, this compilation offers the reader a broader
perspective on the approach necessary to analyze practical human
rights issues in Europe.

* Attorney; International Business Consultant; and Adjunct Professor of International Law, University of Denver College of Law; J.D. University of Denver; LL.M.
in International and European Community Law, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven,
Belgium; M.A. in International Studies, University of Denver Graduate School of
International Studies; B.S. St. Michaels College.
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The majority of the articles in Human Rights offer a summary on
the law relating to a specific right, drawing from the most important
source of law for that particular right. Thus, Human Rights is a good
reference book for those who would like an overview of the law in Europe pertaining to specific rights. Nearly all of the most important civil
and political rights are covered, including some of the most notable
social and economic rights such as education and worker's rights. The
collection also contains several articles on refugee law. There are even
some surprises such as the rights of psychiatric detainees and the
rights of children in intercountry adoption. In addition to the legal
summaries of various rights, there is a selected bibliography at the end
of each section for researchers.
Human Rights should be of interest to scholars working in the
area of comparative human rights law. It offers a succinct and pragmatic view of human rights law in Europe. In addition, some of the
articles in this collection are concerned with human rights under Irish
national law, and international human rights from an Irish perspective.
Professors of international human rights law are likely to find
material in this work suitable for their courses. The book has twentysix relatively short articles on narrow topics which are ideal for use as
supplementary material. Furthermore, some of the articles are not
likely to cover standard course topics and would make a fine addition
to courses on international human rights. For example, the articles on
human rights law in the European Union would offer the student a
more complete survey of human rights law in Europe.
The majority of the contributors to this compilation are from Ireland, and they comprise an impressive list of scholars, practitioners,
and government officials. Their essays are effective in laying out the
most important human rights issues in Europe. The only possible
criticism is that by dealing with European human rights in a very
general manner, it cannot be a comprehensive nor important source for
any particular area of the law, nor for any particular legal regime. But
clearly the editor, Liz Heffernan, did not intend this collection to be
focused on one area of human rights nor on one legal regime. Instead,
she has successfully compiled a collection of essays that summarize the
most important sources of human rights law in Europe.

Human Rights of Women: National and
International Perspectives
REVIEWED BY CELIA R. TAYLOR*
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES; Edited by Rebecca J. Cook; University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (1994); ($19.95); ISBN 0-81221538-9; 640 pp. (pbk).
Human Rights of Women: National and InternationalPerspectives
purports to explore how the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women,' adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979, together with supporting provisions
and institutions of international human rights law, could become an
effective instrument for women's human rights. In fact, Human Rights
of Women, a compilation of essays by a diverse group of scholars, discusses the Convention in some depth, but reaches far beyond to consider broader themes. Central to the book is the premise that "international norms and institutions were designed by men primarily to serve
men's interests." (at 438). With that as the starting point of discussion,
the essays collected in the book consider means of inserting women's
voices and concerns into the traditionally male-dominated arena of
international human rights.
The question of how to achieve the goal of empowering women in
the international field is, not surprisingly, not resolved fully by any of
the works in the book, but some insightful analysis of problems and
potential solutions are provided. Human Rights of Women is divided
into several sections; "Challenges" addresses the theoretical difficulties
of separating and defining women's rights in the broader area of human rights; "International and Regional Approaches" details specific
programs and policies regarding women's rights currently in place in
the African and Inter-American systems, among others; "National Approaches" does the same on the domestic front; and "Guaranteeing
Human Rights of Particular Significance to Women" considers how to
secure such rights as reproductive rights and access to land, among
others.
Despite this division (which is helpful to those interested in specific regions or programs), some common threads run throughout the
book, unifying otherwise disparate concerns. Many of the authors start
by recognizing that the Convention itself, while worthwhile, presents

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; LL.M. Columbia University; J.D. New York University School of Law; B.A. George Washington University.
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difficulties. First, while many countries have ratified the Convention',
ratification does not preclude the common practice of entering reservations. These reservations, in effect, permit a country to accept the
Convention in so far as doing so will not impose obligations to change
religious or customary law.3 In the event of a conflict, reservations
render the Convention subordinate to these other laws. Thus ratification may prove on many issues to be a token gesture which does nothing to change the underlying status of women's rights.
More important, the Convention defines equality as nondiscrimination; a constant measure of women against men.4 This meaning is
criticized by many authors as too limited, although they recognize the
impossibility of crafting one unified definition which would encompass
the myriad positions taken by women themselves on how the term
should be defined.5 As with many of the problems considered in this
book, the disagreement among the authors adds to the richness of the
debate and does nothing to detract from the utility of the various presentations.
Another significant problem for many of the authors is the difficulty of using international law to regulate women's rights when that
law generally will not reach into the "private" arenas of home and
family, with the result that major sites for the oppression of women
are immune from scrutiny. This problem is recognized and addressed
in each section of the book, with a general consensus (to the extent any
consensus is possible) being that only slow, gradual change will be
possible in this area. The use of prosecution of domestic violence cases
is mentioned as a possible method of how to bring traditionally private
concerns of women to international attention by several authors.'
As with any compilation, the quality of the pieces in Human
Rights of Women varies, although the general level is very high. A
wide array of options to increase recognition of and respect for
women's right is presented, ranging from working to break down the
statist assumptions of international law by granting women the right

2. 131 as of 21 January 1994.
3. For instance, Egypt ratified the Convention, but entered a reservation on the
demand for equality between women and men in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations, which are governed by Islamic Shari'a law.
4. Article 5(a) of the Convention calls on state parties to "modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the
" Convention, suidea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes ....
pra note 1.
5. Particularly interesting on this problem are the essays by Radhika
Coomaraswmay and Hilary Charlesworth.
6. See, e.g. Rhonda Copelon, Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence
as Torture, and Kenneth Roth, Domestic Violence as an International Human Rights
Issue.
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to participate directly in the international legal arena 7 to working
within existing systems more effectively.8 Some pieces do not present
concrete proposals for change, but instead discuss theoretical problems
and challenges facing women as they seek to define "rights" in a particularized context.
The unique challenge of defining rights for women causes Human
Rights of Women, when read as a whole, to confront the potential problem of repetitiveness. The pervasive nature of problems such as the
reach of public law into private spheres and the general lack of knowledge by many women about access to rights enforcement mechanisms
naturally leads to consideration of these issues by multiple authors.
However, this potential redundancy is likely to be helpful to many
readers who are interested in a specific topic or region. There is little
danger of missing a crucial argument if the book is read in sections,
making it useful for a broad spectrum of academicians, legal theorists
and feminist scholars. Also of great value to all readers is the inclusion
of a list of ratifications of selected human rights documents, model
communication forms (describing how to lodge comments and complaints under various United Nations procedures) and an extensive list
of organizational resources.
In sum, Human Rights of Women is a valuable resource for a wide
audience. It presents cogent theoretical arguments in the challenging
arena of women's international human rights; it discusses both hortatory and practical suggestions of changes that can be made within
existing systems to better advance such rights and provides useful
information on procedures and resources. The voices are diverse and a
reader will not agree with each view expressed, but will certainly find
much to stimulate thought, and with any luck, action.

7. Karen Knop, Rethinking the Sovereign State.
8. Mona Rishmawi, The Developing Approaches of the International Commission
of Jurists to Women's Human Rights.
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AFRICA, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING
WORLD; Edited by Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds, David R. Penna, and
Debra Joy Cruz Sobrepena; Greenwood Press; Westport, CT (1994);
ISBN 0-313-29007-5; 272 pp. (hardcover).
This book is a compilation of papers from a conference entitled
"Africa and Global Human Rights." It examines the development of
human rights and economic and political systems. It utilizes the
political economy approach, recognizing the interrelationship between
political and economic systems in the protection of human rights.
The first section looks at the development of Africa, exploring the
problems of developing a conscious human rights agenda. Human
rights have largely been suppressed during the liberation struggles in
order to create a unified sense of nationalism. Many of the social and
economic problems that previously existed continue to confront the
liberated societies. These problems hinder the promotion of a human
rights agenda. However, signs of an increasing demand for democratic
participation are emerging.
The second section explores the responsibilities the international
community has to protect human rights in the developing African
nations. It also looks at ways in which the international community
can play a role in the protection of human rights. This includes a
moral obligation to eradicate poverty, an obligation to intervene in
order to stop egregious human rights violations, tactics used and
challenges faced by NGOs, and a need for cooperative regional efforts
to implement the right to development.
The third section explores challenges to human rights advancement imposed by internal government structures. Individual liberty is
limited when the society is unable to effectively challenge the
government. This is particularly difficult when all power is accumulated in one party. When economic development takes priority over all
other policies, individual rights have been suppressed. Academic
criticisms of economic policies stemming from IMF and World Bank
policies have led governments to suppress academic rights of both students and professors. Without economic development policies creating
a broader distribution of wealth, political changes remain largely
ineffective.
The book ends on a relatively positive note with examples of
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successful attempts to protect human rights that could be used as
future models. For over 100 years Botswana has protected rights to
personal security and political participation. This can be attributed to
institutional systems protecting the underlying facets of these rights.
Many modem structures and practices are rooted in the pre-colonial
era. Consequently, it is necessary to understand the historical and
modern societies in order to effectively protect human rights. Ending
with that article, it emphasizes the important role of political and
economic systems in the protection of individual human rights.
Gail Buhler

GEORGE, SUSAN, and FABRIZZIO, SABELLI, FAITH & CREDIT:
THE WORLD BANKS SECULAR EMPIRE; Westview Press; Boulder,
Colorado (1994); ISBN 0-8133-2607-9; 282 pp. (pbk).
One of the most powerful and influential entities at large in the
world today, both economically and politically, is the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), which along with
the International Development Association (IDA), composes what is
commonly referred to as the World Bank. Yet, this awesomely powerful
institution is, as the authors Susan George and Fabrizzio Sabelli have
observed, simply unknown to many.
Faith & Credit: The World Bank's Secular Empire, sets out to lift
the fog and mystery surrounding this institution, and indeed, provides
illumination with startling clarity. George and Sabelli address this
supranational agency in terms of its impact on the international economic and political order, focusing on its role in the changing relations
between the so called Northern Developed Nations and the Lesser
Developed Nations of the South, and specifically, upon the Bank's
own internal culture which guides both its decisions and its responses.
In examining the Bank's influence and underlying ideology,
George and Sabelli draw upon analogies to the medieval Church and
fundamentalist religions. Regardless of one's own views on the latter,
the analogy assumes striking credibility as the book unfolds. As the
authors observe:
Religion cannot, by definition, be validated or invalidated, declared
true or false - only believed or rejected. Facts are irrelevant to
belief: they belong to another sphere of reality. True believers, the
genuinely pure of heart, exist in every faith, but the majority generally just goes along lukewarmly out of cultural habit or material
advantage. When, however, the faith achieves political hegemony
as well, like the medieval church (or the Bolsheviks, or the Ayatollahs), it is in a position to make people offers they can't refuse, or
to make their lives extremely uncomfortable if they do.
Faith & Credit asserts that the World Bank, like the medieval
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Church, has achieved political hegemony in the field of development.
Borrowing nations are forced, like it or not, to abide by the beliefs and
values of the World Bank. Because of the lack of sound criteria for
determining the successes or failures of the Bank's projects, "it doesn't
matter whether it works or not, nor how many ordinary people's lives
are damaged or destroyed, nor how much nature may be abused because of it." To the true believers (read individuals in the World Bank
and its supporters), the facts are irrelevant. The truth of the Bank's
assumptions is unquestionable.
As the above quoted material indicates, however, Faith & Credit
is not another harangue of the Bank and its failings and shortcomings.
Rather, it focuses upon the underlying foundations of the Bank's own
internal cultural views, which give rise to the policies the Bank puts
forth and pursues with seemingly little, or no regard for the consequences.
George and Sabelh also address the drastically changed world
order in which we now live. Few have as yet taken the time to address
the consequences of the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War in relation to developing nations. These events have had a
tremendous impact on the North-South relationship. The World Bank
perhaps by default has stepped in, though it is ill-equipped to do so, to
fill the gap left by the absence of a coherent policy on the part of the
Northern nations towards the South.
In gripping style, the authors set out to undress the World Bank.
Faith & Credit also provides a brief history of the World Bank's formation and its rise to a position of power and dominance, and also outline
the dramatic impact upon its internal culture and workings wrought
by Robert McNamara during his presidency of the institution (196881).
George and Sabelli also address the most recent shift in World
Bank policy, known as structural adjustment, and the catastrophic
social, economic, environmental, and individual costs the pursuit of
this policy has lead to in borrowing nations. Questions such as, why
countries began and still are borrowing, who encouraged them to do so,
which interests inside the country have benefitted and which have not,
and who actually pays the cost of structural adjustments are discussed. Although the Bank claims it is only an economic institution,
the book takes note of the actual impact which structural adjustment
has had on governmental organization and domestic decision making
in affected nations.
Those not well-versed in the finer points of economics need not
fear this book. The authors provide understandable explanations of the
underlying neo-classical economic theory upon which the World Bank's
culture and policies are based, and point out some of the shortcomings
of this particular economic outlook, such as problems associated with
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placing the whole of human existence and endeavor under the sign of
the marketplace.
Faith & Credit: The World Bank's Secular Empire, provides an
excellent overview of the workings, impact, and underlying assumptions of the World Bank. It is carefully thought out and avoids making
simplistic assumptions about why the World Bank behaves as it does.
Buttressed by excellent sources and information, the book also poses
challenging questions regarding what role, if any, the World Bank is to
play in the future. The book should prove useful not only to decisionmakers and policy-analysts, but also to individuals seeking to become
more informed about the role of the World Bank in relation to developing nations. It also provides partial answers to the pressing questions
of why lesser developed nations seem perpetually caught in an antidevelopment tailspin.
Timothy L. Finkenbinder

JIA, WEI, CHINESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS AND POLICIES: EVOLUTION & TRANSFORMATION; Quorum Books;
Westport, CT (1994); ISBN 0-89930-900-3; 216 pp. (hardcover). Index.
"Make foreign investment serve China", is the underlying theme
of Wei Jia's account of China's progress toward development of a market-oriented economy. The text describes, with notable detail, the confluence of political and economic drives that produced the world's largest centrally-driven experiment in capitalism. Jia's work is a practical
blend of overall analysis of this change, coupled with specific language
and citations to the underlying laws and directives.
Chinese Foreign Investment divides the transformational changes
into seven "tidal" areas: Joint Ventures; Foreign-Owned Subsidiaries;
Regional Policies; Tax Regimes; Foreign Exchange Management; Technology and Intellectual Property Protection; and Foreign Banking.
Each category begins with a description of the underlying political
forces at the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976. Jia proceeds from
there to demonstrate a "ratcheted" evolution toward a market-driven
approach as China alternately balances its realized need for foreign
direct investment with the inherently cautious and conservative nature
of a managed economy.
Rather than providing the reader with pure analysis, Jia presents
strategies available to foreign direct investment firms dealing with this
economy. For example, in the context of foreign exchange management,
Chinese policy strongly encourages foreign owned firms and joint ventures to replenish foreign exchange reserves mainly through increased
exports. However, Chinese ForeignInvestment suggests more available,
if less sanctioned, approaches toward replenishment, including import
substitution and exchange "swapping" between related firms.
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Chapter 7 contains a particularly timely discussion of Chinese
development of intellectual property protection with the passage of the
Trademark Law of 1982, and the Patent Law of 1985. The principle of
recognizing property rights in the context of labor is necessarily antithetical to China's Communist ideals, and the author presents an excellent analysis of the conflict between China's desire to integrate itself
into the world economy with the realization that foreign investors are
reluctant to provide technical know-how that would normally be protected property. Apropos, Jia discusses the belated passage of the
Copyright Law in 1991 in response to the United States' imposition of
"Super 301" trade sanctions. This discussion of Chinese reticence to
recognize private property rights coupled with the stated goals of foreign technology acquisition is consistent with the book's overall theme
that liberalization of Chinese law is more the product of calculated
concessions to strengthen Chinese economy than cooperative development. As this particular area is still in transition, the final word on
the success of Chinese recognition of intellectual property rights is still
undetermined.
Chinese Foreign Investment Laws and Policies, is both an excellent introduction and an in-depth presentation to Chinese foreign investment issues. The "tidal" categories are logically organized, and
contain enough reference to underlying laws to make this book a practical guide for approaching Chinese commercial law. It is clear, however, that the level of dynamic change described by this book will necessitate continuous updates and revisions.
JonathanKindred

CHUKWUMERIJE, OKEZIE, CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION; Quorum Books; Westport, CT
(1994); ISBN 0-89930-878-3; 218 pp. (hardcover).
The growing predominance of international business has given
rise to the need for quick, reliable settlements of commercial disputes.
As a result, international commercial arbitration, while being as old as
the practice of trade itself, has seen a recent growth within the global
business and legal communities. Okezie Chukwumerije's Choice of Law
in InternationalCommercialArbitration is a comprehensive analysis of
the legal problems arising out of choice of law disputes at different
stages of the arbitration process. Choice of Law examines the different
reasons why choice of law disputes arise and offers solutions to these
problems by applying national and international strategies at resolution. Similarly, Chukwumerije demonstrates the significance of commercial arbitration and the importance of resolving choice of law disputes in the international business arena.
The author lists three major benefits underlying international
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commercial arbitration. First, with the ever accelerating speed at
which global business is carried out, it is not surprising that a quick,
inexpensive way of resolving disputes is preferable to that offered by
filing suits in domestic courts. Second, in contracts with sovereign
states as parties, foreign parties are assured of an unbiased resolution.
This is exemplified by the nationalization of Texaco's oil refineries by
Libya. It seems without recourse to arbitration, Texaco would not have
been able to receive a fair decision for compensation. Finally, commercial arbitration agreements satisfy the parties' desire for a great deal
of flexibility in determining what law or rule should govern a contract
if a dispute arises. This provides reliability and ensures that all parties to a contract know ahead of time all the details of dispute resolution. Arbitration contracts, however, cannot anticipate every possible
dispute so national and international law is necessary to fill in the
gaps left by agreements. This gives rise to choice of law disputes.
Chukwumerije outlines three distinct scenarios where commercial
arbitration can arise. First, at the outset of the dispute to determine
which laws are applicable to the arbitration agreement itself. It should
be noted that the law determining the applicability of the arbitration
agreement can often be different from the law determining the substantive aspects of the arbitration contract. In the past, many different
choice of law strategies have been utilized to determine both the capacity and the authority of parties to enter into arbitration agreements. From these, the author advocates the utilization of a "close
connection test", which is the principle that the laws most closely related to the arbitration agreement should govern. Not only does this
test look to the parties implied interests, but also considers the country
or international organization that may have a stake in the matter.
A second important area where choice of law issues arise is in
attempting to determine the laws applicable to the arbitral procedure.
In this area, there is a growing trend towards international harmonization of arbitration proceedings, both through the use of conventions
and treaties, as well as through the standardization of national laws
for the conduct, regulation, and enforcement of arbitration proceedings
and awards. With this trend, misconceptions based on localized ways
of doing business will be prevented, creating an environment which
encourages international business negotiations.
Finally, choice of law disputes occur when trying to resolve substantive disputes arising out of commercial arbitrations. The author
points out that this is the area with the least amount of agreement,
thus emphasizing the need for parties to specify which national law is
to be used in case of substantive disputes. Until a more uniform set of
international laws governing commercial arbitration exists, this is the
only option to protecting the parties interests.
The need for resolution of choice of law problems in commercial
arbitration is upon us; while everyone agrees that international busi-
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ness could benefit enormously from the resolution of these disputes,
there is no uniform theory from which to solve them. Okezie
Chukwumerije's Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, while emphasizing individual party responsibility toward ameliorating these problems, shows that national and international laws
need to be harmonized in order for disputes to be satisfactorily resolved. While analyzing the different approaches taken to dispute
resolution, great insight is gained in understanding how close we are
to bridging these problems.
Thomas Muther

MCGEE, ROBERT W., A TRADE POLICY FOR FREE SOCIETIES:
THE CASE AGAINST PROTECTIONISM; Quorum Books, Westport,
CT (1994); ISBN 0-89930-898-8; 191 pp. (hardcover).
Robert McGee's A Trade Policy for Free Societies is appropriately
subtitled A Case Against Protectionism since it is a polemic against
protectionism, more than a case for liberalized trade. By dividing the
free world economic system into two camps, producers and consumers,
McGee argues that the basic result of any protectionist policy is to
protect fat-cat producers at the expense of ordinary consumers. Tariffs, subsidies, and other free trade barriers harm consumers more
than producers, he claims, because protectionism raises prices. McGee,
a professor of business, argues from a neo-classical economic standpoint, and acknowledges political factors only as a thorn in the side of
free-trade economic policies in the sense that protectionist ideas have
survived, despite well reasoned arguments to the contrary because of a
well-financed lobby.
A Trade Policy for Free Societies challenges various mercantilistic
(e.g. infant industry) and labor (e.g. job and wage preservation) arguments supporting protectionism by revealing the fallacies of each.
McGee's approach is to shift the labor vs. management paradigm by
utilizing economic models to demonstrate that protectionism harms the
average worker as consumer. According to McGee, subsidies are a
government's way to soak the taxpayers of one country to pay for the
purchases of another country, for the net gain of the producers in both
countries. Similarly, anti-dumping laws raise prices thereby lowering
real wages for consumers who could otherwise benefit from less expensive products. McGee's logical conclusion is that even if a country's
imports grow infinitely while its exports shrink to zero, the economy
would be better off because it would be more efficient, in neo-classical
economic terms.
Certainly, if neo-classical economic theory is anything, it is logically valid. Problems arise when political and social forces are dismissed as mere "market failure" and not accounted for in the equation.
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McGee's economic models and illustrations are, therefore, limited in
the sense that they assume static conditions and do not factor in dynamic considerations, such as economies of scale. The fact that some
countries are wealthy while some countries are not is a condition attributable to history and must be considered by economic
policymakers. Neo-classical trade theories tend to ignore extant
wealth disparities in formulating policies and assume everyone is lined
up evenly on he starting line. In all fairness, however, McGee's focus
is primarily on trade between industrialized countries and not on conditions in less-developed countries where neo-classical trade policies,
via the World Bank, often devastate recipient countries.
In Part I, "The Philosophy of Protectionism," McGee advances
logical, theoretical arguments for free trade while debunking some of
the more common justifications for protectionism, e.g. job security and
wage rates. McGee argues that protectionism doesn't safeguard U.S.
jobs because export revenues earned by Japan are reinvested in the
U.S. resulting in more jobs for Americans created by inevitable capital
inflows. And wage rates are not affected by cheap imports because
wage rates are determined by productivity rates. U.S. wages are ten
times higher than Mexican wages in the auto industry simply because
U.S. productivity is ten times higher than Mexican productivity.
Trade between countries with unequal advantages is only possible
because lower wages offset lower productivity.
As with most theories based on comparative advantage, the reasons for and effects of productivity and wage differentials are overlooked because conditions, such as resource allocation and technology,
are considered "given." According to McGee, there is no such thing as
"unfair" competitive advantage as long as the right to contract is preserved; but it is unfair to deprive consumers in any country from engaging in the free and voluntary exchange of goods. Whether it is
unfair that some countries are rich while others are poor is irrelevant
to his analysis. For example, the infant-industry justification for protectionism assumes that a new industry is good for a country and
should be encouraged, while free trade advocates don't support any
industry over another as long as there is free exchange of goods. If
this means that one country will export microchips while another produces bananas, so be it.
In Part II, "The Cost of Protectionism," McGee examines and
quantifies, using economic models, the monetary and non-monetary
price the world will pay for erecting trade barriers. As evidence of
non-monetary losses caused by higher prices he cites the increased
unemployment, deteriorated product quality, loss of individual rights,
and administration costs, all of which contribute to a reduced standard
of living. To illustrate the monetary costs, McGee examines four traditionally protected industries--auto, steel, textiles, and agricultural
products--and calculating the gains and losses due to higher prices,
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estimates the "deadweight" loss caused by protectionism.
In Part III, "Antidumping Policy," McGee develops utilitarian
arguments for free trade based on the (mis)administration of U.S. antidumping legislation by the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission, which together enforce and investigate Tariff
Act violations. Although the technical definition of dumping fluctuates, it is generally regarded as the sale of imports at less than wholesale or actual market value. Problems arise, however, in computing
the cost of production of imports, which necessarily results in arbitrary
determinations and absurd results. Some of the difficulties are inherent to the process, e.g. how to measure capital depreciation. McGee
also offers several examples of crude methodologies, undertaken by
government entities, which violate standard accounting principles.
One of the worst is determining whether dumping has occurred by
comparing U.S. wholesale prices to foreign retail prices.
In addition to the infeasibility of enforcing anti-dumping legislation, McGee offers some convincing philosophical arguments for abandoning anti-dumping policies. Anti-dumping policies are based on the
assumption that "dumping" undermines "fair trade" by predatory pricing aimed at bankrupting producers that compete with cheaper imports, in order to monopolize the market and ultimately raise prices.
McGee challenges the notion of a substantive concept of "fair trade,"
outside of the process of free exchange, and compares it to the absurd
attempt to define a "fair price." He claims that setting different prices
in different markets is simply rational economic behavior allowed at
the domestic level.
Furthermore, McGee presents empirical evidence that the predatory pricing threat has never actually driven any U.S. firms into bankruptcy. This may be because U.S. anti-dumping penalties have had
such a chilling effect on importers that they keep prices artificially
inflated to avoid the legal expenses involved in defending against antidumping charges. And higher prices hurt the U.S. economy twofold;
they erode the standard of living and cause unemployment by raising
the cost of inputs, as occurred in 1984 when voluntary restraints were
imposed on U.S. steel imports.
The strength of A Trade Policy for Free Societies is the
interactionof empirical examples with theoretical assertions. McGee's
focus on industrial country situations redeems this book from being
merely another recapitulation of neo-classical economic trade theory,
complete with questionable assumptions, such as uniform technology.
Countries such as South Korea have proven that liberalized trade, if
not flawed, should be limited to trade between countries with similar
economies, such as Japan and the U.S. In A Trade Policy for Free
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Societies, McGee extolls the virtues of free trade and, to his credit,
contextualizes his arguments in the developed world.
Isabel Posso
A LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
WOLFGANG E. BURHENNE; Edited by Alexandre Kiss and Frangoise
Burhenne-Guilmin; EPLP Special Issue, IUCN; Gland, Switzerland
(1994); ISBN 2-8317-0203-8; 275pp. (pbk).
The editors of A Law for the Environment compiled this collection
in appreciation of the work of Dr. Wolfgang E. Burhenne, 1991 recipient of the United Nations International Environmental Prize and lifelong scholar of environmental Law. Through an assortment of essays
written by some of today's foremost legal scholars, this book shows
multi-national perspectives on current environmental legal issues. The
global character of the book is demonstrated alone by the fact that of
the thirty-one essays, seven are written in French and five are written
in German; unfortunately, no supplemental synopses in the secondary
languages are provided. All essays are brief and well-written; some
take a very narrow focus on specific legal issues, and some include
broad policy and sociological perspectives.
A Law for the Environment is divided into four principal parts.
The first essays describe the historic origins of environmental law,
followed by a section on the foundations and principles of environmental law. Several compositions analyze specific problems in the current
application of those principles; descriptions of various national approaches to environmental regulation conclude this collection of essays.
The lead article in the first, historical, section is a fictional account written in the middle ages which describes the prosecution of
mankind, by Jupiter and Mercury, for destroying the earth by overmining. The article effectively relates this mythology to the difficulty of
effecting social responsibility for the environment under national and
international legal structures based on democratic ideals. This essay
forms the philosophical basis for the historical discussions that follow,
including a summary of treaties and instruments concerning international environmental law from 1972 forward as well as analyses of the
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in
Rio de Janeiro and its Agenda 21. The final article in this section provides the history and desired accomplishments of the IUCN draft International Covenant on Environment and Development.
Four essays on regulations and judicial decision-making as related
to environmental issues under the regional basic laws of Germany and
Switzerland and under the constitutions of French and Djibouti law
provide the center stone of the second part of the book. These essays
show several examples of centralized and decentralized environmental
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regulation and collectively point out success and failure of the different
approaches to environmental law and policy making. An essay contrasting the policies of precaution and sustainability on an abstract
level and a manuscript advocating cooperation between business and
lawmakers instead of punishment of the former conclude this portion
of A Law for the Environment.
Current problems in international environmental law are addresses by at least ten articles. The topics range from the pollution of waterways and wetlands' protection to renewable energy resources, polar
environmental conservation, and biological diversity. One article provides an excellent economic analysis of accidental polluting discharges.
A description of the objectives and limitations of the voluntary ecological audits prescribed by the European Commission provides the conclusion to section three.
The book concludes with a final section consisting of eight essays
on the national approaches to environmental regulation of Argentina,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, and the
United States. Some of the essays represent a reiteration of national
law, while some address methodology.
The organization of A Law for the Environment into four section
appears somewhat arbitrary as issues often overlap in chronology and
content. Especially puzzling is the mode of separation of the last three
sections; the editors would have done better with a regional segregation of the issues. With this limitation in mind, the book's historical
introduction is meant for the initiated reader, and it provides an excellent insight in the strides taken since the beginnings of international
environmental law. The essays on national attempts to deal with specific environmental issues provide a wonderful introduction of various
regulatory and policy approaches taken by civil law countries.
While it appears that the editors have taken great care to represent a wide variety of geographical areas, they have, unfortunately,
overlooked the efforts made by Asian nations towards environmental
law reform. One essay constitutes mere Lobgesang for Dr. Burhenne
without providing the reader with much substance.
Overall, all essays in this collection provide a superb analysis of
current issues of environmental law which more than compensates for
the book's organizational inadequacies. This collection provides excellent synopses of national policy and legal approaches to very complex
and up-to-date issues. The essays are succinct and well-written and all
provide an excellent basis for research in the national environmnental
law topics they address.

Michael Roch

